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Abstract of Dissertation 
This dissertation is a polemical exegesis of Heidegger's 1920's position with respect to the 
foundational, extracting from his thought an original pre-conception of the foundational 
which does not conform to current patterns of Heidegger interpretation. This might be 
expressed as a rescuing of foundations from metaphysics. The first half of the dissertation 
concentrates on methodological idiosyncracies in the semantic, syntactic and macro- 
structural organisation of foundational ideas, an analysis which begins to yield a number 
of "patterns" embedded in the language and thinking of Heidegger, patterns which, for 
example, subvert the propositional and reverse the normal processes of understanding. 
These patterns are "paratypes", the tools of "disas-sembling" (the latter term describes that 
in Heidegger's thought which provides the original motivation for the later development of 
deconstruction). The second half of the dissertation applies and extends these findings in 
two directions: firstly, with respect to the internal development of the Sein und Zeit 
project, by exploring the coalescence of temporality and foundations; secondly, with 
respect to the direction and fate of the Sein und Zeit project, by exploring a limited 
number of "foundational" aspects (fugue, Kehre, Abgrund, Ereignis) of a single but 
singularly important writing from the 1930's: Beiträge zur Philosophie. In so doing the 
dissertation aims to bring out the Copernican thought-revolution in the early work, and to 
provide both the conceptual motivation and the methodological tools for a more far- 
reaching reappreciation of Heidegger's early work. Thus the dissertation has 
consequences, not only for the foundational, but also for the language-thought 
problematic, for the possibility of overcoming metaphysics, for Heidegger's general 
development, and for the appraisal of the position of time in his work. 
I 
INTRODUCTION: HEIDEGGER 
AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FOUNDATIONS. 
Reading Jacques Derrida's "Letter to a Japanese Friend", l in which he discusses how to 
translate the French deconstruction into Japanese, it occurred to me that if there is a word 
in Heidegger's writing which really deserves the translation deconstruction, it is not 
Destruktion or Abbau, but Freilegung (lit.: free-laying, liberation). 2 Which is not to read 
Derrida back into Heidegger, but perhaps briefly to re-liberate Derrida's original de(- 
)liberation of deconstruction. The title of this thesis refers to the Freilegung of Grund, and 
does not intend to invoke any advanced theory of criticism from Derrida or de Man. The 
word "deconstruction" is used in the title because, literally taken, it describes a pattern 
governing the foundational in the early Heidegger, and because it would probably attract 
the kind of reader who would be interested in this thesis. Flirting with this word further 
could lead to misunderstanding, though, because of what recent philosophy has made of it, 
and having waved it as a flag in the title, a new and perhaps better word will be 
substituted. Deconstruction (in its use associated with Derrida) describes a complete 
strategy or method (even if intrinsically incompletable), but Destruktion is self-confessedly 
only a part of Heidegger's phenomenological method of reduction-construction- 
destruction, so if one is to capture the entirety of Heidegger's method, one must turn to a 
different word: Freilegung, or perhaps "disas-sembly" (with a hyphen - which I rather 
violently interpret as the taking apart of a construction of semblances or pretences). 
3 The 
meaning of Freilegung is not made explicit by Heidegger, but here it is taken to mean the 
J. Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", tr. by D. C. Wood & A. Benjamin in D. C. Wood & 
R. Bernasconi eds. Derrida and D ferance (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
2 
e. g. SZ, p. 8; the liberal translation is intentional. 
3 On the etymology: "assembly", in its contemporary English usage, strictly derives from the Latin 
simul - "together", and does not contain any nuance of "pretending" or "feigning". However the 
various English words with -sembl- roots have two Latin sources: simul and similis ("similar"). 
Words derived from the latter have developed the possible nuance of feigning and pretending, as 
in "dissemble" and "semblance". Thus there is only a slight etymological violence involved in 
strategic disas-sembling (deconstruction) of the semblances by which metaphysics hides 
the hiding of its own foundations (of the as-sembling by which being hides itself), that is, 
the violent reversal (Kehre) of the normal processes of understanding to reveal that from 
which understanding naturally lures one away. 4 Thus, not deconstruction, but disas- 
sembl ing. 
To show the disas-sembling of ground (the genitive here is ambiguous) in the early 
Heidegger, a single guiding question will be followed as narrowly as possible: what is the 
foundational, or what do foundational notions signify, in Heidegger's writings of the late 
1920's? Such a "what is...? " question is, of course, problematic for the Heideggerian. 
While the last paragraph of this thesis does indeed give a heavily qualified answer of the 
"ground is... " form, "what is...? " questions are useful primarily in the way in which 
phenomenology shows them to break down, to cease functioning properly. Pursuing this 
guiding question is thus, primarily, pursuing this breakdown -a breakdown which is a 
disas-sembly. As such, this thesis does not consciously bring any pre-fabricated method to 
the analysis of Heidegger. Neither does it attempt to extract and recommend any 
methodology for more general application. It is a detailed analysis and interpretation of 
Heidegger. 
To draw back a moment from Heidegger, what is a philosophical ground, a philosophical 
foundation in general? The answer is, unfortunately for the layman, vague and many- 
sided. A ground may be what is prior to something else, in the sense of a cause or reason. 
It may also be the motivation offered by a purpose - thus something which exists not in the 
past but in the future. Or it may be a guiding principle (of action, of thought) extending 
from the past into the future. Of particular interest is "the ultimate" ground. For many 
theists this is a supernatural being ("God") which creates or sustains the world, a being 
which can even be identified with a person. For Plato, the ultimate "ground" was the first 
principle or the form of the good. For Descartes, the cogito - the fact that one thinks. For 
Kant, the synthetic unity of apperception - in other words, the tendency of the mind to 
taking "as-sembly" to mean the a joining together which feigns or pretends or disguises. I have 
kept the hyphen to distinguish this meaning. 
These points are discussed in more detail in the third section of the introduction. On the violent 
reversal of understanding, see pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
3 
make sense of everything by drawing its data into a unity. For empiricists, generally, 
something experiential. For rationalists, something mental or linguistic - but a concept, an 
idea, or a proposition or set of propositions? Taking an overview, then, is a ground past, 
present or future? Is it a supernatural being transcending comprehension, or a person, or a 
thought, or an experience? From this array of claims one might try to separate out the 
issue of the identification of the ultimate ground (God, the cogito, the form of the good, 
the synthetic unity of apperception) from that of the nature or character of such a ground - 
i. e. what it is that makes it a ground. Operating with this distinction one could say with 
some justice, both that ground is identified by Heidegger - of course - as Sein (being), and 
that what is characteristic of Heidegger, over against previous philosophers, is that the 
issue of identification is virtually suspended for the sake of the issue of the nature of 
ground. Dropping the distinction, one must add that a source of particular difficulty in the 
study of Heidegger is that the two issues come to the same, and are each in different 
respects both intensively investigated and indefinitely suspended. 
1) Ground in Heidegger's earlier writings 
"Ground" is more than a merely frequent concept within Heidegger's earlier writings. The 
many morphological variations and synonymous expressions pervade his language almost 
obsessively. Likewise "foundational" is not a term which merely describes the 
architectonic of the earlier writings, but by being so applied, the term threatens the content 
of those writings - expecially their anti-foundationalist, post-metaphysical aspirations. The 
problem which quickly emerges from rigorously pursuing the question "what is the 
foundational in Heidegger's 1920's writings? " is that the answer is anything but clear. In 
Sein und Zeit (SZ) the frequency of occurrence of foundational ideas clashes with the lack 
of an explanation for them. A comment such as "Grund-seiend, das heißt als geworfenes 
existierend... "5 ostensibly explains what it is to be a ground, but is hardly helpful. 
Although the general appearance of SZ and those writings in which the SZ project is 
developed enerally appear foundationalist, some comments suggest an anti- Z> 
5 SZ, p. 284: "being a basis - that is, existing as thrown. " 
4 
foundational ism: "Der Grund ist... ein Abgrund". 6 If one turns from the few explicit 
comments to the way in which Heidegger uses foundational notions, the situation becomes 
even more complex (see part A of this thesis). Clear only is that Heidegger must have 
thought deeply about the nature of ground, and must already have been operating with a 
complex, revised and unexplained notion of the foundational. Only in about 1928, two 
years after writing SZ, does Heidegger become more explicit. Indeed, looking at the main 
developments of the years immediately following the publication of SZ (e. g. in "Vom 
Wesen des Grundes" (VWG) and Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik (MAL)), the 
large theme which emerges is finally the foundational theme latent in SZ. To what extent 
can these subsequent analyses of ground be read back into the SZ project? One argument 
is that, in this respect, VWG and MAL are largely consistent with the use of foundational 
language in SZ. Another turns on a contemporary comment by Heidegger about his 
development in these years. In 1928 Heidegger wrote to Jaspers the following line, which 
he did not explain further: 
"Das Neue ist lediglich, daß ich mich in meinem Philosophieren nicht mehr 
»verstecke«. Es hat irgendwo einen Ruck gegeben. " 
7 
The letters to Jaspers have a frankness missing from many of Heidegger's later self- 
interpretative comments, and so this line should be treated at its face value. The main 
novelties in the writings of 1928 are the more radical style and the theme of ground, so 
one should probably interpret the above passage as indicating these features to be the cards 
which Heidegger withheld a few years earlier (and at that, perhaps the most valued cards). 
Given that the 1928 writings can be grouped with the writings of the SZ project, do they 
help with the question of ground? In fact they only deepen the problems. Heidegger seems 
to want to take away any clear answer to the question, and to leave instead a constellation 
of pregnantly vague assertions - ground is, inter alia, freedom, temporality, 
transcendence, Umwillen (lit. for-the-sake-of). How can it be that this is no longer hiding? 
6 GA20, p. 402: "The ground is... an abyss. " See further pt. B, ch. 2, section 2. 
7 Letter to Jaspers of 10. xi. 1928, in Biemel & Saner ed. Martin HeideggerlKarl Jaspers: 
Briefwechsel 1920-1963, p. 110. Heidegger's emphasis and scare-quoting. Tr.: "The news is 
simply that I no longer 'hide' myself in my philosophizing. Somewhere there has been a push. " 
5 
The problem of foundations is thus aggravated by the clash between, on the one hand, the 
centrality of the foundational to an understanding of Heidegger and, on the other hand, the 
contradictoriness and elusiveness of his assertions about ground. This raises an urgent case 
for studying the foundational in the earlier Heidegger. How has the secondary literature so 
far responded to this demand? 
2) Ground in secondary literature on Heidegger 
In view of the facts that SZ is self-confessedly an exercise in fundamental ontology, and 
contains a significant amount of foundationalist language, it is strange how little major 
work has been done on the innocent words "ground" and "foundation". Moreover, many 
interpretations and criticisms of Heidegger merely assume that they know what the 
foundational is about. Thus while there is a lack of material directed straight at the 
problem, there is a corresponding oversupply of indirect comments. This situation may in 
part be because there is reigning orthodoxy of post- or anti-foundational ism in many 
circles where Heidegger is taken at all seriously, and in those circles where the Heidegger 
of SZ is accepted as departing from his later fathering of that orthodoxy, his 
foundationalism is regarded as an embarrassing mistake (partly through dubious 
interpretation of Heidegger's later comments on his earlier work). Thus it may be that 
many do not regard "ground" in the earlier Heidegger as a worthwhile subject. But as 
Heidegger himself wrote in 1962: - 
"Ihre Unterscheidung zwischen 
"Heidegger 1" und "Heidegger II" ist 
allein unter der Bedingung berechtigt, daß 
stets beachtet wird: Nur von dem unter I 
Gedachten her wird zunächst das unter II 
zu Denkende zugänglich. Aber I wird nur 
möglich, wenn es in II enthalten ist. " 
8 
"The distinction you make between Heidegger I 
and Heidegger II is justified only on the condition 
that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way 
of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain 
access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. 
But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes 
possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II. " 
8 Letter to Richardson, in W. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), at p. xxiii. 
6 
Even some 30 years of Heidegger interpretation later, this comment remains to he worked 
through and realised by many commentators. The passage does not justify the distinction 
between early and late phases of thought in Heidegger; it diplomatically distances itself 
from this distinction as daringly as it can, given that it is a preface to a book which rests 
on such a distinction. The condition given has a structure reminiscent of Heidegger's 
"destructions" of received texts. 
Particularly as regards the issues of foundational ism, little has been done to reunite the 
phases of Heidegger's thought. And yet this may be one of the core strands of a 
reunification. 
"... for the question of the relation of the late to the early Heidegger is precisely 
the question of the sense in which post-metaphysical hermeneutics can stand free 
of a foundational account of the structure and dynamics... of our own being. Put 
in Heideggerian terms, the question is one of projecting such conceptual 
foundations as "Ereignis" (the event of appropriation) and "Es gibt Sein" (the 
giving of being) back upon the horizon of the Daseinsanalytik given in Sein und 
Zeit as an analysis of the fundamental conditions of selfhood preparatory to the 
9 
raising of the question of being. " 
Stephen Tyman's opinion quoted here is that the foundational issue does indeed lie at the 
heart of the problem of Heidegger's development, and he speaks of a "projection" onto 
one another of apparently differing conceptions from earlier and later writings. In this 
thesis, I do not intend to complete the entire programme of reunifying the different phases 
of Heidegger's thought on foundations - this would be too ambitious. The work here is 
restricted to a preparation for such a reunification (effected by a reinterpretation of 
Heidegger's writings on foundations in the 1920's), and an indication of the direction such 
a reunification would take (by considering Ereignis in Heidegger's 1936 book Beiträge zur 
Philosophie). 
The following report on the state of the secondary literature is divided into two: (1) an 
exhaustive study of materials dealing exclusively with the foundational; (2) a selective 
9 S. Tyman, "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", International Philosophical 
Quarterly 24 (1984), p. 348. 
7 
study of prevailing assumptions about the foundational, both in conservative orthodox 
and in "radical" orthodoxy. 
a) Materials dealing exclusively with the foundational 
The following is an overview of those materials (mainly articles and dissertations) which 
have direct relevance to the problem. If one may judge by the explicit references and 
bibliographies, most of the materials were written in a relative lack of knowledge of the 
earlier publications. (1) I. Koza: Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers 
Auseinandersetzung mit Kant (book, 1967). 10 (2) J. Buchanan: "Heidegger and the Problem 
of Ground" (article, 1973). (3) J. Caputo: a variety of material, including the articles 
"Being, Ground and Play in Heidegger" (1970)12 and "The rose is without why" (1971)13 
and his doctoral dissertation14 - but most of the important material is incorporated in his 
book The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (1978). 15 (4) S. Tyman: "Heidegger 
and the Deconstruction of Foundations" (article, 1984). 
16 (5) U. Wenzel: Die Problematik 
des Gründens beim späten Heidegger (doctoral dissertation, 1986). 17 (6) D. Panis: a 
number of short articles: "Heidegger et le soupcon du fondement" (1985)18, "La question 
de I'etre comme fond abyssal d'aprýs Heidegger" (1986) 
19 and "Vers une pensee plus 
10 Ratingen bei Düsseldorf: Henn Verlag, 1967. 
II Philosophy Today 17 (1973), pp. 232-245. 
12 Man & World 3 (1970), pp. 26-48. 
13 Philosophy Today 15 (1971), pp. 3-16. 
14 The Way back into Ground: An Interpretation of the Path of Heidegger's Thought, Brynn Mawr 
College, 1968. 
15 Ohio University Press, 1978. 
16 in International Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1984), pp. 347-372. 
17 
presented to Freiburg University, Germany, in 1986; published in same year by Schäuble Verlag, 
Rheinfelden. 
18 Cahiers Internationaux de Svmbolisme 51/52 (1985): 103-114. 
19 Les Etudes Philosophiques 1986: 59-78. 
8 
originelle du pourquoi" (1991). 20 (7) R. Crease: Heidegger, Leibniz and the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason (doctoral dissertation, 1987). 21 (8) J. A. Purcell: Heidegger's Early 
Ontology: Rethinking the Ground (doctoral dissertation, 1989). 22 These will be discussed 
in the order listed - i. e. chronologically. 
Ingeborg Koza's early and little known offering is a useful one. Having noted the early 
Heidegger's interpretation of ground as transcendence (in Kant und das Problem der 
Metaphysik and VWG), and the later Heidegger's identification of ground and being (for 
example, in Der Satz vom Grund (SG), e. g. pp. 93,184,179f. ), her thesis is that these 
early and late conceptions of ground, apparently different, are in fact intimately connected. 
The argument proceeds by way of close and lengthy textual analysis which occupies pretty 
well the entirity of the book. The weaknesses or limitations of her book are as follows: (i) 
the textual analysis is so strictly dedicated to "interpreting" ground, first as transcendence, 
then in its "belonging-together" with being, that something of a reduction of ground to 
transcendence/being is achieved; Heidegger's other "interpretations" of ground are 
subjected to these overall "interpretations" at the expense of a more constellational or 
pluralistic approach - so, for example, Koza's fascinating remarks that the early Heidegger 
interprets ground as time is a point which goes undeveloped other than to serve the idea of 
"ground as transcendence"; 23 (ii) there are no methodological or linguistic interests - i. e. it 
is never appreciated that "how Heidegger expresses himself' is actually a fruitful problem 
for the topic; (iii) the implications of the thesis or its two constituent parts are not really 
worked through - Koza places herself in the camp of those who do not believe in the 
biographical Kehre, and otherwise lacks a conclusion. The strength of the book is that 
Koza has presented the Grund-Transzendenz link as a contribution to appreciating the 
diachronic unity of Heidegger's thought. 
24 
20 Heidegger Studies 7 (1991): 111-124. First appeared in 1986 as "Heidegger et la question du 
fondement" in a bulletin of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Liege entitled La 
Philosophie d'Aujourd'hui. Further references in this thesis are to the earlier appearance. 
21 Columbia University, USA, 1987. 
22 Purdue University, USA, 1989. 
23 
on the ground/time point: Koza, op. cit., e. g. pp. 51,85. 
24 The Grund-Transzendenz link is not difficult for a reader of VWG (or MAL) to spot, however. 
See, e. g., J. J. Kockelmans, Heidegger's 'Being and Time'. Washington DC: University Press of 
9 
James Buchanan's brief article makes no real contribution: it accepts a standard 
biographical Kehre, and repeats the doctrine that the early Heidegger's metaphysical 
foundationalism was abandoned after the 1920's for something that was quite the opposite 
or reverse. 
John Caputo's dissertation of 1968, while obviously dated, remains valuable. There is 
more here on the earlier Heidegger than in his published work. It is ambitious in its range 
(Caputo says that he really wanted to cover the whole of Heidegger, but as this was not 
possible he settled for the vast theme of ground instead). Basically he compares VWG and 
SG, taking it rather for granted that a biographical Kehre took place in the early to mid- 
1930's. Of particular interest is the importance he attaches to the interpretation of ground 
as temporality, 25 yet while he makes a substantial diversion to summarise the whole of SZ 
in order to explain how time fits into Heidegger's thought, there is no discussion of the 
purpose or significance of ground as temporality. What is important here is to see how 
what Habermas denigrated as a "temporal isierte Ursprungsphilosophie" (temporalised 
foundational philosophy) 16 actually contains something valuable. 27 In Caputo's later 
published work, his interests shift toward language and the later Heidegger, centering on 
the paradoxical and other paronomasic features of Heidegger's language of ground - 
particularly on the way in which Heidegger attempts to write about the inexpressible. To 
this extent some of my own interests with the early Heidegger parallel Caputo's interests 
with the later. Where relevant Caputo's work will be returned to. 28 
Stephen Tyman's 1984 article ("Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations") is the 
approach relating most closely to my own. Its introduction to the problem is its greatest 
strength: Tyman eloquently (but briefly) situates the foundational problem in the context 
of contemporary interpretation (and, to some extent, current philosophical debate), and 
America, 1989, at p. 330. The real problem is what to make of it, and how to integrate this with 
the rest of Heidegger's thought. Kockelmans, like Koza, seems to reduce Grund to Transzendenz 
-I disagree with this. See pt. B, ch. 2, section 1b. 
IS J. Caputo, The Way back into Ground: An Interpretation of the Path of Heidegger's 77hought, 
p. 105. 
26 J. Habermas, Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985. 
27 See below at pt. B, ch. 2. 
10 
likewise briefly paints in the immediate historical background of Husserl. 29 He sets a 
program as follows: - 
"The respect in which Heidegger himself is to be counted among the other 
deconstructivists... and anti-foundationalists generally becomes tangled and 
troublesome. It is therefore necessary to begin with (I) an overview favoring an 
anti-foundationalist interpretation of Heidegger... (II) an analysis of the function 
of foundations in the early writings, and (III) an assessment (using temporality as a 
clue) of the extent to which the horizon of the Daseinsanalytik opens onto the later 
discussion, before concluding with (IV) a revision of the concept of foundation 
itself, and a determination of whether this new sense permits the discovery of a 
30 decisive and fundamental continuity in Heidegger's thought. " 
Expressed thus, Tyman"s program is very similar to my own, but it differs significantly in 
its realisation, and is more limited in its conclusions. As to its realisation: the use of 
temporality is in fact disappointing, turning only on its triadic articulation in SZ, and 
failing to notice a coalescence of the foundational and the temporal; otherwise he skates 
too quickly over material that must be examined more carefully. The conclusion is 
relatively limited: the foundational (in early Heidegger) is an active dimensional openness; 
in other words, founding means participation. 
31 This participational founding Tyman 
(briefly) links to a suppressed strand of the metaphysical tradition, and, criticising 
Heidegger for operating with too narrow a definition of metaphysics, he takes a mildly 
deconstructive tilt at Heidegger for closet-metaphysicality. It should be noted, though, that 
Tyman does not regard the deconstructive coup de grace (strata-egic incompatibility) as 
reason for rejection or devaluation, regarding the reemergence of this suppressed element 
in the metaphysical tradition as worthwhile. 
32 
The 1986 dissertation by Uwe Wenzel has the following limitations and/or weaknesses: (1) 
as its title indicates it is concerned almost exclusively with the later Heidegger (in this 
case, that means the post-war writings); reference to the earlier thinking is almost non- 
existent, (2) Wenzel devotes a considerable part of the book to the Grund-Sein relation 
28 See pt. A, ch. 1, section 3. 
19 S. Tyman, op. cit., pp. 351-355. 
30 ibid., pp. 348f. 
31 ibid., pp. 371ff. 
32 Tyman's conclusion is discussed in more detail pt. A, ch. 1, section 3. 
(and this with respect to the same text which interests Caputo and many others so much: 
Der Satz vom Grund); in so doing, Wenzel simply assumes that the relation of Grund and 
Sein differentiates early and later Heidegger (such that early Heidegger is metaphysical, 
while the later is non-metaphysical), and is apparently quite ignorant (surprisingly so) of 
Koza's thesis that ground as being is actually the clue to a link with the earlier thinking on 
ground; he likewise fails to take proper account of the on-going publication of the 
complete works of Heidegger; (3) consistent with this, Wenzel hangs on to a biographical 
interpretation of the Kehre 33 - the Heideggerian concepts of Sprung and Kehre are 
interpreted as "from... to... " movements, for example, from a metaphysical 
understanding of ground in the early Heidegger to a non-metaphysical in the later. 
Although Wenzel briefly notes comments of Heidegger's on Sprung which should ward 
him away from such simplicity, nevertheless he never ceases to regard the non- 
metaphysical understanding of ground as a pole of the leap or turn; a metactically 
displacive appropriation by the turning leap of its various poles, such that ground "is" a 
turning never comes into consideration. 
34 The strengths of Wenzel's analyses are: (1) the 
recognition that ground, in Heidegger, is constellational - i. e. it cannot be reduced to 
anything simple or unified; (2) the recognition that ground, in Heidegger, is not only an 
ontic, ontological, or epistemological issue, but also a semantic one (to which end he 
explores language as a site of grounding); (3) his main argument that ground, in the later 
Heidegger, is non-metaphysical grounding (ein anderes Gründen). This "other" grounding 
is non-metaphysical by virtue of three main features: (a) ground holds together both being 
and nothing - this he interprets as the problem of Grund-Abgrund, 
35 
which concerns 
Tyman, Panis and Vattimo36; (b) grounding is dialogical (but in contrast to my analysis of 
a "dialectic" feature37 of ground, Wenzel intends this in a much more restricted sense - 
namely, that the objectification of the object occurs in a dialogue between thing and world, 
33 See esp. Wenzel, op. cit., pp. 72-79. 
34 For the meaning of "metactic", see pt. A, ch. 4, section 3. 
35 On Abgrund see pt. B, ch. 2, section 2. 
36 i e. the works by Tyman and Panis discussed here, and the ideas advanced by Vattimo and 
discussed in the next section. 
37 On dialectic see pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
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or between the poles of the fourfold 3s); (c) that grounding is characterised by an 
Anderssein (other-being-ness) - possibly he means a continual movement of self- 
differentiation. (Although these three features are intended to establish the non- 
metaphysical character of ground, the connection here is not well explained. ) 
Daniel Panis considers the idea of ground as abyss (in German: Grund als Abgrund, or in 
Panis' French: le fondement sans fond). While (e. g. ) Vattimo (see below) posits a 
substitution between Grund and Abgrund, Panis maintains their synchronicit, y. The notion 
of Abgrund appears so soon after SZ that this topic cannot be said to belong to the "later" 
Heidegger. 39 
Robert Crease's 1987 doctoral thesis is one of the better contributions in the area. It notes 
that Grund is a constant concern during the lexical windings of Heidegger's development, 
and that Heidegger repeatedly uses Leibniz on the principle of sufficient reason as a 
starting-point. Crease's central thesis is that "Heidegger's conception of how Sein has 
changed is best viewed through the evolution of his conception of ground. " 40 Thus he 
identifies subtly differing conceptions of ground in three phases of Heidegger's career. 
Although the lexical associations of Grund in this development (i. e. 1920's - 
Transzendenz; 1930's - Ereignis; post-war - Spie[) 
41 are quite marked, the formal aspects 
of the change (which are Crease's primary interest) are much smaller. 42 In its range, 
Crease's thesis is quite ambitious: thus he devotes much space to the history of the 
principle of sufficient reason (Kant, Aquinas, but especially Leibniz); in addition to this he 
tries to span the whole of Heidegger's career. As he says, 
43 this rather restricts the depth 
of his analysis, and in fact as regards Heidegger he has to concentrate narrowly on what 
Heidegger says about ground in relation to Leibniz. The thesis is also marked by a 
concern to make Heidegger palatable to an ""analytical" tradition (i. e. non-"continental"") - 
38 For the latter, see Wenzel, op. cit. at pp. 99-151 and Heidegger's lectures "Das Ding" and 
"Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" in Vorträge und Aufsätze. 
39 See pt. B, ch. 2, section 2. 
40 R Crease, op. cit., p. 1'90. 
41 ibid., p. 243. 
4" ibid., p. 237-240. 
43 ibid., p. 17. 
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thus there is primarily formalising approach and a (recessive) attempt to integrate the 
results with a framework and other comments from Robert Nozick. 44 Thus, for example, 
consideration of Heidegger's foundational methodology and the relation of "round and 
time are quite absent. 
The title of Purcell's doctoral thesis (Heidegger's early ontology: rethinking the ground) 
could even have been a title for the present thesis, but there is nevertheless an important 
difference, which lies in who is doing the "rethinking" of ground. For me (and Tyman) 
this would he Heidegger. 45 For Purcell, Heidegger does not rethink ground - the 
rethinking is a critique of Heidegger based on an idea from Deleuze. Purcell acknowledges 
Heidegger's early anti-metaphysical stance, but regards this as a limited success and 
ultimate failure: - 
"Heidegger's early philosophy effectively overcomes certain conceptual 
determinations within the standpoint of metaphysics, namely, the subject-object 
distinction, the problem of reflection, and the notion of being as presence... 
[BUT] the project of metaphysics is to provide a conceptual grounding which 
legitimates the discourse of metaphysics.... Because Heidegger still operates 
within this framework, his project remains within the discourse of metaphysics -a 
discourse he sought to overcome. " 
46 
Purcell operates with a strict distinction of methodological framework and conceptual 
determinations: as regards the latter, Heidegger is accorded some limited success against 
metaphysics; as regards the former, Heidegger fails. My own thesis is concerned primarily 
with the method of the earlier Heidegger (insofar as this could ever be distinguished from 
content), and holds that it is here that ground is rethought. The bulk of Purcell's thesis is a 
recapitulation of the main ideas of SZ (including the time material) in order to bring out 
44 The book to which Crease repeatedly returns is R. Nozick, "Philosophical Explanations", 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
45 Purcell has little excuse for not reading Tyman's article, published five years earlier in the 
International Philosophical Quarterly; Purcell's general philosophical orientation would make 
him receptive to Tyman, and had he read Tyman, he would surely never have proceeded on the 
assumption that Heidegger did not rethink ground. 
46 Purcell, op. cit., p. iv. 
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their adherence to a traditional (or "arhorial") foundational ism. 47 The rethinking of ground 
produced by Purcell uses Deleuze and Guattaris model of a "rhizome". 48 As appropriated 
by Purcell, this appears to he no more than a minor qualification of the arborial model - 
substituting a multiplicity of little trees for one big one. The term "qualification" is used 
on the grounds that the rhizome model can be understood without any change in method, 
mode of discourse, or manner of thinking. I would suggest that multiplicity and 
horizontality can indeed be found within the early Heidegger - although according to a 
model different from that of the rhizome. 49 
***** 
What can be concluded from this survey of literature? What possibilities and paths remain 
unexplored or unappreciated? The good quality material from Caputo and Wenzel is 
mainly on Heidegger's 1950's thinking, and they assume that their interesting insights 
have no parallel in the 1920's thinking - nevertheless the present thesis goes well beyond a 
mere argument that such parallels exist. Koza's book is strictly limited to ground as 
transcendence (1920's) and as being (1950's), and offers one of the two explicit theses that 
Heidegger's early and later conceptions of ground are not really so different. 
50 Panis may 
be sympathetic to such a thesis, but his articles are limited and exploratory in nature (i. e. 
the juxtaposition of negative and positive in ground). Tyman provides the second explicit 
attempt to link earlier and later thought on ground, and this time with an attention to 
"rethinking" that is lacking in Koza; Tyman's thesis is limited to an examination of the 
participatory character of ground, and otherwise its shortcomings are due to the sheer 
ambition of carrying out the program he sets himself within the space of one article. 
Crease, like Caputo and Tyman, must take a place in the essential literature in this area, 
47 Purcell takes the term "arborial" from Deleuze and Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus); it means 
"having a tree-like structure". Interestingly Purcell concludes that Derrida, as well as Heidegger. 
is an arborial metaphysicist (stated at p. 213, argument on pp. 204-215). 
48 Deleuze & Guattari, op. cit.; a rhizome is a horizontally spreading root-system, sending up a 
multiplicity of potentially independent shoots; it is used as a contrast to the arborial model. 
Deleuze & Guattari have discussed rhizomes elsewhere; the following book is devoted 
exclusively to the subject (not mentioned by Purcell): Rhizome, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1976. 
49 See pt. A, ch. I (semantic interpenetration), pt. B, ch. 1, section 2 (horizon), pt. B, ch. 2, section la 
(fugue). 
50 Koza's results are ignored by all the other writers; even Caputo only gives a bibliographical 
mention. 
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his contribution is limited in that it is tied to the Leibniz connection. Buchanan and Purcell 
both hold a traditional view of Heidegger's early foundationalism and fail to address those 
elements in the earlier writings which point in a different direction. Here it should he 
pointed out that Purcell's dissertation is the only full length work on ground in general in 
the early Heidegger. Among these sources a wide variety of ideas about Heidegger's 
foundationalism are scattered - but in a quite independent fashion - most of the sources are 
unaware of each other. Among the ideas which will be taken up again are: (1) the 
similarity and relative unity of the early and later thinking on ground (Koza/Tyman, 
Crease(? )); (2) links between ground, time and transcendence (Koza/Caputo); S' (3) the 
importance of paradoxical and paronomasic features of Heidegger's language of ground 
for an appreciation of what Heidegger is up to (Caputo) ; 
52 (4) the constellational or multi- 
dimensional character of ground (Wenzel/Tyman); S3 (5) the participatory, active, open 
character of ground (Tyman); 
54 (6) the synchronicity of the Seinshaftigkeit and Nichts- 
haftigkeit of ground as Abgrund (Wenzel, Panis); 
55 (7) the dialogical character of ground 
(Wenzel). 56 
h) General assumptions about the foundational 
Current and recent work on Heidegger is too varied for any classification into schools or 
trends. 57 If secondary literature could be categorised at all, one might look for the way in 
which certain strands combined in each author's work: for example, to what extent an 
author is influenced by deconstruction, to what extent an author has the pure and narrow 
aim of Heidegger interpretation, the way in which the author reacts to the all-pervading 
problems of language and history. National culture also has a role to play: it is not unfair 
51 See pt. B, ch. 1. 
52 
e. g. pt. A, ch. 2, section 1. 
53 See pt. A, ch. 1. 
54 See pt. A, ch. 1, section 3. 
55 See pt. B, ch. 2, section 2. 
56 See pt. A, ch. 4. 
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to say that Germany tends to divide between scholarly, conservative respect to the master 
and a tradition of sometimes startling aversion (based on Heideggers political affiliations). 
Non-German culture is more open to novel and "contemporary" approaches. Perhaps the 
major aspect of Heidegger scholarship, however, is its size, 58 with the consequence, for 
example, that many authors have only a partial knowledge of developments, even within 
their own speciality. 
59 The production of secondary literature has suffered an explosion 
(perhaps a doubling) in the decade since the bibliography60 of Hans-Martin Saß appeared, 
and it seems possible for almost opposing orthodoxies61 to co-exist within the field, and 
for the radicalism invited by Heidegger to he itself an orthodox approach collapsing into 
the stereotypical. 
With these comments on the heterogeneity of the secondary literature in mind, two views 
have been selected to represent the poles of (i) foundationalist, and (ii) anti-foundationalist 
interpretations of Heidegger's 1920's writings. The first of these comes from Werner 
Marx (crudely characterised as conservative), the second from Gianni Vattimo (crudely 
characterised as radical orthodoxy). The general principle aimed at during the exposition 
and criticism of these two views is that the polarity between (i) and (ii) arises out of a 
common failure to rethink the foundational with Heidegger. 
The perceived relation between Heidegger's earlier and later writing (traditionally referred 
to as the Kehre) affects the perception of Heidegger's earlier (anti-)foundation-alism. How 
this is so begins to emerge in the following analyses. There is one idea which will go 
unchallenged: that the fate of foundational language is the Kehre. But this can have 
different meanings: (a) that the Kehre, as a critical category within which Heidegger's 
57 See D. J. Schmidt, "In Heidegger's Wake", Heidegger Studies 5 (1989), pp. 210-211 for critical 
comments on dividing secondary literature into left- and right-wing approaches. 
58 See the comments on "bibliographical sources" in the bibliography. 
59 It was noticable during particularly careful bibliographical researches for the themes of (i) ground 
and (ii) time, that mutual lack of awareness was a major hindrance to progress. 
60 Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and Glossary, Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation 
Center, 1982. 
61 "Orthodoxy" in the sense of an accumulation of no-longer seriously questioned doctrines or 
methods. 
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development unfolds, marks the disappearance of foundational language from his writings, 
(h) that the Kehre, as a concept internal to Heidegger's philosophy, is a structure within 
the rethought conception of ground. 
i) A Conservative View 
In his memorial address of 1976, presented some months after Heidegger's death, Werner 
Marx attempted to sum up, in a non-partisan manner, what he saw as the most important 
and comprehensive points in Heidegger's thought. He asked three main questions: - 
1. How did Heidegger characterise previous, that is to say, metaphysical 
thought? 
2. In what sense was Heidegger's own thought already "transformed" or "other" 
than previous metaphysical thought? 
3. What constituted for him the task and issue of thought, i. e., of that thought 
which has undergone transformation? " 
62 
In the questions he asks, Marx takes the most important thing in the whole of Heidegger 
to be the transformation of metaphysics into thought. Marx is undoubtedly correct in the 
significance he gives this issue. It is in his answers, his interpretation of the 
transformation, that his view becomes controversial despite his attempt to be non- 
controversial. He produces a stereotypical version of Heidegger criticism, seen elsewhere 
for example in Richardson's classic book. 63 According to patterns of this kind, 
Heidegger's thought is perceived here as a movement, a movement from a traditional 
mode of philosophy (metaphysics, phenomenology), a movement to something called 
"thinking". How does Marx answer his three questions? To the first question, he answers 
62 Werner Marx, "Thought and Issue in Heidegger", p. 13-14; ET in J. Sallis ed. Radical 
Phenomenology (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978); although originally, delivered in 
German, the only publication seems to be in English. 
63 W. J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963) 
(passim); the same view is in: J. J. Kockelmans, Heidegger's 'Being and Time', p. 8; R. Rortv, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), e. g p. 5f.; J. Habermas, Der 
philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), p. 181. The view is of 
course widespread; the object here is to present it as an orthodoxy. 
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that Heidegger characterizes metaphysics as the interpretation of being (Sein) as ground 
(Grund). 
"According to Heidegger, all metaphysics regards the Being of that which is, of 
beings, as obviously ground. Being as ground has appeared in many distinct forms 
in metaphysics: as the transcendental condition of the possibility of the objectivity 
of objects, as the dialectical mediation of the movement in absolute spirit, and 
64 
even as the historical process of production. " 
With the second question ("In what sense was Heidegger's own thought already 
"transformed" or "other" than previous metaphysical thought? "), Marx turns to the issue 
of the Kehre, the so-called turn in Heidegger's thinking. The turn or transformation in 
Heidegger's thinking is variously dated from around 1930 to around 1945, and is 
commonly interpreted as a turn from metaphysics to thinking, in the sense that in his 
earlier thought Heidegger was preparing for and attempting this turn, and that in the later 
thought he had (or thought he had) effected this turn. 
65 Does Marx agree that there is a 
turn? 
"There can, at all events, be no doubt that Heidegger's thought underwent an early 
6 
transformation. "6 
As he is deliberately attempting to be non-partisan, Marx avoids a dating of the turn, but 
he does give a characterisation of the turn; although he acknowledges the controversial 
character of the turn's success, this characterisation is left unquestioned. 
"Heidegger actually passed beyond metaphysics. " 
67 
64 Marx, op. cit., p. 15; Marx quotes no particular source, but refers vaguely to "numerous sources". 
He is in fact virtually quoting from the essay "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" 
(tr. J. Stambaugh in On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)), at p. 56. 
65 This is an unapologetically crude summary of one of the most vexed issues of Heidegger 
interpretation. The Kehre is discussed more fully a few paragraphs below, and in pt. B, ch. 2, 
section lb. (NB: datings of the turn for before 1930 exist; e. g. F. Vezin, "Translation as 
Phenomenological Labour", Heidegger Studies 3/4 at p. 129 places the abandonment of 
metaphysics as pre-Sein und Zeit). 
66 Marx, op. cit., p. 16 
67 ibid., p. 17 
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In a chain of points arguing for the success of Heidegger's attempted turn. Marx 
characterises the transformation as "passing beyond metaphysics" , "self-liberation from 
the ontological concepts of metaphysics", "severance from metaphysics", "dissociation 
from metaphysics". 68 The third question discussed by Marx was: "What constituted for 
him the task and issue of thought, i. e., of that thought which has undergone 
transformation? " In his answer to this third question, Marx discusses concepts such as 
Zeitlichkeit (temporality), Anwesenheit (presence), aletheia (truth), Lichtung (clearing) and 
Ereignis (event). 69 His overall answer is that the issue of thought is "das Ungedachte der 
Metaphysik", the unthought in metaphysics. 70 For Marx, the use of these concepts by 
Heidegger marks the successful severance, liberation and dissociation from metaphysics. 
In his "Brief über den »Humanismus«", Heidegger footnoted that Ereignis had been the 
key term, or guiding term, of his thought since 1936.71 Marx says of Ereignis: - 
"... "Ereignis"... has the non-metaphysical significance which makes it possible to 
conceive of clearing and of the occurrence of Being within it as a "groundless 
bringing about" of particular being... a groundless disclosing.... This exposition 
of the basic characteristics of letting be in terms of Ereignis determines henceforth 
the direction of the "task and issue" of thought of the later Heidegger. The terms 
employed to designate it ward off all searching for grounds in the metaphysical 
72 sense. 
In these sentences, Marx makes very plain where he places Grund and all associated 
foundationalist language or structures in the philosophy of Heidegger: in the "early" 
Heidegger, as distinct from the "later" Heidegger, before the "turn"; the turn marks a 
severance, dissociation and liberation from this early metaphysical thinking; the essentially 
68 It would be preferable to have Marx's original German terms to check the nuance, but these do 
not seem to be published; however the oversupply of different terms all carrying the same 
message seems to rule out any intrusion of the translation. 
69 Marx, op cit., pp. 19-20 (Ereignis: pp. 25-26) 
70 ibid., p. 14; Marx relies on Heidegger's essay "The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking". 
71 GA9, p. 316 (footnote to Ist ed. of BH in 1949); Heidegger is probably referring to Beiträge zur 
Philosophie, subtitled Vorn Ereignis, which was completed 1936-38 (but unpublished until 
1989). 
71 Marx, op. cit., p. 25 
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different thinking after the turn is marked by a different lexis (e. (,. Zeitlichkeit, 
Anwesenheit, Lichtung, Ereignis). 
***** 
Two preliminary critical remarks of Marx's position will be made here. The criticisms can 
only be preliminary, since this thesis as a whole reinterprets the foundational in opposition 
to such orthodox views. 
The first critical remark concerns the temporal structure of the Kehre. Marx and many 
others have used the word Kehre with a biographical time-structure: the 1920's are a 
period of preparation for the turn, in the 1950's the turn is supposedly completed. The 
biographical time-structure accompanies the idea of the completion of the Kehre, and thus 
the issue of the success of the Kehre (i. e. did Heidegger really manage to escape 
metaphysics? ). 73 Is a biographical time-structure correct or justified? What alternatives 
might there be? 74 Particularly in Beiträge zur Philosophie (BP), Heidegger offers an 
alternative model for a transformation of thinking. The precise interpretation of this model 
is obscure75, but the main features are (1) a first beginning, (2) an "other" beginning, (3) a 
transition between these (Übergang). It is not wholly wrong to associate the first 
beginning with "metaphysics" as interpreted by Marx's Heidegger, and the other 
beginning with Denken. What is interesting here is Heidegger's self-interpretation (in BP) 
with respect to the Übergang: he describes himself as preparing the way for others to 
attempt the Übergang; the achievement of the other beginning of thought, and what such 
an achievement might be like, is left far in an open future. This gives the following model 
(not necessarily correct, just an alternative): Heidegger repeatedly and in different ways 
prepared the ground for a transformation. The movement of the Kehre, its time-structure, 
might then be seen on either of two different levels: (1) there is a separate and parallel 
movement towards the Kehre within each work of Heidegger, such that the time-structure 
73 
. i. e. a linear time-structure. That time-structure can be more complex than a mono-directional 
measurable linearity is something one should have learnt from Heidegger (as a matter of practical 
philosophical method rather than as if assenting to news of outer Mongolian potato prices). 
74 On this subject, see esp. R. Hosokawa, "Heidegger und das Problem der Kehre", in Studies in 
Philosophy 5 (1989). (This periodical is a bulletin of the Faculty of Literature, Kyushu 
University, Fukuoka, Japan). 
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is that of the narrative progression of each work (Kehre within Heidegger. but as a 
repeated narrative form rather than a once-achieved biographical development); (2) 
Heidegger can he placed as a small point within the historical Kehre of thinking, such that 
the time-structure is seinsgeschichtlich (Heidegger within Kehre). 76 Marx makes the 
interpretation of the Kehre an issue of where foundational language and thought 
(metaphysics) gets left behind. If we reject the biographical interpretation of the Kehre, it 
would seem that Heidegger does not leave behind such language and thought. 
Why might the biographical interpretation of the Kehre have been so popular? As was seen 
with Marx, one primary encouragement for a biographical interpretation of the Kehre are 
the changes in Heidegger's vocabulary and styles during his life-time: these changes are 
such that there is a tendency for the later works to show less of the "traditional 
metaphysical" linguistic ornamentation (or at least, to treat it in a more critical, distanced 
fashion). Is there a necessary connection between vocabulary and style, and the underlying 
thought? These vocabulary and style changes might not reflect deeper changes, but to 
establish this would mean a study of the relation between thinking and linguistic 
presentation in Heidegger. 77 A second main reason for the biographical interpretation 
concerns certain self-interpretative comments by Heidegger, 78 and the use, in particular, 
of words such as grundlos (groundless) and Abgrund (abyss, groundlessness). 79 
The second criticism of Marx's interpretation concerns proximity and distance. To what 
extent does Marx's model of severance, dissociation and liberation make sense of 
Heidegger's description of his project as a "Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik", a 
re-turn or regression into the ground of metaphysics? 
80 Marx's model implies distance and 
75 See pt. B, ch. 2. 
76 Seinsgeschichte: "history of Being"; seinsgeschichtlich means "pertaining to, or having the 
character of, the history of Being". 
77 See pt. A of this thesis. 
78 These are fully reinterpreted by R. Hosokawa, op. cit. See also J. Grondin, "Prolegomenes ä 
I' intelligence du tournant chez Heidegger", Les Etudes Philosophiques 3 (1990). 
79 See the discussion of Abgrund in pt. B, ch. 2, section 2. 
80 
e. g. "Einleitung zu: *Was ist Metaphysik? «", GA9, p. 365. Pöggeler's classic interpretation 
makes better sense of this (as it does of the entire problem of the unity of Heidegger's thought). 
O. Päggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 3rd ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1990). 
ýý 
non-relation. Heidegger's own description and practice suggest not a distancing, but an 
approach to metaphysics so close as to be a violation. Marx recognises this proximity, but 
regards it as a mere preliminary to the distancing Kehre. Where Marx uses words such as 
severance, dissociation and liberation, Heidegger typically has Überwindung 
(overcoming). But does Überwindung imply distance and non-relation? Normal categories 
of thinking and criticising may find it difficult to cope with the juxtaposition of proximity 
and distance in Heidegger. Of course, the existence of such juxtapositions and interplays 
in Heidegger has long been recognised. The problem is one of the extent to which such 
irregularities are appropriated: whether they are regarded as curiosities which may be 
commented upon briefly, confined and forgotten; or whether they are recognised as 
belonging to the essential fabric of Heidegger's thought - as iterating infrastructures. 
8' 
ii) A Radical Orthodoxy 
Gianni Vattimo82 interprets Heidegger as a "philosopher of post-modernism", which 
effectively means a kind of nihilist or anti-foundationalist. For him, the Heidegger of SZ 
was already turning against metaphysics and abandoning foundations. Despite the 
somewhat dramatic or radical tone in which Heidegger is appropriated for post- 
modernism, there is nothing new here. Tyman remarks, "it does not take profound powers 
of discernment to spot anti-foundational indications even in Heidegger's earlier thought". 
83 
"Precisely the notion of foundation, and of thought both as foundation and means 
of access to a foundation, is radically interrogated by Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
" 
84 
81 See pt. A, ch. 2 and ch. 4. 
8- The intention is not to label Vattimo as radically orthodox; rather, his repetition of an anti- 
foundationalist interpretation of Heidegger. 
83 S. Tyman, op. cit., p. 349. Tyman explores prima facie evidence for Heidegger's early anti- 
foundationalism on pp. 349-352. 
84 G. Vattimo. The End of Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988), p. 2; ET of La Fine 
della Modernitil (Milan: Garzanti, 1985). 
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Vattimo sees this "radical interrogation" not as an interro`ation within which Heidegger 
remains, but one though which Heidegger has passed, with results. 
"Both philosophers find themselves obliged, on the one hand, to take up a critical 
distance from Western thought insofar as it is foundational; on the other hand, 
however, they find themselves unable to criticize Western thought in the name of 
another, and truer, foundation. It is this that rightly allows us to consider them to 
85 be the philosophers of post-modernity. " 
The results of Heidegger's radical interrogation are seen by Vattimo as a distance from 
foundational thinking, and the absence of anything as a replacement for the foundational in 
thinking. Here we see the same "distance" model presupposed by Marx. Vattimo identifies 
two main "nihilistic" traits in Heidegger: - 
"The first nihilistic element in Heidegger's hermeneutic theory may be found in 
his analysis of Dasein as a hermeneutic totality.... The hermeneutic totality that is 
Dasein may not be in fact identified with some Kantian a priori structure. " 
86 
True, Dasein may not be identified with an a priori structure in the Kantian sense; 
nevertheless it is some kind of a priori structure. Vattimo fails to pursue the issue of the 
nature of this a priori; doing so is one approach to appreciating Heidegger's rethinking of 
the foundational. 87 The second nihilistic element indicated by Vattimo is the conception of 
An-denken (thinking). 88 In discussing An-denken, Vattimo says that the hermeneutic 
totality (Dasein) is such that its "foundation consists of a lack of foundation", 89 writing as 
if there is an black-and-white difference in Heidegger between what is a foundation and 
what is not. This fails to appreciate Heidegger's use of paradox and interplay of bipolar 
oppositions. 90 It is likewise essential to Vattimo's views that he has not thought his way 
out of the possibility of an infinite regression of grounds (other than by abandoning the 
85 ibid., p. 2-3. 
86 ibid., pp. 115-6. 
87 See pt. B, ch. 1, section I a. 
ss G. Vattimo, op. cit., p. 118. 
sg ibid., p. 119. 
90 See pt. A, ch. 2, section 1 (paradox), pt. A, ch. 4, section 2 and pt. B, ch. 2, section lb (bipolar 
oppositions), pt. B. ch. 2, section 2 (Abgrund). 
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foundational altogether). Finitude is a fundamental motivation in 
reconceptualisation of foundations. 9' 
Heidegger's 
Vattimo's misinterpretation also has a source in textual exegesis. On the whole Vattimo 
interprets Heidegger with little textual reference; actual quotes are thus all the more 
significant. There is one text in particular (from Heidegger's 1962 lecture "Zeit und Sein") 
which Vattimo quotes repeatedly in support of his interpretation of Heidegger. It is this: - 
"Das Sein es selbst eigens denken, verlangt, 
vom Sein abzusehen, sofern es wie in aller 
Metaphysik nur aus dem Seienden her und 
für dieses als dessen Grund ergründet und 
ausgelegt wird. Das Sein eigens denken, 
verlangt, das Sein als den Grund des 
Seienden fahren zu lassen zugunsten des im 
Entbergen verborgen spielenden Gebens, 
d. h. des 'Es gibt'. " 
92 
"To think Being itself explicitly requires 
disregarding Being to the extent that it is only 
grounded and interpreted in terms of beings and 
for beings as their ground, as in all metaphysics. 
To think Being explicitly requires us to let Being 
go as the ground of beings in favour of the giving 
which prevails concealed in unconcealment, that 
93 
is, in favour of the It gives. " 
Vattimo's use of this passage is questionable. In La Fine della Modernitä the main 
quotations suppress the final phrase "zugunsten des... 'es gibt"` ("in favour of... the 'it 
gives'"), and in general the words which Vattimo actually takes account of in all his 
interpretations of this passage are "[.... ] Das Sein eigens denken, verlangt, das Sein als 
Grund [... ] fahren zu lassen [.... ]". He fails to consider carefully the importance of the 
previous sentence, and of the qualification "des Seienden", and of the positive substitute 
offered in the final phrase. The first sentence, and the qualification "des Seienden", could 
be taken to restrict the sense of Grund in which it is here rejected (but even "rejection" 
may be wrong - "letting go" better translates the original "fahren lassen", and it is quite 
possible that a play is intended, taking "letting go" in the sense of upping anchor, 
releasing oneself from fixed, static determinations of ground). Grund, so far as it is 
91 See pt. A, ch. 4; pt. B, ch. 1, section 2b. 
92 Heidegger, "Zeit und Sein", pp-5-6; quoted in Vattimo, op. cit., p. 30 (footnote 1) & p. 118; 
Vattimo, "Dialectics, Difference, and Weak Thought" (ET in Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal 10/1 (1984), p. 159); Vattimo, "An-denken, Denken und Grund" in U. Guzzoni, ed. 
Nachdenken über Heidegger (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg Verlag, 1980). 
93 I have changed the ET in one crucial respect: "fahren zu lassen" has been translated to let go" 
rather than as "to relinquish"; this is to retain the possibility of a word-play intended in the 
original. Vattimo's Italian is "lasciar perdere" (La Fine della Modernitä, Italian ed. at p. 37), 
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"rejected", is only rejected in the context of the postulation of a foundational relationship 
between entities and being entitatively conceived: that is, Grund as a relation between two 
entitative poles. 94 Earlier Vattimo was quoted as saying Heidegger was unable "to criticize 
Western thought in the name of another, and truer, foundation", and yet the occasionally 
suppressed final phrase offers something which should at least be considered as a 
candidate for the "other" "truer" foundation (the "es gibt"). This provides only an initial 
criticism of Vattimo's position: the various themes touched on here (the static-dynamic 
problem, the model of a relation between entitative poles, and the "es gibt", where 
Heidegger's interpretations of the "es" as Ereignis and Zeitlichkeit will he explored for 
their foundational significance95), will be returned to. 
Leaving aside the interpretation of this passage, there is the more general questionability 
of taking a text from towards the end of Heidegger's career (the 1960's) and applying it to 
the thought of the 1920's and 1930's. As Walter Biemel has pointed out: 
"One danger certainly present consists in the fact that we often jump to the last, 
most difficult phase of Heidegger's thought and cling to concepts there without 
having carried out the work of reasoning (Denkarbeit), which in Heidegger's own 
case precedes these concepts.... " 
96 
Vattimo has surely taken a text from the latest phase of Heidegger's thought, and applied 
it to earlier phases, completely bypassing the Denkarbeit. 
3) Aims and limitations 
This dissertation is exegetical. It is not the chosen form of this dissertation to argue for the 
truth of a closed proposition (or thesis) about the foundational in the early Heidegger. The 
meaning "to forget", literally "to allow something to get lost", which loses the possible 
ambiguity of the original. 
94 See pt. A, ch. 4, section 3. 
95 See pt. B, ch. 1, section 3. 
96 W. Biemel, in the panel discussion published in Kockelmans ed. On Heidegger and Language, at 
p. 273. 
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subject matter of this dissertation is such that I think such a form would he detrimental to 
the contribution which it can make. The form is rather to take a question ("what is the 
foundational in the early Heidegger? "), justify it, and pursue the possibility and 
impossibility of answering this question - in the process of doing so shedding new light on 
some parts of Heidegger, provoking fresh thought, offering new connections - with, as a 
result, an improved appreciation of the foundational in Heidegger. It is both difficult and 
inadvisable to force such an appreciation of the foundational into inflexible propositional 
forms; this has the unavoidable disadvantage that many overall matters will remain unclear 
for a number of pages and chapters. 
This dissertation concentrates on one theme only, in one author - and at that, narrowly and 
selectively. The justification for this is that the theme of foundations in Heidegger is large 
enough, important enough, and deeply misinterpreted. Such a restriction is particularly 
difficult with Heidegger, since at all points his themes merge with one another and engage 
inextricably with the history of philosophy. Themes such as language, time, arid 
metaphysics clamour along with the works of (inter alia) Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant and 
Husserl. The themes of language and time are more fully integrated into this thesis than 
those of history and metaphysics, because it is in the area of ground-language-time that I 
want to contribute to research. As regards (i) historical contextualisation of Heidegger on 
foundations, and (ii) framing the work of this dissertation in a thesis about "overcoming 
metaphysics", I am very wary, for the following reasons. 
Heidegger's relationship to his forebears is both close and distant. Terence Malick has an 
account of Husserl's reactions to SZ: he initially thought that Heidegger had simply 
dressed up his own doctrines in a different language; then slowly came to feel that 
Heidegger had betrayed phenomenology. 97 A few years before Heidegger had already 
warned of oversimplifying his debt to his historical forebears. 98 This warning should be 
heeded. Heidegger's appropriation of the tradition is complex. As regards foundations, 
Crease points out the constant return to Leibniz, while Tyman indicates similarities with 
97 See Malick's brief introduction to his translation of Heidegger's "Vom Wesen des Grundes", at 
pp. xi-xiii, esp. footnote 3 on p. xii (The Essence of Reasons, Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1969). 
98 GA63 (lectures of summer 1923), p. 5, mentioning Luther, Aristotle, Kierkegaard and Husserl. 
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Husserl. 99 But as these cases show, particular relations can only he shown with respect to 
small parts of the theme: Leibniz and the principle of sufficient reason; Husserl and 
equiprimordiality. Against whom or what is Heidegger reacting, from whom is he 
borrowing, if his concept of ground is taken at its widest? Heidegger was conversant with 
an extremely wide range of the history of philosophy, and his thought, although 
inextricably linked to that history, nevertheless violently interprets that history by 
reducing it and then constructing a more unified derivative - all this prior to (and not 
particularly explicit in) Heidegger's own text. At its widest, Heidegger's historical debt is 
to a series of abstractions: grounding as a linear, uni-directional dependence relation, 
analogous to local experience of gravity on the Earth's surface; ground as something firm 
and final; ground as selbstverstlindlich (approx.: self-evident); grounding as principled; 
ground as giving rise to the problems of transcendence and of infinite regression; ground 
so conditioned as to create the problem of whether there "is" any ultimate ground. 
Heidegger's thought is inextricably linked to the history of philosophy in a way that goes 
beyond the mere fact that history always conditions us, since he consciously 
reappropriates and exploits that fact; but at the same time Heidegger relates himself to that 
history by several removes - which makes possible a relatively non-historical approach. It 
is possible that the ideas against which Heidegger reacts are to be found more in a 
mimicry of that history in his own texts, than in the texts of other authors. For these 
reasons I am extremely wary of sketching a historical background to "the foundational in 
Heidegger" in a few paragraphs or even a chapter; it is better to warn. 
More specifically than "foundations", however, this dissertation has to do, as the title 
says, with the "deconstruction of foundations". This has a rather more specific historical 
background. What I have rather loosely and broadly called "deconstruction", using the 
terminological vogue of the late 20th century, could be associated with the radically 
decentering ideas of Copernican and Newtonian revolutions (as applied to 16th, 17th and 
18th century thinking), revolutions which, for scientific thinking, in a sense ripped the 
ground from beneath people's feet. Most philosophy of course, to an extent, reacts like 
other artistic expressions of a civilisation to the range of that civilisation's scientific, 
geographical and cross-cultural awareness. To this extent there is a small, perhaps often 
subconscious reflection of such a revolution in most philosophical writing. 
What I think 
99 See above, section 2a. 
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distinguishes Heidegger, and along with him Kant, is the extent to which these 
philosophers consciously attempt to do for philosophy what Copernicus and Newton (for 
example) did for natural science, by subverting and renovating the most basic ontological 
assumptions of thought processes. 100 Thus as regards the suhject matter of this thesis, 
there is a historical background which lies outside philosophy. Heidegger's primary 
motivation from the history of philosophy may have been to radically improve on Kant's 
attempt to effect this ontological revolution. 
The much-abused term "metaphysics" likewise haunts the discussion of Heidegger's 
conception of foundations. Heidegger's relations to metaphysics could as little be 
summarised here as those (similar) ones to history. ' 01 As used in this thesis, metaphysics 
has two closely associated meanings: (i) that (incompletely explicit) tradition as perceived 
by Heidegger in his reactions against it; (ii) a carefully conceived notion which probably 
approximates to Heidegger's conception in the period under study. Metaphysics, in this 
latter sense, is not associated with any concept or vocabulary, or with any thinker or 
school, or with preoccupation with any particular themes. It is marked by a particular 
pattern governing its own origin (ground). Metaphysics involves a conceptual framework 
that is derivative, but such that the original derivation and the origin of the derivation are 
not comprehensible within metaphysics, and are thus hidden to the metaphysical 
perspective. The derivation is simultaneously a self-concealment of its origin and 
originating by virtue of its being a privileging, a bracketing-out. The privileging brackets 
out by drawing attention away from something, and thus hides something. That 
metaphysics, thus conceived, consists in omission, explains why it is "bad": the 
conceptual framework which it creates is dogged by inadequacies, whether it is the 
inability to account for, e. g., epistemological access to what it originally omitted (what 
Kant called the scandal of philosophy), or whether it is the inability to answer properly the 
needs102 which drive humanity to questioning the limits of their existence. The privileging 
derivation is thus not aU privileging or derivation, but a self-concealing omission with 
100 In the case of Kant, see especially the preface to the second edition of the Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft. 
101 For a complete book on this subject, see, e. g., G. Haeffner, Heideggers Begriff der Metaphysik. 
This study had the explicit approval of Heidegger himself. 
102 See the closing passages of pt-B, ch. 2, section 2. 
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pernicious consequences for thinking at its extremes. Thus metaphysics does not turn on 
what is privileged, but how. From this, one can abstract three salient features of 
metaphysics: (1) It involves the imposition upon... (being) of an original derivation or 
privileging or bracketing-out or schematising; (2) it is auto-affirmatory, concealing not 
only its origins, but also its originating; (3) it is inadequate to the needs of thinking at its 
extremes, and therefore undesirable. 
Other definitions of metaphysics have been put forward, but many of these can be 
explained on the basis of the above. Logocentrism, for example, is a form of privileging, 
but there are other forms. Metaphysics as the philosophy of "presence" privileges a 
particular concept ("presence"), but receives its validation as metaphysics, not by virtue of 
presence, but by virtue of the way in which presence is privileged against other modes of 
time. Thus Heidegger tries a prioritising of the future in escaping from the domination of 
presence, but by conceiving of the future as "ecstatic" he attempts to replace the 
"bracketing-out" character of the privileging by a "bracketing-in". Purcell 103 states that 
"the project of metaphysics is to provide a conceptual grounding which legitimates the 
discourse of metaphysics", and claims that Heidegger failed because his project fell within 
this definition. This definition states only the second of the three features described above 
(auto-affirmation). Although Purcell is free to define metaphysics as he chooses, 
nevertheless he fails to say why metaphysics as he defines it is "bad" (i. e. he leaves out 
the third of the above three features, which is linked inextricably to the notion of 
bracketing-out, the first feature). Purcell's thesis may be right in its own terms, but as 
such it misses the point. 
103 J 
. 
Purcell . op. cit., p. 
iv. 
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Given then that this definition of metaphysics is useful and relatively faithful to 
Heidegger, how may one overcome metaphysics in so far as it is something undesirable? 
The key difficulty is that we are already historically situated in metaphysical thinking, and 
according to the definition, this thinking (conceptual framework, "as-sembly") is closed 
and locked with respect to the possibility of detecting or tracing its derivation. This hiding 
of the hiddenness of its origin can be termed a semblance, a seeming. Thus metaphysics 
could be termed an as-sembly, a sembling structure, sembling in the very origin of its 
structure. The overcoming of metaphysics, as defined, is then a disas-sembly (i. e. the 
word I have put in contact with deconstruction and Freilegung). The task is then the 
laying free (Freilegung) of the self-concealed ground of (= to) metaphysics, the same as 
the disas-sembly of the concealing "ground" of (= in) metaphysics. ' 04 Within the self- 
concealing closure of metaphysics, the task is to find some clue which will enable the 
recovery of what has been bracketed out. 
Heidegger's SZ project is susceptible to interpretation according to this framework (which 
does not mean that it can be restricted to this framework). Thus the first half of the 
published portion of SZ (§§9-44) takes up the classic metaphysical topics such as the 
nature of the object, the world, space, other minds, language, reality and truth, and 
attempts to rework them from within the metaphysical perspective until they reveal some 
crack or failure in their auto -afftrmatory character. As Heidegger theorises, it is when 
something strikes an impasse or breakdown that its truer nature is revealed, 105 and if 
metaphysics is a bad thing in the sense described, then surely it would have its 
breakdowns? Thus it is that Heidegger's metaphysical reworking of the metaphysics of 
Dasein eventually reveals its Verfallenheit (fallenness, derivation). Having achieved a 
break in the auto-affirmatory character of metaphysics, SZ then turns to exploiting this to 
bring to light what the metaphysical derivation had bracketed out: time. 
The question which the fate of the SZ project itself raises is whether or not such a project 
is actually completahle. Is it possible to overcome metaphysics? 
104 A local distinction is intended between ground and "ground". 
105 5Z, §16. 
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Taking metaphysics as a semantic rather than as a methodological error certainly brings a 
prematurely negative answer to this question. If metaphysics maintains itself in the same 
way that nuances of meaning continue to taint our language (or certain parts of it), the 
question of ridding oneself of metaphysics becomes rather like that of ridding ourselves of 
history - impossible, and just as absurd as thinking that a few millenia of intellectual 
history are so worthless that they should be abandoned. This only provides a good reason 
for defining metaphysics in as a-historical and non-semantic a way as possible. Staying 
with metaphysics as a methodological error, one may ask, where is it that the structure of 
metaphysics (as defined above) comes from? What is the origin of its concealment of its 
concealing of its origins? Metaphysics arises in the site opened in the negotiation between 
being and text. Might it not be the case that any such traffic between being and text is 
doomed to decay into metaphysics? In which case two alternatives would be left for 
avoiding metaphysics: either abandon writing for the contemplation of being (Bigelow's 
suggestion 1°6), or abandon being for textual idealism. Alternatively, it might be the case 
that late twentieth century thought has still not exhausted the possibilities put at its 
disposal by Heidegger for continuing the struggle to open a non-metaphysical space for 
negotiation between being and writing. Particularly on so abstract a matter, one may only 
delude oneself by speculating on the chances of success before one actually gets down to 
the detail of trying it out for oneself. 
Despite these extended comments on metaphysics, this is not a framework within which 
this thesis was conceived, nor into which it will be retrospectively forced. Yet another 
contribution on the possibility of overcoming metaphysics, and on the actuality of 
Heidegger's having done so, would be tiresome. Although intimately connected to the 
metaphysical issue, this is primarily a thesis on the interpretation of ground in the earlier 
Heidegger - an interpretation which I think is interesting and valuable enough 
in itself, and 
of a significance to philosophical methodology extending beyond its implications for a 
particular definition of metaphysics. 
106 P. Bigelow, The Cunning, The Donning of Being, (the preface, the pre- or non-preface, and the 
postface). NB: page references to the prefaces are 
difficult because Bigelow deliberately restarts 
the page-numbering. 
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Interpretations of ground in Heidegger's earlier writings up to now are, as I claim, either 
demonstrably wrong (and as such seriously underestimate Heidegger), or limited. A 
recovery of the actual place of the foundational in Heidegger's earlier thought can lead to 
a recovery of the unity of his thought. This place of the foundational in Heidegger's 
earlier thought is inherently, and deliberately, unstable. The foundational is found in a 
multi-level Grund-Freilegung or disas-sembly (on the levels, for example, of the 
concept, 107 the proposition, 108 of the system 109, and of idiom 110 ) of received foundational 
notions. Although what emerges from this disas-sembly is radically different from the 
received conceptions, naming it "ground" is justified, not only because Heidegger persists 
in calling it such, but because it responds to the same needs which generate foundational 
issues in philosophy. The analysis of this disas-sembly is divided into two parts: the first 
concerns methodological peculiarities which appear when one looks closely at the way 
Heidegger uses the foundational in his writings; the second examines some apparently 
eccentric connections of the foundational, namely, the coalescence of ground and time, 
and the integration of the foundational problematic into the thinking of (= from) the 
Ereignis. 
107 See pt. A, ch. 1. 
108 See pt. A, ch. 2 and ch. 4. 
109 See pt. A, ch. 3. 
110 See pt. B, ch. 1 and ch. 2. 
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PART A. HEIDEGGER' S THINKING AND 
WRITING ABOUT GROUND: SOME 
METHODOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES 
The question here must be carefully restricted: what is the foundational, or what do the 
foundational notions signify, in Heidegger's earlier writings? ("Earlier" here means the 
writings of the 1920's, but with occasional glances ahead as far as Beiträge zur 
Philosophie of 1936-38). This seemingly innocent question is more difficult to answer 
than it appears, and generally the strategy of this part of the thesis is a twofold one: first, 
to take this question in several directions, all of which lead to apparent breakdowns, 
aporias, fissures, or simply unusual structures in the coherence and intelligibility of 
Heidegger's foundational thought; second, to revalue the problematic in these aporias as a 
starting-point for a rethinking of the foundational. One of the issues which arises with 
respect to this second step is the extent to which such a revaluation of the problematic and 
such a rethinking of the foundational can be attributed to Heidegger, and to what extent 
his writing nevertheless necessitates the reader to revalue and rethink in this way. 
This part of the thesis is divided into four chapters as follows: - 
1) Semantic Interpenetrations in Foundational Language 
2) Logical Irregularities in Foundational Language 
3) Incongruencies in Foundational Macrostructure 
4) Anticipations of a Turn in Foundational Understanding 
The findings of these chapters are only summarised at the end of part A. Since many of 
the considerations brought up are extended during part B, which deals with the 
connections of ground to temporality (Zeitlichkeit) and the event (Ereignis), extended 
comment on the results must wait. 
***** 
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Initially, a rather more prosaic examination of the basic foundational notions will he made. 
The word Grund is the most common foundational notion used by Heidegger, and is the 
primary keyword of Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik (MAL, 1928) and "Vom 
Wesen des Grundes" (VWG, 1928) - in the later writings also Der Satz vom Grund (SG, 
1955/56). 1 In Heidegger Grund simultaneously designates at least a combined conception 
of ontic foundations and cognitive origins (i. e. reasons), but what Grund is understood to 
mean should simultaneously extend at least to the entirety of finely distinguished origins, 
causes, principles, substrates and reasons produced in the history of Western Philosophy. 
Grund, in Heidegger, is at least a historical synthesis. Even a multi-dimensional 
conception fails to do Heidegger the least justice, and one should try to develop Grund 
further to a conception of the unity and totality within which this multiple reference is 
possible. Yet these developments of Grund to the unity and totality within which its 
multiple reference is possible are only very preliminary moves which fail to go beyond the 
boundaries of the word itself, ignoring the relations of Grund to other words. The way in 
which Heidegger exploits the relations of words does not allow any internal meaning to 
survive untouched. A yet further shortcoming of the conception of Grund gained so far is 
that what has been said presumes a static and consistent signification. Is this a justified 
assumption? Perhaps the conception of Grund is intended to change as one reads, for 
example, MAL. Or perhaps different conceptions of Grund are appropriate for different 
modes and styles of writing, or for different regions and extremes of thinking. 
The word Ursprung (origin) is used synonymously with Grund. However there are 
differences of use and exploitation. With the word Grund, Heidegger restricts himself to 
the use of a number of morphological variations (the nouns Gründen, Gründlichkeir, the 
verb gründen, the participle/adjective gründend, the adjective gründlich) and compounds 
(around 40 different compounds in SZ, excluding the considerable number of 
morphological variations of these compounds). The morphological variations significantly 
increase after SZ - the most important post-SZ variation being Gründung. As regards the 
use of Ursprung, it covers not only the ontic foundation normally signified by Grund. but 
The substantial section of Beiträge Zur Philosophie (1936-38) entitled "Die Gründung" should also 
be mentioned. 
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also expresses historical origins. The etymology of Ursprung is also exploited. The "Ur" 
prefix, itself exploited by Heidegger in compounds such as Urgrund, Urelement, Urstand, 
Urphanomen, Ursache, Urwahrheit, Urtranszendenz, Urgestein, denotes something 
"original" or "old". The "-sprung" element of the compound denotes a leap or jump, a 
movement at or away from the source. Normally this latter dynamic connotation lies 
dormant in the word Ursprung, but Heidegger plays on it, bringing it back to activity. 
The use of various morphological variations on the root fund- likewise form part of the 
standard repertoire of foundational notions (e. g. Fundament, fundieren, fundamental). 
These and further expressions do not invite further comment for the moment. 2 
In need of comment, however, is the difficulty of identifying lexical expressions of 
foundations. It has already been mentioned how freely Heidegger shifts between 
morphological variations on the same root (e. g. -grund- or -spring-) in his expression of 
foundations. Likewise there was an example of a prefix used to add a foundational 
significance to a root (ur-). The prefix vor- (in English, usually "pre-") is also added for a 
similar effect. 3 The prefix vor- is, as a matter of German grammar, separable: this means 
that in many sentences "vor" may appear as a particle placed some distance from the verb, 
although essentially modifying the verb. In such a case it may be difficult for the English 
native-speaker to spot the foundational allusion. This is only the beginning of the problem: 
Heidegger had a predilection for compound-words and phrases, the parts of which he 
would disperse around the sentence. Sometimes this is combined with deliberate ambiguity 
- there is not only a foundational interpretation, but also another meaning. The dispersion 
of the elements of the foundational idea is at its most difficult when Heidegger tries 
sensitising the reader to the directionality of ground - since here he resorts to a variety of 
prepositions and particles, the combined effect of which may be difficult to grasp in the 
German and virtually impossible to translate. 
4 Foundational expression, therefore, even at 
the simplest level of lexis, can sometimes be difficult to detect. 
2 Among those foundational expressions to be discussed later: Bedingung der Möglichkeit; a priori. 
3 There is a difference between the two prefixes: ur- suggests absolute origin, while vor- is relative. 
4 On the directionality of ground, see ch. 4, section 2 below on dialectic. 
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These comments on the basic lexis of ground have yielded an open-ended result: 
foundational ideas are dispersed in a variety of expressions, and these expressions 
themselves contain a multiplicity of reference and a structural subtlety and self- 
consciousness. Moving on from these preliminary observations, what does Heidegger 
make explicit about the nature of foundations? Certainly we can find statements in 
Heidegger which purport to say what ground "is". SZ itself has few statements hearing 
directly on ground, although there is the following: 
"Grund-seiend, das heißt als geworfenes "In being a basis - that is, in existing as 5 
existierend.... "5 thrown.... " 
Here it says that to be a ground is to exist as thrown, which does not seem very helpful. 6 
In 1928, Heidegger tells us that the basic phenomenon of ground (Urphänomen des 
Grundes) is something called Umwillen (a purposive phenomenon), 7 that the origin of 
ground is freedom, 8 that ground pertains, in some very important sense, to being. 9 and 
that the origin of ground is freedom as transcendence, 10 or, more or less, that ground is 
transcendence, with various triadic analyses of this: ground is < Stiften, Boden-nehmen, 
or 1 Begründen >, ' <Möglichkeit, Boden, Ausweis> . Here 
12 we also find the quasi- 
5 SZ, p. 284 
6 Nevertheless see next paragraph. 
3 MAL, pp. 276 & 282 
8 MAL, p. 276 
9 MAL, pp. 138 & 284 
10 VWG, p. 60; the association of Grund and Transzendenz has much to do with the temporal 
character of foundations, and is therefore returned to in pt. B, ch. 1, section 1b. One among 
various possible translations: < endowing, taking-a-basis, justifying >. 
11 VWG, pp. 60f. Note: for the sake of clarity, when a formal triadic (or quadratic) formulation of 
Heidegger's is referred to in the text, the marks < ... > are used. 
Possible translation: 
< possibility, basis, self-identification >. 
12 VWG, p. 66 
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paradoxical idea of ground as Abgrund (abyss). 13 In 1936 we find ground described, inter 
alga, as kehrig (versive, turning). 14 
The list could go on, but some things should already be pointed out. The answers 
Heidegger gives are semantically (and philosophically) outrageous: to identify ground with 
freedom and transcendence can seem an "everything into the liquidizer" approach to 
philosophy. In fact Heidegger's comments should be taken seriously - and not merely at 
the semantic level. 1. The purpose of the freedom-transcendence interpretation is, among 
other things, structural (so far as this can be distinguished from "semantic"): the idea is to 
destabilize and refashion certain structural properties of the conception of ground. With 
the triadic analysis of ground in VWG we should once again become suspicious of 
Heidegger's method, and ask whether the method is actually more significant than the 
interpretations of ground produced. Ground is analysed into an unstable triad, the terms of 
which change and interweave as one turns over the pages: perhaps the purpose of the 
triadic analysis was to produce something internally changing and unstable. Such triads 
are commonplace in Heidegger's early writings (and not absent from the later), and it may 
be that their problematic character indicates something about the nature of Heidegger's 
foundational structures. 
16 To return the the quotation from SZ, here Grund was elaborated 
in terms of a combination of Existenz and Geworfenheit. In SZ, Existenz is a future- 
associated concept, Geworfenheit a past-orientated concept. Buried in this elaboration of 
ground, there are not only the semantic elements of ground as purpose (rationale, arche - 
future-orientated), and of ground as determinative history, but also the non-semantic, pre- 
logical issue of the unity of these two opposing or complementary parts. 
17 
13 VWG, p. 69; for an analysis of (quasi-)paradoxical forms in Heidegger, see pt. A, ch. 2 on logical 
irregularities in foundational language. 
14 BP, p. 261; the matter of the relation between Grund and Kehre is returned to in pt. A, ch. 4, 
section 2 and pt. B, ch. 2, section 1b. 
15 For an analysis of the semantic problem, see the following chapter on semantic interpenetration. 
16 This problem is the subject of pt. A, ch. 3, section 1 on triadic and quadratic patterns. 
17 Bi-directionality in foundational language is the subject of pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
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CH. I SEMANTIC INTERPENETRATIONS IN 
FOUNDATIONAL LANGUAGE 
l) The problem 
In 1928 Heidegger explicitly addressed the question of foundations in his contribution to the 
Festschrift for Husserl's 70th birthday. This article, entitled "Vom Wesen des Grundes" 
(VWG) was the first published treatise of Grund - contemporaneously composed with the 
more extensive and only recently published lecture series Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der 
Logik (MAL) which in its main theses is very similar. How helpful is this promisingly 
entitled article for the question pursued in this dissertation? When Heidegger sets himself 
the task of eliciting the essence of ground, what is his own reply? The following passages 
come from the closing pages of VWG, and contain some of the most explicit comments 
Heidegger makes on the nature of Grund. 
"Demnach besagt Grund: Möglichkeit, Boden, 
1 Ausweis. " 
"Accordingly ground means: possibility, 
(basislfloor], self-identification. " 
"Das Wesen des Grundes ist die transzendental 
entspringende dreifache Streuung des Gründens 
in Weltentwurf, Eingenommenheit im Seienden 
"2 und ontologische Begründung des Seienden. 
"... deshalb erweist sich schon das früheste 
Fragen nach dem Wesen des Grundes als 
verschlungen mit der Aufgabe einer Erhellung 
des Wesens von Sein und Wahrheit. " 
3 
"The essence of ground is the transcendentally 
source-ing threefold dispersion of grounding 
in world projection, enthrallment with the 
entity and ontological justification of the 
entity. " 
"... thus the earliest inquiring after the essence 
of ground reveals itself to be enmeshed with 
the task of an elucidation of the essence of 
being and truth. " 
VWG, p. 66 (GA9, p. 170); own translation. My own translations intentionally veer on the side of 
the literal, often serving more as guides to the German than as translations. 
2 WVG, p. 67 (GA9, p. 171); own translation. 
3 
ibid.; own translation. 
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"Der Grund hat sein Un-wesen, weil er der 
endlichen Freiheit entspringt. Diese selbst kann 
sich dem, was ihr so entspringt, nicht 
entziehen. Der transzendierend entspringende 
Grund legt sich auf die Freiheit selbst zurück, 
und sie wird als Ursprung selbst zum »Grund«. 
Die Freiheit ist der Grund des Grundes.... Als 
dieser Grund aber ist die Freiheit der Ab-grund 
des Daseins. "4 
"Ground has its un-essence, because it sources 
from finite freedom. Freedom itself cannot 
take back what sources from it in this way. 
Transcending sourcing ground leans back onto 
freedom, and freedom itself becomes, as 
source, 'ground'. Freedom is the ground of 
ground.... But as this ground freedom is the 
abyss [lit. down-ground] of Dasein. " 
These not untypical passages can be taken to show two things which are useful at this point: 
first, that Grund is closely associated with numerous other concepts (e. g. Möglichkeit, 
Ausweis, Boden, Weltentwurf, Streuung, Begrtindung, Eingenommenheit vom Seienden, 
Sein, Wahrheit, Freiheit, Abgrund - to put aside for a moment the crucial problems of 
Transzendenz and Zeitlichkeit which arise in VWG); second, that Heideggers style does not 
make things clear and unambiguous. As quoted, the passages create more of a problem than 
they solve, nor is it likely that this is contrary to Heideggers intentions. 
VWG and the other early writings on ground are returned to frequently in this dissertation, 
but I do not intend to examine them systematically. The reasons are these: VWG has in any 
case already been thoroughly examined in this respect; 5 further, I doubt whether a 
systematic examination, or an examination of what Heidegger says on the essence of ground 
would actually solve the problem or contribute significantly to the secondary literature: 
VWG raises far more problems than it solves, and indeed, it should lead the investigation of 
Grund into considerations of method and style. For these reasons, reference to the earlier 
writings on Grund is selective, concentrating narrowly on raising those methodological 
issues which can contribute to a solution of the problem. 
To return to the character of the passages from VWG, the following comment from Patrick 
Bigelow is appropriate. 
"But if we are to meditate on the formula ti to on e on; and endeavour thereby to 
disengage the interior structure of metaphysics we find an essential ambiguity: we 
fall into the amphiboly of being, a secret trapdoor in the beguiling disingenuousness 
4 VWG, p. 69 (GA9, p. 174); own translation. 
5 
e. g.: I. Koza, Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant. 
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of language through which we are hurled down into the metaphysical vocation and 
venture, hurled down until we teeter-totter on the brink of a thinksink. "6 
The subject of this thesis is the simple question: what does Grund mean in its early 
Heideggerian usage? Perhaps nowhere other than in such a question is one closer to the 
interior structure of metaphysics, and as Bigelow aptly remarks, such a question disguises a 
trapdoor in(to) the beguiling disingenuousness of language. Instead, then, of beginning with 
the question with which I would like to begin, I begin with the beguiling disingenuousness 
of foundational language, and hope to trace my way back through the trapdoor - just 
perhaps - to the beginning of a "meaning" for Grund. Manfred Thiel writes of falling into 
this same thinksink during his first lecture experience with Heidegger: - 
"From lecture to lecture Being - initially opened - increasingly closed itself in an 
impenetrable tangle of verbal distortions. " 
7 
While it should be mentioned that Thiel seems to regard himself almost as a crusader 
against Heideggerian witchcraft, 8 his comments about Heidegger's language and his linking 
of the language question to the political question (Nazi associations) are typical for 
6 P. Bigelow, The Conning, The Cunning of Being - Being a Kierkegaardian Demonstration of the 
Postmodern Implosion of Metaphysical Sense in Aristotle and the Early Heidegger (Tallahassee: 
Florida State University, 1990), p. 108. On his concept of the "amphiboly of being", see pt. A, 
ch. 4, section 1 of this chapter. The italicised letters are Greek, meaning "what is being as being? ". 
7 "Von Vorlesung zu Vorlesung verschloß sich das anfangs aufgetane Sein mehr und mehr in einem 
undurchdringlichen Gewirr von Wortverdrehungen, " from: M. Thiel, Heidegger: Sein Werk - 
Aufbau und Durchblick (Heidelberg: Elpis, 1977), p. 9 (own translation). 
8 While this is a fair comment on Thiel's attitude towards Heidegger, nevertheless the content of 
some of his comments deserve more attention than his attitude would attract. He provides a useful 
list of the typical objections to Heidegger's handling of his material: contrariness to reason, 
mistranslation and misquotation of philosophers criticised, violation of original texts through 
capricious misinterpretation, misrepresentation through selective quotation, reliance on empty style 
to make his points. See M. Thiel, Der Nihilismus: Heidegger und die Sophistik, (Elpis Verlag, 
Heidelberg, 1986), esp. pp. 1180-2. Whether, and in what sense, Heidegger was "against reason" 
(Thiel's accusation) is one way of seeing the issue of this thesis. Thiel's point about "mere" style 
fails to take account of the long-acknowledged connection between form and content in Heidegger. 
While Thiel's points about Heidegger's use of the great historical texts of philosophy are, as 
regards their descriptive content, largely true, his evaluation that this use of the great philosophers 
arises out of a disrespect for them is another matter. The most serious criticism of Heidegger is 
missed by Thiel: namely, that he has perhaps encouraged more sloppy philosophy in others than he 
is guilty of himself. Heidegger's eccentricities would be quite simply "bad" if divorced from an 
appreciation of the purpose which they serve; the task therefore is to elicit what lies behind the 
eccentricities. 
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opponents and critics of Heidegger. 9 Nevertheless the problem of the closure of being in an 
impenetrable tangle of verbal distortions is a legitimate criticism of Heidegger with which 
even the most casual reader must come to terms. It is the case that if one clings to "norms" 
of reading and fails to develop new ways of accepting and understanding a text, one is 
going to have a hard time with Heidegger. But what are these "norms" of reading, and what 
are these "new ways" of accepting and understanding a text? In reading Heidegger language 
is a problem which arises immediately and in many different guises, and which never 
leaves. The only way to cope with Heidegger is to learn how to live within language as a 
problem. While to say this is by no means new or controversial, and while much has been 
written on Heidegger and language, nevertheless, in writing this thesis it became apparent 
that secondary literature on Heidegger was devoid even of a partial consensus sufficient to 
provide a basis on which to present the main ideas about ground. Many of the most 
essential features of Heidegger's language have been recognised and written about; for 
example, the constellational10 and kinetic11 characters of language. Often, however, the 
insights have been fragmentary or too preliminary; otherwise they have tended to miss the 
point altogether - for example, by taking Heidegger as "just" a poet, a mystic, a (failed) 
metaphysician "turned" (failed) mystic. At least as regards the earlier Heidegger(s) (that is, 
up to the 1930's), there is not yet any comprehensive, adequate analytical work or 
consensus on the "how" of his writing. 12 Responding to these problems and filling the gaps 
9A 
canonical work in this respect: T. Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1964). There does not yet seem to be a full length, studious and non-partisan work on the 
possible political implications of Heidegger's (ab-)use of language, although the less studious 
accusations repeatedly levelled against Heidegger clearly call for such a work. A recent book 
claiming to fill this gap is: H. Meschonnic, Le Langage Heidegger (Pans: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1990) (though this book seems too steeped in Meschonnic's own ideas about poetry to be 
of great use). 
10 
e. g. U. Wenzel, Die Problematik des Gründens beirn späten Heidegger (Schäuble Verlag, 
Rheinfelden, 1986), see esp. p. 206, ("konstellativ"). 
1te. 
g. R. Ansen, »Bewegtheit«: zur Genesis einer kinetischen Ontologie bei Heidegger (Junghans 
Verlag, Cuxhaven, 1990). 
12 In agreement with this point: D. J. Schmidt, "In Heidegger's Wake", Heidegger Studies 5 (1989), 
p. 203. One of the better and more comprehensive attempts to date to categorise Heidegger's use of 
language is: E. Schäfer Die Sprache Heideggers, Verlag Neske, Pfüllingen, 1962 (originally 
written as a dissertation at the University of Bonn in 1960). This book nevertheless has its 
limitations. Parts are discussed in pt. A, ch. 2, section 1 below (on logical irregularities in 
foundational language). The chapter of greatest interest here is entitled "Metalogische Denkformen 
und grammatische Besonderheiten" ("Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical 
Peculiarities"), where Schäfer discusses the following: paradox, circularity, tautology, 
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is too formidable a task for this thesis. In this respect Henri Meschonnic speaks of the 
necessity of a "renovation of the theory of language" simply in order to accommodate 
Heidegger. '3 The aim here is only to bring the problem to a stage where the main task of 
this thesis can be performed satisfactorily. There is no attempt, for example, to theorise 
about language independently of Heidegger. 
What is meant by this vaguely indicated language problem? Language problems in 
Heidegger are in fact multiple. 14 Carnap was drawn primarily by Heidegger's abuses of 
logic and syntax. 15 The question of the non-logical manner of Heidegger's thinking is 
addressed in the next chapter. Thiel's reference to Wortverdrehungen (verbal distortions) is 
primarily a complaint about semantics, however, and it is this semantic problem which is 
addressed in this section. There is a certain danger in describing problems in advance (as 
Heidegger points out at the beginning of SZ, and as is particularly the case when dealing 
with his texts); neverthless I will try to describe the problem in question as governing the 
separability and stability of semantic items. 16 The problem is approximately that described, 
for example, by John Sallis in his appropriately entitled article "Meaning Adrift". '7 In the 
following it is especially the separability and stability of those semantic items expressing the 
foundational which are analysed. The existing secondary literature does not offer suitable 
analyses of the problem of the separability and stability of those semantic items expressing 
the foundational. However, near and of relevance are two articles by George Ghanotakis 
predication, figura etymologica, neologism, paranomasia, punctuation (colons, dots), comparative 
and superlative forms. Part of this chapter (pp. 196-217) has been translated into English: 
J. J. Kockelmans ed. On Heidegger and Language (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 
1972), at pp. 281-301. 
13 H. Meschonnic, op. cit., p. 6. 
14 The two mentioned here by no means exhaust the catalogue. 
15 i. e. Carnap's celebrated comments on Heidegger excerpted and translated in: M. Murray ed. 
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 23-34. Also drawinL, 
attention (rather more sympathetically) to the structural curiosity of Heidegger's syntax is 
D. J. Schmidt, who likens Heidegger's syntax to a Moebius strip (op. cit., p. 203). 
16 A word of caution may be appropriate for the reader who wants immediately to reduce or interpret 
this description. The problem described is susceptible to a number of characterisations. To think 
that this problem was merely one of "hermeneutics" or interpretation would be to reduce it, to 
prejudice it. Interpretation (where the separability and stability of semantic items is sacrificed, one 
semantic item being brought into contact with another in order to modify it semantically) is at best 
only one part of a wider phenomenon in Heidegger's language. 
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and Alfons Grieder on the concept Wesen. Their observations find parallels in the language 
of Grund. 
In the 1984 article by Ghanotakis, '8 the following points are relevant: - 
1. The "predominantly verbal (temporal) connotations" of Wesen "mark it 
off from the traditional static essentia". 19 
2. Wesen has a "non-metaphysical status". 20 
3. Wesen has a "multiplicity of connotations and significations", 21 that is, 
the "co-extensiveness and often interchangeability" of Wesen with 
other key notions, such as truth, horizon, "projective context of 
intelligibility", ground, possibility, meaning (Sinn), gathering, 
enduring, and, not least, Sein. 22 
4. This "multiplicity of significations is not random", but reflects the 
"dimensions of the ways Being... manifests itself'. 23 
While all these points are stated in his article, Ghanotakis is so brief that they receive no 
development. The article has much in common with the longer article by Grieder, published 
in the same journal in 1988.24 The main points of relevance from Grieder's article are as 
follows: - 
17 Heidegger Studies 1 (1985). 
18 G. A. Ghanotakis, "Unscrambling Heidegger's notion of 'essence': a consideration of some 
topographical and thematic difficulties", Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 15/1, 
pp. 22-33. 
19 ibid., p. 22 
20 ibid., p. 22 
?t ibid., pp. 24 & 26 
77 
22 ibid., pp. 25-26 
23 ibid., p. 26 
24 A. Grieder, "What did Heidegger mean by 'essence'? ", Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology 19/1; the Grieder article does not refer to the Ghanotakis article, despite some 
overlaps. 
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I. The traditional meaning of essentia is suspended while the term Wesen 
is recovered for a new use; this new conception nevertheless remains 
completely indeterminate in the 1920's. 25 
2. In general, "there is little hope... of elucidating Essence without getting 
entangled with a number of other Heideggerian notions"; 26 and in 
particular, Wesen is "inseparable" from Sein and Wahrheit. 27 
3. The indeterminacy of Wesen in the 1920's gives way in subsequent 
decades to a partially determinate, constantly changing and ever 
ambivalent notion; Grieder's strategy is to contrast the centrality and 
frequency of the term in the metalanguage with the synchronous 
ambivalencies and uncertainties of the notion. 
Ghanotakis' article is limited mainly by its brevity; Grieder provides a more successful 
account, particularly as regards the development and ambivalence of Wesen; however 
Grieder's weakness is a semantic concern which fails to appreciate the methodological or 
tactical dimensions. Both writers appreciate the "close affinity" of Wesen and Grund, 
referring to Heidegger's "definition" of Wesen in "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930): - 
"»Wesen« ist dabei verstanden als der Grund der "'Essence' is thereby understood as ground of 
inneren Möglichkeit dessen, was zunächst und the inner possibility of that which is 
im allgemeinen als bekannt zugestanden wird. " immediately and generally conceded as 
8 known. " 
They likewise both recognise that this problem of "close affinities", "inseparability", 
"entanglement", "co-extensiveness" and "interchangeability" covers a wide range of other 
key terms (e. g.: being, truth, gathering, horizon, meaning). 
Taking these observations as a starting-point, and now placing Grund at the centre of 
attention, a series of texts from Heidegger will be analysed. It is taken as obvious from the 
start that Ursprung and Fundament belong to the network of associations, along with 
25 ibid., p. 81 
26 ibid., p. 68 
27 ibid., p. 64 
28 GA9, p. 186; own translation. 
45 
morphological variations of these (e. g. grtinden, entspringen, grtindlich, fundieren... ). The 
textual analyses selected extend the network to the following (for each root only one form is 
given; morphological variations are assumed as understood): Bedingung der Möglichkeit, 
Verwurzelung, Ermöglichung, Öffnung, Lichtung, aussprechen, liegen, geben, ermöglichen, 
Horizont, Sinn, erwachsen, bestimmen, Transzendenz, Freiheit, Umwillen, Dasein, 
Zeitlichkeit, zeitigen. 29 The absence from this list of Sein, Wahrheit and Ereignis - which 
are among the most important of many missing items - is only provisional. 
30 If the extent of 
this as a meaning-network of foundational-dependence-type-relations seems excessive, the 
reader is referred hack to the observations of Ghanotakis and Grieder. One final point: in 
the course of the analyses it is sought also to comment on the how and why of the lack of 
separability and stability of semantic items. 
Semantic interpenetration in Heidegger may be said to occur in any of the following ways. 
(1) Apposition: centrally, simply listing alternative words at the same place in the text; 
effected by (e. g. ) brackets, footnotes, perenthetic dashes, "or" connectors, "i. e. " 
connectors. (2) Interchanging: centrally, during what is a repetition or structural parallel of 
an earlier formulation, certain lexical items are changed for others. (3) (Quasi- 
)identification: the text in one way or another places an identification or quasi-identification 
between two lexical items (in its simplest form, "X is Y", where an identity is intended; but 
Heidegger uses a variety of connectives). (4) Metaphor and simile. (5) Hermeneutical 
association (explicit interpretation, e. g. with an als connector). (6) Etymological association 
(morphological variation on the same root, even where the meanings are normally quite 
different). (7) Alliterative association. These categories give an idea of the range of 
29 For translations of terms in this list, see the appendix. In many cases the idea of foundational 
dependence does not allow itself to be lifted easily from the text in the form of one or two lexical 
items; thus the list has been formed with some textual violence; the justification is giving the 
reader a preliminary overview of the range of the network. However it should be pointed out that 
even this list little more than scratches the surface. The following terms (among others) could also 
have been worked in, but the textual analyses required would have been tedious: einschließen, 
prägen, gehören, zugrundeliegen, vorangehen, früher sein, konstituieren, verstehen (tr.: to 
include, to mould, to belong, to lie-as-basis, to precede, to be earlier, to constitute, to 
understand). 
30 VWG, pp. 31f. (GA9, pp. 135f. ): Heidegger speaks of the Verklammerung (bracketting together) 
and the Wesenszusammenhang (essential connectedness) of Grund, Sein, Wahrheit and 
Transzendenz. 
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semantic associations referred to here. However such associations cannot he fully 
categorised in this way. Many examples of semantic shifting lie indeterminately among the 
above categories. In other cases it is not clear whether or not an association is intended (for 
example, because there is no sufficient unified background against which the change could 
be measured). 
One point that should become increasingly clear over the following pages is that the 
language problems referred to here cannot and should not be reduced to a matter of 
(multiple) "interpretation". Certainly Heidegger uses forms of expression which can be 
described as interpretative, but I think these are better viewed as one among many devices 
used to create semantic interpenetration. The danger of reducing semantic interpenetration 
to interpretation is that the latter may be taken as signifying a substitution of one meaning 
for another, or at least, as a privileging of one meaning over another. Such privileging 
entails a loss of whatever non-metaphysical advantages semantic interpenetration may have 
possessed. Patterns of substitution and privileging resurrect the idea that Grund is indeed 
abandoned or subordinated, and thus nurture the interpretation of the Kehre as a 
biographical "from... to... " progression. Above all, it is what I have labelled 
"interchanging" which shows that a substitutive or privileging model does not apply to 
semantic interpenetration, since the interchanges never prefer one lexical set over another 
but mix them equally. A study of the texts suggests a model where incompletely assimilable 
meanings are synthesised or held together in an absence of privileging. 
2) Textual Analyses 
The first text for analysis comes from SZ, and links together the traditional foundational 
structure of rootedness (Verwurzelung) with the supposedly post- or anti-foundational 
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conceptions of clearing 31 (Lichtung) and opening (Öffnung). At the beginning of SZ §69 
there are the following sentences. 
"Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit... ist 
die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß ein 
Seiendes sein kann, das als sein »Da« existiert... 
Das Seiende, das den Titel Da-sein trägt, ist 
»gelichtet«.... Was dieses Seiende wesenhaft 
lichtet, das heißt es für es selbst sowohl »offen« 
als auch »hell« macht, wurde vor aller 
»zeitlichen« Interpretation als Sorge 
bestimmt.... Die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit lichtet 
das Da ursprünglich. Sie ist das primäre 
Regulativ der möglichen Einheit aller 
wesenhaften existenzialen Strukturen des 
Daseins. Erst aus der Verwurzelung des Da- 
seins in der Zeitlichkeit.... " 
32 
"The ecstatical unity of temporality... is the 
condition for the possibility that there can be 
an entity which exists as its 'there'. The 
entity which bears the title 'Being-there' is 
one that has been 'cleared'.... That by which 
this entity is essentially cleared - in other 
words, that which makes it both 'open' for 
itself and 'bright' for itself - is what we have 
defined as 'care'.... Ecstatic temporality 
clears the 'there' primordially. It is what 
primarily regulates the possible unity of all 
Dasein's existential structures. Only through 
the fact that Being-there is rooted in 
temporality.... " 
This passage, beginning §69, has the function of exploring further the meaning of its first 
sentence. The sentences move through a variety of expressions, yet all say much the "same" 
thing. To make the repetitions clearer, the following rewrites the first and last three 
sentences: - 
1. Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit ist die Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit dafür, daß ein Seiendes sein kann, das als sein »Da« 
existiert. 
33 
2. Die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit lichtet das Da ursprünglich. 
31 Cf. the comments of Werner Marx quoted in the introduction, section 2bi, in which Marx tries to 
characterise the turn as an abandonment of traditional foundational vocabulary for a lexis in which 
(e. g. ) Lichtung and Öffnung are typical. 
32 SZ, pp. 350-351. 
33 The relevant parts of the sentence are underlined. In many of the analyses below, I have followed 
the same method of reorganizing the essential parts of the text in German. The purpose of such 
reorganization is to make the patterns and parallels in the Heidegger text as clear as possible. Since 
the German is often lexically more economical and precise than the English, translation in many 
cases would only revive the confusion. Translations are footnoted, but the text of the dissertation 
does and must work with the German. The translations here are: 1. the ecstatic unity of 
temporality is the condition of the possibility for an entity being able to be which exists as its 
' there'; 2. ecstatic temporality clears the 'there' primordially; 3. temporality is what primarily 
regulates the possible unity of all Dasein's existential structures; 
4. Da-sein is rooted in 
temporality. 
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3. Die Zeitlichkeit ist das primäre Regulativ der möglichen Einheit aller 
wesenhaften existenzialen Strukturen des Daseins. 
4. Das Da-sein ist in der Zeitlichkeit verwurzelt. 
The relations through which this passage shifts in the relation of Zeitlichkeit and Da(-sein) 
are: (a) ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für, (b) lichtet ursprünglich, (c) ist das primäre 
Regulativ der möglichen Einheit der Strukturen des, (d) verwurzelt in. In the original 
passage, lichten is interpreted as carrying the meaning of "opening" as well as 
"illuminating". Thus, interwoven in this passage, we find: (a) a form evocative of Kant's 
foundational ism; (b) a form found in the (supposedly non-metaphysical, non-foundational) 
later Heidegger; (c) a seemingly technical, logical, or structural form; and finally, (d) a 
metaphor of rootedness which would seem to reinstate everything which a "good anti- 
metaphysician" would wish to escape. Given the order in which these relations occur, there 
is certainly no room for suggestion here that the language of opening and illuminating 
supercedes or replaces the lexical forms which appear more foundationalist and 
metaphysical. The context suggests they are alternative, parallel modes of expression, 
although it would be to go too far to interpret them as identical or synonymous. 
Nevertheless, a replacement model can be firmly excluded; and, with a degree of 
probability, so can an interpretation which seeks to place fine distinctions between the 
interwoven relations. 
As a final note it should be pointed out that in the third sentence of the original quotation, a 
"das heißt" clause interpretatively adds offen to gelichtet (corresponding substantives: 
Öffnung, Lichtung). 
***** 
The next analysis turns on a series of sentences excerpted from MAL. Here the more 
obviously foundational notions of origin (Ursprung) and originating-from or leaping-out 
(Entspringen) are associated with the less obviously foundational notions of speaking-out 
(Aussprechen), giving (Geben) and Tieing (Liegen). In these lectures of Summer 1928, the 
following concatenation of relations between Gewärtigen (expecting) and Dann (the "then") 
are to be found. 
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"Das Gewärtigen gibt selbst aus sich, als 
Gewärtigen, das Dann her. Das Dann ist das, 
als welches das Gewärtigen sich ausspricht - 
was also in ihm selbst liegt. Das Dann ist das, 
als welches das Gewärtigen sich ausspricht - 
was also in ihm liegt. Im Gewärtigen und nur in 
ihm schlummern gleichsam die Dann.... Das 
Dann erhebt sich aus und in einem 
Gewärtigen.... [Das Dann] entspringt dem 
Gewärtigen als solchem und ist weder eine 
Objekt- noch eine Subjekteigenschaft.... Das im 
Gewärtigen aufspringende und aussprechbare 
Dann.... " 34 
"Expecting gives out of itself, as expecting, 
the then. The then is that as which expectation 
speaks itself out - is thus something in 
expectation itself. In expecting, and only in it, 
slumbers, as it were, the thens.... The then 
arises from and in an expecting.... [The then] 
springs from expecting as such and is neither 
a property of objects nor of subjects..... The 
then which springs up and can be spoken out 
35 in expecting....  
As if he has not yet made the point quite clear enough, Heidegger later repeats it as 
follows. 
"Um es nochmal zu sagen: Gewärtigen, 
Behalten und Gegenwärtigen sind nicht etwa 
nur die Art des Erfassens der Dann, Damals 
und Jetzt, die Weise des Bewußtseins davon, 
sondern selbst der Ursprung. " 
36 
"To repeat: expectancy, retention and making- 
present are not merely the way we grasp the 
then, the formerly, and the now, not merely 
modes of being conscious of them; they are 
rather the very origin of the then, the 
formerly, and the now. " 
To make the parallels clearer, the relations can be rewritten as follows. 
1. G gibt selbst aus sich D her. 37 
2. G spricht sich als D aus. 
3. D liegt im G. 
4. D schlummert im G. 
5. D erhebt sich aus G. 
6. D erhebt sich in G. 
7. D entspringt G. 
8. D springt im G auf. 
34 MAL, pp 260-261. 
35 Heim's translation slightly corrected and literalised. (As regards corrections, it is assumed that the 
German is the more reliable version, which may not always be the case). 
36 MAL, p. 263. 
37 Translations: 1. G gives D hither from itself; 2. G speaks-out itself as D; 3. D lies in G; 4. D 
slumbers in G; 5. D raises itself from out of G; 6. D raises itself in G; 7. D springs 
from G; 8. D 
springs up in G; 9. D can speak-out itself out in G; 10. G is the origin of 
D. 
-SO 
9. D kann sich im G aussprechen. 
10. G ist der Ursprung des D. 
Thus in only three pages, Heidegger runs through ten different ways of expressing the 
relation between two concepts. Why? "Substitution" and "interpretation" are hardly 
adequate to the situation, for what is being substituted for what? what is being interpreted 
as what? The basic relation here is a foundational one, but Heidegger avoids pinning 
himself to any particular lexis in the expression of this relation. The variety of relations 
also contain some mildly disruptive features: for example, in (1) and (2) Gewärtigen is the 
agent of the derivation, but in (5)-(8) the agent is clearly Dann; there is a play on internality 
and externality going on - (1), (2), (5) and (7) posit a separation of Gewärtigen and Dann, 
while (3), (4) and (6) suggest that Dann remains internal to Gewärtigen: further, there is 
variation between static, dynamic and formal characterisations of the relation: (10) is a 
formalisation, (3) and (4) are static - (4) particularly emphasises the static, while (1) and 
(5)-(8) are dynamic. It is quite impossible from the context to ascribe any of these poles 
(agent-patient, internal-external, static-dynamic, formal-natural) priority over its opposite. 
Thus, while it would appear that the same foundational relation is the subject of all the 
various expressions, to unify them in a single written form would lose something vital, 
namely the tensions between the various expressions. 
In the second of the parallels analysed above, it was seen how Aussprechen (speaking-out) 
was made to carry a foundational role. One of the significant areas in the intertwined 
foundational fabric of Heideggers earlier writing is that of meaning (Sinn) and 
understanding (Verstehen). This is examined more carefully in chapter 4, but for the 
moment the following passage can be noted which links "making possible" with "giving a 
sense/meaning to". (The former, "making possible" (Ermöglichung) is again linked into the 
foundational network further below). 
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"Wie die Zukunft primär das Verstehen, die 
Gewesenheit die Stimmung ermöglicht, so hat 
das dritte konstitutive Strukturmoment der 
Sorge, das Verfallen, seinen existenzialen Sinn 
38 
in der Gegenwart. " 
"Just as understanding is made po,, sihle 
primarily by the future, and moods are made 
possible by having been, the third constitutive 
item in the structure of care - namely, falling - 
has its existential meaning in the Present. " 
In the first part of the comparison, future and past are related to mood and understanding by 
ermöglichen (to make possible). In the second part of the comparison, a parallel relation 
between present and falling is set up, but now the connective is changed to "seinen 
existenzialen Sinn haben" - in other words, making possible is paralleled with containing or 
providing existential sense or meaning. 
***** 
The matter in hand now turns to a comprehensive study of the variety of connections 
posited between the trio Transzendenz, Zeitlichkeit, Seinsverständnis (transcendence, 
temporality and understanding-of-being). First a passage from Heidegger is taken as an 
example of how lexical variation operates in practice. Then a comprehensive summary is 
given of the range of expression used by Heidegger to relate the three concepts. 
"Wenn Transzendenz des Seinsverständnis 
ermöglicht, Transzendenz aber in der ekstatisch- 
horizontalen Verfassung der Zeitlichkeit 
gründet, dann ist diese die Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses. " 39 
"If transcendence makes possible the 
understanding of being and if transcendence is 
founded on the ecstatic-honzonal constitution 
of temporality, then temporality is the 
condition of the possibility of the 
understanding of being. " 
Formally expressed: - 
1. Transzendenz r. Seinsverständnis (r: ermöglichen) 
and 
2. Zeitlichkeit r. Transzendenz (r': gründen in 
40 
therefore 
38 SZ, p. 346. 
39 GP, p. 429. 
40 
r' means the inverse of r. 
52 
3. Zeitlichkeit r. Seinsverständnis (r: Bedingung der Möglichkeit) 
The form of the whole is that of a formal argument from premises to conclusion, yet this 
can only be the case if the various expressions of the foundational relation (r) are the same. 
In the following list of additional relations of Zeitlichkeit, Transzendenz and 
Seinsverständnis in Heidegger, rather than lengthily quoting the original texts and then 
extracting subject, object and verbal relation from complex German sentences, the bare 
essentials have been reformulated (in German, with the verbal relations translated in the 
footnotes). 
1. Zeitlichkeit ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Transzendenz. 41 
2. Zeitlichkeit ermöglicht Transzendenz. 42 
3. Transzendenz ist möglich aufgrund der Zeitlichkeit . 
43 
4. Zeitlichkeit ist die innere Möglichkeit der Transzendenz. 44 
5. Zeitlichkeit ist das Geschehen der Transzendenz. 45 
6. Transzendenz ist in der Zeitlichkeit verwurzelt. 46 
7. Transzendenz wurzelt im Wesen der Zeit (this is reexpressed in a 
footnote as "die temporale Interpretation der Transzendenz} . 
47 
8. Transzendenz fundiert zeitlich. 48 
9. Transzendenz zeitigt sich in der Zeitlichkeit 
49 
10. Seinsverständnis ist Transzendenz. 50 
41 GP, p. 452; "... condition of the possibility for... " 
42 SZ, p. 364; "... makes possible... " 
43 GP, p. 444; "... is possible on the basis of... " 
44 MAL, p. 252; "... is the inner possibility of... " 
45 VWG, p. 69 (GA9, p. 173); "... is the happening of... " 
46 GP, p. 460; "... is rooted in... " 
47 VWG, p. 62 (GA9, p. 166); "... takes root in... " 
48 SZ, p. 389; "... founds temporally. " 
49 MAL, p. 273; "... temporal 1 zes itself in... " 
50 MAL, p. 280; "... is...,, 
53 
11. Zeit als Horizont des Seinsverständnisses. "51 
12. Transzendenz bildet Seinsverständnis aus. 52 
Sentences (1) to (4) are very similar - lexical variations of the idea of "making possible"; 
(6) and (7) repeat the naturalistic metaphor of "taking root" (the footnote to (7) then takes 
the relation in a hermeneutic direction! ); (5) is interesting, since it brings in a dynamic note 
(das Geschehen), which in Heidegger has textual associations with history (historical 
origins) and semantic associations with the Ereignis; (9) uses sich zeitigen for the 
foundational relation (see pt. B, ch. 1, section Ic for more on this); (10) is typical of the 
replacement of a foundational relation with one of apparent identity (cf. Heidegger's 
comments on the identity of Sein and Grund); (11) raises the issue of convergence between 
Heidegger's conceptions of Grund and Horizont (this point is expanded below and examined 
in detail in pt. B, ch. 1, section 2). While (1) to (11) are all typical, (12) is an unusual 
metaphor. 
While this has briefly covered the foundational relations posited between (for the most part) 
Transzendenz and Zeitlichkeit, it must be said that the poles of these foundational relations 
are themselves foundational in essence (e. g. Transzendenz is described in VWG53 as the 
Urgeschehen and as Freiheit zum Grunde). The interpretation of these poles is discussed 
further in pt. B, ch. 1, section 1. The coincidence between pole and relation is discussed 
further in pt. A, ch. 4, section 3. 
In the context of the eleventh of the above sentences, a direct association of Grund and 
Horizont was indicated. One of the patterns which appear within the initial linguistic 
confusion is that of words which change the structure of founding. Founding is perhaps 
traditionally perceived as a linear mono-directional dependence relation. A conflation of 
Grund and Horizont (if there is one in Heidegger) would severely threaten such a structural 
perception of foundations. The following provides a further example of how Horizont is 
worked into the text. 
51 SZ, p. 1 & 17; "... as horizon... " (not actually a proper sentence, but the relevance is the same). 
52 
VWG, p. 65 (GA9, p. 170); ausbildet: cultivates/shapes/forms/develops 
53 
p 70f. (GA9, p. 175) 
54 
"Dieses [leibhaftige] Begegnenlassen [von 
Seiendem] gründet in einer Gegenwart. Sie [die 
Gegenwart] gibt überhaupt den ekstatischen 
Horizont, innerhalb dessen Seiendes leibhaftig 
54 anwesend sein kann. 
"Letting them [i. e. entities] be thus 
encountered [bodily] is grounded in a Present. 
This Present gives us in general the ecstatical 
horizon within which entities can have bodily 
presence. " 
The capacity of entities to have bodily presence (2nd sentence) and letting them he bodily 
encountered (1st sentence) amounts to much the same thing; the two sentences connect this 
to "eine Gegenwart", the first with "gründen in", the second with "den ekstatischen 
Horizont geben". Horizon here has the same function as a foundation, but this 
interchanging is structurally violent. The horizonal reconstruction of ground is examined in 
greater detail in pt. B, ch. 1, section 2. 
The passages in MAL and VWG which discuss Transzendenz and Zeitlichkeit also bring the 
concepts of Umwillen and Freiheit into the network. MAL gives the following connections 
(Heidegger concludes the third of these from the conjunction of the first and second): - 
1. Das Umwillen ist das Urphänomen von Grund. 55 
2. Das Umwillen zeitigt sich in der Freiheit. 56 
3. Die Freiheit ist der Ursprung von Grund. 57 
The conjunction of these in a syllogistic pattern suggests that sich zeitigen in (temporalising 
itself in) is quasi-synonymous with Urphänomen sein (being the original phenomenon) and 
Ursprung sein (being the origin). Sich zeitigen not only has the meaning of "temporal ising", 
but also (archaically) of ripening, of growing to maturity. This same idea of growth can be 
seen in the following association. In SZ Heidegger analyses Aussage as <Aufzeigung, 
Prüdikation, Mitteilung > . 
58 During his exposition he states: - 
54 SZ, p. 346; the words in square brackets add in information from the preceding sentences which 
make it clearer how the second of the quoted sentences relates to the first. 
55 MAL, p. 276 & p. 282; note that these four sentences are, like the previous ones, simplifications, 
not quotations. Tr.: "the for-the-sake-of is the basic phenomenon of ground. " 
56 MAL, p. 276; "the for-the-sake-of temporalises itself in freedom. " 
57 ibid.; "freedom is the origin of ground. " 
58 SZ, pp. 154f.; <pointing-out, predication, communication >. 
55 
"Die zweite Bedeutung von Aussage [i. e. 
Prädikation) hat ihr Fundament in der ersten 
[i. e. Aufzeigung). Die Glieder der 
prädizierenden Artikulation, Subjekt-Prädikat, 
erwachsen innerhalb der Aufzeigung. " 
59 
"The second signification of 'assertion' [i. e. 
predication] has its foundation in the first [i. e. 
pointing out]. Within this pointing-out, the 
elements which are Articulated in predication 
- the subject and predicate - arise. " 
The second of these two sentences either restates or renders more precise the first. The 
lexical shift which occurs is "hat ihr Fundament in" ---> "[Die Glieder] erwachsen 
innerhalb". Erwachsen (translated rather flatly by Macquarrie & Robinson as "arise") 
carries the sense of growing to maturity. What is important is that within the network of 
associations around the foundational, certain patterns and trends are to he found, one of 
which is the predilection for slipping in dynamic metaphors of growth and natural 
development. The association of foundational relations with sich zeitigen is examined 
further in pt. B, ch. 1, section Ic. 
The next example builds further on the network of associations, linking conceptions of 
temporality, determination, horizonality, freedom and transcendence (among others). 
"Die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich primär aus der 
Zukunft. Das besagt: die ekstatische Ganze der 
Zeitlichkeit und damit die Einheit des 
Horizontes ist primär aus der Zukunft 
bestimmt. Das ist der metaphysische Ausdruck 
dafür, daß die Welt, die eben in nichts anderem 
gründet als in der ekstatischen Ganzheit des 
Horizontes, sich primär aus dem Umwillen 
zeitigt. Dieses Umwillen ist je das Umwillen 
des Willens, der Freiheit, d. h. des 
60 
transzendierenden Zu-sich-selbst-seins. " 
"Temporality temporalizes itself primarily out 
of the future. This means that the ecstatic 
whole of temporality, and hence the unity of 
the horizon, is determined primarily out of the 
future. That is the metaphysical way of saying 
that the world, which is grounded in nothing 
else than the ecstatic totality of the time 
horizon, temporalizes itself primarily out of 
the for-the-sake-of. This for-the-sake-of is, in 
each case, the for-the-sake-of of willing, of 
freedom, i. e., of the transcending being- 
toward-oneself. " 
This passage exhibits a number of types of semantic shift. The associations can be detected 
because the passage is structured according to a number of repetitions. The idea of the first 
sentence is repeated in the second, introduced by the words "das besagt:... ". The same idea 
is repeated again, from a different perspective, in the third sentence, as can be seen from 
the introductory words "das ist der metaphyische Ausdruck dafür, daß... ". In the fourth 
59 SZ, p. 155. 
60 MAL, p. 273 
56 
sentence, there are shifts structured according to simpler connectors: "ist", apposition, a 
"d. h. " connector. Between the first and second sentences, one of the shifts is "sich zeitigt" - 
-> "ist bestimmt". While the structure of the passage suggests the same idea is being 
presented, the words are slightly different, and in particular, "sich zeitigt" has changed to 
"ist bestimmt". In the third sentence, the verb of this same idea shifts back again to "sich 
zeitigt". In the second sentence, we have the phrase "das ekstatische Ganzheit der 
Zeitlichkeit und damit die Einheit des Horizontes". What is the strength of "und damit"? 
Why is it the case that if the idea holds true of "das ekstatische Ganzheit der Zeitlichkeit", 
it also holds true of "die Einheit des Horizontes"? Here again, there is a certain sameness 
posited between two different lexical items. In the third sentence, we find these two same 
phrases fused together into one phrase: "die ekstatische Ganzheit des Zeithorizontes". Here 
a different kind of sameness is posited between the lexical items. In the final sentence in the 
passage there are appositions of "der Wille", "die Freiheit", "das transzendierende Zu-sich- 
selbst-sein" . 
***** 
The final passage for analysis looks a step beyond the work of the 1920`s, at Beiträge zur 
Philosophie (BP). Although slightly different in character, one can see that the technique of 
building parallel structures with nevertheless constantly changing lexis is an art which 
Heidegger by no means abandons. In BP Heidegger offers the following remarkable 
elaboration of the Ereignis. 
"Das Sein ist das Er-eignis. 
Ereignis ist: 
1. die Er-eignung.... 
2. Das Ereignis der Er-eignung schließt in sich die Ent-scheidung... 
3. Die Er-eignung als Entscheidung bringt den Geschiedenen die Ent-gegnung... 
4. Die Ent-gegnung ist der Ursprung des Streites, der west, indem er das 
Seiende seiner Verlorenheit in die bloße Seiendheit entsetzt. Die Ent-setzurig... 
5. Die Ent-setzung aber ist aus der Lichtung des Da begriffen zugleich der Ent- 
zug des Ereignisses... 
6. So reich gefügt und bildlos das Seyn west, es ruht doch in 
ihm selbst und 
seiner Einfachheit....... seine Einfachheit..., die aus der 
Ent-gegnung als Streit 
entspringt. 
57 
7. Das Einfache des Seyns hat in sich das Gepräge der Einzigkeit... 
8. Die Einzigkeit des Seyns begründet seine Einsamkeit-. " 
61 
At the end of the exposition, Heidegger comments on the whole: - 
"In keiner diese Nennungen wird das Wesen des Seyns voll gedacht und doch wird 
es in jeder »ganz« gedacht.... Ereignis meint immer Ereignis als Er-eignung, Ent- 
scheidung, Ent-gegnung, Ent-setzung, Entzug. Einfachheit, Einzigkeit, Einsamkeit. 
Ungegenständlich ist die Einheit dieser Wesun "62 g.... 
Heidegger simultaneously imposes a rigid framework and attempts to breach its borders by 
conducting a seamless narration. This simultaneity of formal construction and destruction 
was also to he found in the 1920's writing: phenomena would be described with a list of 
words (often triadic, also often longer); formal, sometimes very complex relations would he 
set up within this multiple elaboration; but the narrative continuity of the text would often 
partially re-disguise the formal structure. Not only narrative continuity, but lexical variation 
of coordinating concepts would add to the smoke-screen effect. In the passage quoted from 
BP, lexical variation of coordinating concepts is also to be seen. Numbering off the 
coordinating concepts according to Heidegger's own numbering, they are as follows: - 
1. [Ereignis]... ist... [die Er-eignung]63 
2.... schließt in sich... 
61 BP, pp 470f.; the emphases are Heidegger's - he uses them to mark out from the narrative the parts 
of the concatenation of concepts; it should also be noted that this is NOT a linear concatenation, 
but a branched or forked concatenation: the branch occurs at Ent-gegnung, the first branch 
continues <Entsetzung - Entzug >, the second branch is <Einfachheit - Einzigkeit - 
Einsamkeit>. Translation cannot meet the German. A guide: "Being is the e-vent. Event is 1. e- 
venting.... 2. The event of e-venting encloses in itself the de-cision [di-vided]... 3. E-venting as 
decision brings to the divided the re-tort... 4. Re-tort is the origin of the struggle which essences 
by ap-palling the entity in its lost-ness in pure entitiveness..... 5. But ap-palling is at the same 
time, conceived from [in terms of] the clearing of the there, the with-drawal of the event... 6. 
However richly put together and imageless being may essence, nevertheless it is at peace in itself 
and its simplicity'....... its simplicity..., which sources from the re-tort as struggle. 7. The simple 
of being has in itself the mould of singularity... 8. The singularity of being grounds its 
aloneness.... " 
62 ibid. Guide to meaning: "In none of these namings is the essence of being fully thought and yet in 
each it is indeed 'wholly' thought... Event always means event as e-venting, de-ciding, re-torting. 
ap-palling, withdrawal, simplicity, singularity, aloneness. The unity of this essencing is non- 
entitative.... " 
63 
See the last footnote but one for translations. 
58 
3.... als...... bringt ... 
4.... ist der Ursprung des... 
5.... ist aus der Lichtung des Da begriffen zugleich... 
6.... entspringt... 
7.... hat in sich das Gepräge der... 
8.... begründet... 
It has already been shown how variation between some of these (1,4,5,6,8) is typical of 
Heidegger's expression of foundational relations. 
Turning to Heidegger's comment on the whole exposition, he says: "Ungegenständlich ist 
die Einheit dieser Wesung. "64 The Wesung (essencing) refers to the narrative-concatenation, 
and its unity is regarded as "non-entitative" or "non-objectivised". Two techniques were 
used to avoid entitativisation: a continuously narrative form on which the formal framework 
was only superimposed, and lexical variation of coordinating concepts. From this one can 
conclude then that one of the purposes of lexical variation is avoidance of 
Gegenständlichkeit (objectivisation, entitativisation). 
The final question about the last passage is this: what do these lexically varied coordinating 
relations express? Many of these coordinating relations (e. g. begründen, Ursprung, 
entspringen) had long been associated with the expression of foundational dependence: 
likewise, BP sees one of Heidegger's greatest indulgements in the language of ground; 65 
paradoxically, it would be inappropriate carelessly to attribute a foundational meaning here. In, 
Nor is it simply that the lexis of ground has found a reinterpretation; the lexis actually 
works in a different way in the conveyance of meaning. The relation between meaning-unit 
and written word has developed far from the one-to-one connections of Locke or the early 
Wittgenstein, nor can it be accommodated within any modern semantic theory of which I 
know. Nevertheless it may be to misunderstand Heidegger to think that he has created his 
own rules out of caprice; more reasonable would be the suppositions either that he is 
exaggerating and accelerating the historically dynamic relation of meaning-unit and written 
word, or that the "rules" he creates are responses to philosophical needs perceived by him. 
64 Quoted and translated above. "The unity of this essencing is non-entitative. " 
59 
In the following section it is sought to characterise this "different way " in which 
Heidegger's language works in such cases as those cited above. 
3) A Solution 
The foregoing observations were by no means exhaustive, and they only touch one of many 
kinds of language-play in Heidegger. They were selected according to their relevance to the 
subject of this thesis, not in order to try to solve the more general problem of language in 
Heidegger. 
To recapitulate: foundational ideas and relations are conveyed by a wide lexis, centering on 
words built from the root forms -grund-, -spring-, and -fund-; the foundational lexis 
comprises not only individual words, sometimes it is conveyed by units below that of the 
word (e. g. prefixes, such as "ur-"), sometimes by units higher than that of the word (e. g. 
phrases66). The lexical variation is much greater than this, however: the network extends to 
words which normally have quite different meanings (e. g. lichten, aussprechen, Sinn 
haben), so that here we can speak of semantic interpenetration. Ghanotakis and Grieder 
agree with this "co-extensiveness and often interchangeability" of key notions, citing a 
Wesen-centered network linking ground, meaning (Sinn), being, truth and horizon (among 
others). That the links or semantic interpenetrations do indeed occur has been shown by 
examining texts where interchanges occur: that meaning should remain similar despite the 
lexical shift is proved by the formal frameworks (e. g. ostensible repetition, listing, 
comparison, syllogism) within which the shifts occur. Of course there may be many 
instances of such shifting and semantic interpenetration in Heidegger - but in most instances 
we are not fortunate enough to have a formal textual framework to demonstrate its 
occurrence. Those locations where a clear framework exists nevertheless show that the 
shifts and interpenetrations are not occasional idiosyncrasies, but so constant that they form 
65 The subject of foundations in BP will be returned to in pt-B, ch. 2. 
66 A short list of examples: That seine ontologische Möglichkeit in" (SZ278), "wesenhaft liegen" 
(SZ285), "ist die existenziale Bedingung der Möglichkeit für" (SZ286), "zugrunde liegen" 
(SZ336), "auf dem Grunde möglich sein" (SZ339), "durch... (mit)bestimmt/konstituiert" (SZ, 
pp. 43,110,133,220). 
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the rule rather than the exception. If we extend this finding to all of Heidegger's writing, 
one may then wonder how anything can properly he distinguished or discerned. If semantic 
interpenetration is so wide, and semantic differentiation is a precondition of meaningful 
discourse, then one may wonder with Paul Hühnerfeld whether Heidegger operates a 
"Vokabular ohne Inhalt" (a vocabulary without content). 67 In reponse to this several points 
should be made. Firstly, many distinctions of a normal type are commonly made and 
exploited by Heidegger - but their significance is often local and temporary. Secondly. 
semantic interpenetration extends to two word-types: (i) keywords; (ii) words expressing 
the structural fabric of what might otherwise have been a system. Thirdly, the phrase 
"semantic interpenetration" is taken rather than "semantic mergence", since "differences" of 
a non-normal type remain within the network: as was seen in some of the examples, no 
member of the network could be ascribed priority, and tensions remained within the 
semantic field as regards (for example) static-dynamic, internal-external, formal-natural, 
and agency. In particular, it could not be maintained that there was substitution of certain 
terms for others (such as replacement of traditional or arborial terms for the terminology of 
time, clearing, opening and speaking). The significance of this will emerge only slowly in 
the following sections. 
The loss of a degree of semantic stability and separation not only raises the question of the 
meaningfulness of Heidegger's discourse. There is, likewise, the question of what he is 
trying to gain at this cost. Clearly Heidegger believes there is something to be gained. 
"Die Mehrdeutigkeit ist vielmehr das Element, "Rather, multiplicity of meanings is the 
worin das Denken sich bewegen muß, um ein element in which all thought must move in 
strenges zu sein. " 
68 order to be strict thought. " 
The following passage bears on the same muitivocalness, and is from the so-called 
Aristoteles-Einleitung (AE) of 1922, one of the earliest documents in which the 
development of the thought of SZ can be seen. 
67 P. Hühnerfeld. In Sachen Heidegger. Versuch über ein deutsches Genie (München: Paul List 
Verlag, 1961), p. 126; quoted in J. D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in 
Heidegger's Thought (New 
York: Fordham University, 1978), p. 34. 
68 WD, p. 68; in fact here Heidegger is talking about multiple 
interpretations of Plato, but to transfer 
the quote to a different context does not seem wrong. 
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"Die Vieldeutigkeit des Terminus wird in dem 
bedeuteten Gegenstand selbst ihre Wurzeln 
haben.... Die Einstellung auf Vieldeutigkeit 
(pollachos legomerionn) ist kein bloßes 
Herumstochern in isolierten Wortbedeutungen, 
sondern Ausdruck der radikalen Tendenz, die 
bedeutete Gegenständlichkeit selbst zugänglich 
und die Motivquelle der verschiedenen Weisen 
des Bedeutens verfügbar zu machen. " 
69 
"The multivocalness of ihr term will have its 
roots in the signified object itself.... 
Focussing on multivocalness (polfachos 
legomenon) is not a mere poking around at 
isolated meanings of words, but rather the 
expression of the radical tendency to render 
accessible the signified objectivity itself and 
make available the motivational source of the 
various ways of meaning. " 
Two elements from this passage should be emphasised: first, the idea of the Wurzel (root) 
and Quelle (source) of multivocalness - multivocalness raises a foundational issue - the issue 
of the origin of this multiplicity; 70 second, the idea of objectivity. Perhaps a few years later 
Heidegger would have been more circumspect in his use of such a word as "objectivity". 
Nevertheless, in this early writing, it seems that multivocality is intended to indicate 
something outside the text, and to keep it outside the text. This, perhaps, is the thought 
from which semantic interpenetration originates. 
***** 
So far it has rather been assumed that as the problem is special to HHeidegger's texts, 
Heidegger bears responsibility for setting meaning adrift7' in this way. The assumptions 
about where the drifting is occurring, and who or what is responsible for playing games 
with words, are upset by some remarks by Heidegger. 
69 AE, p. 6 (the page-numbering is the original from the manuscript, reproduced 
in the margins in 
Lessing's edition). Heidegger is in fact talking about the term 
"Leben" (life), but the reference to 
Aristotle's manifold ways of the meaning of 
being (pollachos legomenon) shows that the 
comments are intended to have a more general application. 
70 Cf. pt. A, ch. 2, section 3. 
71 The phrase is taken from J. Sallis, "Meaning 
Adrift", Heidegger Studies 1 (1985), pp. 91-100. 
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"Wenn hier schon von einem Spiel die Rede 
sein darf, dann spielen nicht wir mit Wörtern, 
sondern das Wesen der Sprache spielt mit uns, 
nicht nur im vorliegenden Fall, nicht erst heute, 
sondern längst und stets. Die Sprache spielt 
nämlich so mit unserem Sprechen, daß sie 
dieses gern in die mehr vordergründigen 
Bedeutungen der Worte weggehen läßt. Es ist, 
als ob der Mensch hätte, die Sprache eigentlich 
72 
zu bewohnen. " 
"If we may talk here of playing games at all, 
it is not we who play with words, but the 
nature of language plays with us, not only in 
this case, not only now, but long since and 
always. For language plays with our speech - 
it lets our speech drift away into the more 
obvious meanings of words. It is as though 
man had to make an effort to live properly 
with language. " 
This remark from 1952 should be compared with a metaphor from 1921. 
"Diese Situation ist nicht die rettende Küste 
sondern der Sprung ins treibende Boot, und es 
hängt nun daran, das Tau für die Segel in die 
Hand zu bekommen und nach dem Wind zu 
 73 sehen. 
"This situation is not the rescuing coast, 
rather the leap into the drifting boat, and now 
it is a matter of taking the sail-rope in one's 
hand and looking for the wind. " 
Heidegger's point may be this: that as regards the abstract reaches of philosophy, secure, 
objective and unambiguous meanings are a mirage, a fantasy, and perhaps even dangerously 
so. While individuals, or particular societies within rather short historical, geographical and 
cultural boundaries may be able to use language with relative certainty, when one moves (as 
philosophy does) in the realm of millenia of thought spread over a continent or so, there can 
he no such thing as even approximately objective meaning (as far as abstract thought is 
concerned). This mirage is the outcome of illegitimately extending the necessary 
presuppositions about language required for everyday interaction within our immediate 
environments to a near global reach. Such an extension may even be dangerous, since by 
supposing the objectivity of meaning to have a wider reach than it does, one sheds one's 
own responsibility, placing it instead in the mirage. Heidegger's use of language is perhaps 
intended to mimic, not the style of everyday discourse, but the style of trans-millenial and 
trans-cultural discourse, and in so doing, bring home to the reader that in the situation of 
drifting so widely in the abstract reaches of human existence, a reliable and secure truth 
remains the terrifying and non-rescindable responsibility of Dasein. 
This marks the first aspect of the solution offered. 
72 WD, p. 83. The same text is partially quoted by J. Sallis, op. cit., p. 91. 
73 PIA, p. 37; own translation. 
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***** 
The issue in hand, to repeat, is how to interpret the near-interchangeability of a number of 
Heidegger's key terms, how meaning of some kind survives these radical semantic 
interpenetrations, why Heidegger should indulge in such devices. And thus, in the light of 
this, how we are to understand the concept of "ground". To put a name to the solution, we 
can turn to Heidegger's own word Zusammengehörigkeit (belonging-together). 
Zusammengehörigkeit provides less of a solution as a heading under which further 
theorising has been done. One of the first appearances of the term is in Grundprobleme der 
Phänomenologie (GP). 
"Am Ende ist Hegel einer fundamentalen 
Wahrheit auf den Spur, wenn er sagt: Sein und 
Nichts sind identisch, d. h. gehören zusammen. 
Die radikalere Frage ist freilich: Was macht 
eine solche ursprünglichste Zusammengehörig- 
keit überhaupt möglich? Wir sind nicht 
vorbereitet genug, um in dieses Dunkel 
74 vorzudringen. 
"In the end, Hegel is on the track of a 
fundamental truth when he says that being and 
nothing are identical, that is, belong together. 
Of course, the more radical question is, What 
makes such a most original belonging-together 
at all possible? We are not well enough 
prepared to penetrate into this obscure 
region. " 
Hegel's "identisch" is provided with the gloss "gehören zusammen". Heidegger does not 
really hold the thesis that being and nothing are identical. They "belong together" in the 
same way that other key terms do. Zusammengehörigkeit retains this place in the later 
Heidegger's thought. In Der Satz vom Grund (SG), Heidegger writes: - 
"Seinsgeschicklich anfänglich 'sind' Sein und 
Grund das Selbe, bleiben es auch, aber in einer 
Zusammengehörigkeit, die in eine geschichtlich 
wandelhafte Verschiedenheit auseinander- 
geht. "75 
"As a matter of the initiating of the 
fatefulness of being, being and ground 'are' 
the same, and remain so, but in a belonging 
together which diverges in a historically 
changing diversity. " 
Here Zusammengehörigkeit, a compromise between identity and difference, is understood 
historically; in other terms, a time structure holds them together. It should be emphasised 
that the historical dimension in question is not human-historical but seinsgeschichtlich. The 
possibility of confusion here is further promoted by Heidegger's exploitation of the human- 
historical dimension (the history of philosophy) as a reflection of the seins geschichtliche 
74 GP, p. 443. 
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dimension. The general idea (in both historical dimensions) is that the earlier conceptions 
(i. e. those less refined and determined by history) are closer to some original pre- 
conceptual, pre-metaphysical access to being, and that history (with its proliferation and 
semantic dispersion of metaphysical keywords) represents a falling of language from 
being. 76 Moreover, it is in this falling direction that understanding normally tends to 
operate. Heidegger operates a number of devices which, if not actually attempting to 
reverse this process, nevertheless seek to recreate language conditions tending towards the 
recovery of being. One of these devices is the synthesis (Zusammengehörigkeit) effected by 
semantic interpenetration. 77 
This, the attempted reversal of the seinsgeschichtliche dispersion of being, provides the 
second aspect of the solution on offer. 
***** 
In SG the site of Zusammengehörigkeit is identified as the logos. Like 
Zusammengehörigkeit, logos provides less a solution as another label for the problematic. 
"Sein und Grund gehören im logos zusammen. "Being and ground belong together in the 
Der logos nennt diese Zusammengehörigkeit logos. The logos names this belonging 
von Sein und Grund.... Der logos nennt zumal together of being and ground.... The logos 
rund. "78 names at once in One being and ground. " in Einem Sein und Grund. " 
78 
Worth noting in passing are the different positions logos acquires in relation to Sein, 
Grund, and Zusammengehörigkeit: first it is the site of Zusammengehörigkeit; then it is the 
Zusammengehörigkeit of Sein and Grund; then it actually names both Sein and Grund. Here 
the possibility is raised, for the first time but not the last, that the language problem not 
only applies to Grund, but in part constitutes it; in other words, in accounting for semantic 
75 SG, p. 184; own translation. The relevance of this and the next quotation is owed to I. Koza, op. cit. 
Koza mentions Zusammengehörigkeit on p. 7. 
76 Thus one finds a tendency in Heidegger to turn to the ontological concepts of antiquity as one 
approach to the thinking of being. There is a significant study of this aspect of Heidegger's 
finding/founding of the origins of thinking: M. Zarader, Heidegger et les paroles de 1'origine 
(Paris: Vrin, 1986). 
77 Another is a "dialectic" pattern or device; see below at pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
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interpenetration we are already encountering the essence of Heideggerian foundations. 
Simply to rename the problem of semantic interpenetration as logos does not help. 79 One 
author who recognises something of the problem is Herman Rapaport. On the logos he 
writes: 
"The logos is itself a saying wherein other words can be heard, as if the logos were 
not a term but a sound structure against which other words come out of what 
Heidegger calls concealment.... Logos... has to be comprehended in terms of 
gathering or collecting, and for Heidegger the word logos is itself a site where other 
terms are brought together or gathered even as they fall away as one term comes to 
stand for another. 80 
Rapaport appears to have seen at least part of the phenomenon which I have analysed in the 
above passages - but only part. Probably he is aware of the passages on the 
Zusammengehörigkeit of being and ground. But when he speaks of "verbal slippages" 
(where I use terms such as semantic interpenetration and lexical shifting), it seems he has in 
mind primarily morphological variations (e. g. grund ---> gründlich) and alliterative and 
etymological slippages. Of course, morphology, alliteration and etymology do frequently 
provide frameworks for semantic slippage. Other frameworks unmentioned by Rapaport are 
interpretative (... als... ) and metaphorical in appearance, plus those of the type analysed 
above. In all, Rapaport is very much better at finding names for the problem (and 
accounting for it) than analysing textual occurrences. Thus he speaks of Heidegger's 
language as a "manifold of undecidable proximities" and "essentialism... replaced by an 
interrogation of proximities pulled out through discourse". 81 His identification and analysis 
of the problem suffers from the same undecidable proximity of names. Thus using the name 
"paranomasia" he says: 
78 SG, p. 179f.; own translation. The connection of logos and Grund is also found in the early 
Heidegger, e. g. PGZ, p. 365. 
79 The logos is frequently discussed in Heidegger's earlier (as well as later) writings: see the 
following list of references. PGZ, §9(a)(ß); GA21, §§11-12; SZ, §7B, §34; GP, §17; MAL, pp. 1- 
6,156f. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse exhaustively Heidegger's theory of language, 
but only to bring the problem to a point where the issue of ground can be pursued. 
80 H. Rapaport, Heidegger and Derrida - Reflections on Time and Language (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 105. 
81 H. Rapaport, op. cit., pp. 109 & 111. 
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"... for Heidegger paronomasia may well be a key to an understanding of 
temporality. 
And later: 
"Paronomasia is, therefore, a crucial temporal clue for an understanding of language 
as that which radically breaks with our everyday sense of experienced time. " 
83 
The Zusammengehörigkeit of multiply interpenetrating keywords in the originative logos is 
thus given a temporal interpretation. But what kind of temporal interpretation is this? 
Certainly not that of everyday time, that is, of a mono-directional sequence of "nows". In 
fact Rapaport seems to mean a kind of textual temporality: reading and writing texts take 
place in time, and certain devices may be used to disrupt the linear continuity of the text. 84 
Rapaport finds that various devices used by Heidegger have a "metaleptic" form (that is, 
going beyond while remaining where they started from, synchronous moving and staying 
still). When Heidegger ventures through a lexical multiplicity, he both goes beyond where 
he started from, and remains there - and this is supposedly isomorphic to a temporal pattern 
(e. g. synchronisation of present and future). Rapaport's identification of metalepsis85 as a 
paratype86 in Heidegger is a valuable insight. Rapaport's weaknesses are an unjustified 
82 ibid., p. 118; Rapaport gets the word "paranomasia" from E. Schöfer, op. cit. - H. Rapaport, op. cit., 
p. 107; Schäfer certainly fails to identify the problem as extending beyond morphological, 
alliterative and etymological variations. The idea of paranomasia as temporality he owes to Derrida 
and Blanchot - H. Rapaport, pp. 113ff. 
83 H. Rapaport, op. cit., p. 127. 
84 For a more methodical and comprehensive study of such temporality, see D. C. Wood, The 
Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989), pp. 319-360, esp. pp. 330- 
332 & 335ff. 
85 Rapaport's "metalepsy" is, according to the OED (2nd ed. ), a slight misspelling and abuse of its 
original meaning; I have corrected the spelling and kept the meaning Rapaport ascribes to the 
word. 
86 "Paratype" is, I hope, a neologism. Its meaning is discussed further in the conclusion, but a 
preliminary definition can run "a device or pattern which disas-sembles" (see the passages on 
disas-sembly in the introduction, especially at section 3). The word has been chosen in order to 
avoid theoretically loaded terms, particularly words evocative of structuralism or system-building. 
Originally I was using rather dissatisfactory terms drawn from a number of sources: "infra- 
structure" from Gasche (7he Tain of the Mirror), "Tiefenstruktur" from Rombach (Die Gegenwart 
der Philosophie), "metalogical form of thought" from Schäfer (Die Sprache Heideggers). As a 
disas-sembling device or pattern, the paratype iterates indefinitely but non-systematically - in 
different ways the text tends to mould itself to the pattern of paratypes. The paratype is what, if 
anything, saves the text from devolving into a system - it is a kind of anti-category. This is not to 
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restriction of everything to the text, 
87 and (associated with this) a blind eye cast at 
Heidegger's use of such linguistic devices for a para-liptic intimation of being. 88 
To restate: Rapaport recognises a problem like that identified as "semantic 
interpenetration": namely, a holding together or gathering of keywords, in a way in which 
their difference is denied by the gathering, yet at the same time a non-identity is 
maintained. Non-identity or difference is likened to a "going beyond" while denial of 
difference is likened to "staying put". The juxtaposition of such moving beyond while 
staying still is a paratype called metalepsis. Metalepsis has a temporal aspect, which may be 
understood as the synchronisation (identity) of the disparate (difference) moments of time. 
This forgets that the metaleptic synthesis is also paraliptic, i. e. that it emphasises something 
by avoiding it -a device used by Heidegger to intimate what is irretrievably outside the 
text. While Rapaport slides horizontally through textual parallels of (dis-)similarity, 
Heidegger indicates a foundational problem: 
"Die radikalere Frage ist freilich: Was macht "Of course, the more radical question is, 
eine solche ursprünglichste Zusammengehörig- What makes such a most original belonging- 
keit überhaupt möglich? " 
R9 together at all possible? " 
Heidegger asks after the condition for the possibility for such Zusammengehörigkeit of 
keywords. The dramatically presented question is left hanging, however. Paraliptically so. 
This marks a third aspect to the solution on offer: namely, that the problem of semantic 
interpenetration has its origin in the nature of both foundations and time, with certain 
say that it is what Heidegger calls an existential - an existential may have paratypal properties, or 
function in a paratypal way - the paratype is the more general and abstract pattern permitting the 
generation and functioning of existentials. 
$7 Or an extension of the text to "everything"; Wood's borrowing of the word "hydrosemantics" from 
J. L. Austin to describe a trend of recent philosophy comes to mind. D. C. Wood, op. cit., p. 332. 
88 Rapaport does in fact mention a form of paralipsis (though not calling it such); he interprets it 
temporally, speaking of slowing down as one approaches the question of being, of making time; 
nevertheless it is only a passing mention, and he will not acknowledge that such a device aims at 
intimating something irretrievably outside the text. H. Rapaport, op. cit., p. 120. 
89 GP, p. 443. 
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paratypes marking the relations here of language, time and ground - metalepsis and 
paralipsis. 
**** 
At this point a brief recapitulation would be appropriate. A start was made simply by asking 
what Grund meant in Heidegger's earlier work. The problem of language raised itself 
acutely at this point, since the meaning of Grund became dispersed in a multiplicity of 
semantically interpenetrating keywords. The semantic interpenetration maintains an 
interplay of difference and identity, and in a number of respects the semantic items in the 
network are incompletely assimilable. Due to this non-assimilability, it could not be said 
that semantic interpenetration collapsed the text into meaninglessness; nevertheless the 
question remained, what does it communicate? (For the moment this question must remain 
unanswered). It was seen how the phenomenon of semantic interpenetration might be an 
iterating paratype with a temporal interpretation (both a historical and a textual temporality 
were mentioned), and it was seen that Heidegger tries to turn attention towards the 
condition for the possibility (ground) of such a discourse. Thus the problem returns to that 
of ground - but now as something which may point paraliptically beyond the text. 
Paralipsis has it in common with mysticism that they deal with that which is not articulated 
in speech. Heidegger's use of paralipsis has it further in common with mysticism that 
attention is focussed at something which cannot be articulated. The charge of "mysticism" 
can be and has been applied pejoratively against Heidegger. 
90 One must be careful here 
what one means by "mysticism". 
91 "Mysticism" is commonly used in the pejorative sense of 
rendering the obvious obscure - Heidegger indeed uses it 
in this sense in 
Aänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (PIA) in his phrase "bodenlose 
Wortmystik" ("foundationless verbal mysticism"). 
92 But as Caputo93 points out, Heidegger 
was well versed in the mystical tradition, and knew its value in the sense of rendering the 
90 L. Versenyi, Heidegger, Being and Truth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 162f. 
91 The seminal work is: J. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (Ohio University 
Press, 1978 & New York: Fordham University Press, 1986). Subsequent references are to the 
1986 reprint, which contains additional material by way of an extended introduction. 
92 PIA, p. 126. 
93 
op. cit. 
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inarticulable or transcendent in speech. It is interesting to note that when Heidegger finds 
mysticism objectionable, it is on the basis of its foundationlessness. The mystical element in 
Heidegger is used, neither to obscure foundations nor to pitch them into an abyss, rather, to 
attempt to articulate a foundation that lies beyond the reach of normal language (i. e. closer 
to language than can be captured by its gaze). To turn to Caputo, what are the main results 
of his work on mysticism in Heidegger? Do his results help towards a solution to the 
problem of semantic interpenetration? Caputo seeks chiefly to limit the application of the 
word "mysticism" to Heideggers writing. This is the significance of the word "element" in 
the title of his book The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought. 
"The disconcerting thing about Heidegger... is not that he is a mystic, as the 
sneering references to Seinsmystik made by his critics imply, but the fact that he is 
not, that the path he stakes out is ominous, uncertain, exposed on all sides to the 
'danger'. And that, I think, is something about Heidegger which we today, in the 
epoch of differance, are likely to miss. " 
94 
The limited mystical element which Caputo finds is the following: - 
"Heidegger has appropriated the structural relationship between soul and God... in 
order to articulate the relationship in his own work between thought and Being. " 
95 
As an example of the structural relationship in question in the above quotation, one can 
refer briefly to St. Augustine's comment that God is closer to the soul than the soul to itself. 
Here we find Rapaport's metaleptic figure reproduced, although this time stepping (and not 
stepping) beyond the text. To add a historical dimension to this mystical explanation of 
semantic interpenetration, one might cite the myth of the fall of the soul (thought) from its 
union with God (being). 96 Here we find the figure discussed earlier of a seinsgeschichtliche 
dispersion of being into a multiplicity of metaphysical keywords. Other sources include 
attempts to express the ineffable three-in-one character of the Trinity and the dual (god- 
man) nature of Christ, attempts which parallel the problem here of the synchronicity of 
multiplicity and unity in meaning. 
94 J. D. Caputo, op. cit., p. xxi. 
95 J. Caputo, op. cit., p. 239. 
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Of course, none of these theological precedents are confined to the mystical tradition, but 
rather they feature in the philosophico-theological mainstream of Christian doctrinal 
development. The philosophical developments which grew out of the fusion of ancient 
intellectual traditions with the faith-movement of Christianity in the first millenium are 
developments which receive comparatively little attention in modern secularized philosophy. 
Yet it was especially the centuries of still unfinished attempts to render intellectually 
acceptable the faith-insights of the tri-unity of God and the divinity of Christ which formed 
a driving power for ontological thought. Both of these problematics are relevant to any 
discussion of multiplicity and unity, since they involved the leading thinkers of many 
centuries in the development of general ontologies whose eccentricity exceeds the now 
generally acknowledged bounds of the received metaphysical tradition. 
This is a direction which Stephen Tyman takes in his deconstructive appreciation of 
Heidegger. 97 In fact Tyman refers only to Plato, but his reference to this as a "recurrent 
strain" suggests he may not have forgotten the contributions of early Christian thought. 
Tyman completes his analysis of the foundational in (the early) Heidegger by identifying a 
revision of the foundational as "active dimensional openness", which he then restates as 
participation. 98 The terminology of participation makes clearer the relevance to the problem 
of semantic interpenetration (a problem which has already been shown to reflect a deeper 
problem with foundations). Tyman comments: - 
"Drawing upon the still largely enigmatic Platonic doctrine of methexis, let us call 
this suppressed tradition the metaphysics of participation. Whether this constitutes 
merely an occasional recurrent strain within the dominant tradition of metaphysical 
explanation, or a minor tradition of its own, what is significant about the 
metaphysics of participation is not so much its explanatory power as its recognition 
of the need to focus primary attention upon the highly self-referential act of 
cognizing aright the precognitive sources of cognition.... Thus it must be, for 
example, that the Platonic problem of the one and the many is derivative from the 
conscious participation in the beyond-consciousness rather than vice versa.... 
Furthermore, participation is differently named, differently thematized, and 
seemingly even differently experienced in different philosophies. Consequently, as a 
96 There may be another infrastructure at work here: a mediative or bi-directional - "dialectic" (see 
ch. 4, section 2 below). 
97 S. Tyman, "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", International Philosophical 
Quarterly 24 (1984), pp. 347-372. 
98 S. Tyman, op. cit., p. 371. 
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'doctrine, ' it does not enjoy the closure demanded of a systematic explanation. It 
does not explain anything at all, it answers only to a need. " 
99 
What other sources are there for the methectic tradition? The Greek concept of koinonia 
(mutual communion or indwelling) has frequently appeared in Heidegger literature, and has 
its source in early Trinitarian doctrine. Later Trinitarian developments produced the 
concept of perichoresis, mentioned by C. L. Lutz in connection with Heidegger. 100 The Latin 
word for methexis is the root, not only of "participation", but also of "participle" - i. e. that 
grammatical category which combines noun and verb, static and dynamic. This strand is 
taken up by Bigelow into what he calls the "amphiboly" of being. 101 Gasche, in a chapter 
on the "interlacings of heterology", discusses Derrida's appropriation of another Platonic 
concept, that of symploke (interweaving, entrelacement). 102 Gasche appropriates these 
sources as syntheses which are "irreducibly aporetic", containing a "radical alterity". 103 
It is a witness to the intangibility of the problem and the multiplicity of ways in which it 
appears in Heidegger's writings, that (e. g. ) Lutz, Bigelow and Gasche should independently 
offer accounts, all referring to Heidegger, which while coinciding in their basic principle, 
nevertheless differ wildly in terminology, approach and analysis. Lutz and Bigelow will be 
returned to later in this chapter, but a few more words on Gasche are appropriate here. 
Gasche is concerned mainly with Derrida, and as regards interlacings of heterology, 
particularly with Derrida on Plato. But he also discusses Heidegger in this connection. Here 
he fails to appreciate the appearance of the methectic tradition in the earlier Heidegger, and 
99 S. Tyman, op. cit., pp. 371f. 
100 C. Lutz, Zwischen Sein und Nichts, doctoral dissertation, Bonn University, 1984, p. 11. 
Perichoresis originally meant "rotation", but its appropriation into Trinitarian doctrine produced 
what has been called one of the most obscure and incomprehensible of all theological concepts. 
101 PBigelow, op. cit., p. 111.; Bigelow in fact associates the Latin participium with the Greek 
metoche - Lutz, however, with methexis. In any case, the 
literature seems to associate metoche and 
methexis. For more on Bigelow's "amphiboly of being", see pt. A, ch. 4, section 1. 
102 While these Platonic concepts may have had different applications for Plato, their contemporary 
recovery circles around the same problematic. The relevant sources are: R. Gasche, The 
Tain of the 
Mirror (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 79-105; Plato, Statesman (267b-311c): 
Gasche refers to a number of places in Derrida, but particularly: J. Derrida, "La 
Dissemination", 
(ET, e. g. pp. 122,166). 
1 03 R. Gasche, op. cit., p. 104. 
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depends on (yet again) a biographical interpretation of the Kehre to explain how it appears 
in the later Heidegger. He says: - 
"Heidegger's later philosophy reaches out under the name of Being towards 
structures of thought that are not easily recuperable in terms of semantics and that 
are, indeed, more originary than the classical objects of thought. Instead of 
synthesizing the manifold, the contradictory, the aporetic into one speculative whole 
or totality, these structures (such as Zug, Fuge, 
104 Geviert, Unter-schied, and so on) 
serve as path-breaking traces, according to which the manifold, the contradictory, is 
laid out (and held together). " 
105 
Gascht places the early Heidegger outside the methectic tradition (contrary to the opinions 
of Tyman and Bigelow) on the grounds that the syntheses of the manifold, the contradictory 
and the aporetic are totalising syntheses - perhaps he means by this, homogeneous rather 
than heterogeneous. Gasche comes to this conclusion because he follows the "content" of 
what Heidegger says (whereas I have looked primarily at the style and method), and 
because he looks particularly at the notion of totality in SZ. I do not feel qualified to 
digress in detail on totality here, but there seem to be two ways to escape Gasche: (1) one 
refuses to take early Heidegger's totalising strands at their face value, for example, by 
taking the line that in the visible portion of SZ Heidegger was mimicking the metaphysical 
tradition in preparation for a destruction of these same totalising demands in the unwritten 
two-thirds of SZ; (2) or one says that there is a conflict of strata in the earlier Heidegger, 
between a totalising theme which is being steadily undermined by considerations of method 
and the nature of foundations - in other words that the totalising theme is subjected to a 
heterogeneity, a conflict with an anti-totalising direction of thinking. 
These considerations mark a fourth aspect to the solution on offer: namely, that Heidegger 
stands in a long and continuing onto-theological tradition ("methectic"), bordering on the 
mystical tradition, which asserts the heterogeneity of the origin contrary to any 
conceptuality derivable from our normal environments. 
104 On fugue structure, see pt. B. ch. 2, section la. 
105 R. Gasche, op. cit., p. 85. 
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CH. 2. LOGICAL IRREGULARITIES IN FOUNDATIONAL LANGUAGE 
That there is a general language problem in Heidegger, particularly with respect to 
foundational language, was discussed at the beginning of the last chapter. There it was 
pointed out that the language problem has many dimensions, and only one of these 
(semantic interpenetration) was examined. Examination of the problem posed by semantic 
interpenetration led to the beginnings of a revaluation of the foundational. Here a similar 
method will be pursued with respect to the logical dimensions of the problem. An 
adequate account of the foundational in Heidegger's earlier writings must he able to 
account for such formulations as "der Grund gründet" 1 and "der abgründige Grund". 2 
Heidegger's use of paradoxical and tautologous formulations is well-known and well- 
documented, but good explanation of its significance is lacking. 3 In the following section, 
the best account available - that of Erasmus Schäfer - will be examined; subsequently 
Heidegger's discussion of the principles of identity, contradiction and ground in the 
lecture series MAL will be looked at in order to develop a better account. 
1) The significance of paradox and tautology 
Schöfer's principal examples of the use by Heidegger of paradox are the analyses of truth4 
(the un-essence of the essence of truth) and Zeitlichkeit (namely, the repeated formulations 
in which the future is paradoxically said to be "no later" than the past, and the past is said 
to take its origin in the future). 5 A supplementary list of other paradoxical formulations is 
also given by him, for example: the birth-character of death, the flight of Dasein from 
itself, the conflation of "whence" and "whither", the word-plays on bipolar oppositions 
such as "near" and "far", "whole" and "nothing", "first" and "last"; the silent speech of 
1 BP, pp. 29 & 307. 
2 BP, passim; the idea also appears in VWG. 
3 The following comments are based on E. Schöfer, Die Sprache Heideggers (Verlag Neske, 
Pfüllingen, 1962); ET of relevant chapter in J. J. Kockelmans ed. On Heidegger and Language 
(Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972), at pp. 281-301. 
4 In addition to Schöfer's references, also, e. g., BP, pp. 347ff. 
5 Schäfer, op. cit., pp. 186-191. 
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conscience; the courage to fear; the bright night of nothing. 6 Not mentioned by Schäfer, 
and of relevance to this thesis, are the formulations in Beiträge zur Philosophie of the 
abyssal ground? and the need of needlessness. 8 
How does Schäfer assess Heidegger's use of paradox? He draws several elements of 
explanation together: (1) paradox as a shock tactic, the justification of the use of which 
lies in the effect on the reader; (2) paradox as, taking the Greek origin literally, 
"para-doxos" - against doctrine, contrary to the expectations of traditional opinion: (3) 
paradox as a possible form of expression among other forms, such that an idea of itself not 
paradoxical could be presented, inter alia, as a paradox; (4) paradox as the juxtaposition 
of two ideas from two different levels of discourse, reconcilable when recognised as 
belonging to different levels of discourse, but which, in the context of the paradox, the 
reader is invited to take as belonging to a single level at which they are not reconcilable. 9 
Generally, Schäfer wishes to weaken and explain away Heidegger's use of paradox, and 
reveal a conventionally consistent expression behind the paradox. Maintenance of the 
strength of the paradox by a "dialectical" interpretation in the Hegelian manner is 
avoided. 10 
While there is nothing "wrong" with Schöfer's assessment of paradox, it is limited by its 
failure to learn from Heidegger. Schäfer looks out at Heidegger from the shelter of a non- 
Heideggerian framework for the appraisal of paradox. To improve on Schäfer, we need at 
least to think of the paradox in terms of Heidegger's work on time and ground. The work 
in question here is Heidegger's analysis of the three principles of identity, contradiction 
6 Schäfer, op. cit., pp. 192f, 195. 
7 BP, pp. 371-388. 
8 BP, p. 107. 
9 The appeal to different textual levels as justifying apparently paradoxical formulations has been 
' around' for some time; e. g. in the context of theological criticism of statements about the nature 
of god. Such a justification appears to conflict with the methods of deconstruction-ist criticism, 
which actually seeks out non-homogeneity between different textual strata and applies a negative 
evaluation on this basis. (Here I use Gaschz's distinction between deconstructionist criticism and 
deconstructivism: R. Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1986, 
p. 3. ) 
10 Schäfer, op. cit., pp. 183-7,193-6. 
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and ground in MAL, and since these have consequences not only for Heidegger's use of 
paradox (breach of the principle of contradiction), but also for his use of tautology (breach 
of the principle of identity), Schöfer's comments on tautology will be brought into the 
discussion first. 
As with paradox, tautology is not an occasional and well-marked departure from an 
otherwise logically well-behaved text. The tautologies and paradoxes more commonly 
quoted from Heidegger simply lie at the more readily identifiable end of a range of quasi- 
tautologous and quasi-paradoxical forms. The most readily identifiable kind of tautology 
regularly found in Heidegger's writings is that of the "etymological tautology", referred to 
by Schäfer as the figura etymologica. II An etymological tautology is the repetition of 
morphological variations of the same root both in the subject and in the predicate of some 
proposition (e. g. unity unifies), whereas a standard tautology involves the repetition of 
ideas in subject and predicate (e. g. the event occurred). Some examples of etymological 
tautology given by Schäfer are: das Nichts nichtet, 
12 die Welt weltet, 13 das Ding dingt, 
14 
die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich, 
is die Angst ängstet sich, 16 das Wesen west 
17 (the nothing 
nothings, the world worlds, the thing things, temporality temporalizes, worry worries, the 
essence essences). Further important examples are: der Grund gründet 
1 (ground 
grounds), der Sprung erspringt 
19 (the leap leaps), "vom Ereignis er-eignet... "20 (not to be 
translated lightly). 
II Schäfer, op. cit., pp. 202-217 (pp. 287-301). 
12 VWG, p. 21 (GA9, p. 123), WIM, p. ll (GA9, p. 114). 
13 VA, p. 172; first occurrence of the neologism "weiten" is 1919, GA vol. 56/57 at p. 
73. 
14 VA, p. 173. 
15 SZ, p. 328. 
16 SZ, p. 186. 
17 frequently; for further examples cited by Schäfer: op. cit., p. 203f. 
18 BP, p. 29 & 307; cf. also the description of Dasein on p. 
239 as "der gegründete Gründer des 
Grundes" (the grounded grounder of grounds). 
19 BP, p. 9. 
20 BP, p. 3. 
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In the case of etymological tautology, Schäfer seems to arrive at a better explanation than 
in the case of paradox, and an explanation that partly takes account of the content of 
Heidegger's thought. However some points need bringing out more strongly. To account 
for Heidegger's etymological tautologies, Schäfer draws on the following: - 
"Welt west, indem sie wettet. Dies sagt, das 
Welten von Welt ist weder durch anderes 
erklärbar noch aus anderem ergründbar. "21 
"World essences in that it worlds. This means 
that the world's worlding can be neither 
explained by something else nor fathomed from 
something else. " 
Schäfer comments that between the subject and its activity, its doing, there is "no 
difference", although he then interprets the identity/difference issue as one solely of 
"intensity". 22 To put the point differently, several things seem to be achieved by the 
tautology: (1) it is made clear that the activity is unique to the subject - no other subject 
does the same thing; (2) the activity as described is the entirety of the subject's activity - 
everything the subject does is contained in the predicate - the subject does nothing else; (3) 
the reader is required to see the activity of the subject as a unity - the subject does not do 
many different things, just one thing. 
Schäfer also makes the point that nothing can be inserted between the subject and its 
activity, which is more in line with Heidegger's own comment; in other words: a third 
thing is excluded. 23 The English translation of "ergründen" as "to fathom" draws the 
attention away from something that Schäfer also fails to emphasise: the exclusion of the 
third is the exclusion of a foundational move, of a step back in the chain of principles, 
grounds, substrates or justifications. What is at stake in the problem of tautologous 
expression is, for Heidegger, the issue of the regression of grounds. The issue is this: to 
what extent can the thinker avoid falling into patterns of infinite regressions and vicious 
circles through the use of foundational concepts? 
21 VA, p. 172. 
22 Schäfer, op. cit., pp. 208f. 
23 The exclusion of a catalyst is also achieved by the use of reflexives in an attempt to copy the 
Greek middle-voiced mood. 
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Modern western disdain of tautology (whether on grounds of style or of linguistic 
inefficiency) has this disadvantage: that in any proposition purporting to express a 
"fundamental" metaphysical principle or fact, something can always he driven between 
subject and predicate - something which can demand a further explanation or justification, 
something which undermines the status of the proposition as "fundamental". However, 
does it help simply to rehabilitate the tautology in the face of literary disdain - i. e. simply 
to remove its negative evaluation? The rehabilitation of the tautology is no better than the 
use of (e. g. ) conceptions of God as the unmoved mover or the natura naturans, or the 
logician's appeal to the self-evidency of certain truths. All these tactics share this: that 
they simply evade the problem of infinite regression rather than looking to the origin of 
the problem and genuinely solving it. Does Heidegger simply evade the problem? 
Beyond Schöfer's explanation of tautology in Heidegger as (1) maintaining the intensity of 
the agent's activity in the realisation of its potential, and (2) the exclusion of a third 
element, a catalyst for this realisation, lie further possible explanations. Schäfer speaks 
also of the unifying of subject and predicate in a non-empty sense, and moves to the 
problem of Heidegger's challenge to subject-predicate structure. What he says, however, 
is vague and brief. The following explanation may be a derived or quite different idea. 
One of the predicaments faced at the meta-philosophical level of discourse adopted by 
Heidegger is the prejudice concepts are subjected to in their presentation according to 
received grammatical categories (nouns, verbs, etc). Whether a concept is presented in a 
verbal form or a substantivised form affects the way in which the concept is understood by 
the reader. More generally, all the received grammatical categories (not only noun and 
verb) prejudice thinking. These predicaments lead into the dilemma: how to remove the 
prejudice of received grammatical structure (i. e. de-categorise language) without losing 
successful communication altogether. With the violation of grammatical borders, rigid 
structuring of language becomes fluid. Here we have, not semantic interpenetration (i. e. 
breakdown of semantic borders), but a breakdown of syntactic structure, raising a problem 
of difference and identity similar to that of the last section. 
Leaving Schäfer, it can be said that his book - thorough and unambitious - nevertheless 
has its limits: the date of writing leaves him unable to take into account the subsequently 
,8 
published works, many of which are vital to the theme; his categorisation of features of 
Heidegger's language use often has the character of a museum - its greatest strength is the 
collection and listing of peculiarities from the texts, while the philosophical comment on 
these lacks persistence and an appreciation for the unity, purpose or development of 
Heidegger's use of language; further, Schöfer's framework for appreciating Heidegger 
remains not only largely "outside Heidegger", but also relatively unaffected by Heidegger, 
which means that Schäfer misses many links between the form and content of Heidegger's 
work. 
2) The principles of identity, contradiction and sufficient reason 
This section looks in particular at the discussion of the three principles of identity, 
contradiction and ground in MAL; Heidegger's discussion centres around the expression 
of these principles in Leibniz. (The same historical starting point is taken in Der Satz vom 
Grund, which is an associated but different approach to the problem). 
24 Heidegger's 
deliberations on the relative priority among these three principles enables the development 
of an explanation for the use of paradox and tautology discussed in the last section. This 
explanation brings the issue of the character of the foundational into the problem of 
paradox and tautology. The section begins with an identification of the main thesis in 
MAL about the principle of ground (it is not immediately obvious what the main thesis is, 
nor what kind of attitude Heidegger adopts towards it); the section then moves on to 
examine Heidegger's textual destruction of Leibniz so far as this touches on the principle 
of ground; finally the validity of the findings and their significance is discussed. 
***** 
24 On the Leibniz-Heidegger connection, see: R. Crease, Heidegger, Leibniz, and the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason (dissertation, Columbia University, 1987); R. Cristin, Heidegger e Leibniz: il 
sentiero e la ragione (Milan: Bompiani, 1990). More has been written about the 
later approach 
in SG: e. g. J. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, U. Wenzel, 
Die Problematik 
des Gründen beim späten Heidegger; also I. Koza, Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers 
Auseinandersetzung mit Kant. On early Heidegger and the principles of logic: D. A. White, Logic 
and Ontology in Heidegger (Ohio State UP, 1985), Ch. 1.; 
F. Dastur, "Logic and Ontology: 
Heidegger's 'Destruction' of Logic", in Research in Phenomenology 17 (1987), pp. 55-74 
(followed by a discussion with, inter alia, Derrida, Krell and 
Sallis). 
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Widely recognised in the secondary literature on Heidegger is his challenge to subject- 
predicate structure in Western languages. 25 An example from the later Heidegger is the 
strategy of parataxis waged against subject-predicate structure in Was heißt Denken?. 26 
The general claim in both early and later stages of Heideggers thought, crudely 
summarised, is that the contingent appearance of subject-predicate form in Indo-European 
languages is the origin of characteristic forms in Western logic. Showing the dependence 
of supposedly self-evident principles of logic on contingent structures appearing in natural 
languages is a preliminary to freeing oneself from the hold of these principles and making 
a new beginning to thinking. The relativisation of subject-predicate based logic is a goal 
towards which Heidegger moves by using a number of different strategies. One of the 
earlier strategies involved, superficially interpreted, a reordering of three principles of 
logic. The "accepted" (übliche)27 order (principle of identity ---> principle of 
contradiction ---> principle of ground) is changed so that the principle of ground becomes 
the first principle of logic. The lecture series of Summer 1928 (MAL) is the most 
important of Heidegger's early writings on this subject. 
Before discussing MAL, a brief warning should be given: it should not be thought that the 
main thesis of MAL marks any radically new departure or change following the 
publication of SZ. Material on the principles of contradiction and identity was already 
intended in the lecture series of Winter 25/26,28 although the proposed section (section 
B. ld) was neither delivered nor published. 
29 The basic intention of the undelivered section 
was summarised in the introduction as follows: - 
25 See Schäfer, op. cit., p. 210; J. Lohmann, "M. Heideggers »Ontologische 
Differenz« und die 
Sprache", Lexis I, 1948, at pp. 49-106; ET of Lohmann's article in J. J. Kockelmans ed., op. cit., 
pp. 303-363; D. A. White, op. cit. 
26 WD, p. IIIf., SG, p. 105. 
27 MAL, p. 282. 
28 Logik - Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, 
GA21. 
29 See the outline of the lectures, GA21, p. 26. 
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"... wohl aber muß gefragt werden, ob nicht der 
»Satz« vom Widerspruch nur ein bestimmter 
Ausdruck ist für ein ursprüngliches 
Grundverhältnis, das primär nicht in der 
Dimension des Spruches und des Satzes 
30 liegt.... " 
"... but rather it must he asked whether the 
' principle' of contradiction is not simply a 
particular expression for a primordial ground- 
relation, which lies primarily elsewhere than in 
the dimension of diction and principle.... " 
This significantly anticipates MAL. To turn to MAL, how is this subordination of the 
principle of contradiction to issues of founding worked out in 1928? 
In the first half of MAL (pp. 1-133) there is continual discussion of the origins and 
interrelations, in the history of philosophy, of the three principles of identity, 
contradiction, and sufficient reason. With particular reference to Leibniz, Heidegger notes 
that these three principles have been accorded an order of priority, such that the principle 
of identity is first, and the principle of ground is third. Heidegger summarises his own 
counter-thesis at the very end of MAL: - 
"Unser These lautet: der erste Grundsatz der 
Logik ist der Satz vom Grunde. "31 
"Our claim is that the first grounding statement 
[Grundsatz - principle] of logic is the statement 
of ground. " 
It would be tempting to take this counter-thesis at the same level and in the same way as 
the theses Heidegger mentions from Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten. 32 This interpretation 
should be avoided. The previous quotation continues: - 
"Aber diese These ist nicht einfach die 
Umkehrung der überlieferten Ordnung, sondern 
sie ist gesprochen aus der Radikalisierung der 
Logik zur Metaphysik. n33 
"This claim, however, is not simply the 
reversal of the traditional order, but is spoken 
out of the radicalisation of logic toward 
metaphysics. " 
During the discussion of Leibniz (MAL §§1-3), Heidegger avoids an explicit reversal of 
the principles. His purpose there is otherwise, namely: (1) to undermine the tendency of 
logicians to justify logic on its own basis; (2) to discredit any kind of linear ordering of 
logical principles; (3) to suggest a new direction for philosophical logic. All this is a part 
of the radicalisation (radix - root - ground) of logic into metaphysics. A note here is 
30 GA21, p. 23. 
31 MAL, p. 282. 
32 MAL, p. 64ff. 
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required on the meaning of "metaphysics" in this context. since the passage may initially 
seem to be an admission of indulging in just what 20th century philosophy has been so 
concerned to save itself from. Consistently with Derrida's comment that there are no 
metaphysical concepts in and of themselves, 34 in KM and MAL Heidegger seems to want 
to retrieve even the word "metaphysics" from the metaphysical tradition. 
Although Heidegger plays with the possibility of the priority of the principle of ground in 
the earlier parts of MAL, he does not seriously announce this thesis until after the second 
main part (Zweites Hauptstück, pp. 135-281). The main achievement of this second half of 
the lecture series is the development or reconstruction of the notion of "ground", and by 
the time the thesis that "the principle of ground is the first principle of logic" is produced, 
'"ground" has a quite different kind of meaning from that which it had earlier. So as 
before, it cannot be said that in reversing one metaphysical thesis Heidegger has simply 
produced yet another metaphysical thesis. The radicalisation of logic into metaphysics (a 
foundational move) may reveal a quite different metaphysics to the traditional one - but the 
centre of interest here must remain with the foundational. 
The MAL thesis that "the principle of ground is the first principle of logic" has this 
relevance: that it provides an explanation for Heidegger's use of tautology and paradox 
(and more general logico-syntactic irregularities). If the principle of identity is not the first 
and most "self-evident" principle of logic, this is because certain simple identities and 
tautologies are not so innocently trivial as they seem. Likewise, Heidegger's counter-thesis 
would have it that the principle of contradiction is more than the simple converse of the 
principle of identity. In Heidegger's interpretation of Leibniz, he strips away the 
innocence of the principles to reveal foundational presuppositions of a more nebulous and 
primordial character than any fine-cut propositions and axioms. The claim that the first 
principle of logic is the principle of ground is less a metaphysical counter-thesis to 
Leibniz, as a destruction or disas-sembly revealing foundational presuppositions. 
35 The 
33 MAL, p. 282. 
34 Derrida, Positions (ET trans. A. Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), at p. 57 of 
ET. (quoted in R. Gasche, op. cit., p. 165). 
35 Heidegger describes his analysis of Leibniz as a "Destruktion": MAL, pp. 35 & 37. 
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subject of this section now turns to tracing these foundational traits as they appear in the 
course of the destruction. 
36 
W**** 
The destruction is initiated with an interpretation of the historical background to Leibniz's 
conceptions. Abbreviated, the line of thought runs thus: (1) Western logic is subject- 
predicate based. 37 (2) The subject-predicate relation was, originally, a relation where the 
subject is the Zugrundeliegende (lying-as-a-basis-for, by which Heidegger translates the 
Gk. hypokeimenon). 38 (3) A key intermediate step in the history of predicate theory was 
the inclusion theory of predication, whereby the predicate is regarded as "included within" 
the subject. 39 (4) Heidegger uses the conception of "inclusion" as a historical bridge 
between the original Greek conception of predication as a kind of grounding (in a 
hypokeimenon) and the later conception that all true predications were analysable in terms 
of identity relations: zugrundeliegen ---> inclusion ---> identity. 
4° This is the core of 
Heidegger's explanation how the principles of identity and contradiction gained primacy 
over the principle of ground by historical accident. To explain this primacy historically is 
to undercut the tendency to try and justify logic on its own basis - i. e. as consisting of 
self-evident truths. 41 Behind the discussion of the ordering of principles of ground, 
identity and contradiction, lies the more important theme of the relation of history and 
logic: does logic, as a set of timeless truths, stand self-evidently on its own basis, or is its 
content and justification only to be fully grasped through its history? Behind this lies the 
issue of the conception of time in thinking: logical principles have a history, and the 
supposedly non-temporal character of logical principles cannot be used to justify regarding 
them as superior to and separable from their historical origins. Whether Heidegger's 
interpretation is true as a matter of human history from Plato onwards is of secondary 
importance: cutting out some of the possibly mythical material in the interpretation, it 
36 Cf. VWG pp. 26f (GA9, pp. 1290 for a very abbreviated version of the MAL destruction. 
37 MAL, p. 1. 
38 MAL, p. 39. 
39 MAL, pp. 37-47. 
40 MAL, pp. 48f. 
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retains serious worth as a matter of Seinsgeschichte - of a different historical dimension 
constituted by the falling differentiation of being and thought. 
The second part of Heidegger's destruction to be examined here looks at his questioning 
of Leibniz's hierarchy of principles. Of greater significance here is the style and method, 
rather than the content. The method involves finding points or breaks in Leibniz's system 
where unacknowledged foundational presuppositions are revealed. For example, 
Heidegger says that Leibniz's veritates rationis (the principles of identity and 
contradiction) are in no lesser need of a Grund than the veritatesfacti, the difference lying 
in whether or not the Grund needs to be shown (i. e. in their Beweisbedürftigkeit). 42 A 
detailed interpretation of the following passage will be used to show what is typical in 
Heidegger's method. 
"Rückführbarkeit auf Identitäten besagt: 
Widerspruchslosigkeit. Was einen Widerspruch 
einschließt, das ist, was überhaupt nicht sein 
kann, da ja esse finesse und dieses idem esse 
besagt. Was vom Grund aus nicht sein kann, ist 
das unmögliche. Allein, sofern gerade diese 
notwendigen Wahrheiten dem Prinzip der 
Widerspruchslosigkeit als dem Prinzip ihrer 
Rückführbarkeit - d. h. Begründbarkeit 
unterstehen, gehört zu ihnen auch das 
principium reddendae rationis - ja, man kann 
und muß umgekehrt sagen: dieses ist 
ursprünglicher als der Satz vom 
Widerspruch. " 43 
"Reducibility to identities denotes non- 
contradiction. Whatever contains a 
contradiction is what cannot at all be, since 
esse denotes finesse and this denotes idem esse. 
What basically cannot be is the impossible. Yet 
insofar as these necessary truths are subject to 
the principle of non-contradiction as principle 
of their reducibility, i. e. of their 
demonstrability, the principium reddendae 
rationis also belongs among them. Indeed one 
could and must say, conversely, that the latter 
principle is more primordial than the principle 
of non-contradiction. " 
In this passage, careful attention needs to be paid to the interplay of concepts expressing 
(i) identity/contradiction, and (ii) ground. In the latter group (concepts expressing ground) 
the following should be noted: Rückjilhrbarkeit, vom Grund aus, Begründbarkeit 
unterstehen, principium reddendae rationis, ursprünglicher. Care also needs to be taken 
over Heidegger's endorsement of these sentences: the first three are loosely attached to 
Heidegger's Leibniz interpretation; the fourth and last sentence is Heidegger himself, but 
whether this is a genuine view rather than a critical tactic is questionable. 
41 At MAL, p. 70, Heidegger comments on this tendency'. 
42 MAL, p. 65f. 
43 MAL, p. 66; Heim's translation slightly altered. 
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To interpret the passage: in the first three sentences, Heidegger can he seen adopting the 
tactic of trying to insert at any point possible "grounding concepts" into expositions of 
Leibniz on identity and contradiction (one could say that he attempts to locate foundational 
fissures, Freudian slips, in Leibniz's text). Between the second and third sentences, 
Heidegger shifts from the strengthening particle "überhaupt" to the normally synonymous 
but foundationally provocative expression "vom Grund aus": this must rate as a fairly 
frivolous shift. Less frivolous is the introduction of the concept of Rückführbarkeit into 
the interdefinition of identity and contradiction in the first sentence. Rückführharkeit is 
Heidegger's interpretative translation of Leibniz's words resolutio, resolvi and reduci 
(loosely quoted by Heidegger). The Latin reducere is the origin of the English "to 
reduce"; Heidegger's German translation (rück)ühren) is etymologically correct but 
semantically questionable: unusual in German, but not quite a neologism, rückführen 
recovers the Latin origin of re-ducere, a returning or leading back. While a conventional 
logician might prefer to discuss the Leibniz texts in terms of "analysis" and "reduction", 
Heidegger uses a term expressing motion (fiihr-) back (Rück-). In the fourth sentence 
Heidegger again slightly shifts the concept: "Rückführbarkeit - d. h. Begründbarkeit", 
making the foundational connection more obvious. This foundational character Heidegger 
has revealed within the relation of identity and contradiction. He then exploits the 
foundational element opened up between them in order to provoke the reader with the idea 
that the principle of ground may he placed, in order of priority, between the principles of 
identity and contradiction: "dieses [das principium reddendae rationis] ist ursprünglicher 
44 
als der Satz vom Widerspruch" . 
***** 
What is the significance of this claim that the principle of ground is prior to the principle 
of contradiction? How should we assess the validity of this claim? To what extent is a 
truth-value attributable to this claim? 
The significance is this: the priority of the principle of ground over the principle of 
contradiction would entail that the principle of ground is not subject to the principle of 
contradiction, and that therefore contradictory expressions are not outlawed in texts which 
44 ibid., translated above. 
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elaborate the principle of ground. This provides a possible understanding of the use of 
paradox. However it does not yet explain why paradox is positively helpful to a text. 
Earlier Heidegger's historical myth of the development of predicate theory was 
summarised, and there it was said that the shifting of predicate theory from being a matter 
of foundations to one of identities was presented by Heidegger as a matter of historical 
accident. Is "accident" the right word here, or might it be the case that Heidegger 
regarded such an evolution of thought as a permanent temptation and tendency (not a 
historical necessity, though)? 45 Reasserting the priority of foundational issues over matters 
of the logic of difference and identity then becomes a matter, not of a one-off correction, 
but a permanent stylistic need. 46 The use of paradox and other logical and syntactic 
irregularities, if they could meet this need, would then be justified as positively beneficial. 
The second question was how one should assess the validity of the suggestion that the 
principle of ground is prior to the principle of contradiction. What can one make of the 
shift-series: reduci/resolvi ---> Rückführbarkeit ---> Begründbarkeit ---> requiring the 
demonstration of a ground? Surely Heidegger's argument for this is no philosophical 
argument at all, but worthless rhetoric, a semantic trompe l'oeil? While the text may 
choose the form of language-play, there is a serious aim behind it. The definition of true 
predication in terms of its "reducibility TO identities" draws the philosopher to 
concentrate on the identities as objects of the search; the definition draws attention away 
from what the philosopher is doing in establishing the identities. Heidegger aims to correct 
this distortion, exploring the nature of what the philosopher is doing (reducere - 
rückfahren). He suggests that the reductio is another manifestation of grounding. The 
questions which need to be extracted and maintained here are these: what are we doing 
when we recognize identities and contradictions, tautologies and paradoxes? Are we doing 
something which is correctly identified as a process of grounding? The language play 
draws attention to the foundational in the pre-cognitive. 
45 Note Heidegger's comment at MAL, p. 70, on logic's constant tendency to deny 
its metaphysical 
origins. 
46 Cf. the interpretation of Entwurf in pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
86 
To what extent is Heidegger committing himself to the thesis that the principle of ground 
is prior to the principle of contradiction? The phrasing "ja, man kann und muß... " with 
which he introduces the suggestion evasively circles round a personal endorsement, and 
the thesis is immediately dropped from the discussion. The point Heidegger really wants 
here is something else: namely, that the principle of ground cannot be separated from the 
principles of identity and contradiction in the manner of Leibniz's distinction between 
truths of reason and truths of fact; rather, there is an interdependence of all three 
principles. 
Concluding §3 a couple of pages later, Heidegger says: - 
"... -ja vielleicht besteht gar keine Ordnung in 
dem Sinne, daß eines aus dem anderen 
»geradlinig« ableitbar wäre. Und in der Tat ist 
keines dieser Grundphänomene ursprünglicher 
als das andere - sie sind gleichursprünglich. " 
47 
"Indeed, perhaps there is no order in the sense 
that one would be 'linearly' deducible from the 
other. And in fact none of these basic 
phenomena is more primordial than the other. 
They are equiprimordial. " 
Here he is referring, not to the principles of identity, contradiction and ground per se, 
rather to the basic phenomena in terms of which the principles have been thought out, 
such as identity, ground and truth. Here we find more clearly the rejection of any linear 
ordering; the relation consists rather in the enigmatic brand of interdependence which 
Heidegger calls Gleichursprünglichkeit. In §1-3, Heidegger does not so much "stop short" 
of the thesis that "the principle of ground is the first principle of logic"; rather he has 
"gone beyond" this thesis. The discussion of §3 has focussed on the history of ordering 
the principles. Heidegger's strategy has been to question the particular orders produced, 
with the purpose of raising the general problem of ordering the principles. Having raised 
the problem, he now puts it directly: linear ordering of the principles is in general not 
possible. Heidegger ends up with the problem of the Gleichursprünglichkeit of the 
phenomena in terms of which the principles are stated, and this is a step beyond placing 
the principles in any particular hierarchy. 
The passage last quoted continues: - 
47 MAL, p. 69. 
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"Aber gerade darum ist ein zentrales Problem 1. 
die innere Verfassung dieser Gleichursprüng- 
lichkeit und 2. der Boden, der solches möglich 
 48 macht. 
"But precisely on that account there is a central 
problem concerning: 1) the inner constitution 
of this equiprimordiality, and 2) the ground 
which makes it possible. " 
Why does Heidegger describe (1) and (2) as one central problem? It should be 
remembered that among other semantic interpenetrations in Heidegger, there is the partial 
conflation of Wesen and Grund intended to disrupt an inner-outer distinction in the 
determination of concepts. And how does this central problem arise? The subject of §3 has 
been the ordering of the principles; it was an issue, for example, whether the principle of 
contradiction was prior to the principle of ground, or vice versa. At the end of §3, the 
issue is recognised as a non-issue, and a new issue is produced from the debris of the old. 
The new issue concerns the structure of the old: namely, its attempt to establish relations 
of priority. For example, Heidegger referred to Wolff and Baumgarten's attempt to derive 
the principle of ground from the principle of contradiction: Heidegger's interest lies not so 
much with the correct hierarchical position of the principle of ground, as with the fact that 
they tried to derive one basic principle from another - the issue is what were they doing in 
"deriving"? Was it some kind of "grounding"? 
Two similar theses here need to be distinguished: - 
1. The principle of ground is prior to the principle of contradiction. 
2. The problem of "grounding" (in a sense as yet undefined in 
Heidegger's text) takes precedence over conventional themes in 
philosophical logic. 
Heidegger means to accept the second of these, not the first. 
***** 
To conclude this sub-section, where does the discussion stand? what has been gained? 
Although possibilities for a justification of the use of logical and syntactic irregularities 
have arisen during the course of the discussion, their validity turns on clarifying the 
48 MAL, p. 69. 
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conception and status of the foundational in Heidegger. At every point, the issue of the 
foundational arose, but was not solved. At this point in the discussion, the issue of the 
foundational has centred on the notion of Gleichursprünglichkeit (equiprimordiality). To 
what extent does this lead finally to the sought-after clarification? 
3) Equiprimordiality 
In the last section the main theme was Heidegger's discussion in MAL §§1-3 of the 
historical origins and relative logical priority of the three principles of identity, 
contradiction and ground. Two lines of attack were identified: the questioning of the self- 
evidency of a logical ordering (i) by tracing the historical origins of the ordering, and (ii) 
by suggesting an alternative order. The goal served by this disas-sembly of Leibniz was to 
bring into question the wisdom of any attempt to order basic principles or concepts of 
thinking in a linear hierarchy, and this was presented by Heidegger as a problem about the 
nature of the foundational. The alternative to a linear hierarchy was Gleichursprünglichkeit 
(equiprimordiality). 49 However this remained an unexplored name. 
Is Gleichursprünglichkeit a problem? Perhaps it means quite simply no more than a 
horizontal structure as distinct from a vertical one, such that the phenomena do not line up 
in a vertical chain, each dependent on the one above, but rather that no phenomenon is 
nearer an ultimate origin than the others and all are on the same level. However 
Heidegger's actual use of this word suggests there is nothing so simple as this, and he 
draws attention to the nature of Gleichursprünglichkeit as a problem. 
49 R. Gasche, op. cit., p. 181f., notes the use of the concept Gleichursprünglichkeit 
in Husserl, and 
footnotes D. Henrich's point that Fichte first used the word. Gasche briefly, 
discusses Heidegger, 
concluding with the criticism that Heidegger fails to abandon the 
idea of Gleichursprünglichkeit 
forming a unit and totality (within which the coming together of a plurality 
is possible). The 
little that Heidegger says about Gleichursprünglichkeit is indeed multiply unsatisfactory. 
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"Und in der Tat ist keines dieser 
Grundphänomene ursprünglicher als das andere 
- sie sind gleichursprünglich. Aber gerade 
darum ist ein zentrales Problem 1. die innere 
Verfassung dieser Gleichursprünglichkeit und 2. 
der Boden, der solches möglich macht. " 
so 
"And in fact none of these basic phenomena is 
more primordial than the other. They are 
equiprimordial. But precisely on that account 
there is a central problem concerning: 1) the 
inner constitution of this equiprimordiality, and 
2) the ground which makes it possible. " 
Gleichursprünglichkeit suffers the same weaknesses as a number of Heidegger's more 
deeply methodological notions: although its importance is emphasised, and although it can 
he seen in operation, only scattered and incomplete accounts of its nature are given. 
Enough can he gathered from Heidegger's use to know that as early as 1921 it was a 
relatively well-developed notion. 51 It is particularly associated with the interrelation of the 
triadic structures which pervade (e. g. ) SZ, 52 but it is not restricted to this: it also 
characterises the interrelation of some binary oppositions ("Das Dasein ist 
gleichursprünglich in der Wahrheit und Unwahrheit"53), and larger concept-groups. 54 
Despite the precedents in Husserl and Fichte, 55 Heidegger probably used the word as 
parallel to Gleichzeitigkeit (simultaneity); the relation between Gleichursprünglichkeit and 
Gleichzeitigkeit may be more than mere parallel construction if one takes into 
consideration the coalescence of time and ground discussed in pt. B, ch. 1.56 The chief 
characteristic of Gleichursprünglichkeit may be said to be its evasiveness: above all it is 
used to avoid relating keywords in hierarchies of derivation while maintaining (unifying? ) 
a multiplicity of keywords. This can be seen, for example, in the following passage. 
so MAL, p. 69. 
51 PIA, pp. 102f. 
52 
e. g. SZ, pp. 114,133,137,161,200,220,297,329,365,372. 
53 SZ, p. 223 ("Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth"). 
54 SZ, p. 385: the five keywords death, guilt, conscience, 
freedom and finitude are grouped as 
equiprimordial. 
55 See footnote 49 above. 
56 Also relevant to the connection between Gleichursprünglichkeit and time: at 
SZ, p. 159 there is an 
interchange between zugleich (at the same time) and gleichursprünglich 
(see section on semantic 
interpenetration for the notion of interchanging); cf. also the use of gleichzeitig 
in VWG, p. 62. 
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[Die Absicht der vorliegenden Untersuchung] 
"ist eine fundamentalontologische. Wenn wir 
sonach dem In-Sein thematisch nachfragen, 
dann können wir zwar nicht die 
Ursprünglichkeit des Phänomens durch 
Ableitung aus anderen, d. h. durch eine 
unangemessene Analyse im Sinne einer 
Auflösung vernichten wollen. Die 
Unableitbarkeit eines Ursprünglichen schließt 
aber eine Mannigfaltigkeit der dafür 
konstitutiven Seinscharaktere nicht aus. Zeigen 
sich solche, dann sind sie existenzial 
gleichursprünglich. Das Phänomen der 
Gleichursprünglichkeit der konstitutiven 
Momente ist in der Ontologie oft mißachtet 
worden zufolge einer methodisch ungezügelten 
Tendenz zur Herkunftsnachweisung von allem 
und jedem aus einem einfachen »Urgrund«. " 
57 
"The aim of our investigation... is one of 
fundamental ontology. Consequently, if we 
inquire about Being-in as our theme, we cannot 
indeed consent to nullify the primordial 
character of this phenomenon by deriving it 
from others - that is to say, by an inappropriate 
analysis, in the sense of dissolving or breaking 
up. But the fact that something primordial is 
underivable does not rule out the possibility 
that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being 
may be constitutive for it. If these show 
themselves, then existentially they are 
equiprimordial. The phenomenon of the 
equiprimordiality of constitutive items has 
often been disregarded in ontology, because of 
a methodologically unrestrained tendency to 
derive everything and anything from some 
simple 'primal ground'. " 
In this passage Heidegger seems to be arguing against a tree-structure for ontology. 
58 The 
tree-structure is based on some simple, single Urgrund, and all other ontological concepts 
are required to fit into a framework spreading out from the Urgrund by relations of 
derivation. Gleichursprünglichkeit marks an attempt to maintain the unity of being and the 
multiplicity of ontological concepts without constructing a tree of derivations; but as we 
saw from MAL, it by no means entails a departure from the foundational. How could 
Gleichursprünglichkeit achieve such a feat? While for the most part there is no clue to this 
in Heidegger's writing, nevertheless it does seem that mutual dependence and 
interdefinability play a role (perhaps one may speak of semantic interpenetration). The 
following passage is a particularly good example of this. Here Heidegger is speaking of 
the equiprimordiality of Neigung (propensity) and Abstand (refraining, restraint). 
"Gleichursprünglich mit der Neigung, besagt 
hier: daß der Charakter ein solcher ist, den die 
Neigung gerade verdeckt, abdrängt und in die 
Zerstreuung hineinreißt, so daß er nun, durch 
diese Abdrängung hindurchgegangen, als 
zerstreut in der Welt begegnet.... Abstand, der 
Neigung mitermöglicht. wird von ihr gerade 
59 
mitgerissen. " 
"Here equiprimordial with propensity means: 
that its character is such that propensity 
actually disguises it, expels it and drags it into 
dispersion, so now that it has gone through this 
expulsion, it is encountered as dispersed in the 
world.... Restraint, which co-enables 
propensity, is actually co-torn from the latter. " 
57 SZ, p. 131. 
58 Cf. G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, Rhizome (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1976). 
59 PIA, p. 102f. (own translation) 
I, 1 
There is not so much a compromise of unity and multiplicity in Gleichursprünglichkeit as 
a maintenance of their intimate tension in a foundational relation other than one of a 
deriving kind. Further to this, it may he that Gleichurspriinglichkeit is intended to contain 
the possibility of its own decay into different hierarchies of derivation. 
"Ist die Sprache mit dem Menschen gegeben 
oder mit dem Menschen die Sprache? Oder wird 
und ist das Eine durch das Andere gar nicht 
zwei verschiedene? Und weshalb? Weil beide 
gleichursprünglich dem Seyn zugehören. " 
60 
"Is language given with human being, or is 
human being given with language? Or isn't the 
One, doesn't the One actually become by virtue 
of the Other two different things? And why? 
Because both belong equiprimordially to 
being. " 
In this passage Heidegger seems to present a hierarchical dilemma, and rather than solving 
the dilemma, he explains it on the basis of the Gleichursprünglichkeit of the phenomena in 
question - perhaps because this combines the possibilities of both horns of the dilemma. 
However the final word on Gleichursprünglichkeit has to be that here the path which led 
from the consideration of logical and syntactic irregularities Tina peters out: unsatisfactory 
as it might be, the evidence for the character of this vital phenomenon is too scant and 
ambiguous to allow further progress. How clear an idea of Gleichursprünglichkeit might 
Heidegger actually have had? Was he himself writing with only partially conceived 
methods? Between the last two passages on Gleichursprünglichkeit cited, there is a gap of 
15 years: can it be that in this time Heidegger still failed to work out the concept properly 
for himself? Or does he just keep his most valued methodological cards closest to his 
chest? Or is it even that there is a permanent failure to make progress with this particular 
strand of foundational methodology? Gleichursprünglichkeit is, first and foremost, the way 
in which the key existentalia interrelate; it names the primary manner of interrelation in 
the architectonic of SZ. So rather than pursuing the word Gleichursprünglichkeit, the 
search will move instead in the direction of the foundational architectonic or macro- 
structure of SZ. 
60 BP, p. 497 (own translation). 
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CH. 3. INCONGRUENCIES IN FOUNDATIONAL MACROSTRUCTURE 
The question which is being pursued to its limits is this: what is the foundational, or what 
do the foundational notions signify, in Heidegger's earlier writings? In the final section to 
his 1928 article VWG Heidegger provides a triadic analysis of Grund, or perhaps several 
slightly differing but interrelated triadic analyses. The triad is variously expressed as 
< Stiften, Boden-nehmen, Begründen >, I< Möglichkeit, Boden, Ausweis > 112 
< Weltentwurf, Eingenommenheit, Begründen > ,3< Stiftung, Boden-nehmen, 
Rechtgebung> .4 Do these triadic analyses in VWG provide the answer to the question 
(once interpreted in the light of the last two sections)? It is true that the triadic analyses 
occupy more than half of the final section of VWG, but they do not mark the end or the 
climax. Rather, Heidegger uses the interplay of unity and multiplicity in the threefold 
determination of ground to take the discussion in a new direction (that of freedom and 
temporal ity). 5 
"Aber läßt sich nicht doch immer noch fragen, 
warum diese drei zusammengehörigen 
Bestimmungsstücke der Transzendenz mit dem 
gleichen Titel »Gründen« bezeichnet werden? 
Besteht hier nur noch eine künstlich erzwungene 
und spielerische Gemeinsamkeit des Wortlauts? 
Oder sind die drei Weisen des Gründens doch 
noch in einer Hinsicht - obzwar dies je wieder 
anders - identisch? "6 
"But isn't the question still outstanding, why 
these three belonging-together determining- 
pieces of transcendence are dubbed with the 
same title 'grounding'? Is there nothing more 
here than an artificially forced and playful 
community of word-sounds? Or are the three 
ways of grounding nevertheless identical in one 
respect - although in each case in a different 
way? " 
1 VWG, p. 60 (GA9, p. 165); note that for the sake of clarity triadic (and quadratic) constellations 
are cited using <... >; original German is used in the text, as often the English translations 
(footnoted) are so tortuous as to lose a sense of the structural peculiarities. Strictly speaking, 
Heidegger provides this triad as an analysis of Gründen, which is the relation of Freiheit and 
Grund, but he does not stick with this fine distinction - nor is this likely to be accidental, since it 
is common for Heidegger to conflate a relation with its poles (see section on metaxy: pt. A, ch. 4, 
section 3). Tr.: < endowing, taking-a-basis, justifying >. 
2 VWG, p. 66 (GA9, p. 170): < possibility, basis, self-identification >. 
3 VWG, p. 67 (GA9, p. 171); <projection-of-world, prepossession, justifying >; as a member of 
this triad, Begründen is also expressed (i. a. ) as "Ermöglichung der Warunfage" (enabling of the 
why-question) - p. 64. 
4 ibid. ;< endowing, taking-a-basis, legitimisation >. 
5 Such a tactic is again common to SZ. 
6 VWG, p. 67 (GA9, p. 171); own translation. 
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It is at this point that the moral, the hidden purpose, of the triadic analysis comes to the 
fore. Heidegger continues: - 
"Diese Frage ist in der Tat zu bejahen. Die 
Aufhellung der Bedeutung aber, hinsichtlich 
deren sich die drei unzertrennlichen Weisen des 
Gründens einheitlich und doch gestreut 
entsprechen, läßt sich in der »Ebene« der 
jetzigen Betrachtung nicht durchführen. " 
7 
"This question is in fact to be answered 
affirmatively. But at the 'level' of the present 
consideration, it is not possible to carry 
through the illumination of the meaning with 
respect to which the three indivisible ways of 
grounding correspond to one another in a 
unitary and yet dispersed fashion. " 
Here there is a similar move to the one which was witnessed in MAL towards the end of 
the destruction of Leibniz: namely, the problematic of the structures hitherto revealed is 
used to take the foundational issue in a new direction, and into a new idiom. 
8 In MAL, a 
key to the solution was named as Gleichursprtinglichkeit, which as was noted above is also 
commonly used to denote the internal structure of the triadic constellations. 9 Another line 
of response in both MAL and VWG is the following. 
"Die Freiheit ist der Grund des Grundes.... Das 
Grund-sein der Freiheit hat nicht - was zu 
meinen sich aber immer nahelegt - den 
Charakter einer der Weisen des Gründens, 
sondern bestimmt sich als die gründende Einheit 
der transzendentalen Streuung des Gründens. ^ 10 
"Freedom is the ground of ground.... The 
ground-being of freedom does not have the 
character of one of the ways of grounding (but 
always runs close to this), rather it determines 
itself as the grounding unity of the 
transcendental dispersion of grounding. " 
Taking the problematic of unity and multiplicity in the foundational to a new level and a 
new idiom reveals a deeper essence of ground, one that accounts for the problematic: this 
essence of ground is freedom. But in the new idiom such a statement has a volatile 
instability: ground, freedom and origin drift immediately into issues of temporality, 
transcendence and finitude. 
***** 
ibid.; own translation. 
8 In SZ such moves can also be demonstrated; for example, SZ, p. 396: 
Heidegger criticizes 
Nietzsche's triadic analysis of history as failing to examine the Grund of the unity of the three 
modes. 
9 Though not, oddly, in VWG. 
10 VWG, p. 69 (GA9, p. 174); own translation. Cf. also MAL, pp. 282ff. 
& 276. 
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The discussion of ground in VWG can be taken in many directions. The purpose of the 
selective analysis above was to make the point that the internal structure and role of the 
triadic constellations so frequently encountered in Heidegger's early writings is relevant to 
the problem of foundations. In the case of VWG, it happened to he an analysis of ground 
that raised the foundational problematic contained in Heidegger's triadic analyses; but the 
same foundational problematic (i. e. one that can he labelled Gleichursprünglichkeit) arises 
in the case of other triadic analyses. Generally, the point of this chapter is to exploit the 
structure of these triads to extract what further clues these may contain as to the nature of 
the foundational in Heidegger's earlier writings. What will become apparent is that when 
an analysis of the so-called "triads" is pushed to its limits, a major structural dislocation 
appears. This dislocation is an indeterminacy of the nevertheless interdependent 
constellations between tripolarity and tetrapolarity. 11 This structural dislocation is a clue 
along the path to demonstrating a yet less systematisable architectonic (wrap-into 
clustering -a kind of onion structure) of the conceptual constellations or clusters in 
Heidegger. 12 The perception of the earlier Heidegger as a crude foundationalist probably 
rests partly on (i) the lexis of SZ, 
13 
and partly on (ii) the belief that the intermittent 
formalisms of that work (such as triadic analyses) were either intended to, or could in 
theory, be reconciled into a system with an arborial-foundational structure. The analysis 
below of the indeterminacy between tripolarity and tetrapolarity and the wrap-into 
character of conceptual clustering provides evidence to show that (ii) could not he the 
case. 
1) Tetrapolarity 
Two of Heidegger's more conservative interpreters have engaged in a well-known 
argument aimed at maintaining the structural homogeneity of SZ. The argument in 
question is that between Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Otto Pöggeler on the triad 
I1 Cf. J. Derrida, La Dissemination (Pans: Seuil, 1972), pp. 29-32,347,386-394 (on 3's and 4's 
and numbers in general). Reference owed to J. Sallis, Delimitations (Bloomington: 
Indiana 
University Press, 1986), p. 141. To what extent does Heidegger anticipate Derrida? 
12 Some onions are also multi-centered. 
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<Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - ? >, as to whether the third element is Verfallen or Rede. 14 
It initially appears that in Ch. 5A of the first section of SZ (§§29-34), Heidegger provides 
a triadic analysis of Erschlossenheit as <Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - Rede> , and the 
relation of Verfallen, discussed separately in Ch. 5B, remains obscure. However in Ch. 4 of 
the second section (§68), it seems that the main triad is < Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - 
Verfallen>, with Rede trailing like a relic of earlier times which Heidegger could not 
quite bring himself to discard completely. In 1963 Pöggeler argued that Heidegger had 
quite simply replaced Rede with Verfallen while writing the book. is Against this, Von 
Herrmann defended Heidegger's consistency, maintaining that the real triad all along is 
<Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - Verfallen >, while Rede plays a higher order role in 
determining the Gleichursprünglichkeit of the triad. 16 Then in 1982, Günter Wohlfahrt 
briefly suggested an alternative in his hook Der Augenblick, '? namely, that the triad was 
not a triad at all (a point simply assumed by Pöggeler and Von Herrmann), but rather a 
"Vierteilung" or "Quadruplizität, "18 i. e. that Verfallen and Rede both belonged to the 
constellation. In a lengthy afterword to the second edition of his book (1985), Von 
Herrmann strongly attacked both Pöggeler and Wohlfahrt with a considerable textual 
exegesis. 19 There is no intention to engage with Von Herrmann's arguments here; the 
strongest point against Von Herrmann is that his argument rests on the possibility of a 
global maintenance of fine distinctions among the terms used in the structural fabric of 
SZ, and on the basis of what was said in the section on semantic interpenetration (above), 
13 i. e. the frequency of foundational terms; discussed in pt. A, ch. 1. 
14 In addition to the sources cited below, see also: P. Emad, "The significance of the new edition of 
'Subjekt und Dasein' and the fundamental ontology of language", in Heidegger Studies 2 (1986), 
pp. 144ff. On the translation of many of the terms in this section, see the appendix. 
15 O. P5ggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers Pfullingen: Neske (1st ed. '63,2nd ed. '83 with 
additions, 3rd ed. '90 with a large afterword), at p. 210 (of the 3rd ed. ). 
16 F-W. von Herrmann, Subjekt und Dasein (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1974 & 1985), pp. 103-144. 
17 G. Wohlfahrt, Der Augenblick (Freiburg: Alber, 1982), at pp. 140f. 
18 The idea of <Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - Rede - Verfallen > as a tetrad 
has not been uncommon, 
though neither has it received serious attention. Wohlfahrt mentions Walter Biemel as having 
suggested it. The idea is also in Tyman's "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", 
International Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1984), p. 361. Tyman cites a number of sources on this 
problem (though oddly fails to mention the most important: Von Herrmann). 
19 F-W. von Herrmann, op. cit., 2nd ed. 1985, pp. 198-224. 
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it seems that such distinctions could at best be local, and that generally Heidegger cannot 
be read in the way Von Herrmann reads him. 
One thing that seems to have been omitted in these arguments is an examination of other 
conceptual constellations or clusters in Heidegger, to see what general patterns there are. 
This is one direction in which the debate could move instead of stagnating in a battle of 
textual attrition. 20 
To justify the framework for interpretation which will be used below, it must first be 
established that quadratic as well as triadic clusters exist in Heidegger. This can be done 
with the following examples: < Versuchung, Beruhigung, Entfremdung, Verfängnis> , 
21 
< Beredete, Geredete, Mitteilung, Bekundung > , 
22 < Datierbarkeit, Weltlichkeit, 
Gespanntheit, Öffentlichkeit> 
, 
23 <herkünftig, fortwirkend, innenzeitig, überliefert> , 
24 
<Angerufene, Aufgerufene, Gerufene, Rufer> . 
25 True, clustering is predominantly, 
triadic, but there is a not insignificant minority of quadratic forms which some 
20 Rainer Bast moves in this direction in his very brief article "Ist Heideggers »Sein und Zeit. ein 
patchwork? ", Information Philosophie 4 (1986), pp. 18-30. Macro-structural incongruencies get 
two paragraphs on pp. 20 & 22 (including a few remarks on the <Befrndlichkeit - Verstehen - 
??? > problem). Bast's article indicates a direction for reinterpretation of SZ (rather than 
performing the reinterpretation), and this direction involves the creation of genetic structures to 
explain the internal irregularities. On the whole I think Bast retreats toÄquickly from noting the 
irregularities into creating a theory of the genesis of SZ to explain them. My own approach is to 
work through these irregularities as far as possible, to see what can be inferred from them about 
the character of the foundational. Two other commentators broadly support an approach similar 
to that of Bast: H. Rapaport, Heidegger and Derrida - Reflections on Time and Language, pp. 18, 
79-82,92f.; T. Kisiel, "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger", in J. J. Kockelmans ed. 
Hermeneutic Phenomenology (Washington DC: Center for Advanced Research in 
Phenomenology, 1988), at pp. 18f. 
21 The analysis of Verfallen at SZ, p. 180, which is very similar to the fourfold analysis of Ruinanz 
in PIA (p. 140) as < Verführerische, Beruhigende, Entfremdende, Vernichtende> . Tr. of the SZ 
cluster: < temptation, tranquillizing, alienation, entanglement >. 
22 The analysis of Rede at SZ, §34; Rede is also given a fourfold analysis in PGZ (p. 363). Tr. of 
the SZ cluster: <what-is-talked-about, something-said-in-the-talk, communication, making- 
known >. 
The analysis of Jetzt at SZ, p. 424. Tr.: <datability, worldhood, spannedness, publicness> . It 
is 
important to note that the Macquame & Robinson translation makes this look like a triad. Only 
from the German text is it clear that there is a quadratic cluster. 
24 SZ p. 378f. states clearly that a fourfold analysis of Geschichte is intended; it is difficult to extract 
the names of its members from the text since the dispersion and intertwining are quite severe 
here. 
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commentators have misguidedly misquoted or overlooked to maintain a non-existent 
structural homogeneity. 26 
The framework for interpretation works on the provisional assumption (supported by the 
precedents above) that <Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - Verfallen - Rede> is a quadratic 
cluster which is sometimes defectively cited by Heidegger. Putting this together with the 
fact that many of the SZ clusters are interdependent such their members have one-to-one 
mappings onto each other, so far as a system can he deduced from SZ it looks like the 
following. 27 
25 The analysis of Ruf in SZ, §§56-57. 
26 
e. g. C. Lutz, Zwischen Sein und Nichts (doctoral 
dissertation, Bonn 1984), at p. 112 (no. 12). 
17 See the tables (German, then English) on the next two pages. 
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The table needs a few notes of explanation. (1) Multiple entries are often given, because 
Heidegger varies his expression considerably (see section on semantic interpenetration. the 
variation is in fact far wider than the table shows). (2) The analyses giving rise to this 
table come exclusively from SZ, and all the references are to SZ; this is because the 
constellations vary considerably between the otherwise rather more homogeneous writings 
of the later 20's. (3) The third and fourth columns cannot be properly merged, nor 
properly separated, in a textually faithful analysis - more comment on this below. (4) The 
table covers those groupings for which a reasonable systematisation can be made (which 
includes the most important groupings); there are a very large number of groupings of 
secondary importance which are not shown because systematisation was not possible. The 
exclusion of such a large number of groupings needs further explanation: (a) sometimes 
the elements of triadic or quadratic analyses are not completely clear from the text, 
although it is clear that such an configurating is intended (e. g. the triadic analyses of Tod 
28 and Befindlichkeit 29); (b) even when mappings onto the core structure (given in the 
table) are announced, the mappings are incomplete, unclear, lacking or contradictory. 
30 
For example, consider the relation of <Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit> to 
<Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - Rede - Verfallen> : Zweideutigkeit is derived from 
Auslegung, which is primarily derived from Verstehen but also has connections with Rede; 
Neugier is derived from Sicht, which is again derived from Verstehen; while Gerede is 
associated with Rede. 31 The situation can adopt an appearance of even further 
complication, because the one-to-one mappings of the core structure are only primary 
determinations. The (foundational) associations of different constellations (e. g. <x, y, z> 
and <a, b, c>) are such that a is primarily determined by x, but partially determined by y 
and z. For Heidegger it is important than in a foundational relation between concept 
28 SZ, §§46ff. 
29 SZ, §29. 
30 Such is the case with the analyses of Verfalles: (SZ178,180), Rede (SZ. 
§34), Furcht (SZ, §30), 
Zuhandenheit (SZ144), Öffentlichkeit (SZ127), das Man (SZ, §27), the triads <Gerede, 
Neugier, Zweideutigkeit> (SZ175,180) and <Auffälligkeit, Aufdringlichkeit, Aufsässigkeit> 
(SZ, p. 74). 
31 Also noticed by R. Bast, op. cit., p. 20. In addition to 
further examples cited by Bast, see SZ, 
pp. 272 & 277 for the attempted mappings of the moments of 
Ruf onto those of Rede and Sorge. 
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clusters, the full structure of the original should he reflected in all the members of the 
dependent cluster, and he often fails to make it clear which determination is primary. 32 
These qualifications and observations made, the subject can turn to that of the tripolarity 
or tetrapolarity of the core structure. As the table shows, Heidegger had no difficulty 
separating and defining the first two terms of the structure - broadly speaking, those terms 
corresponding to future-past, or to the traditional distinction of reason (cf. Verstehen) and 
emotion (cf. Befindlichkeit). The difficulty comes with the third (and fourth) terms, and 
here it can be seen that the nature of the problem is very different from that perceived by 
Pöggeler and Von Herrmann. The modes of temporality associated with the present have 
been placed indeterminately between the columns, as SZ §68 leaves it ambiguous whether 
the present is mapped onto Verfallen or Rede (though Verfallen is slightly preferred). 
Further down the table, Sein-bei has also been placed indeterminately. This is because 
there is a permanent indecisiveness whether the third moment of Sorge is a Sein-bei- 
innerweltlichem-Seienden (being-among-intrawordly-entities) or a Sein-bei-anderem-Dasein 
(being-among-others) - i. e. a dilemma whether Sein-bei relates to inanimate entities, or 
(crudely put) human being. 33 In the former case, Sein-bei alines with Verfallen in the third 
column; in the latter case, with Rede and Mitsein in the fourth column. One could say that 
Heidegger is in fact operating with an unacknowledged quadratic expansion of Sorge. The 
general characters of the third and fourth columns can now be seen: the third column has 
to do with falling, everydayness and inanimate objects, while the fourth column has to do 
with interpersonal relationship and communication. For some reason (not the topic of this 
thesis) Heidegger refuses to merge these conceptual sets, and is reluctant to commit 
himself to an association of the present with one or the other. The result is that the tripolar 
core-structure constantly risks decaying into a tetrapolar one. Certainly this creates great 
problems for a reading of Heidegger. But it is not clear that this was actually a problem 
for Heidegger: is it perhaps the by-product of anti-formalist concerns, rather than a 
dilemma over the relation of certain phenomena? 
32 A further complicating factor is that different clusters sometimes have members 
in common: note 
the recurrences of Existenz and Verfallen in the table; also Mitteilung occurs 
in both the Rede- 
and Aussage- clusters. 
33 
e. g. SZ, pp. 55,193,268. 
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A dilemma over the relation of presence, falling and intrapersonal relationship would not 
he relevant to this thesis. Relevant is the issue of formal foundational structuring. And in 
fact there is something even more radically unconventional going on here than a simple 
ambiguity between tripolarity and tetrapolarity. This is what I have termed wrap-into 
clustering. 
2) Wrap-into clustering 
Heidegger's presentation of conceptual clusters invariably follows the same pattern: the 
first member is considered in itself, then the second is related to the first; subsequently the 
third is related to both. Usually this process presents a conflict of formalism and anti- 
formalism. The triadic analysis of Grund in VWG (see above) is a classic example of this. 
The following features in the development of the triadic analyses of VWG should be 
noted: there is a constant shifting of the expressions used for each member of the triad - 
not only to semantically similar expressions, but also between different grammatical 
categories, and likewise dispersion of the concept into phrases which inextricably link 
themselves into phrasal elaborations of the other members; the textual "analysis" takes the 
form of a seamless progression through the members, such that each subsequently 
introduced member almost grows out of the previous ones - the textual form attempts to 
unify the triadic multiplicity by sacrificing structural formalism to seamless semantic 
development. How should one interpret the conflict of formalism and anti-formalism here? 
Is it that Heidegger is in the first place reliant on a formal system, and that the best he can 
do to escape this is to add on, by way of apology, some stylistic superficialities? 
In Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (which is plainly a earlier version of the 
first 230 pages or so of SZ)34, there is a rather more extended example of the same pattern 
of conceptual development, which involves the much fought-over phenomena of 
Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Verfallen and Rede. Comparing PGZ to SZ, what emerges as 
surprising is not how numerous the system-confounding dislocations and inconsistencies of 
34 PGZ (GA20), lecture series of summer 1925. 
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SZ are, but rather, how few they are. 35 PGZ can he used as evidence for the claim that the 
anti-formalistic device of wrap-into clustering has priority over triadic systematisation. 
The analysis here is confined to §§28-31 of PGZ, which are devoted to a progressive 
development of the phenomena Entdecktheit, Verfallen, Unheimlichkeit and Sorge. 
Heidegger notes that the interconnection of these phenomena36 is both ordered and 
foundational. 
"Die genannte Phänomene hängen unter sich 
zusammen, und in der Ordnung, wie sie hier 
gegeben sind, zeigt sich zugleich ein gewisser 
Fundierungszusammenhang unter ihnen. " 
37 
"These phenomena are connected among 
themselves; and the order in which they are 
advanced here at the same time serves to 
manifest a certain founding relation among 
them. " 
The general pattern of the subsequent development has something of an onion structure 
(wrap-into), in that succeeding sections wrap layers of new concepts around and into the 
concepts of the previous sections. An onion is ultimately far too ordered a structure to 
describe what is going on, but it provides a useful starting model. The most important 
qualification is that outer layers of an onion leave the inner layers undisturbed, while 
Heidegger's new layers tend to link and lock into the old irrespective of their structure. 
Thus wrap-into, not wrap-around. To return to the development of PGZ, this starts off 
with Entdecktheit, and spins a couple more keywords into this (Erschlossenheit, 
Befindlichkeit). In the subsequent pages, comparisons, analyses and parallels slowly build 
up the stockpile of keywords, and this stockpile is carried over into and enlarged in each 
subsequent section and sub-section. Each subsequently introduced keyword is woven into 
the stockpile by relating it to a number of the previous concepts. Such introductions are 
without regard for the interrelation or structural location of those concepts already in the 
stockpile. The multiply cross-connecting and short-circuiting relations produced present a 
foundational paradox as well as a systematic impossibility: namely, that while foundational 
lexis abounds, hierarchical orderings according to inferiority and superiority are not only 
35 Thus I disagree with the perspective of Bast (op. cit. ) and Rapaport (op. cit. 
) on the problem. 
36 Heidegger uses "phenomenon", "concept" and "structure" relatively 
interchanably (see section 
above on semantic interpenetration); in discussing 
Heidegger the same interchangability has been 
followed. 
37 PGZ, p. 348. 
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lacking, but impossible to impose. This gives a general idea of wrap-into clustering, but 
what of the detail? 
§28 begins with Entdecktheit. In the course of discussing Entdecliheit, Erschlossenheit 
makes an appearance, and is eventually related formally to Entdeclaheit as 
gleichursprtinglich. 
38 Befindlichkeit is wrapped in next. 
"Befindlichkeit ist das Apriori für Entdecktheit 
und Erschlossenheit, sie ist ein 
gleichursprünglicher Charakter neben der 
Erschlossenheit und macht mit ihr das aus, was 
wir die Entdeckrheit nennen. " 
39 
"Disposedness is the apriori for disco veredness 
and disclosedness. It is a co-original 
[equiprimordial] character along with 
disclosedness and constitutes with it what we 
call disco veredness. " 
It is at the beginning of the onion-development that the interrelations are at their clearest 
and most unambiguous; but here too the stockpile is still relatively small, and the 
opportunities for structural subversion therefore remain low. Gleichursprünglichkeit is not 
attributed to any of the interrelated concepts other than < Entdecltheit - Erschlossenheit - 
Befindlichkeit> , nevertheless there is close interweaving during the subsequent 
introductions of concepts. Verstehen is the first major concept to join the stockpile after 
Befindlichkeit, and the interweaving of Verstehen with the existing members can be seen in 
the following passages. 
"Verstehen als befindliches Erschließen und 
Erschlossenhaben von Welt ist als dieses ein 
erschließendes Sichbefriiden. "40 
"Understanding as disposed disclosure and 
having disclosed the world is as such a 
disclosive self-finding. " 
"Das Verstehen ist die Entdecktheit des Woran- 
seins mit etwas. " 
41 
"Understanding is the discoveredness of the 
whereat-being with something. " 
Subsequently Auslegung is added to the stockpile as a mode of Verstehen, 
42 and then, still 
part of the section analysing Entdecktheit (§28), comes the integration of Rede. Rede is 
38 PGZ, p. 350: "Die Mit-entdecktheit des In-Seins selbst... ist keine Folge der Welterschlossenheit, 
sondern ist mit ihr gleichursprünglich. " - "The co-discoveredness of in-being 
itself... is not a 
consequence of the disclosedness of the world, but is co-original [equiprimordial] with 
it. " 
39 PGZ, p. 354 
40 PGZ, p. 356 
41 PGZ, p. 357 
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integrated into the stockpile in different and mutually non-assimilable ways. Firstl`', 
Heidegger relates it to a concatenation which runs more or less <In-sein, Entdec/aheit, 
Verstehen, Auslegung, Sprache>, but not such that Rede is tagged on to the end. 43 If any 
formal relation is possible, it would he as in the following diagram. 
In-sein 
1' 
Entdecke 
Verstehe 
1' 
Auslegu 
Sprache 
Rede 
Rede is also integrated into the stockpile via its fourfold analysis as <Beredete, Geredete, 
Mitteilung, Kundgabe> . 
44 Again, so far as a formalisation of the integration is possible, 
it appears thus: - 
Rede 
In-der-Welt-sein 
" °-4-- Beredete 
Geredete 
Mitsein 
Mitteilung 
Entdecktheit 
Kundgabe 
Befindlichkeit 
As if this was not enough, Rede is later described as "Seinsmodus des Verstehens , 
45 and 
as "Modus der Zeitigung des Daseins" . 
46 The integration of Rede into the stockpile is 
structural simplicity compared to the accommodation of Verfallen in §29. The diagram 
which follows attempts to formalise what can be formalised, but by this stage so little of 
42 PGZ, pp. 359-360 
43 PGZ, p. 361 
44 PGZ, p. 362-363. 
45 PGZ, p. 366. 
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the systematic remains that the diagram represents textual development rather than any 
47 
system. 
Rede Auslegung (Welt) (Mitsein) 
Gerede Neugier Zweideutigkeit 
Versuchung -> Beruhigung 
Entfremdung 
Sichverfangen 
Verfallen 
The following section on Unheimlichkeit (§30) continues in a similar vein. The fourth 
keyword in the original Fundierungszusammenhang, Sorge, is analysed in §31. At the 
beginning of this final analysis, the stockpile is initially abandoned for an independent 
development, but then (pp. 411-417) Sorge is vaguely linked to Entdecktheit, Verstehen, 
Auslegung and Rede. The systematic integration discernible from SZ (see the earlier table) 
is entirely lacking. 
This analysis of PGZ is intended to provide evidence for the priority of an anti-systematic 
procedure called wrap-into clustering over systematic procedures framing the phenomena 
into (e. g. ) clearly inter-mappable triads. Against this, it might be said that the relevant 
sections in PGZ are only preparatory for SZ, and that therefore SZ better shows 
Heidegger's intentions. To reply to this objection: it is tenable (and probable) that this 
applies to §31, on Sorge, but it does not appear to be a reasonable hypothesis for the anti- 
46 PGZ, p. 376. 
47 This is not a weakness; the general point is that system is sacrificed to seamless textual 
development. However, it should be remembered that in SZ and PGZ, < Gerede, Neugier, 
Zweideutigkeit> and <Versuchung, Beruhigung, Entfremdung, Sichverfangen > are 
formal 
constellations. 
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systematic form of §§28-30. Especially in the case of §§28-29, considerable care must 
have gone into creating the complex sentences which interweave the accumulating 
phenomena. Further evidence comes from VWG, where there is a non-systematic 
progression through <Entdecktheit, Erschlossenheit, Sichbefinden (=Befindlichkeit), 
Verstehen, logos (=Rede) >, which is of a style closer to that of PGZ than to that of 
SZ. 48 Given, then, that my claim is correct, how can the move towards system in SZ he 
explained? It is possible that such wrap-into clustering tended towards the triadic in SZ 
because Heidegger's intention of recapitulating the Daseinsanalytik in terms of temporality 
(which at that stage he could only conceive of as tripartite: past - present - future) forced 
him to reduce the size of larger clusters and impose a more homogeneous framework. In 
PGZ the temporal recapitulation is absent and perhaps its detail had not yet been worked 
out in Heidegger's mind. The tripolar-tetrapolar dislocation in SZ may then he interpreted 
as the incompleteness of this response demanded by the temporal recapitulation. 
The question remains, what is the significance of all this for the conception of 
foundations? 
That there is at least a relevance should be clear: the development in PGZ described as an 
example of wrap-into clustering is referred to by Heidegger as a 
Fundierungszusammenhang 49 and the passages constituting the development are rife with 
foundational lexis; further, wrap-into clustering is associated with Gleichursprüinglichkeit, 
which in MAL named the gateway to a reconstruction of ground: finally, the whole matter 
of this section has been the macro-structure of SZ, which (despite its incompletion and 
unsatisfactory nature) is probably one of the main causes for a foundational 
interpretation 
of the earlier Heidegger. The significance for the conception of 
foundations can be 
expressed thus: when concepts are analysed according to a "wrap-into cluster" method, 
traditional distinctions disappear between what are essential features, accidents, 
derivatives 
and origins: what is determinative of a phenomenon 
(essential, foundational) lies in a non- 
48 VWG, pp. 27-29 (GA9, pp. 130-132). 
49 PGZ, p. 348. 
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hierarchical, unsystematisahle, non-coherent interplay. 
50 Wrap-into clustering (at least in 
PGZ) even deprives the interplay of a centre. 
The contribution made by this chapter on the incongruencies of foundational macro- 
structure is this. As has been said before, there are probably two main motives for 
regarding SZ as a foundational work: lexical, and macro-structural. The lexical motive 
was examined in the first chapter of this part of the dissertation. To turn to the macro- 
structural motive: superficially, at least, SZ moves through a series of foundational 
structures, each being deeper than the one before. Everything is traced back into a final 
dependence on Zeitlichkeit as a kind of Heideggerian cogito. At each level a constellation 
of derivatives and modifications is mapped out. The often eccentric expression of these 
structures seemingly leaves a concise statement of the foundational system to interpreters, 
but when one tries to put such a completion and formalisation into practice, it founders. 
The main problem is that the power and status of the triadic constellations and their 
foundational interrelations is greater than their tangibility (susceptibility to accurate 
expression). SZ could hardly be summarised without referring to the threefold ecstatic 
analyses of time as temporality, and the preparation for this by an isomorphic non- 
temporal analysis of Dasein in the first half of the book: thus the role of these 
constellations is powerful and prominent. Yet there are radical problems with the 
articulation and interrelation of these constellations as has been shown above. Thus: the 
interplay between structural power and structural intangibility in SZ may he said to 
provide the seeds of a self-destruction of its purported foundational ism. 
51 
50 But it should never be forgotten that the interplay of phenomena constantly points, paraliptically, 
towards being as the condition of its possibility. 
51 Cf. D. C. Wood, The Deconstruction of Time, footnote to p. 223 on p. 401. 
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CH. 4. ANTICIPATIONS OF A TURN IN 
FOUNDATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 
To return once again to the 1928 essay on the essence of ground (VWG), in 1949 
Heidegger added a forward to the essay, in which he described the essay as naming the 
ontological difference. At first glance this seems to conflict with the essay title ("Vom 
Wesen des Grundes" - "On the essence of ground"). What is the connection? The 
ontological difference is described as the "difference of being and entity"I and as the 
"nothing between entity and being". 2 How is it that this difference amounts to nothing? 
Heidegger also describes the issue as the Aufbrechen (breaking open) of the difference, 
and as Unterscheidenkönnen (ability to differentiate). 3 In other words, the issue is the 
origin of difference. To go a little beyond what Heidegger makes explicit, the issue is 
perhaps better stated: what kind of structure must a pre-differential origin of 
differentiability have, in order to act as the condition for the possibility of identity and 
difference? A homogeneous, simple origin would not provide the possibility of its own 
degeneration into difference. Thus the answer to the question is a difference that is a 
virtual nothing -a minimal difference -a difference that breaks the grammar of difference 
as a bipolar relation. This difference is the ontological difference. Describing the 
ontological difference in VWG takes Heidegger in the direction of transcendence. 
"Der Grund der ontologischen Differenz nennen 
wir vorgreifend die Transzendenz des 
4 Daseins. " 
"By way of anticipation we will call the ground 
of the ontological difference the transcendence 
of Dasein. " 
Heidegger continues by describing the traditional structure of Transzendenz. 
1 VWG, p. 30 (GA9, p. 134). 
2 VWG, p. 21 (GA9, p. 123). 
3 VWG, p. 31 (GA9, p. 134). 
4 VWG, p. 31 (GA9, p. 135); own translation. 
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"Transzendenz bedeutet Überstieg.... Formal "Transcendence means overstepping.... 
läßt sich der Überstieg als eine Beziehung Formally the overstepping can he grasped as a 
fassen, die sich »von« etwas »zu« etwas relation which pulls itself 'from' something 
hinzieht. " 5 away 'towards' something. " 
Traditionally transcendence is a uni-directional movement from (subject) to (object). 
(Whether the subject-object relation here is interpreted epistemologically, grammatically, 
or otherwise would be a matter of indifference to Heidegger, since he probably regards the 
same considerations as paralleled in all of these senses of transcendence). Subsequently in 
VWG Heidegger attempts a revision of this structure. It is not only in terms of 
transcendence that Heidegger attempts this foundational revision. The same revision of 
uni-directional foundational movements appears in a number of other guises. In this 
section those guises in which it appears in SZ are the subject of study. Generally 
speaking, the problem is that of the movement between entity and being, between the 
(supposed) poles of the ontological difference. Being, perhaps, is the foundation of the 
entity, and the problem of the question of the the meaning of being is the question of the 
movement from entity to being. While words such as "transcendence" and "ontological 
difference" are absent from this section, the matter of eliciting the nature of this 
foundational movement between being and entity is its constant subject. 
1) The sens and duplicity of being 
In the title of this section, both sens and duplicity carry a double meaning. The French 
sens means both meaning and direction; duplicity means both doubleness and 
deceitfulness. Sens and duplicity refer to two precedents in the secondary literature for the 
kind of structure attributed in this section to Heidegger's understanding of the 
foundational. The first of these is an article by Gerard Guest on reversals of direction in 
SZ; the second of these comes from a book by Pat Bigelow in which (inter alia) he 
presents what he calls the "amphiboly of being" in SZ. 
5 VWG, p. 33 (GA9, p. 137); own translation. 
Guest's article "Anabase - Acheminement viers l'amont de la 'presupposition"' is an 
extremely detailed interpretation of a number of sentences from SZ §44.6 The area of 
Guest's meditating concerns "the topology of the land of being", a topology which he 
finds does not obey certain norms. Reversals of direction are the key to the topological 
irregularities. Although Guest's article does not explicitly take issue with any 
interpretation of Heidegger (and is devoid of almost any mention of secondary literature), 
it seems to be a polemic directed at a particular conservative interpretation: namely, one 
according to which the early Heidegger is seen as progressing from Dasein to being, and 
the later Heidegger - after the Kehre (reversal) - is seen as progressing in the reverse 
direction, from being to Dasein. Guest studies the connection of the poles Dasein and 
Wahrheit des Seins as they occur in SZ, especially on pp. 226-228, and finds that both 
directions of movement are present in, and essential to, SZ. In other words, he finds that a 
Kehre of a kind said to apply to Heidegger's thought diachronically is already present and 
complete, synchronically, in SZ, and in such a way that the reversed movements are not 
sequentially related, but simultaneously. Guest describes the double-movement thus: 
"... un mouvement d'aller-et-retour... caracteristique du mouvement d'ensemble de 
l'ontologie fondamentale, et essentiel ä sa demarcbe. 11 s'agit de ce mouvement de 
va-et-vient qui... remonte vers 1" idee de l'etre pur et simple', pour venir ensuite, 
comme sur 1'elan meme de la remontee mais par contre-coup.... comme un 
boomerang. " 7 
And later, bringing in the Kehre, he continues: 
"L'effectuation de ce va-et-vient methodique, qui constitue comme teile 
1"anabase' de Sein und Zeit, est l'un des chemins au 'detour' desquels (a la 
6 G. Guest, "Anabase - Acheminement vers 1'amont de la 'presupposition' - Le chemin de Sein und 
Zeit", Heidegger Studies 5 (1989), pp. 79-133. The following account of his article is not 
comprehensive, but selects those points relevant to my own thesis. 
7 Guest, op. cit., p. 98. "... a movement of going-and-returning... characteristic of the entire 
movement of fundamental ontology and essential to its progress. It is a matter of a movement of 
coming-and-going which... reascends towards the 'pure and simple idea of being', only then to 
return, as if with the same momentum of the reascent but by re-percussion.... like a boomerang. " 
The idea of a language group of coming-and-going is by no means new to Heidegger scholarship. 
See T. Kisiel, "The Language of the Event: the Event of Language", in J. Sallis ed. Heidegger 
and the Path of Thinking (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1970), at pp. 101f. Kisiel 
identifies this language group in the later Heidegger. What Guest does that is new is to identify 
the same movements in the earlier Heidegger. 
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'Kehre' desquels), le Dasein s'expose ä etre conduit, induit ou requis, ä faire cette 
' experience de la pensc ee' en quoi consiste la 'Kehre'. " 
8 
A part (although not the main part) of Guest's achievement here is to trace a number of 
Kehre patterns occurring within SZ. (1) He introduces the problem of bi-directionality as 
the efforts of phenomenology to move in a direction opposite to that of Verfallen. 
"L'anabase me thodique de la phenom6nologie de Sein und Zeit suit, ä contre-courant du 
sens du 'devalement' (Verfallen), le contre-flux phenomenologique....... 9 (2) He notices 
that there is a general play on reversal of directions occurring at SZ, p. 437: on the one 
hand Heidegger asks about the possibility of a way from time to being; on the other hand 
Dasein already always has a pre-understanding of being. 10 (Guest does not seem to spot 
the play here between Verstehen and Entwurf, in terms of which I examine the problem 
further on). (3) He notices the bi-directionality attributed to philosophical questioning 
(" 
... entspringt... zurückschlägt. ") in the following text: 
"Philosophie ist universale phänomenologische 
Ontologie, ausgehend von der Hermeneutik des 
Daseins, die als Analytik der Existenz das Ende 
des Leitfadens alles philosophischen Fragens 
dort festgemacht hat, woraus es entspringt und 
wohin es zurückschlägt. " 
11 
"Philosophy is universal phenomenological 
ontology, and takes its departure from the 
hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of 
existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all 
philosophical inquiry at the point from which it 
arises and to which it returns. " 
(4) He notices a bi-directionality attributed to Lichtung (carrying the senses of intellectual 
illumination and the later Heideggerian "clearing"), whereby in some places Dasein 
appears to be the source of Lichtung, such that Dasein sheds light on the truth; in other 
places, it is truth which illuminates Dasein. 12 (5) But above all, Guest's article turns on a 
$ Guest, op. cit., p. 117. "The performance of this methododical coming-and-going, which 
constitutes as such the 'anabasis' of Sein und Zeit, is one of the paths on the twists of which (on 
the Kehre of which) Dasein dares to be led, induced or conscripted, dares to undergo the 
' experience of thinking' in which the Kehre consists. " 
Guest, op. cit., p. 80. "The methodical anabasis of the phenomenology of Sei, z und Zeit follows the 
phenomenological counter-flux, against the flow of the direction of 'falling' (Verfallen).... " 
10 Discussed in Guest, op. cit., pp. 89-92. 
1 SZ, pp. 51 & 436 (Heidegger says it twice; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation with a slight 
alteration), quoted and discussed in Guest, op. cit., p. 96f. 
12 Compare SZ, pp. 133,313,436. Discussed in Guest, op. cit., pp. 99-103. 
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hi-directionality of Voraussetzen (presupposition) in the Dasein-truth relation. 13 Which 
way round is the presupposition? Is it "we" who presuppose truth, or truth that is the 
origin of our presuppositions? 
The sentences which occupy the centre of Guest's attention are the following: 
"Aus der existential begriffenen Seinsart der 
Wahrheit wird nun auch der Sinn der 
Wahrheitsvoraussetzung verständlich. Warum 
müssen wir voraussetzen, daß es Wahrheit gibt? 
Was heißt »voraussetzen«? Was meint das 
»müssen« und »wir«? Was besagt: »es gibt 
Wahrheit«? Wahrheit setzen »wir« voraus, weil 
»wir«, seiend in der Seinsart des Daseins, »in 
der Wahrheit« sind.... Nicht wir setzen die 
»Wahrheit« voraus, sondern sie ist es, die 
ontologisch überhaupt möglich macht, daß wir 
so sein können, daß wir etwas »voraussetzen«. 
Wahrheit ermöglicht erst so etwas wie 
14 Voraussetzung. " 
"From the existentially conceived kind of being 
of truth now too the meaning of truth- 
presupposition becomes intelligible. Why must 
we presuppose that there is truth? What does 
' presupposing' denote? What do 'must' and 
' we' mean? What is conveyed by saying: 
' there is truth'? 'We' presuppose truth, 
because 'we', being in the kind of being of 
Dasein, are 'in the truth'.... It is not we who 
presuppose 'truth', rather, it is 'truth' which 
makes it ontologically at all possible that we 
can be such as to 'presuppose' something. 
Truth first makes possible such a thing as 
presupposing. " 
The two sentences at the centre of this are these: 
"Wahrheit setzen »wir« voraus, weil »wir«, 
seiend in der Seinsart des Daseins, »in der 
Wahrheit« sind.... Nicht wir setzen die 
»Wahrheit« voraus, sondern sie ist es, die 
ontologisch überhaupt möglich macht, daß wir 
so sein können, daß wir etwas »voraussetzen«. " 
"'We' presuppose truth, because 'we', being 
in the kind of being of Dasein, are 'in the 
truth'.... It is not we who presuppose 'truth', 
rather, it is 'truth' which makes it 
ontologically at all possible that we can be such 
as to 'presuppose' something. " 
The attention here is the change between the two sentences: in the first, "we" presuppose 
truth; in the second, seemingly paradoxically, this is denied, and rather it is truth that acts 
as the origin of presupposing. Guest initially provides a parallactic explanation of the 
paradox: namely, that it is not the matter itself which is first affirmed and denied, but 
13 SZ, pp. 226-228. Discussed in Guest, op. cit., pp. 80-87,117-124. It should be noted that Guest 
was using a Niemeyer edition of SZ, where Heidegger's Randbemerkungen, first added in the 
15th Niemeyer edition and the Gesamtausgabe edition, are added at the end, rather than inserted 
on each page as in the Gesamtausgabe. Thus Guest has page references such as 439 and 444, 
which for a Gesamtausgabe user are useless, since this stops at p. 437. Gesamtausgabe references 
can be converted to Niemeyer, but not vice versa; thus Guest's reference system should not be 
followed. (e. g. Guest's SZ, p. 444 is more helpfully cited as SZ, p. 227n). 
14 SZ, p. 227f.; own translation. 
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rather, the point of view changes from which the two sentences are uttered. Thus Guest 
writes: 
"En un sens ('vom Dasein aus'): "....... ". Mais, en un autre sens ('vom Wahrheit 
des Seyns her')..... Mais ces deux sens, une fois distingues, doivent etre penszs 
comme s'entre-appartenant, et comme, au fond ne faisant qu'un.... "15 
But then, as the passage shows, he reaffirms the unity of the points of view. There is more 
going on here than a simple change of direction, and for this point, Guest builds on the 
footnote added to the Gesamtausgabe edition, which changes or compliments the second 
sentence thus: 
"(Nicht wir setzen die »Wahrheit« voraus, ) 
sondern das Wesen der Wahrheit setzt uns in 
das Voraus des Zugesagten! " 16 
"(It is not we who presuppose 'truth', ) rather 
the essence of truth supposes [lit. places] us in 
the pre- of the accepted. " 
In the light of the grammatical peculiarities this poses, Guest comes to the following 
position: 
"S'il s'agit bien de maintenir, dans la formulation de l'apostille, le vocabulaire de 
la 'presupposition', c'est au prix d'une etonnante reforme de la ' grammaire' de 
celle-ci; reforme qu'accomplit ici, non pas tant la simple inversion du clivage, que 
l' apparent demantelement, et la savante ' de-struction' , de l' usage du verbe 
'voraussetzen'.... Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'inverser le sens d'effectuation et de 
provenance de la 'presupposition de verite'.... Ce que fait ' l'essence de la verite', 
selon la 'grammaire' de l'expression (qui accomplit ici... cette 'Befreiung der 
Grammatik'-).... c'est bel et bien nous 'poser' dans... l'amont quest ce qui 
vient au-devant de la 'presupposition' pour la rendre possible.... " 
17 
15 Guest, op. cit., p. 121. It should be noted that Guest's words are chosen with great care; thus the 
literalism of the following translation: "In one direction/sense ('vom Dasein aus' [from out of 
Dasein]): ......... But in another direction/sense ('vom Wahrheit des Seyns her' [hither from the 
truth of being])..... But these two directions/senses, once distinguished, must be thought as 
belonging-together and as basically constituting one.... " 
16 SZ, p. 227n. (Own translation). The brackets contain the main text, then the footnote is added 
directly. 
17 Guest, op. cit., p. 125f.; the loose quotation of "Befreiung der Grammatik" (freeing from 
grammar) is from SZ, p. 165f. Tr.: "While it may be a matter of maintaining the vocabulary of 
' presupposition' in the formulation of the marginal note, this is at the price of an astonishing 
reform of the 'grammar' of [this vocabulary]; a reform which accomplishes, not so much the 
simple inversion of the cleavage, as the apparent demolition and the skilful 'de-struction' of the 
usage of the verb 'presuppose'.... It is not simply a question of inverting the direction [sense] of 
performance and the provenance of the 'presupposition of truth' .... 
What 'the essence of truth' 
11's 
In other words, he recognizes that there is more here than just reversals of direction, and 
more still than Kehre-figures within the fabric of thought of SZ: there is also a 
grammatical reform going on, particularly in relation to the concept of "presupposition". 
Guest's article makes a contribution, not only on the basis of these conclusions, but also 
by virtue of the meticulous care of his analysis of the texts in question. Width is sacrificed 
to depth, however, and a more general pervasiveness of Kehre patterns within the thought 
of SZ remains to be shown, although Guest claims that the double movement is "essential" 
to fundamental ontology. 18 Guest's attention is likewise on the poles of this double 
movement (Dasein, the truth of being), and the topology of being; the between of these 
poles takes second place, while the foundational is left out completely. Yet it is only a 
short step from Guest's deliberations to issues of foundations. As Heidegger remarks 
during the same passages analysed by Guest: 
"Was besagt »voraussetzen«? Etwas verstehen 
als den Grund des Seins eines anderen 
19 Seienden.  
"What does 'presupposing' mean? To 
understand something as the ground of the 
being of another entity. " 
An immediate consequence of Guest's indication of a reform of the grammar of 
"presupposition" is that the foundational is likewise being subjected to such a structural 
reform. (It is unlikely Guest missed this; he simply does not choose to go in this 
direction). 
Another weakness or limitation of Guest's article is that it does not put this double 
movement firmly into a wider philosophical context: what does Heidegger hope to gain by 
deploying such a cursive figure? I suggest that it serves a purpose well beyond that of a 
mere revision of the grammar of foundations. 
***** 
does, according to the 'grammar' of the expression (which here accomplishes... this ' Befreiung 
der Grammatik'... )..., is to place us well and truly in... the incline which is what comes in front 
of the 'presupposition' to render it possible.... " 
18 Guest, op. cit., p. 98 (quoted above). 
19 SZ, p. 228 (own translation). 
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Bigelow provides a very different perspective and approach to what is essentially the same 
curiosity as that examined by Guest. 20 Bigelow names the double movement in SZ as the 
"amphiboly of being", and (unlike Guest) links it firmly to the problem of foundations and 
metaphysics. Virtually the only explicit point of contact between Bigelow's and Guest's 
analyses are the references to the problem of the hermeneutic circle. The basic mood of 
Bigelow's book is a fatalistic and playfully eloquent resignation, with a carefully 
cultivated style which seemingly idles between the thoughtful and the rhetorical: it is quite 
the opposite of Guest's meticulous extraction of the remotest nuances of meaning from 
every sentence. Another major difference from Guest is that, while Guest exploits the 
double movement as a contribution to appreciating the unity of Heidegger's thought, 
Bigelow sees in it the core of the failure of SZ, prompting a (biographical) turn away from 
that work towards a playful state of philosophical resignation (like Bigelow's own). Here 
the thoroughness and care of Guest's assessment must take preference; Bigelow's work 
has a more speculative and artistic value. 
What is the "amphiboly of being"? 21 It does not have a centered definition; rather it 
operates like a Gasche-esque infrastructure, 
22 reappearing, iterating, in a number of 
supervenient but non-identical patterns. The main examples given by Bigelow are: (i) 
being's ambiguous categorisability as substantive or as activity - that is, that about being 
which is reflected in its dual grammatical status as a participle; 
23 (ii) the dual instability of 
the ontological difference, such that any attempt to articulate being devolves into ontic 
enquiry, while conversely, the articulation of the nature of entities always presupposes a 
reference to or understanding of being; 
24 (iii) the double self-effacement of being, such 
that not only does any attempt to articulate it devolve, but that the devolution is disguised: 
20 P. Bigelow, The Conning, The Cunning of Being - Being a Kierkegaardian Demonstration of the 
Postmodern Implosion of Metaphysical Sense in Aristotle and the Early Heidegger (Tallahassee: 
Florida State University Press, 1990). 
21 The word amphiboly is used by Kant in the title of the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic 
in 
his Kritik der reinen Vernunft. The term is not discussed by Kant, however, nor does 
Bigelow 
refer to this use. Amphiboly normally means a sentence (as distinct 
from a word) with two 
meanings. 
22 See R. Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror. 
23 P. Bigelow, op. cit., p. 111. 
24 ' ibid., e. g. pp. 108,110,118f. 
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"amphiholy is both the trace of the oblivion of being and the effacement of this trace". 25 
Amphiboly appears in a number of subsidiary plays of duality - such as Heidegger's play 
on concealment and unconcealment and the duplicity of genitives. 26 Amphiholy names the 
virtual structure (better: paratype) behind the various evasions of being, and thus accounts 
for the impossibility of ontology. In accounting for the impossibility of ontology, 
amphiboly of course describes being - it is itself part of an ontology; the very fact of an 
analysis of amphiboly proclaims the possibility of ontology. This play between the 
possibility and impossibility of ontology, this incompatibility of strata, is, according to 
Bigelow, another appearance of the amphiboly of being: in other words, it is a character 
of being that the strata of a critical ontology (such as his own) will he incompatible. 
Ontology is eminently and immanently deconstructible. 
As regards the role of the amphiboly of being in SZ, Bigelow regards this work as a failed 
attempt to "disambiguate" the amphiboly of being. 
"This failure is due to the dialectical nature of the amphiboly of being, that the 
attempt to cleave being from beings contracts into the cleaving of being to 
beings.... "27 
While Bigelow's ideas offer interesting food for thought, there is no real argument for his 
case. In particular, his conclusion that the amphiboly of being results in the impossibility 
of ontology does not follow from the descriptions given of the amphiboly of being. What 
follows is that a successful ontology would require a uniquely cunning method. Bigelow 
does not analyse Heidegger's method in this respect, and thus he does not reach a position 
from which he can judge the success or failure of SZ. 
To show how the amphiboly of being cripples the SZ project, Bigelow turns to the role of 
the foundational in Heidegger's thought. This he summarizes as follows. 
"At the beginning of his career Heidegger's exclusive concern was to lay a 
foundation for metaphysics. Repeatedly he insists on the urgency, the needfulness, 
of this concern. But as we know, his way was to be underway toward the thinking 
of the ground of thinking, until eventually he came to see that along this path the 
25 ibid., p. 121. 
26 ibid., pp. 113 & 119. 
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ground no longer mattered, for it is the path in the clearing that precisely' 
suffices. "28 
And the amphiboly of being raises the following foundational problem in SZ: 
"... it is precisely the meaning of ground in Being and Time... that volatilizes the 
metaphysical venture, for in Being and Time the intelligibility of the ground 
revolves around the hermeneutic circle until it collapses into the auto-apotropaia of 
the Ab-grund, a perpetual turning the gaze away from the ground by turning the 
Ab-grund away from its own groundlessness. " 
29 
A criticism of this passage: it may well be that the meaning of ground in SZ does indeed 
have volatile consequences for metaphysics (but Tyman's point30 should he kept in mind, 
namely, that the concept of metaphysics here is too narrow, and that there is a suppressed 
tradition in which Heidegger's revision of ground nevertheless stands); ground does 
indeed have much to do with the hermeneutic circle - the question is what exactly, and this 
question will be pursued below; finally, Bigelow overstates and misinterprets the role of 
the Abgrund. 31 
2) Projective understanding, circularity and dialectic 
In Guest's article there is a play between the two meanings of "sens" in French: meaning 
and direction. 32 In the following paragraphs this play will be extended. Heidegger defines 
Sinn (sens) as follows: 
27 ibid., p. 128. 
28 ibid., p. 106. 
29 
ibid., p. 139. 
30 See pt. A, ch. 1, section 3. 
31 See pt B, ch. 2, section 2. 
32 "Sinn" (the German for seta) can very occasionally have the meaning of direction (as well as the 
normal meaning of "meaning"): in the phrase "im Uhrzeigersinn" (clockwise), "-sinn" conveys 
the idea of directionality. 
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"Sinn ist das... Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus 
dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird. " 
33 
"Meaning is the whither-upon of projection 
whence something becomes understandable as 34 
something.... " 
Particular attention needs to he paid to the reversal of directions in this definition. 
Entwerfen (projecting) is an away-towards... movement (whither), while Verstehen 
(understanding) is the returning movement from whatever it was towards which projecting 
moved (whence). Entwerfen is associated with the directional particles "auf... hin", while 
Verstehen is associated with the directional particles "aus... her" which express the 
reverse movement. 
35 
To what extent is this double movement of sense a double movement in the foundational? 
Guest's article already anticipates such a move: he notes the changes of direction 
associated with Voraussetzen and Lichtung, both of which belong to the network of 
foundational notions analysed earlier. 
36 However much more is needed to establish this 
double movement as a movement within the foundational. As was seen in the section on 
semantic interpenetration, lexical variation is used to introduce an internal heterogeneity 
into the conception of the foundational, and the dimensions of this heterogeneity consisted 
of different kinds of tension. One of these dimensions of tension concerns the direction of 
action. To explain: the classic transitive subject-predicate relation posits an agent, which 
acts upon an object. Grammatically, the object remains passive. The uni-directionality of 
action in the classic subject-predicate relation is of course purely surface-grammatical, but 
the danger exists for abstract thought that the surface-grammatical structure may invade 
the matter to be thought37 (perhaps, indeed, it already has - this invasion may the 
movement of falling). Lexical variation can remedy this. An example: saying that "X 
illuminates (lichtet) Y" sets up X as the foundation for Y, and has the directional structure 
X ---> Y. "Y essences out of (west aus) X" sets up the same foundational relation, 
but 
reverses the directional surface-syntax: Y is the source of action. The philosophical 
33 SZ, p. 151. 
34 Own translation. "Aus dem her" would normally be translated with Macquarrie & Robinson's "in 
terms of", but the directional relationship to "auf... hin" is of overriding importance. 
35 For a consideration (with a different interest and emphasis) of Entwurf, Verstehen and circles, see 
J. Sallis, Delimitations, pp. 119-125. The points here are not covered by Sallis. 
36 See pt. A, ch. 1, section 2. 
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significance is this: that the conception of ground against which Heidegger is reacting is 
one where founding is a one-way dependence - rather like a pile of bricks in a 
gravitational field like that experienced on the surface of the earth, each item depends on 
the one below it. Some passages in Heidegger show a juxtaposition of directionally 
different foundational notions - e. g. the opposition of "gründen in" (based upon) and 
"speisen aus" (feeding from)38; the opposition of "gründen in" and "wesen aus" (essencing 
from)39; the opposition of "in ihm gründend" (based in it) and "aus ihm entspringend" 
(arising from it). 40 Generally most of the lexical items in the foundational network can be 
ascribed a directionality, either by virtue of their normal meaning, or with the help of 
prepositions and particles Heidegger normally places with them. Translation often loses 
these nuances. Thus a crude division of foundational notions as follows can be made. 
(This is sometimes difficult to spot, since semantic directionality cuts across grammatical 
directionality) 
"41 
(source) 
gründen in entspringen aus 
fundieren in geben... her 
entrücken auf (... hin) wesen aus 
entwerfen auf (... hin) verstehen aus (... her) 
wurzeln in erwachsen (aus) 
voraussetzen ermöglichen 
liegen in lichten 
37 One might also apply Chomsky's distinction between surface and deep structure here. 
38 SZ, p. 169. The Macquame-Robinson translation loses the sense of the directional tension. 
39 SZ, p. 252 ("wesen aus" occurs in the Gesamtausgabe footnote). 
40 SZ, p. 284. 
41 The arrows mark the directionality of the terms in relation to the source. Verbs only have been 
used here for the sake of clarity. Nouns and other parts of speech from Heidegger can be divided 
similarly, but this would be confusing and tedious. The prepositions (only some are given here) 
emphasize the directionality; likewise the untranslatable particles "hin" and "her" - "hin" means 
an outwards or away-from movement,. "her" an inwards movement. The first column translates 
(from top to bottom): ground in, be founded in, be carried away to, project onto, root in, 
presuppose, lie in. The second column: spring from, give, essence out of, understand, grow 
from, make possible, illuminate. 
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The most notable omission from this list is the verb zeitigen. 42 Heidegger seems to ascribe 
both directions to this verb. While the other main foundational notions tend to have a 
unique direction and a bi-directional heterogeneity arises only through their common 
integration into the foundational semantic field, zeitigen seems to have an internal 
heterogeneity. 
***** 
The revision of ground in this manner is not merely a reaction against a perception of 
traditional foundational ism, but has a concrete and central role to play in the functioning 
of fundamental ontology. This is best shown by following the interplay of Verstehen and 
Entwurf. At various points it will become clear that this interplay has a foundational 
significance, but to demonstrate the foundational relevance from the start, it will be shown 
how Heidegger associates Grund and Sinn (Sinn was defined in terms of Entwurf and 
Verstehen in the passage quoted above). 
In this passage Heidegger recites the familiar thesis of the grounding character of 
Zeitlichkcit: - 
"Der ursprünglicher ontologische Grund der "The primordial ontological basis for Dasein's 
Existenzialität des Daseins aber ist die existentiality is temporality. " 
43 Zeitlichkeit. " 
A couple of paragraphs later he refers back to this. The context expects the repetition of 
the relation between Zeitlichkeit and Dasein as foundational, given in terms of Grund. 
However the notion of grounding has been replaced by that of Seinssinn: - 
"Wenn die Zeitlichkeit den ursprünglichen "If temporality makes up the primordial 
Seinssinn des Daseins ausmacht.... " 
44 meaning of Dasein's Being.... " 
This is not a casual slip. Exactly the same is seen in the following reference to exactly the 
same thesis: - 
41 
lit. "to temporalise" or "to mature"; there is an extended discussion of its meaning in the next 
chapter. 
43 SZ, p. 234. 
44 SZ, p. 235. 
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"Die These, der Sinn des Daseins ist die 
Zeitlichkeit..,. " 45 
"The thesis that the meaning of Dasein is, 
temporality.... " 
And again, even more clearly, in one of the closing passages of Sein und Zeit: 
"Die Aufgabe der bisherigen Betrachtungen 
war, das ursprüngliche Ganze des faktischen 
Daseins hinsichtlich der Möglichkeiten des 
eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Existierens 
existenzial-ontologisch aus seinem Grunde zu 
interpretieren. Als dieser Grund und somit als 
Seinssinn der Sorge offenbarte sich die 
Zeitlichkeit. " 46 
"In our considerations hitherto, our task has 
been to Interpret the primordial whole of 
factical Dasein with regard to its possibilities of 
authentic and inauthentic existing, and to do so 
in an existential-ontological manner in terns of 
its very basis. Temporality has manifested itself 
as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of 
the Being of care. " 
The key part of this passage is "als dieser Grund und somit als Seinssinn... ". The 
establishment of the Seinssinn comes or occurs "with" (mit) the establishment of ground. 
Another helpful passage is this: - 
"Der Sinn von Sein kann nie in Gegensatz 
gebracht werden zum Seienden oder zum Sein 
als tragenden »Grund« des Seienden, weil 
»Grund« nur als Sinn zugänglich wird, und sei 
er selbst der Abgrund der Sinnlosigkeit. " 
47 
"The meaning of Being can never be contrasted 
with entities, or with Being as the 'ground' 
which gives entities support; for a 'ground' 
becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it 
is itself the abyss of meaninglessness. " 
There is no contrast between the meaning of being, and being as ground. »Grund«, in 
scare-quotes, should probably be taken to refer to the unrevised traditional notion of 
ground. Thus "becomes accessible only as meaning" refers to the kind of change ground 
undergoes in the revision. There is no access to any objective, external facts which 
constitute ground, even if this is what grounding as such attempts to establish. The 
establishment of ground establishes only the Seinssinn of what we try to ground. 
Grounding is meaning insofar as it uncovers the being of something. 
***** 
To return to Heidegger's "definition" of Sinn, it ran thus: 
45 SZ, p. 331. 
46 SZ, p. 436. 
47 SZ, p. 152. 
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"Sinn ist das... Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus 
dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird. " 
48 
"Meaning is the whither-upon of projection 
whence something becomes understandable as 
something.... " 
This could be shown diagrammatically thus: 
49 
Entwurf 
------------------- >> ------------------- 
------------------- << ------------------- 
Verstehen 
Woraufbin/Worausher 
However this misrepresents the situation in the following respects: (1) although the 
Woraufhin (Worausher) has a certain unity, it is a rather holistic and indeterminate notion; 
the diagram suggests it might be easily delimited; to improve, the diagram would 
somehow show the Entwurf dispersing itself, and Verstehen resynthesising. (2) Verstehen 
does not "return" to that which the Entwurf left: what it was initially sought to understand 
changes its character during the course of this process of understanding; thus the diagram 
would show Entwurf and Verstehen diverging slightly. So an improvement of the above 
diagram would look like this: 50 
Fntunirf 
/ 
1 
JVorauthin/Worausher 
Verstehen 
 
48 SZ, p. 151; own translation. "Aus dem her" would normally be translated with Maquame 
& 
Robinson's "in terms of", but the directional relationship to "auf... hin" is of overriding 
importance. 
49 Explanation of diagram: the arrows show a to and fro movement. One of the poles of this 
movement is named: Woraufhin (also termed Worausher). The two movements are also named: 
respectively, Entwurf and Verstehen. 
50 Explanation of diagram: a simple development of the previous 
diagram, such that the two 
directions (Entwurf and Verstehen) disperse themselves into an indefinite 
(non-polar) region on 
the right of the diagram, and that the two directions diverge slightly on the 
left of the diagram. 
This divergence marks the fact that the to-and-fro of the Entwurf-Verstehen cycle 
lead to a 
definite development of the concept (which lies, unmarked, on the 
left). 
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This pattern reappears in numerous guises in Heidegger's writings, often so that it maN' 
not be recognised. For example, Heidegger's analysis of questioning at the beginning of 
SZ 51 breaks up questioning into the concepts < Gefragte, Befragte, Erfragte> 
, 
s2 
which 
could be placed on the diagram in the following way: 53 
Gefragte 
Befragte 
Erfragte 
At the end of the section on the formal structure of the question of being (SZ§2), 
Heidegger addresses the problem of circularity in the question of being, a theme he 
returns to a number of times. He says this: 
"Nicht ein »Zirkel im Beweis« liegt in der Frage 
nach dem Sinn von Sein, wohl aber eine 
merkwürdige »Rück- oder Vor-bezogenheit« des 
Gefragten (Sein) auf das Fragen als Seinsmodus 
54 
eines Seienden. " 
"In the question of the meaning of Being there 
is no 'circular reasoning' but rather a 
remarkable 'relatedness backward or forward' 
which what we asking about (Being) bears to 
the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an 
entity. " 
51 SZ, p. 5. Fora more general analysis of SZ§2. see J. Sallis, op. cit., pp. 105-111. 
52 Even Macquarrie & Robinson were largely defeated for translations; the terms are built on the - 
frag- root; fragen means to ask or to question. For a better understanding of their meaning, see 
Heidegger's explanation in SZ§2, or the diagram. 
53 Explanation of diagram: essentially the same as the previous one. The Woraufhin or Worausher 
has been relabelled as Befragte. The directions have not been labelled. That from which the to- 
and-fro movement starts and at which it ends have been labelled, respectively, Gefragte and 
Erfragte. The divergence of the directions to the left of the diagram represents the difference 
which the movement opens up between Gefragte and Erfragte. 
54 sz, p. 8. 
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The last phrase, "das Fragen als Seinsmodus eines Seienden", refers to the peculiarly 
inquisitive character of Dasein, which is selected as the Befragte. Thus in this passage 
Heidegger already refers to a dialectical mediation, a non-circular hermeneutic to-and-fro. 
And in the passage just prior to this, Heidegger shows that the non-circularity (or non- 
viciousness of what circularity there might he) turns on the foundational character of this 
dialectical mediation, and on the revision of this foundational character. 
"Ein »Zirkel im Beweis« kann in der 
Fragestellung überhaupt nicht liegen, weil es in 
der Beantwortung der Frage nicht um eine 
ableitende Begründung, sondern um 
aufweisende Grund-Freilegung geht. "55 
"A 'circular argument' cannot in any way lie 
in formulating the question [about the meaning 
of being]; for in answering this question the 
issue is not one of a derivative grounding, 
rather it is one of [a] showing ground-free- 
laying. " 
Heidegger says nothing more here on the nature of this revision, though at the very least 
one can read into the words ableitend (deriving) and Freilegung (free-laying) the rejection 
of hierarchical founding in favour of a founding associated with freedom, as presented in 
MAL and VWG. 
***** 
As Guest points out, one of the directions in this double-movement is a "falling" direction, 
and the efforts of SZ are aimed at moving against this natural flow of understanding. This 
is stated by Heidegger quite clearly in the following passage: 
"Die Freilegung des ursprünglichen Seins des 
Daseins muß ihm vielmehr im Gegenzug zur 
verfallenden ontisch-ontologischen Auslegungs- 
tendenz abgerungen werden. " 
56 
"The free-laying of Dasein's primordial being 
must rather be wrested from Dasein by 
following the opposite course from that taken 
by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of 
interpretation. " 
The Freilegung (and here Freilegung once again in the sense of Grund-Freilegung) moves 
in opposition to the naturally falling tendencies of ontological interpretation, and must 
do 
so. Heidegger goes on to say that this inflicts a violence on our everyday processes of 
55 SZ, p. 8; Macquame & Robinson's translation 
has been literalised. 
56 
SZ, p. 31 1 (Heidegger's emphasis); Macquarrie 
& Robinson's translation slightly adjusted. 
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understanding. (This should be compared with one aspect of the solution found earlier in 
this chapter for semantic interpenetration in Heidegger). 57 
"Die existenziale Analyse hat daher für die 
Ansprüche bzw. die Genügsamkeit und 
beruhigte Selbstverständlichkeit der alltäglichen 
Auslegung ständig den Charakter einer 
Gewaltsamkeit. Dieser Charakter zeichnet zwar 
die Ontologie des Daseins besonders aus, er 
eignet aber jeder Interpretation, weil das in ihr 
sich ausbildende Verstehen die Struktur des 
Entwerfens hat. 58 
"Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has 
the character of doing violence to the claims or 
the complacency and placid obviousness of 
everyday interpretation. This characteristic [of 
violence] is a remarkable feature of the 
ontology of Dasein [in general], but linked 
[particularly] to interpretation because 
interpretation's internally developing 
understanding has the structure of projection. " 
Thus Entwerfen names this violent move against the natural direction of understanding. 
Not only Entwerfen, however, but also this naturally falling tendency itself belongs to 
being: 
"Die Seinsart des Daseins fordert daher von 
einer ontologischen Interpretation..., daß sie 
sich das Sein dieses Seienden gegen seine eigene 
Verdeckungstendenz erobert. "59 
"Dasein's kind of being thus demands of an 
ontological interpretation.... that it storm and 
subjugate the being of the entity contrary to its 
[being's] own disguising tendency. " 
In this last passage, the tendency of being to disguise itself by enticing ontological 
understanding to run in the wrong direction echoes the amphibolous character of being 
described by Bigelow. Bigelow, as stated above, holds that the amphibolous character of 
being precludes the success of Heidegger's project in SZ; his objection is a version of the 
vicious circle objection: namely, that being's character of always leading understanding 
away from itself makes ontology inherently impossible. But it is exactly here that 
Heidegger has a theory that, if not successful, at least goes a step beyond Bigelow - and 
this is the possibility of a violent contrary movement: the Entwurf. The problem which 
now arises is that of the operation of the Entwurf: where does it take us, and with what 
justification? Heidegger raises these questions too. 
57 See pt. A, ch. 1, section 3 (second part of the solution). 
58 SZ, p. 311; own translation. The second sentence is particularly obscure, and the given translation 
is a free interpretation. The important point, though, the causal association of the violence of the 
ontology with the structure of projection, is not in doubt. 
59 SZ, p. 311; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation altered. Heidegger's emphasis. 
127 
"Aber gibt es hierfür [d. h. für das Entwerfen] 
nicht je eine eigene Leitung und Regelung? 
Woher sollen aber die ontologischen Entwürfe 
die Evidenz der phänomenalen Angemessenheit 
für ihre »Befunde« nehmen? Die ontologische 
Interpretation entwirft vorgegebenes Seiendes 
auf das ihm eigene Sein, um es hinsichtlich 
seiner Struktur auf den Begriff zu bringen. Wo 
sind die Wegweiser für die Entwurfsrichtung, 
damit sie überhaupt auf das Sein treffe? Und 
wenn gar das Seiende, das für die existenziale 
Analytik thematisch wird, in seiner Weise zu 
sein das ihm zugehörige Sein verbirgt? "60 
"But isn't there ever a specific guidance and 
regulation for this [i. e. for projection]? From 
where are ontological projections to get the 
evidence for the phenomenal appropriacy of 
their 'findings'? Ontological interpretation 
projects a given entity onto its own being so as 
to bring it to conceptualisation with regard to 
its structure. Where are the signposts for the 
direction of projection, so that it successfully 
targets being? And what if the entity which 
becomes the theme of the existential analytic in 
its way of being actually conceals the being 
which belongs to it? " 
The questions about some sort of guide for the Entwurf eventually take Heidegger to the 
Seinsverständnis that is always already "in" Dasein, but in an indeterminate and obscure 
way. 61 The Verstehen-Entwurf reciprocity now seems to begin to iterate, and thus 
Heidegger once again raises the question of circularity. 62 The circle is discussed earlier in 
63 
§32 of SZ. Here the well-known passage is found in which Heidegger says that it is not 
a matter of escaping or avoiding the circle, but getting into it in the right way. 
"Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel 
heraus-, sondern in ihn nach der rechten Weise 
64 hineinzukommen. 
"What is decisive is not to get out of the circle 
but to come into it in the right way. " 
But what could this right way be? If ontology is to be possible, then to come into the 
circle in the right way must also be a possibility. Bearing in mind that the "circle" is 
constructed from the to-and-fro movement of Verstehen and Entwurf, this word Entwurf 
also occurs in the introduction to the second edition of Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
during Kant's discussion of the nature of scientific revolutions and the problem of 
hermeneutic circularity. 65 Kant writes: 
60 SZ, p. 311f.; own translation. 
61 SZ, p. 313. 
62 SZ, p. 314. 
63 SZ, pp. 152f. 
64 SZ, p. 153. 
65 The reference is owed to P. Bigelow, op. cit., p. 14ß. 
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"Sie begriffen, daß die Vernunft nur das einsieht, was sie selbst nach ihrem 
Entwurfe hervorbringt.... "66 
In other words, a projection or plan (Entwurf) is prior to understanding. The point is, for 
example, that something such as the Copernican conception of the solar system could 
never be deduced from observations, but required an Entwurf which could then be tested 
against observations. The problem which arises is: how can one produce a correct 
Entwurf? is there any sure path towards it? The answer is obviously no. Of course, one's 
previous knowledge may give one a vague idea of the sort of thing which might work, but 
some kind of leap is still required. 67 Copernicus is an example of someone who managed 
to get into the circle in the right way, but it was only in retrospect that this could be 
shown. How, then, do we get into Heidegger's circle in the right way? Can one be sure in 
advance? 
"Es gilt, einen Weg zur Aufhellung der 
ontologischen Fundamentalfrage zu suchen und 
zu gehen. Ob er der einzige oder überhaupt der 
rechte ist, das kann erst nach dem Gang 
entschieden werden. "68 
"One must seek and follow a way of casting 
light on the fundamental question of ontology. 
Whether this is the only way or even the right 
one can be decided only after one has gone 
along it. " 
This passage would seem to confirm the suspicion that in advance of finding the path, of 
getting into the circle in the right way, one can only hope for some luck. However 
Heidegger has more up his sleeve than simply this. The next move is a typically 
Heideggerian device which does not seem to be appreciated in the secondary literature: 
namely, the revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental. (This is not a random 
device external to the matter of the being itself; rather it reflects the restructuring of 
ground itself). Classically, the vicious circle objection is a problem which an investigation 
meets along its path. The problem is external to the matter in hand, and prevents further 
progress along the path (or rather, dubs further progress as absurd). The Heidegger device 
is to stop seeing the problem as external to the matter in hand, and rather to see it 
emerging from the matter in hand. The idea is that as the problem emerges from the 
matter in hand, so the structure of the problem must, in some way, reflect the structure of 
66 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Bxiii. "They learned that reason has insight only into that which 
it produces after a plan (Entwurf) of its own. " 
67 Cf. the concept of the "leap" (Sprung) which occurs in Heidegger's writings. 
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the matter in hand. Thus to progress further, one looks at the way in which the problem 
emerges from the matter in hand to get a better insight into its essence or structure. 69 This 
device can he seen at work in the following passages, which extend the discussion quoted 
above of finding an adequate Entwurf. 
"Wird so nicht endlich ganz offenkundig, daß 
sich das aufgerollte fundamentalontologische 
Problem in einem »Zirkel« sich bewegt? Zwar 
zeigten wir schon bei der Analyse der Struktur 
des Verstehens überhaupt, daß, was mit dem 
unangemessenen Ausdruck »Zirkel« bemängelt 
wird, zum Wesen und zu der Auszeichnung des 
Verstehens selbst gehört. 70 
"Does it not finally become patently clear that 
the rolled-up fundamental -ontological problem 
moves in a 'circle'? We have indeed already 
shown in the analysis of the structure of 
understanding in general that what is 
undervalued with the inappropriate term 
" circle' belongs to the essence and distinctive 
character of understanding itself. " 
Here Heidegger refers back to the discussion of the hermeneutic circle in §32, and it can 
be seen that the problematic "circle" (note the scare-quotes) sketches out the structure of 
the essence of understanding. 
"Was die Verständigkeit, vermeinend, der 
höchsten Strenge wissenschaftlicher 
Untersuchung zu genügen, mit der Vermeidung 
des »Zirkels« zu beseitigen wünscht, ist nichts 
Geringeres als die Grundstruktur der Sorge. 
Ursprünglich durch sie konstituiert, ist das 
Dasein je schon sich-selbst-vorweg. " 
71 
"What common sense wishes to eliminate in 
avoiding the 'circle', on the supposition that it 
is measuring up to the loftiest rigour of 
scientific investigation, is nothing less than the 
basic structure of care. Because it is 
primordially constituted by care, any Dasein is 
already ahead of itself. " 
Here Heidegger goes further: the problematic "circle" structure is the Grundstruktur 
(ground-structure) of care. Indeed, not only is the problematic in the circle revalued and 
appropriated as the ground and essence of Dasein, so also the Zirkeleinwand, the 
objection. 
68 SZ, p. 437; Macquame & Robinson's translation altered. 
69 This device or tactic is what is rhetoricized (and misunderstood? ) by Bigelow as the synchronous 
possibility and impossibility of ontology. The only Heidegger text which bears explicitly on the 
matter is the analysis of conspicuity (Auf älligkeit) in SZ§16. 
70 SZ, p. 314. Macquarne & Robinson's translation considerably altered. 
71 SZ, p. 315. 
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"Der »Zirkeleinwand« kommt aber selbst aus 
einer Seinsart des Daseins. " 
72 
"Yet the 'charge of circularity' itself comes 
from a kind of being which belongs to Dasein. " 
Almost all along, the references to circularity have been circumscribed and suspended with 
the use of quotation marks. The inference is that there is not really a circle here anyway, 
but some other kind of structure, which only appears as a circle in the field of logic. What 
clues does Heidegger give as the "real" structure of this "circle"? After saying that it is 
the Grundstruktur of Sorge (quoted above), Heidegger then recapitulates the structure of 
Sorge as "je schon sich-selbst-vorweg". This structure is metaleptic - another kind of 
double movement. 73 Further clues to the "real" structure of thie "circle" are given in the 
following passage: 
"Der gegen die existenziale Interpretation 
vorgebrachte »Zirkeleinwand« will sagen: die 
Idee der Existenz und des Seins überhaupt wird 
»vorausgesetzt« und »darnach« das Dasein 
interpretiert, um daraus die Idee des Seins zu 
gewinnen. Allein was bedeutet das 
»Voraussetzen«? Wird mit der Idee der Existenz 
ein Satz angesetzt, aus dem wir nach den 
formalen Regeln der Konsequenz weitere Sätze 
über das Sein des Dasein deduzieren? Oder hat 
diese Voraus-setzen den Charakter des 
verstehenden Entwerfens, so zwar, daß die 
solches Verstehen ausbildende Interpretation das 
Auszulegende gerade erst selbst zu Wort 
kommen läßt, damit es von sich aus entscheide, 
ob es als dieses Seiende die Seinsverfassung 
hergibt, auf welche es im Entwurf 
formalanzeigend erschlossen wurde? " 
74 
"The 'circularity objection' which is brought 
against existential interpretation claims: the 
idea of existence and being in general is 
' presupposed' and 'after that' Dasein is 
interpreted so as to extract the idea of being. 
But what does 'presupposing' mean? With the 
idea of existence is a proposition being posited, 
from which we deduce further propositions 
about the being of Dasein according to the 
formal rules of logicality? Or does this pre- 
supposing have the character of understanding 
projecting, such that the interpretation which 
develops such understanding is precisely what 
first allows the matter for interpretation to put 
itself into words, so that the matter resolves 
itself as to whether, as this entity, it reveals the 
constitution of being onto which it was 
formally disclosed in projection? " 
The "circle" acquires two characterisations here: first, that its movement is non-sequential; 
second, that its movement is creative. (1) The sequentiality of the steps is suggested as an 
origin for the vicious circle by the scare-quoted »vorausgesetzt« (lit. placed before) and 
72 SZ, p. 315. 
73 For a discussion of metalepsis, see the discussion of Rapaport in the earlier section on semantic 
interpenetration. 
74 SZ, p. 314f.; own translation. The interpretation and translation of the section italicised by 
Heidegger is exceptionally difficult. The strength of "von sich aus entscheide" (resolves itself) is 
(probably) freedom from prejudice as to whether the interpretation faithfully conveys something 
of the being of the entity which it was sought to understand. 
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»darnach« (after). The later phrase verstehendes Entwerfen suggests a participatory 
synchronicity, a synthetic tension. (2) The refence to principles and the phrase "erst selbst 
zu Wort kommen läßt" (itself actually first articulates) contrasts the ready-made fine 
definition of principles with the creative process. The mediative bi-directional process of 
verstehendes Entwerfen is prior to the determination of such principles, indeed, is the 
creation of articulation and conceptual determination. If the verstehend-entwerfend 
mediation is creative, it follows that it could not indefinitely extend backwards in a 
constant circling; rather, it quickly reaches an origin. The logical vicious circle depends 
for its infinite regression on a clearly distinct and determinate sequence. Heidegger must 
be right to think that if the circle gets rapidly indeterminate as it regresses, one may soon 
be unable to trace a regression any more. The contrast between the propositional nature of 
the principle (Satz) and Heidegger's idea of "erst zu Wort kommen läßt" needs especial 
emphasis: it is not only that the search for foundations should not be thought to consist in 
the production of propositions; further, the very nature of such a foundational enquiry is 
that it deals with the pre-propositional (as well as the pre-cognitive), and thus it works 
with semantic-syntactic structures other than those of everyday language (i. e. with 
paratypes). The vicious circle arises if one ignores this. The next section takes up another 
tactic by which the proposition is disintegrated so as to bring the circle into its correct 
relation to the understanding. 
***** 
To draw this section to a close, two things will be done: first, to place the bi-directionality 
or dialectic of projective understanding in its historical perspective; second, to show how 
the reversal (Kehre) of projective understanding is anticipated in the final paragraph of 
SZ. 
To place this bi-directionality in its historical perspective, it can justifiably be called 
dialectic. This justification needs to be made, since on the whole the term is not well 
received by Heidegger. 
75 Dialectic is discussed by Plato in The Republic as a part of the 
75 And even less well by Kant, who calls it a logic of illusion: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B349. 
The purpose of introducing the term "dialectic" here is that of finding a convenient and adequate 
description of Heidegger's method and language. Dialectic has had many meanings in 
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education of the philosopher. 
76 Plato maps out the function and status of dialectic more 
clearly than its procedure. Dialectic is the highest method in philosophy, and the only 
method available to pure reason in the attainment of the highest forms of knowledge. At 
533c-d Plato refers to the problem of gaining firm knowledge of the first principle in the 
face of prejudices and assumptions - dialectic is unique in its ability to avoid these 
prejudices and assumptions. Heidegger claims77 that phenomenology is the only 
appropriate method for ontology (i. e. for the recovery of the question of being); this is 
exactly analogous to Plato's claim about dialectic and the first principle. And in both 
cases, the primary concern is the development of a method which avoids prejudices. 
Heidegger never exhaustively describes what he means by phenomenology, althought there 
are extensive passages on the subject. 78 From SZ §7 it is clear that phenomenology is a 
hermeneutical79 method for overcoming the self-concealing80 tendencies of phenomena 
(and presumably being), a method which has to supply not only its own lexis, but even its 
own grammar. 8' While the structure of projective understanding is never explicitly 
associated with phenomenology, it becomes clear in the course of SZ that the structure and 
directionality of projective understanding is a grammatically revisional hermeneutical 
method for overcoming the self-concealing tendencies of being, and that, like 
phenomenology, it is considered essential to the operation of fundamental ontology. 
In discussing Heidegger, I therefore use the term "dialectic" to refer to a key device or 
figure (paratype) in the phenomenological method, namely, that of the double foundational 
movement of projective understanding. Phenomenology is commonly thought to belong to 
the early Heidegger, and to distinguish the early from the late Heidegger. However it is a 
philosophy. I have drawn from Plato, not from Kant or Hegel, and my interest is in the 
semantics, not the logic, of the word. 
76 Plato, The Republic, 531d-534e. 
77 SZ, p. 35. 
78 
e. g. PGZ §§4-13; SZ §7; GP §5. 
79 SZ, p. 37. 
80 SZ, p. 35f. 
81 SZ, p. 39. 
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case of the terminology changing more than the method, and the dialectic paratype in 
phenomenology clearly outlasts the term "phenomenology". It is in this way that I 
interpret the comments of Heidegger in his letter to Richardson, in which he carefully 
warded off any suggestion that he had stopped being a phenomenologist. 
What might the paratype "dialectic" have to do with ground? The unreconstructed 
conception of ground is one of a linear, mono-directional dependence relation, structurally 
analogous to our local experience of gravity. Working with such an unreconstructed 
conception makes it relatively easy to move in one direction (deductively), and relatively 
difficult moving in the other direction (contrary to the falling tendency of interpretation82). 
In practice the difficulty with moving in the other direction is not so much speculating 
about possible reasons or grounds; the problem is justifying the move in this direction, 
that is, finding an Entwurfsrichtung (direction of projection) which is adequate to target 
being accurately. 83 The crucial difficulty is how to avoid the presumption of a God's-eye 
view of the universe, and in so doing quietly making an illicit assumption in one's arguing 
back. How can one legitimately move back? 
One kind of attempt to deal with this problem is transcendental argumentation. Heidegger 
uses forms of expression (particularly the Kantian phrase "condition of the possibility 
for") which suggest he too might be using a basically transcendental form of 
argumentation. Crudely and briefly described, transcendental argumentation has the 
general form of two premises and a conclusion, where (1) the first premise p is an 
admission of a very general and uncontroversial empirical character, such as the facticity 
of empirical knowledge or experience or the facticity of meaningful communication, and 
(2) the second premise is condition of the form "if 
P 
then ", stating a necessary condition 
for the possibility of p; as, according to (1), p holds, so therefore q must hold as the 
necessary condition for the possibility of p. 
84 In this manner transcendental argumentation 
lays a claim to justifiable movement back towards first principles. However the God's-eye 
view objection can be played with respect to the second premise. In fact there are no 
82 SZ, p. 311 (quoted above). 
83 SZ, p. 3 11 If. (quoted above). 
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formal, extended transcendental arguments in Heidegger, although transcendental 
arguments could be constructed from what Heidegger says. His use of the suggestive 
phrase "condition for the possibility of' is a parasitic allusion to Kant where the key 
interest in borrowing the phrase is not for its logical form, but for its semantic properties: 
Heidegger has no interest in the logic of the transcendental argument; his interest is that 
semantically the phrase "condition for the possibility of' expresses a justifiable move hack 
towards first principles. Evidence for this is that the phrase "condition for the possibility 
of" is used alongside (and interchangeably with) other terms expressing the same 
retrogression. 85 Thus any logical defect in transcendental argumentation would not affect 
Heidegger. The question remains, how does Heidegger avoid the God's-eye view? 
One can restate the problem in terms of Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel in terms of 
palaces and builder's huts. The classic systematic philosopher builds a palace while 
inhabiting a builder's shack nearby: the shack constitutes the perspective and methodology 
which lie outside the fine homogeneous and totalising structure of the palace. The 
necessity of such an external perspective and methodology places a question-mark over the 
possibility of a total system. With respect to Heidegger, phenomenology seems to be a 
method whereby the builder's shack is itself gradually turned into the palace. 86 This 
reflects the structure of the paratype (disas-sembling device) whereby the problematic is 
revalued as the essential. In the metaphor his position runs as follows: in fact we always 
already have been in the palace (of Seinsverständnis); it is just that the palace has fallen 
84 This summary is extremely simplified and does the extensive secondary literature on 
transcendental arguments little justice. For a start, see T. Wilkerson, Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason (Oxford University Press, 1976), ch. 10. 
85 See section on semantic interpenetration. 
86 But in any case Heidegger's palace is more like Kant's dwelling-house than a tower reaching to 
the heavens: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B735. Whether Heidegger's "palace" is a totalising 
system is very questionable: Heidegger's continual appeal in SZ to the necessity of a (pre- 
perspectival? pre-conceptual? ) access to Dasein's totality do not constitute a claim to provide a 
total analysis, nor are these appeals ever satisfied - they serve simply to motivate the next steps. 
(However to find a term to describe the relation of SZ to Dasein's totality is difficult: terms like 
"aspect", "part", "perspective", are ruled out; Heidegger's terminological evasions make it 
difficult to defend him on this point. There is a sense in which it is quite obvious that SZ 
provides no total analysis, but instead moves quickly to intimating the extra-textual origins 
and/or limits of that totality). As Kant says of his own project, at the outset it seemed as though a 
tower was to be built to the heavens, but the execution of the project humbled these ambitions. 
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(verfallen) into terrible decay and we have to reverse this process using the materials 
tieing around us inside the palace/shack. There is then something of a Pompidou Centre 
move, whereby the scaffolding and other building paraphernalia actually turn out to 
constitute the palace. 
That the problem of moving back ever arose is diagnosed as a forgetting or bracketting-put 
of Entwurf as part of the dialectical process of projective understanding. The theory of 
projection does not therefore respond to the problem in the terms the problem sets, but 
undermines it. The retrieve of Entwurf inflicts violence on our natural thought processes, 
since it moves in an opposite direction, and in so doing demands a new lexis and 
grammar. 87 It is in this way that Heidegger's dialectic responds to Plato's hope of an 
unprejudiced ascent to the first principle. 
With these comments as to the foundationally dialectical character of meaning as 
projective understanding, the final paragraph of SZ, on the meaning of being, will he 
interpreted, and its anticipation of a reversal (Kehre) brought out. 
In this final paragraph, Heidegger asks: 
"Wie ist erschließendes Verstehen von Sein "How is this disclosive understanding at all 
daseinsmaßig überhaupt möglich? " 
88 possible for Dasein? " 
As has already been shown, the acquisition of Verstehen turns on an adequate Entwurf, 
and an Entwurf is the reverse of the natural process of understanding. As there is already a 
Seinsverständnis in Dasein, the matter thus turns to the reversal of this Seinsverständnis. 
To do this, Heidegger digs deeper into the constitution of Dasein, finding it has the basic 
structure of Zeitlichkeit. With regard to Dasein's inherent Seinsverständnis, Zeitlichkeit is 
Temporalität. 89 It follows that gaining an adequate Entwurf for the meaning of being has 
something to do with a reversal and the structure of Temporalität. This is as far as SZ 
Kant, interestingly, speaks of the inevitability that each must build his own intellectual home, 
such is the size of people's mutual misunderstanding, resulting in a scattering of constructions. 
87 SZ, p. 39. Cf. pt. A, ch. 1 and ch. 2 on the lexis and grammar of founding. 
88 SZ, p. 437 (Heidegger's emphasis). 
89 This point is only shown in GP. 
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gets. Not all of this is clear from the closing words, but what is clear from the final 
paragraph is that after the above question about a Verstehen von Sein, Heidegger then 
turns to the possibility of Zeitlichkeit offering an Entwurf. 
"Kann die Frage ihre Antwort im Rückgang auf 
die ursprüngliche Seinsverfassung des Sein- 
verstehenden Daseins gewinnen? Die 
existenzial-ontologische Verfassung der 
Daseinsganzheit gründet in der Zeitlichkeit. 
Demnach muß eine ursprüngliche 
Zeitigungsweise der ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit 
selbst den ekstatischen Entwurf von Sein 
überhaupt ermöglichen. "90 
"Can this question be answered by going back 
to the primordial constitution-of-being of that 
Dasein by which being is understood? The 
existential -ontological constitution of Dasein's 
totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the 
ecstatical projection of being must be made 
possible by a primordial way in which 
ecstatical temporality temporalizes. " 
This brings the matter to time. But before going on to the next chapter (on time), there is 
still something outstanding in the structure and methodology of founding which must be 
examined. In the last passage, Heidegger said that the constitution of Dasein was grounded 
in Zeitlichkeit. And in GP, Heidegger speaks of an "Entwurf auf Zeit", a projection onto 
time, as the projection which will make possible a recovery of the meaning of being. 91 
Time and temporality appear here as poles of a grounding-projecting relation. Yet what 
seems to happen as Heidegger circles towards being is that the poles become subordinate 
to and indistinguishable from their relatedness. This raises the methodological problem 
which will be pursued in the next section. 
3) A short note on metaxy and the end of circling 
"Dasein... ist... das Sein des Grundes.... 
92 Dasein ist sein Grund existierend.... " 
"Dasein... is... the being of ground.... Dasein 
is its basis existently.... 
There is a role-shift for ground in SZ, such that the investigation of ground no longer 
targets something that there is to understand, rather, what it is to understand. The ground 
of Dasein is not a category to be filled, but an existential: this, of course, is nothing new, 
but were the implications of this ever worked out properly in the secondary literature? 
90 SZ, p. 437; Macquarne & Robinson's translation with minor alterations. 
91 GP, p. 437. 
92 SZ, p. 285; own translation. Macquarrie & Robinson interpret out the crucial point. 
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Dasein does not have ground, does not have a rationale, does not have a Seinssinn; it is 
such. As Heidegger says so often, the Greeks described human being as the zoon logon 
echon. 
93 In this definition logos is not only the source of speech, but also of rationale, in 
the sense of (a) reason, ground. Here the proposition "temporality is the ground of 
Dasein", which posits a relation between temporality and Dasein, begins to disintegrate as 
a proposition. Dasein, surface-grammatically a pole of the founding relation, coalesces in 
on the relation, such that as a matter of the deep-syntax it cannot be distinguished from the 
founding relation. 
In the previous section it was seen how Heidegger's defence against the circularity 
objection, that is, the infinite regression of grounds to which ontology may seem doomed, 
turned on the mistake of regarding the constituents of the circle as determinate 
propositions. The statement that temporality is the ground of Dasein would be one such 
constituent of the circle. Thus the disintegration of the propositional nature of this 
statement is crucial to Heidegger's defence; indeed, the way in which the disintegration 
occurs is crucial to the project of ontology. MAL demonstrates that the proposition is 
ultimately foundational (as a matter of its internal structure) not only in this case, but 
generally so. 94 Thus the disintegration or reconstruction of propositional-form reflects a 
revision of ground. 
The classic proposition sets up a subject-predicate relation in which the subject, 
grammatically, acts as the point of security - as the h3pokeimenon. The interpretations of 
ground as freedom, transcendence and temporality are examples of Heidegger putting the 
principle of the following passage into practice: 
"Diese Situation ist nicht die rettende Küste 
sondern der Sprung ins treibende Boot, und es 
hängt nun daran, das Tau für die Segel in die 
Hand zu bekommen und nach dem Wind zu 
" 95 sehen. 
"This situation is not the rescuing coast, rather 
the leap into the drifting boat, and now it is a 
matter of taking the sail-rope in one's hand and 
looking for the wind. " 
93 
e. g. SZ, pp. 25,48,165. 
94 See the material on MAL in pt. A, ch. 2. 
95 PIA, p. 37. 
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Thus weaning thought from false ontic security, Heidegger tries to open a space of free 
creativeness, where the foundational is not a groping for the nearest point of security, but 
a response to a radical absence of such ontological security. This thought is analogous, not 
to the immediately experience of gravity on the earth's surface - an inevitable falling to the 
floor, but to the planets and stars which fail to fall - which literally create their own 
ground. In other words, a thought which has effected a Copernican turn with regard to the 
foundational. At the grammatical level, this means (inter alia) a disruption of the 
proposition. At the lexical level, this means (inter alia) a cultivation of terms which act 
like bridges without supports. In this vein we have the following passage in SZ: 
"In welche Richtung gilt es zu sehen für die 
phänomenale Charakteristik des In-seins als 
solchen? Wir erhalten Antwort durch die 
Erinnerung daran, was bei der Anzeige des 
Phänomens dem phänomenologisch behaltenden 
Blick anvertraut wurde: das In-sein im 
Unterschied von der vorhandenen Inwendigkeit 
eines Vorhandenen »in« einem anderen.... das 
In-Sein vielmehr als wesenhafte Seinsart dieses 
Seienden selbst. Was anderes stellt sich aber 
dann mit diesem Phänomen dar als vorhandene 
commercium zwischen einem vorhandenen 
Subjekt und einem vorhandenen Objekt? Diese 
Auslegung käme dem phänomenalen Bestand 
schon näher, wenn sie sagte: das Dasein ist das 
Sein dieses »Zwischen«. Irreführend bliebe die 
Orientierung an dem »Zwischen« trotzdem. Sie 
macht unbesehen den ontologisch unbestimmten 
Ansatz des Seienden mit, wozwischen dieses 
Zwischen als solches »ist«. Das Zwischen ist 
schon als Resultat der convenentia zweier 
Vorhandenen begriffen. " 96 
"In what direction must one look for the 
phenomenal characterisation of being-in as 
such? We get an answer by recalling what was 
entrusted to the persistently phenomenological 
view when this phenomenon was announced: 
the difference of being-in from the present-at- 
hand insideness of one present-at-hand thing 
in' another.... rather, being-in as the essential 
way of being of this entity itself. But what else 
does this phenomenon then present if not a 
present-at-hand commercium between a 
present-at-hand subject and a present-at-hand 
object? This interpretation would come closer 
to the phenomenal content by saying: Dasein is 
the being of this 'between'. Nevertheless 
orientating oneself with the 'between' would 
remain misleading. It covertly brings in the 
ontologically vague assumption of the entities 
between which this between, as such, 'Is'. The 
between is already conceived as the result of 
the convenientia of two things present-at- 
hand. " 
Here Heidegger can be seen trying to set up the "in" and the "between" as (impossibly) 
poleless relations. This does not mean that Heidegger simply reduces everything to the 
relational. 97 Rather, the structure towards which Heidegger is working is the condition for 
the possibility of a subject-object-relation, 98 in the same way that the laws according to 
which planets and stars do not fall, but create their own ground, are prior conditions for 
96 SZ, p. 132; own translation. 
97 SZ, p. 88. 
98 
ibid. 
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the locally prevailing gravitational conditions on the earth's surface. The paratype (disas- 
sembling structure) which Heidegger tries to create here lacks a name, and as it will 
reappear a number of times yet, it needs one; it will therefore he called metactical (from 
"metaxy"). 99 Creating a sense of the metactical involves such devices as depriving 
relations of their poles; prioritising them over their poles; interchanging hi-polar 
opposites; letting the names of the poles stand for the relation and vice versa. 
Metaxy can he seen at work again in the following passage from SZ: 
"Im Sein des Daseins liegt schon das 
»Zwischen« mit Bezug auf Geburt und Tod. 
Keineswegs dagegen »ist« das Dasein in einem 
Zeitpunkt wirklich und außerdem noch von dem 
Nichtwirklichen seiner Geburt und seines Todes 
»umgeben«. Existenzial verstanden ist die 
Geburt nicht und nie ein Vergangenes im Sinne 
des Nichtmehrvorhandenen, so wenig wie dem 
Tod die Seinsart des noch nicht vorhandenen, 
aber ankommenden Ausstandes eignet. Das 
faktische Dasein existiert gebürtig, und gebürtig 
stirbt es auch schon im Sinne des Seins zum 
Tode.... Als Sorge ist das Dasein das 
100 
»Zwischen«. " 
"The 'between' which relates to birth and 
death already lies in the being of Dasein. This 
in no way means to say that Dasein 'is' actual 
in a point of time and, supplementarily, 
' surrounded' by the non-actuality of its birth 
and death. Existentially understood, birth is not 
and never is something past in the sense of 
something no longer present-at-hand; and death 
is just as far from having the kind of being of 
something outstanding which is not yet present- 
at-hand but coming along. Factical Dasein 
exists birth-wise, and it dies birth-wise in the 
sense of being-towards-death.... As care, 
Dasein is the 'between'. " 
Immediately after this passage, Heidegger says that the ground of the unity of 
(presumably) the dispersion into < birth - between of life - death > is Zeitlichkeit 
(temporality). Repeatedly, the methodologically irregular structures which the 
investigation of the foundational has uncovered lead to the issue of Zeitlichkeit. As regards 
the problem of the hermeneutic circle, it will be seen that Heidegger says that Zeitlichkeit 
is the end of the retrogression - and this, it must be, by virtue of its metactical character. 
99 This follows C. Lutz, Zwischen Sein und Nichts - Der Begriff des 'Ztivischen' im 
Werk von Martin 
Heidegger (dissertation, Bonn University, 1984). Lutz appropriates the word "metaxy" into the 
German language, taking it from Plato (Symposion 204). The Greek "metaxy" means between. 
Lutz's rather short dissertation is more instructive as regards the later Heidegger, and quoting 
SZ 
p. 132 in extenso rather refutes his statements about the earlier Heidegger. Lutz notes a number of 
connections, but lacks any depth or persistence. 
100 SZ, p. 374; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation with alterations. 
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SUMMARY OF PART A. 
This part of the thesis approached the issue of ground in the early Heidegger by taking 
methodological problems as starting-points. As a matter of presentation, four areas where 
methodological problems emerged were analysed: (i) semantic interpenetrations, (ii) 
logico-grammatical irregularities, (iii) macro-structural incongruencies, (iv) problems of 
mediation between being and entity. Although these starting-points presented problems 
which affected not only the language and understanding of ground, but many other areas 
of Heidegger's thought, they led to considerations of the nature of ground. As a matter of 
the issue itself, these areas had more than mere points of contact. Time and again, the 
issues came down to ground as origin of and threat to the identity-difference dimension. 
The first area, semantic interpenetration, began with the difficulty of identifying "the 
language of foundations". 101 The problem was that both the keywords of Heidegger's 
writing (including Grund, Ursprung and Fundament) and the language of the structural 
fabric of his writing interpenetrated, so that not only did fine distinctions often have no 
more than a local validity, but also the separation of normally distinct philosophical 
concepts and areas became impossible (e. g. foundations, truth, transcendence, time, 
freedom, language). Previous secondary literature had two main contributions to make (i) 
the recognition that such a problem applied to the word Wesen; (ii) the recognition of wide 
morphological variation and semantic interpenetration based on alliterative, etymological 
and metaphorical associations. 102 These contributions left a gap which would have to be 
filled as an immediate preliminary to any study of the concept of Grund in Heidegger's 
philosophy. The nature of the problem, in its full extent, was however such that a 
conventional study of the foundational would finally have failed because of the 
impossibility of determining the extent of the language in question. Nevertheless, a new 
direction for studying the foundational arose from considerations of the origin of the 
problem of semantic interpenetration, and taking clues from (inter alia) scattered 
comments by Heidegger, a solution to the problem emerged. This was presented as having 
101 See pt A, ch. 1. 
102 See pt. A, ch. 1, section 1. 
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four aspects. 103 (1) The first aspect concerns the kind of objectivity that can he ascribed to 
the ground of meaning (with implications for the objectivity of ground in general) - 
namely, that such objectivity is a dangerous mirage. The suggestion was made that 
Heidegger's style was a mimicry, not of everyday discourse, but of trans-cultural and 
trans-millenial discourse, with the moral that philosophers, in drifting widely around the 
most abstract reaches of human existence, cannot rescind their own responsibility for 
(their own grounding of) the reliability and security of truth. (2) The second aspect 
concerns the homogeneity and unity of ground, building on the idea of trans-millenial 
discourse, but not in the human-historical sense, rather, in the sense of Seinsgeschichte. 
The idea is that the historically earlier conceptions are closer to some original pre- 
conceptual, pre-metaphysical access to (grounding in) being, and that history, with its 
proliferation, semantic dispersion and increasing refinement of metaphysical keywords, 
represents a falling from being; semantic interpenetration is a device seeking to reverse the 
natural flow of this process and recreate the linguistic conditions necessary for a recovery 
of being (as the ground of metaphysics). (3) The third aspect examines this conflict 
between the homogeneity and heterogeneity of ground in a non-historical (but nevertheless 
still temporal) way, finding that semantic interpenetration offers some formal structural 
models for the nature of ground (metalepsis, paralipsis), such that it can operate as the 
origin of identity and difference and as the explanation of its own unity and fragmentation. 
(4) The paraliptic presence of ground in semantic interpenetrations led to a fourth part of 
the solution: that Heidegger stands in a long onto-theo-logical tradition, bordering on the 
mystical tradition, which asserts a heterogeneity within the origin (ground), an internal 
heterogeneity which is largely contrary to any conceptuality derivable from our normal 
environments. 
The second area, 104 logical-grammatical irregularities, took its starting-point from the 
paradoxical and tautological formulations in foundational language: once again, such 
formulations challenge the possibility of a conventional study of the foundational in 
Heidegger, but open up a new direction for study. Here the use of paradox and tautology 
led to questions about the structure and nature of the proposition and Heidegger's 
assessment of the status of the principles of identity and contradiction in relation to the 
103 See pt. A, ch. 1, section 3. 
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principle of ground (sufficient reason). The thesis that the principle of ground was prior to 
the principles of identity and contradiction was a device used to disas-semble the 
hierarchical foundationalism of Leibniz, and a reflection of the precedence of ground over 
other conventional themes in philosophical logic. Thus it was not so much the case (a) that 
the precedence of the principle of ground permitted abuses of the principles of identity and 
contradiction in philosophical discussion of the principle of ground, as (b) that the 
precedence of ground to the norms of everyday discourse entailed that everyday norms of 
discourse (i. e. the grammar that is caught within logic) are insufficient for indicating or 
showing ground in or via language. The exploitation of paradoxical formulations reflects 
or indicates the tensions of the internal heterogeneity of ground, while tautological 
formulations indicate the mergence of subject and predicate in avoiding the tendency of 
surface grammar towards infinite regression of the foundational. 105 A classic means of 
drawing together unity and multiplicity had of course been arborial hierarchical 
ontologies, and Heidegger's rejection of such a system during his discussion of the 
principles of identity, contradiction and sufficient reason leads into the phenomenon of co- 
originality or equiprimordiality (Gleichursprünglichkeit). Gleichursprünglichkeit, although 
crucially unexplored by Heidegger, is in practice normally posited between phenomena 
which are, inter alia, interdefinable, and with this move the problem more or less merges 
with that of the preceding chapter on semantic interpenetration. The common problems are 
the elaboration of the origin of identity and difference, and the breakdown of the 
conventional methods of semantic and syntactic regulation. 
Gleichursprünglichkeit likewise leads into the third area, macro-structural 
incongruencies. 106 Foundationalism is, inter alia, a matter of the macro-structure of 
thinking, of the overall patterns of cohesion in an ontology. It is not only a matter of the 
nature or existence of an ultimate ground, but also the manner in which subordinate 
phenomena relate to it. The classic pattern is the tree-structure. Foundationalist 
interpretations of SZ probably rest on two superficial observations: firstly, the prevalence 
of foundationalist language (the significance of which was questioned in the previous two 
chapters), and secondly, the macro-structure. Consideration of the macro-structure of SZ 
1 04 See Pt. A, ch. 2. 
105 A metactical paratype or device, the function of which was described in pt. A, ch. 4. 
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led initially to multiple incongruencies in the apparently prevailing intermapping of triadic 
structures (closer analysis revealed an ambiguity between triadic and quadratic 
structures). 
1 07 But behind this a deeper incongruence was then identified: a conflict 
between two structural systems - (i) an "anti"-systematic structuring labelled wrap-into 
clustering, where the tree-structure was replaced by something like an onion-structure, 
with the qualification that succeeding layers invaded the existing structure rather than 
lying above them, and (ii) a more superficial triadic formalising motivated by the need to 
recapitulate the everyday analysis of Dasein in terms of the triadic analysis of 
temporality. 108 It was concluded that the interplay between structural power and structural 
intangibility in SZ provided the seeds of a self-disas-sembly of its apparently conventional 
foundational ism. 
The fourth area concerned problems of mediation between being and entity (thus: the 
origin and "bridging" of the ontological difference). The privileged entity in the recovery 
of the question of being is of course Dasein, and it is primarily the cognitive foundational 
relation between being and Dasein (Seinsverständnis) which Heidegger exploits. In this 
chapter the matters for analysis were the dynamics of the cognitive foundational relation 
and the attempt to secure a method which would render ontology possible in the face of 
the naturally deceptive character of being. This problem, often discussed as that of the 
hermeneutic circle, was met by (i) an attempt to recover a two-way (dialectical) conception 
of grounding, 109 and (ii) a metactical interpretation of ground. 
"° Dialectic names that 
same paratypal double movement described as the second part of the solution 
III to 
semantic interpenetration: the interplay between the naturally falling movement of the 
understanding away from being (interpretation), and the violent Entwurf back towards 
being and contrary to the everyday processes of understanding. Metaxy names a paratype 
which disintegrates the subject-predicate relation (e. g. as mentioned in the chapter on 
logico-syntactic irregularities), and more generally that grammar of thought which 
106 See Pt. A, ch. 3. 
107 See pt. A, ch. 3, section 1. 
108 See pt. A, ch. 3, section 2. 
109 See pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
110 See pt. A, ch. 4, section 3. 
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illegitimately demands a constant reference hack for ontological security; it is a cultivation 
of the poleless between, of poles with no between. Together, dialectic and metaxy secure 
the possibility of finite ontological regression, and mark a stark revision of the concept of 
ground. 
III 
See pt. A, ch. 1, section 3. 
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PART B. CONNECTIONS: GRUND - 
ZEITLICHKEIT - EREIGNIS 
CH. 1. TEMPORALITY: COALESCENCE OF TIME AND GROUND 
Suddenly, in the 1980's, time was discovered... (as a subject of Heidegger interpretation). 
Nevertheless from 1989-1991 three authors, one American, one French, and one German, 
separately complained that despite the obvious centrality of the theme to Sein und Zeit 
hardly anything had been written on Heidegger and time. I Their complaints, if anything, 
witnessed only to the bibliographical difficulties, since the wave of publications on time 
had already struck the presses. 2 We now have: expositions and interpretations ranging 
from the basic to the detailed and exhaustive, 3 examinations of the development of 
Heideggers thought on time, 4 comparisons with most other major writers on time 
1 Chronologically: H. Rapaport, Heidegger and Derrida - Reflections on Time and Language, 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989, at p. 1; F. Dastur, Heidegger et la question du 
temps, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990, at p. 126; M. Fleischer, Die Zeitanalysen in 
Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit', Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1991, at p. 8. There is a 4th 
and more timely complaint to the same effect in G. Nicholson, "Ekstatic Temporality in Sein und 
Zeit", in J. J. Kockelmans, A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time', Washington 
DC: University Press of America, 1986, at p. 209. 
2 The 24 or so references given here are only a selection. A few further references are given in 
M. Fleischer, op. cit., p. 8f. and F. Dastur, op. cit., p. 126f. 
3 
M. Heinz, Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität im Frühwerk Martin Heideggers, Würzburg: 
Königspausen & Neumann, 1982 (originally a doctoral dissertation for Wuppertal University, 
1980); P. Ricoeur, "Temporalite, Historalite, Intratemporalit6: Heidegger et le concept «vulgaire» 
de temps", in Temps et Recit 111, Paris: Seuil, 1985, pp. 90-144; M. Heinz, "The Concept of Time 
in Heidegger's Early Works", in J. J. Kockelmans ed., A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 
'Being and Time', pp. 181-207; J. J. Kockelmanns, Heidegger's 'Being and Time', Ch. 11-14; 
D. C. Wood, The Deconstruction of Time, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989, pp. 137- 
264; F. Dastur, "La constitution ekstatique-horizontale de la temporalite chez Heidegger" in 
Heidegger Studies 2 (1986), pp. 97-109; F. Dastur, "Heidegger et la question du temps" (op. cit. ); 
M. Fleischer, op. cit.; G. Nicholson, op. cit. 
4 O. Pöggeler, "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger", in E. Orth ed., Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und 
Heidegger, Freiburg: Alber, 1983, pp. 152-191; T. Kisiel, "Der Zeitbegriff beim früheren 
Heidegger (um 1925)", in Phanornenologische Forschung 14 (1983), pp. 192ff.; D. Krell. 
Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being. 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986, (ch. 3). 
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(Aristotle5, Augustine6, Kant7, Kierkegaard8, Bergsong, Husserl'c, Derrida1' - He,, ei so 
far gets a miss, despite SZ§82), a few comparisons with other major themes in 
Heidegger, 12 and two informed and strategically significant attacks on Heideggers 
account. 
13 While all of this is only a selection among the many publications now available, 
nevertheless one can say definitively that Heidegger and time is no longer an understudied 
area. Probably the reasons for the significant delay on the production of a body Of 
secondary literature in this field were (i) Heidegger's own apparent abandonment of time 
after SZ, wrongly felt to be an acknowledgement of the theme's pointlessness, (ii) and 
possibly Derrida's "Ousia et Gramme", which with its suggestion that time is irretrievably 
metaphysical14 may have given an intellectual content to the feelings of suspicion aroused 
by (i). Gaps nevertheless remain: generally, there is a need to go beyond exegeses and 
5 J. Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from 'Being and Time'" in Margins of 
Philosophy, tr. A. Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982; also: P. Bigelow, "The 
Indeterminability of Time in 'Sein und Zeit"' in Philosophy and Phenoinenonological Research 
46 (1985/86), pp. 357-379; T. Clark, "Time after Time: Temporality, Temporalisation", Oxford 
Literary Review 9 (1/2) (1987), pp. 119-135. 
6 P. Bigelow, op. cit. 
7 C. Sherover, Heidegger and Kant on Time, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971. 
8 C. White, Time and temporality in the existential thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, 
dissertation, Berkeley, 1976. 
9 L. Giroux, Duree Pure et Temporalite. " Bergson et Heidegger, Tournai: Desdze, 1971. 
10 R. Bernet, "Die Frage nach der Ursprung der Zeit bei Husserl und Heidegger", in Heidegger 
Studies 3/4 (1987/88), pp. 89-104; D. C. Wood, op. cit. 
tl T. Clark, op. cit., H. Rapaport, op. cit., D. C. Wood, op. cit. 
- i. a. - logic: V. Vukicevic, Logik und Zeit in 
der phänomenologischen Philosophie Marin 
Heideggers (1925-1928), Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, 1988 (doctoral dissertation, Bochum, 1987); 
selfhood and individuality: F-K. Blust, Selbstheit und Zeitlichkeit, 
Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 1987 (doctoral dissertation, Freiburg, 1986); U. Thiele, Individualität und 
Zeitlichkeit, dissertation, Freiburg, 1985; history: M. Gillespie, "Temporality and History in the 
Thought of Martin Heidegger", Revue Internationale de Philosophie 
168 (1989), pp. 33-51; 
language: H. Rapaport, op. cit. 
13 P. Bigelow, op. cit.; J. Derrida, op. cit. Bigelow uses Augustine to attack 
Heidegger in a manner 
that deliberately parallels Derrida's well-known use of Aristotle 
in "Ousia et Gramme". 
14 D. C. Wood (op. cit. ) has the overall purpose of rescuing time 
from this claim - p. 2. P. Bigelow 
(op. cit. ) tries a re-burial. 
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historical comparisons; and in particular, there is no hint anywhere of the connection 
between temporality and foundations. '5 
A connection between temporality and foundations - but what prima facie evidence is there 
that here there might be something significant (and of interest to an age which vainly 
yearns to he post-metaphysical)? Perhaps there might he an incidental and entertaining 
comparison to he made - but this would not be relevant. The question here is concerned 
narrowly with what the foundational is, what ground is (the nature of ground, not tht2 
identification of ground), in Heidegger's earlier writings. The answer, as quoted from 
Heidegger's lectures of winter 1921/22, is this: 
"Das eigentliche Fundament der Philosophie ist 
das radikale existentielle Ergreifen und die 
Zeitigung der Fraglichkeit. " 16 
"The authentic foundation of philosophy is the 
radical existentiel seizing [of] and 
temporalisation of questionability. " 
This is repeated two pages later. 
"Der feste Boden (Boden etwas, was sich immer 
erst zeitigt, so wie die Aneignung) liegt im 
Ergreifen der Fragwürdigkeit, d. h. in der 
radikalen Zeitigung des Fragens. " 
17 
"The firm ground (ground something, which 
always first temporalises itself, like 
appropriation) lies in the seizing of question- 
worthiness, that is, in the radical 
temporalisation of questioning. " 
Ground, that is, the ultimate ground sought by metaphysics, is (to be found in, lies in) the 
radical temporalisation "of' questioning (which genitive? ) -a move which (perhaps) aims 
at the internal destruction (disas-sembly) of metaphysics. This chapter focusses narrowly 
15 With the exception of the undeveloped side-remarks by I. Koza in 1967 (Das Problem des 
Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung snit Kant, Ratingen bei Düsseldorf: Henn Verlag, 
1967), and the more emphatic but likewise undeveloped point in J. Caputo's The Way back into 
Ground: An Interpretation of the Path of Heidegger's nought (unpublished doctoral dissertation 
of 1968). 
16 PIA, p. 35; own translation. 
17 PIA, p. 37; own translation; Heidegger's emphasis. It is quite possible that AneignunL' 
(appropriation) is an early echo of Ereignis. On the use of PIA, see T. Kisiel, "The Missing Link 
in the Early Heidegger", in J. J. Kockelmans ed., Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Washington DC: 
University Press of America, 1988, at pp. 20f. According to Kisiel, Heidegger continued revising 
PIA for a few years after delivering it in 1921/22, so thoughts contained in PIA may, in fact 
date 
from a few years later. 
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on eliciting the full impact of the meaning of this early and crucial clue, with the aid of the 
methodological considerations of part A. 
1) Time in the Language and Problematic of Foundations 
A riori 
Heidegger's use of the notion Apriori18 is probably the most obvious coalescence of 
ground and time which exists in his writings. Epistemologically, a priori principles are 
those knowable prior to experience; as these principles were taken as enabling the 
construction of experience (empirical knowledge), they were regarded as foundational. 
The myth of the initially worldless res cogitans which requires an access to the world 
conditioned by principles creates the traditional association of ground and apriori. 
Heidegger initially appropriates, not a Kantian epistemological conception of the apriori, 
but Husserl's phenomenological conception. 19 The difference is that the phenomenological 
conception does not describe something initially within the subject, prior to its accessing 
the world, which aids it to access that world, and which can only be inferred indirectly 
(e. g. as a necessary condition for the possibility of accessing the world); rather, the 
phenomenological conception treats the apriori as a "Titel des Seins" (title of being), 
20 
which is "direkt erfaßbar" (directly ascertainable). 
2' The phenomenological apriori is 
neither epistemological nor ontic, rather, ontological. 
22 The thus appropriated 
phenomenological conception of the apriori is then subjected by Heidegger to an 
18 Orthographic note: Heidegger's practice of writing the "a" and the "priori " together as "apriori" 
for the noun has been followed; separation has been kept for adverbial and adjectival uses. When 
Apriori is used (italicised with a capital letter), this is intended to convey something more 
specific than apriori: i. e. the concept as a term of art in Heidegger's writing. 
19 PGZ, p. 101; but at GP, p. 461, he is more receptive to Kant. 
20 ibid. 
21 PGZ, p. 102; for the possibility and meaning of such a "direct ascertainability", see pt. A, ch. 
4, 
section 2 (on Entwurf). 
1, 
` ibid. 
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etymological literalisation - literally "earlier", it is taken as a fundamentally temporal 
23 
conception. 
The initial reliance on Husserl's rather than Kant's conception does not lose the 
connection with the foundational, however. Although usage in SZ is generally sparse and 
scare-quoted, one occurrence makes it clear that Apriori and Fundamentalstrukiur 
(fundamental structure) are the same thing. 24 In GP, which recovers and extends the 
comments made in PGZ, the foundational in the apriori becomes clearer. Thus there is the 
following associative line: "... daß das Sein ... 
dem Seienden in gewisser Weise 
zugrundeliegen, ihm vorangehen, ein proteron, ein Früheres sind. " 25 To be the Früheres 
is to lie-as-a-ground-for (zugrundeliegen), but this same Früheres, we are told, is the 
Apriori, and then further on: 
"Das Früher ist eine Zeitbestimmung, aber 
nicht eine solche, die nicht in der Zeitordnung 
der Zeit liegt, die wir mit dem Uhr messen, 
sondern ein Früher, das in die »verkehrte Welt« 
gehört. Daher wird dieses Früher, das das Sein 
charakerisiert, vom vulgären Verstande als das 
Später gefaßt. "26 
"To be earlier is a determination of time. but it 
does not pertain to the temporal order of the 
time that we measure by the clock; rather, it is 
an earlier that belongs to the 'inverted world'. 
Therefore, this earlier which characterizes 
being is taken by the popular understanding to 
be the later. " 
Thus the apriori marks, not only a coalescence of time and ground, but also a structurally 
revisionary move (a revision which, e. g., is non-linear and non-hierarchical). Here this 
revision is hinted at by way of paradox such that the future is not later than the past. Two 
sources are available for understanding this: (i) the reasons behind Heidegger's general 
use of paradox27 and (ii) the ecstatic analysis of time. Heidegger takes up the discussion 
again at the very end of GP, in the section entitled "Temporalität und Apriori des 
23 PG Z, p. 100. 
24 SZ, p. 41. 
25 GP, p. 27; the association of words here is of the type discussed in pt. A, ch. 1. Tr.: "... that being 
and ... 
in a certain way underlie beings and precede them and so are a proteron, an earlier. " 
26 GP, p. 27. 
27 See pt. A, ch. 2. 
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Seins". 28 Here he says that the apriori, if it has a temporal origin, requires a revision of 
the concept of time. 
"Die Möglichkeit des Verhaltens zu Seiendem 
verlangt ein vorgängiges Seinsverständnis; und 
die Möglichkeit hinwiederum des 
Seinsverständnisses verlangt einen vorgangigen 
Entwurf auf die Zeit. Aber wo ist die Instanz 
dieses Verlangens je vorgängiger Bedingungen? 
Es ist die Zeitlichkeit selbst als die 
Grundverfassung des Daseins. "29 
"The possibility of comportment towards 
beings demands a precursory understanding of 
being, and the possibility of the understanding 
of being demands in its turn a precursory 
projection upon time. But where is the final 
stage [Instanz] of this demand for ever further 
precursory conditions? It is temporality itself as 
the basic constitution of the Dasein. " 
What needs to be noted here is the reference to foundational problems (as described in the 
previous chapter) and the revision of the concept of time which responds to the 
foundational problem. The initial sentences here are steps hack in (a-)priority, and 
apparently begin to set a circle going (note the occurrences of Entwurf and Verständhiis 
(from Verstehen)30), or at least an unending regress. With the question "wo ist die Instanz 
dieses Verlangens je vorgängiger Bedingungen? ", Heidegger asks for the medium or 
motivation of the stepping back, of the regression of foundational moves. "Instanz" 
literally means a court or stage of official proceedings - the place where justification 
occurs. This place is identified as Zeitlichkeit. Zeitlichkeit thus appears as the medium or 
topos of grounding. Yet there is a tension in this passage between Zeit and Zeitlichkeit. 
For Zeit is the pole, the Woraufhin, of one of the foundational steps back. Is it that a fine 
distinction is set up here between Zeit and Zeitlichkeit, or is it that Zeit(-lichkeit) has a 
dual role? The evidence in fact points towards the latter: Heidegger untidily mixes 
between the three expressions Zeit, Zeitlichkeit and Zeit als Zeitlichkeit; sometimes it 
seems he intends a fine distinction, but globally this cannot be maintained. 
31 For example, 
compare the following passage: 
28 GP, §22c. 
29 GP, p. 462f. 
30 For the directional opposition of Entwurf and Verstehen, see pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
31 See pt. A, ch. 1. 
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"Die früher erwähnte Folge der einander 
gleichsam vorgeschalteten Entwürfe: Verstehen 
von Seiendem, Entwurf auf Sein, Verstehen von 
Sein, Entwurf auf die Zeit, hat ihr Ende am 
Horizont der ekstatischen Einheit der 
Zeitlichkeit. Ursprünglicher können wir dies 
hier nicht begründen, wir müßten dabei auf das 
Problem der Endlichkeit der Zeit eingehen. An 
diesem Horizont hat jede Ekstase der Zeit, d. h. 
die Zeitlichkeit selbst ihr Ende. " 
32 
"The series, mentioned earlier, of projections 
as it were inserted one before the other - 
understanding of beings, projection upon 
being, understanding of being, projection upon 
time - has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic 
unity of temporality. We cannot establish this 
here in a more primordial way; to do that we 
would have to go into the problem of the 
finiteness of time. At this horizon each ecstasis 
of time, hence temporality itself, has its end. " 
This passage refers hack to the regressive chain in the previous passage quoted (although 
now the circling between Entwurf and Verstehen is clearer). At the end of the first 
sentence, Heidegger says that the end of the series (circle) is Zeitlichkeit. Then he says 
this having an end has to do with the finitude, not of Zeitlichkeit, but of Zeit. Thus it 
appears that Zeitlichkeit is the end of Zeit. Yet the earlier passage suggested that if there 
was a distinction, it was the other way round: Zeit is the end of Zeitlichkeit. Then in the 
final sentence we have "Zeit, d. h. Zeitlichkeit", which lays the cards on the table: 
Heidegger allows his own distinction to decay. 
The upshot of this is that it appears that Zeit(-lichkeit) is both the medium of grounding, 
and the end of grounding, or the end of itself as the medium of grounding. The following 
passage confirms this result. 
"Weil das ursprünglich Ermöglichende, der 
Ursprung von Möglichkeit selbst, die Zeit ist, 
zeitigt sich die Zeit selbst als das Früheste 
schlechthin.... Weil die Zeit als Quelle aller 
Ermöglichungen (Möglichkeiten) das Früheste 
ist, sind alle Möglichkeiten als solche in ihrer 
Ermöglichungsfunktion vom Charakter des 
Früher, d. h. apriori. ^33 
"Because the original determinant of 
possibility, the origin of possibility itself, is 
time, time temporalises itself as the absolutely 
earliest.... And because time as the source of 
all enablings (possibilities) is the earliest, all 
possibilities as such in their possibility-making 
function have the character of the earlier, i. e. 
apriori. " 
Time (temporality) is34 the "ursprünglich Ermöglichende", the "Ursprung von 
Möglichkeit", the "Quelle aller Ermöglichungen"; one might as well say Urgrund. As 
32 GP, p. 437. 
33 GP, p. 463; Hofstadter's translation slightly adjusted. 
34 This is not an identification of a specific member of a category (e. g. such that time 
is a specific 
member of the category of grounds); it is an elaboration of the nature of time and of ground - 
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such, time is the "earliest" - which repeats the dual role: earliness is measured by time; 
time measures itself as it own source. In this passage one also finds the tautology "die Zeit 
zeitigt". Here this tautology acquires a concrete function: as substantive, the temporal 
denotes itself as source; as verb, the temporal denotes its role as activity proceeding from 
this source. Thus the etymological tautology 
35 
reflects the "dual" role of the Urgrund, of 
the Quelle aller Ermöglichung, of the Grund des Grundes. But is this "duality", 
"reflexiveness", or is it the metactical decay of the pole into the relation, of the relation 
into the pole, 
36 the disintegration of the proposition into a primordial unity which 
Heidegger implied was necessary for the non-application of the circularity objection? 37 
Along with these considerations, in the earlier passage, Heidegger referred us to the 
finitude of time as explaining these processes. For "finitude of temporality", read "finitude 
of grounding" - i. e. its not being subject to infinite regression or vicious circling. By 
taking up the apriori as a link between ground and time, it is therefore possible to see one 
way in which time and ground coincide in their mutual revision and response to the same 
(foundational) problems. 38 
h) Transzendenz 
An almost equally obvious link between ground and time is Transzendenz. The recognition 
39 
of Grund as Transzendenz has long been recognised on the basis of VWG. MAL 
strongly confirms this early Heidegger position. 
40 
this is the point of the apriori - the exclusion of a general /specific or category/member relation 
between time (temporality) and ground. 
35 See pt. A, ch. 2, section 1. 
36 
See pt. A, ch. 4, section 3. 
37 See pt. A, ch. 4, section 2& SZ, p. 314f.; to pun, there is nothing very original about the 
heterological unity of source and activity here; Christian theological doctrine tried the same 
kind 
of ontological move to explain the tri-unity of god some 1500 years ago, and may 
have been 
drawing on yet earlier versions of Platonist ontologies of the demiurge. 
38 
On the apriori and the relation of time and being, see 
further MAL, pp. 184-189. 
39 
e. g. I. Koza, op. cit. 
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"Die Freiheit als Transzendenz ist... der 
Ursprung von Grund überhaupt. " 
41 
"Freedom as transcendence is... the ort 'n of 
ground in general. " 
It is strange that this has not led to significant analysis of the association of ground and 
temporality, since the discussions of Transzendenz in Heidegger are always cloo: sely 
integrated with the tempo l- problematic. In SZ, §69c is entitled "das zeitliche Problem 
der Transzendenz der Welt", clearly labelling, right from the start, transcendence as an 
essentially temporal problem. In fact §69c contains little of interest, other than a 
foreshadowing of the much more thorough engagement with the problem of transcendence 
in GP, MAL and VWG. 42 In these writings the temporality of transcendence is stated 
quite unambiguously: 
"... weil die Transzendenz im Wesen der Zeit, 
d. h. aber in ihrer ekstatisch-horizontalen 
43 Verfassung wurzelt. 
"... because transcendence is rooted in the 
essence of time, but that is, in its ecstatic- 
horizonal constitution. " 
"Die innere Möglichkeit der Transzendenz, so 
behaupte ich, ist die Zeit als ursprüngliche 
Zeitlichkeit! " 44 
"Origo der Transzendenz aber ist die 
Zeitlichkeit selbst. "45 
"I maintain that the intrinsic possibility of 
transcendence is time, as primordial 
temporality! " 
"Yet the origin of transcendence is temporality 
itself. " 
Although clearly stated there, the temporal interpretation of transcendence is not further 
developed in VWG. 46 Only in MAL (and GP) is this interpretation fully carried through. 
47 
40 R. Crease, Heidegger, Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1987. 
41 VWG, p. 60 (GA9, p. 165); own translation. 
42 Although Transzendenz is relatively absent from SZ, at MAL, p. 214f. the whole of 
SZ is 
recapitulated in terms of Transzendenz. 
43 VWG, p. 62 (GA9, p. 166); own translation. 
44 MAL, p. 252. 
45 MAL, p. 272. 
46 See Heidegger's footnote to the above-quoted passage from VWG. 
47 MAL, § 12, entitled "Transzendenz und Zeitlichkeit" . 
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Thus one can say that Transzendenz marks one of the coincidences of foundational and 
temporal in Heidegger. But what is the point of it as such? Transcendence ,, rises as a 
problem for Heidegger rather in the same way as the hermeneutic circle. Both are 
problems which traditional notions of ground create. The latter is the problem of infinite 
regressions which the principle of ground (nihil est sine ratione) leads into. The former is 
the problem of relating the Urgrund to whatever exists that was not initially internal to it. 
The supposed simplicity or homogeneity of the Urgrund prevented a holistic conception. 
Thus, for example, if one had posited the "I" as the Urphänomen, or the principle of its 
existence as the ultimate principle, then the problem arose of its accessing other minds, 
objects (the world) and other times - problems of transcendence. 
48 (The epistemological 
problem stated here has, for Heidegger, its origin in the ontological problem). 
Alternatively, but with the same structure, transcendence is the problem of moving from 
everything that is immediately accessible to what is beyond that (being, noumena, god). 49 
In all these traditional cases, Grund is posited as a pole of Transzendenz, the pole from 
which one starts. Heidegger's "solution" of the problem of transcendence is a reshuffling 
or restructuring of the original assumptions, whereby ground is no longer a pole of the 
transcending relation, but becomes the transcending relation itself. Thus, for example: 
"Das Dasein selbst ist der Überschritt. Darin 
liegt: Die Transzendenz ist nicht irgendein 
mögliches Verhalten (unter anderen möglichen 
Verhaltungen) des Daseins zu anderem 
Seienden, sondern die Grundverfassung seines 
Seins, auf deren Grunde es sich allererst zu 
Seiendem verhalten kann. "SO 
"Dasein is itself the passage across. And this 
implies that transcendence is not just one 
possible comportment (among others) of 
Dasein toward other beings, but it is the basic 
constitution of its being, on the basis of which 
Dasein can at all relate to beings in the first 
place. " 
Rather than the subject ("I") being placed, in its foundational capacity, as the starting- 
pole, it is identified with the movement of transcendence itself. This reflects, or is derived 
from, the deeper interpretation of Grund as Transzendenz. The kind of "solution" which 
Heidegger offers here conforms to exactly the same kind of strategy used in the case of the 
hermeneutic circle. 51 That is, ground is identified with the problem; the problematic is 
revalued as the fundamental. As was said before, this paratype stops one seeing the 
48 MAL, p. 205f. 
49 MAL, p. 207. 
50 MAL, p. 211. 
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problem (transcendence, circular regression) as external to the matter in hand, coming 
along to meet it as if from somewhere else, rather, the problem emerges from the matter 
in hand. This is not unreasonable when one considers that these problems (transcendence, 
circular regression) are in fact peculiar to the foundational, rather than general problems 
which could arise anywhere at any time. There is a special relation between them and the 
foundational problematic. And as Heidegger says, it is precisely when some process 
breaks down, strikes an impasse, that its normally taken-for-granted inner structure 
becomes visible to the phenomenological perspective. 
52 The impasse of transcendence (so 
Heidegger) reveals the essence of ground as that same "impasse" - and thus one may pass. 
More strongly emphasised in GP than in MAL is the point that transcendence relies for its 
transcending character on the ecstatic nature of temporality. S3 The meaning of the ecstatic 
is fairly well covered by Heidegger. 
54 An ekstatikon is, according to the meaning of the 
Greek word, an Aus-sich-heraustreten (a stepping-outside-itself). 
5-5 More commonly 
Heidegger uses the term Außer-sich (outside-itself). Thus in SZ Heidegger says: 
"Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprüngliche »Außer-sich« "Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of- 
an undfür sich selbst. "56 itself' in and for itself. " 
Clearly the structure of the Außer-sich, the ecstatic nature of time, is metaleptic, that is, 
something which steps beyond itself while remaining where it is. This metaleptic paratype 
was noted earlier, when discussing the language of foundations and the interpenetration of 
51 See pt-A, ch. 4, section 2. 
52 The possible precedent for the revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental is the 
SZ 
discussion of Auffälligkeit in §16, to the effect that a smoothly operating system does not give 
away its inner secrets, and that these inner secrets are best seen at the ruptures, 
fissures and 
breakdowns of the system or project. In GP, Heidegger recovers the Auffälligkeit discussion 
for a 
temporal interpretation - the kind of disruption in question, required 
for making the item 
conspicuous in its being, is a temporal disruption, whereby the item is not the same 
in the 
different moments of time - GP, pp. 439ff. 
53 
GP, p. 428f. 
54 
e. g. SZ, p. 329, GP, p. 377f. 
55 GP, p. 377. 
56 
SZ, p. 329: Heidegger's emphasis. 
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keywords. 57 The metaleptic, or ecstatic, is the original pattern or farm which enables 
transcendence. Thus one can say that as transcendence, ground is not so much inverted`x 
as extra-verted - turned outside itself. 
Transcendence, in Heidegger, also betrays something of the hi-directional revision of 
ground noted in the last chapter. Classically, transcendence is mono-directional - from (the 
given ground) to.... In MAL, not only is ground moved from the position of pole to that 
of the transcending relation, but where transcendence transcends is likewise named - the 
Woraufhin (whither-upon) of Transzendenz is Welt (the world). 
59 Heidegger tends to put 
the emphasis primarily on this classical direction - thus, with regard to the ecstatic basis of 
transcendence, Heidegger uses the phrase "Entrtickung nach..., auf etwas hill. " 60 In 
contrast to this classical direction of movement is the following passage from GP: 
"Transzendenz besagt: sich aus einer Welt "Transcendence means to understand oneself 
"61 from a world. " verstehen. 
In the last chapter, the bi-directionality of Grund was analysed, inter alia, in terms of 
Entwurf (which had direction "auf etwas hin"), and Verstehen, which had direction "aus 
(von) etwas her". Thus in this passage we find the reverse direction in Transzendenz 
emphasised. Once again, a temporal revision of ground maps into the same network of 
problems and revisions covered in the last chapter - this time the issue of dialectical access 
to the highest "principle" (being). 62 
57 See ch. 2, section lc. 
58 Cf. J. Habermas' application to Heidegger of the term "umgekehrte Fundamentalismus" (inverted 
foundationalism); Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985, at 
p. 181. 
59 MAL, p. 212. 
60 GP, p. 378; Heidegger's emphasis. 
61 GP, p. 425; Heidegger's emphasis. 
62 But obviously in Heidegger this is no longer a principle; rather, the disas-sembly or folding-in of 
such a propositional form. 
1Z, ' 
c Z, eitigung 
"Was ist die Zeit? ... 
1st die Zeit eine Funktion 
des Raumes? Oder umgekehrt? Oder sind beide 
identisch? ... 
Die Zeit ist tätig, sie hat verbale 
Beschaffenheit, sie »zeitigt«. Was zeitigt sie 
b3 denn. 
"What is time? ... 
Is time a function of space? 
Or the other way round? Or are they identical'? 
... 
Time is active, it has verbal composition, it 
temporalises' [-Zeitigt-, ]. So what does it 
temporalise? " 
The date of the passage is 1924, but the author is not Martin Heidegger, the many times 
denounced scourge and fascist corrupter of the German language, but Thomas Mann. The 
verb zeitigen had archaic, dialectal and obscure uses in German before either of these 
authors, but even as regards appropriating it to replace the verb "to he" when predicated 
of time, no special originality can be claimed for Heidegger. The root of the verb zeitigen 
(-zeitig-) goes to form well over a dozen morphological variations and compounds in 
Heidegger (including the noun Zeitigung), and it is used in key positions in the most 
advanced sections of the SZ project. Although it has usually been translated as "to 
temporalise", this translation should be treated with some suspicion. Although scattered 
through most of the writings of the 1920's (and later), the main uses are in SZ and PIA. 64 
In the latter the use is significantly different from SZ, and in particular, there is no 
association of Zeitigung 65 with temporal notions such as Zeitlichkeit . 
66 It may be the SZ 
use marks a break with PIA (in which case "temporalisation" is more justifiable as a 
translation in SZ), but if SZ marks only a development of the PIA notion, then Zeitigung 
is certainly best left untranslated. In PIA, Zeitigung appears to be used in a very precise 
sense which is left undeclared; clear only is that it is sometimes associated with the 
development of questioning, and makes up a dimension of meaning in association with 67 
68 
63 T 
. Mann, Der Zauberberg, Oldenburg: Fischer Verlag, 1960, at p. 
479. Originally published in 
1924. Reference owed to O. Pugliese, Vermittlung und Kehre, Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1965, at 
p. 10. 
64 PIA: c. 91 uses; SZ: 103 uses (including morphological variations and compounds). Source for 
SZ statistics: R. A. Bast & H. P. Delfosse, Handbuch Zum Textstudiuin von Martin Heideggers 
»Sein und Zeit«, vol. 1. 
65 From here on Zeitigung is understood to refer to morphological variations and compounds as 
well. 
66 
But AE is transitional in this respect. 
67 PIA, pp. 35,37,195. 
68 
i. e. the use of Zeitigungss: nn in PIA. 
1-S8 
the word Vollzug. 
69 Otherwise a reasonable speculation would place it as transitional 
between "showing", "bringing about" and "temporalising". Kisiel remarks that in the 
unpublished lectures of summer 1922, Heidegger uses zeitigung to translate Aristotle's 
cnergeia. 
70 It is the SZ use in which Zeitigung appears as the activity peculiar to 
Zeitlichkeit. 7' 
To what extent is Zeitigung associated with the foundational? The following passages are 
analysed for semantic interpenetration. 
"Das Verstehen gründet primär in der Zukunft, 
die Befindlichkeit dagegen zeitigt sich primär in 
der Gewesenheit.... Die These »Befindlichkeit 
gründet primär in der Gewesenheit« besagt.... " 
72 
"Understanding is grounded primarily in the 
future; one's state-of-mind, however, 
temporalizes itself primarily in having been.... 
the thesis that 'one's state-of-mind is grounded 
primarily in having been' means that.... " 
The first sentence presents a contrast between Verstehen and Befindlichkeit as concerns 
their relation to modes of time. The context demands that the same verb (or a verb with 
the same signification) be used on both sides of the contrast. Yet Heidegger changes the 
verb. He then quotes what he just said, but misquotes, changing the verb back again. The 
shift is thus: gründet ---> sich zeitigt ---> gründet. The proximity of the terms, and the 
order of the shifts, makes a model of "substitution" or "interpretation" improbable. This is 
semantic interpenetration in the sense described earlier - briefly: a trans-lexical tension of 
heterogeneity. At the end of SZ §68d there is a summary of the entirety of §68 in which 
there is a striking degree and range of vocabulary shift. The emphasis (my own) shows the 
shifts of interest: 
69 
e. g. PIA, pp. 31,79,108,158. See T. Kisiel, "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger", p. 
2if. 
(to which article, compare, in general, AE). One can add that in PIA, primarily the noun 
Zeitigung is used, while the verb is non-reflexive; in SZ the reflexive verb is the commoner 
form. 
70 T. Kisiel, op. cit., p. 21f. 
71 See esp. SZ, p. 328. 
72 SZ, p. 340. 
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"Das Verstehen gründet primär in der 
Zukunft (Vorlaufen bzw. Gewärtigen). Die 
Befindlichkeit zeitigt sich primär in der 
Gewesenheit (Wiederholung bzw. 
Vergessenheit). Das Verfallen ist zeitlich 
primär in der Gegenwart (Gegenwärtigen 
bzw. Augenblick) verwurzelt. Gleichwohl ist 
das Verstehen je »gewesende« Gegenwart. 
Gleichwohl zeitigt sich die Befindlichkeit als 
»gegenwärtigende« Zukunft. Gleichwohl 
»entspringt« die Gegenwart aus, bzw. ist 
gehalten von einer gewesenden Zukunft. 
Daran wird sichtbar: Die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt 
7 
sich in jeder Ekstase ganz.... " 
3 
"Understanding is grounded primarily in the future 
(whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States of 
mind temporalize themselves primarily in having 
been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). 
Falling is temporally rooted primarily in the 
Present (whether in making-present or in the 
moment of vision). All the same, understanding is 
in every case a Present which 'is in the process of 
having been'. All the same, one's state-of-mind 
ripens itself as a future which is ' making present'. 
And all the same, the Present 'leaps away' from a 
future that is in the process of having been, or else 
it is held on to by such a future. Thus we can see 
that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizec 
itself as a whole.... " 
In this passage the temporal patterns within the triad <Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, 
Verfallen> are listed, then re-listed, with a final comment on the whole listing. The 
context offers a tight framework of repetition of parallels; yet within this there is a loose 
shifting of lexis. The shifts are: gründen in ---> sich zeitigen in ---> zeitlich verwurzeln 
in ---> sich zeitigen ---> entspringen aus ---> halten ---> sich zeitigen. The reflexive 
verb sich zeitigen is paralleled to the ideas of: grounding in, being rooted in, leaping or 
springing out from, and being held by. Once again, sich zeitigen is firmly and clearly 
networked into the language of foundations without the privileging of any (set of) terms 
over others. Here the point of the non-privileging of the temporal over the foundational is 
clearer than in the cases of the terms apriori and transcendence. The nature of the ground- 
time link is a holding together of ideas in a heterogeneously temporal origin. 
***** 
One of the fundamental theses of SZ (as a matter of its presentation and overall structure), 
is the basic thesis that temporality is the ground (or basic constitution) of Dasein. Earlier74 
the idea was floated, with respect to Dasein and ground, that this principle was subject to 
a metactical disintegration in SZ. In this section, with the coalescing of time and ground, 
the other pole of this relation folds in, removing the propositional nature of sentences 
expressing the basic thesis of SZ. "Parataxis" would also express the deterioration or 
73 SZ, p. 350; Macquame & Robinson's translation slightly altered. 
74 
See pt. A, ch. 4, section 3. 
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revision (the sentence then reading Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein) but "metaxis" better 
expresses the idea of a poleless between. 
The purpose behind the development of the non-proposition that Zeitlichkeit is the Grulld 
of Dasein is that this non-proposition prepares for the relation of being and time. 
Although Heidegger does not progress beyond the preparatory stages, a number of clues 
hint at the role which the non-proposition Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein plays. Dasein 
always already has a Verständnis von Sein (understanding of being), and the temporality 
which corresponds to this understanding is Temporalität. If the non-proposition 
Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein is to be a preparation, the only function it seems possible for it 
to have is that of an originating parallel. Thus Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein is parallel to 
Temporalitkt: Verständnis: Sein - and this is perhaps the parallel fo r the "origin" of 
them all - Zeit: Horizont: Sein. In other words, it would seem that the revision of ground 
in SZ, which includes a "destruction" (in the phenomenological sense) of the proposition, 
is a preparation for a relation that is adequate for the relation of being and time. 
2) The Limits (Horizon) of the Foundational Project in Sein und Zeit 
a} Time as the Horizon for the Understanding of Being 
The importance and interest in the notion of the horizon lies in this: that, in the context of 
the incompletion of the SZ project, "horizon" is the most specific Heidegger becomes in 
establishing a structure with which to relate being and time. 
75 From the very first page of 
SZ, time is announced as the horizon for the understanding of being: 
"Die konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach 
dem Sinn von »Sehr« ist die Absicht der 
folgenden Abhandlung. Die Interpretation der 
Zeit als des möglichen Horizontes eines jeden 
Seinsverständnisses überhaupt ist ihr vorläufiges 
Ziel. " 76 
"Our aim in the following treatise is to work 
out the question of the meaning of Being and to 
do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the 
Interpretation of time as the possible horizon 
for any understanding whatsoever of Being. " 
75 Cf. F. Dastur, op. cit., pp. 101-108. 
76 SZ, p. 1; cf. GP, p. 22. 
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However, the horizonal relation established here cannot he taken in anything like its 
everyday sense. If we are to understand what Heidegger means when he says that time (as 
temporality) provides the enabling horizon for the understanding of being, it is the notion 
of the horizon that most requires examination. Yet Heidegger's project is unfinished - so 
unfinished that even the preliminaries are unfinished. The thesis that "time provides the 
enabling horizon for the understanding of being" was to he preparatory for the recovery of 
the question of being - the question itself presumably being preparatory for any answer. In 
SZ even this preliminary thesis is unfinished, and in GP (ostensibly a continuation of sorts 
of SZ) 
77 it is taken only a little further. In SZ, Heidegger intended a threefold 
"schematism" of the horizon; 78 the notion of "presence" (much discussed in secondary 
literature) is only one of these schemata. 
"Wir bezeichnen dieses Wohin der Ekstase als 
den Horizont oder genauer das horizontale 
Schema der Ekstase. Jede Ekstase hat in sich ein 
ganz bestimmtes Schema, das sich mit der Art, 
wie sich die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt, d. h. wie sich 
die Ekstasen modifizieren, selbst modifiziert. 
So wie Ekstasen in sich die Einheit von 
Zeitlichkeit ausmachen, so entspricht der 
ekstatischen Einheit der Zeitlichkeit je eine 
solche ihrer horizontalen Schemata. " 
79 
"We call this whither of the ecstasis the 
horizon, or, more precisely, the horizonal 
schema of the ecstasis. Each ecstasis has within 
itself a completely determinate schema which 
modifies itself in coordination with the manner 
in which temporality temporalizes itself, the 
manner in which the ecstases modify 
themselves. Just as the ecstases intrinsically 
constitute the unity of temporality, so in each 
case there corresponds to the ecstatic unity of 
temporality such a unity of its horizonal 
schemata. " 
The schematism of the horizon is a good candidate for the most inelegant part of 
Heidegger's "system". Overall, the schematism attempts to rework the material80 on 
"world" in the terminology of Zeitlichkeit, Ecstasis and Horizont - that is, in terms of the 
ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality. In SZ there is a brief summary of the schematism 
about two thirds the way through the page and a half devoted to the schematism. 
8' In GP 
77 GP, p. In. 
78 Cf. O. Poggeler, "Temporale Interpretation und Hermeneutische Philosophie" in Revue 
liternationale de Philosophie 168 (1989), pp. 5-32, at p. 15f. (his analysis differs; the basic 
matter is the same). 
79 GP, p. 429 
80 i. e. PGZ, §§21-23; SZ, §§14-18. 
81 SZ, pp. 364-5 
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about 27 pages are devoted to the schematism82, but (a) without a summary-. (h) with most 
of the material devoted solely to the schematism of only one of the three horizonal 
schemata (Praesenz), and finally, (c) the word Praesenz being absent from SZ, at first 
glance it can look as if the GP version is entirely new - an impression that can only he 
removed by reference to PGZ. 
83 
The summary provided in SZ reads: 
"Das Schema, in dem das Dasein zukünftig, ob 
eigentlich oder uneigentlich, auf sich zukommt, 
ist das Umwillen seiner. Das Schema, in dem 
das Dasein ihm selbst als geworfenes in der 
Befindlichkeit erschlossen ist, fassen wir als das 
Wovor der Geworfenheit bzw. als Woran der 
Überlassenheit. Es kennzeichnet die horizontale 
Struktur der Gewesenheit. Umwillen seiner 
existierend in der Überlassenheit an es selbst als 
geworfenes, ist das Dasein als Sein-bei... 
zugleich gegenwärtigend. Das horizontale 
Schema der Gegenwart wird bestimmt durch das 
Um-zu. ' 84 
"The schema in which Dasein comes towards 
itself futurally, whether authentically or 
inauthentically, is the 'for-the-sake-of-itself. 
The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to 
itself in a state-of-mind as thrown, is to be 
taken as that in the face of which it has been 
thrown and that to which it has been 
abandoned. This characterizes the horizonal 
schema of what has been. In existing for the 
sake of itself in abandonment to itself as 
something that has been thrown, Dasein, as 
Being-alongside, is at the same time making 
present. The horizonal schema for the Present 
is defined by the 'in-order-to'. " 
Picking out of these convolutions the emphasised words, the horizonal schema of the 
future is Umwillen, the horizonal schema of the present is Um-zu (Praesenz), and the 
horizonal schema of the past is Wovor. Heidegger's use of the word "schema" here evokes 
Kants "Schematism of the Concepts of the Pure Understanding". gs Heidegger has an 
especial interest for Kant's schematism during the 1920's. 
86 Kant's schemata provided an 
interface between the conceptual and the temporal. Read "being" for "concept", and the 
parallel between Kant's schematism of the pure concepts and Heidegger's horizonal 
schematism (interfacing being and time) becomes clear. The SZ project does not stop with 
the horizon as Seinsfrage, but with an unfinished horizonal schematism. 
82 GP, pp. 418-444 
83 
e. g.: PGZ, pp. 252,254,264,268-272,285 
84 SZ, P. 365 
85 
I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 176-187. 
86 
e. g. 43 pages devoted to it in GA vol. 21 (lectures of winter 1925/26). 
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In the explicit analyses of ground in VWG and MAL, the essence of ground is, inter alia. 
revealed as the Umwillen. This is the same concept which functions as the future- 
orientated horizonal schema. Noting that Heidegger, at this stage, holds to the primacy of 
the future among the temporal ecstases, it then appears that Heidegger is trying to replace 
a Praesenz-privileging metaphysics with an ontology which prioritises Umwillen. 87 This 
Umwillen is both the revised conception of ground, and the primary horizonal schema. 
This leads to the question, to what extent amd in what way is horizon a foundational 
notion? 
The following analyses draw on the discussion of semantic interpenetration among key 
foundational notions, and weaves "horizon" into the word-group of ground in a similar 
manner, but with the proviso that "horizon" is not a general alternative for the other 
ground-words, being used only in one very specific context and with a narrow range of 
associated vocabulary and grammar. Once again, the moral is that "substitutive" and 
"interpretative" models must be dropped for that of a network of non-assimilables in 
tension with each other. 
"... läßt sich dann die Frage stellen: Was ist es, 
was diese Verstehen von Sein überhaupt 
möglich macht? Von wo aus, das heißt: aus 
welchem vorgegebenen Horizont her verstehen 
wir dergleichen wie Sein? " 
88 
"... the question can then be posed, What is it 
that makes this understanding of being possible 
at all? Whence - that is, from which 
antecedently given horizon - do we understand 
the like of being? " 
Here one question is introduced by Heidegger, but two are posed. The questions must 
therefore be taken as restatements of each other. The first asks for what makes 
Seinsverständnis possible, the second asks for the horizon of Seinsverständnis. So we 
should take it that the horizon, and that which makes something possible (condition of 
possibility) are the same. The easiest passages for quotation and interpretation tend to link 
"horizon" just with "condition for the possibility", but this is by no means the only 
interweaving to be found. In this passage, Heidegger uses the notion of "horizon" in the 
context of the Platonic understanding of being, interweaving it with Ursprung: 
87 There is a difference intended here between "privilege" and "prioritise". The metaphysics of 
Praesenz supposedly brackets out (completely) other temporal dimensions. The ontology of 
Urnxwillen. by virtue of the ecstatic nature of temporality, prioritises by bracketting in. 
88 GP, p. 21; passages at GP, pp. 388 & 414 could be used for the same point. 
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"Auf die Schwierigkeiten der Platonischen 
Interpretation gehen wir hier nicht ein, auch 
nicht auf den Nachweis des Zusammenhanges 
der Idee des Guten mit dem, was wir früher 
über das antike Seinsverständnis, seinen 
Ursprung aus dem Herstellen, erörteten. Es 
sieht so aus, als würde unsere These, die antike 
Philosophie interpretiere das Sein im Horizont 
des Herstellens im weitesten Sinne, in gar 
keinem Zusammenhang mit dem stehen, was 
Plato als die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des 
Seinsverständnisses fixiert. " g'9 
"We shall not enter here into the difficulties of Platonic interpretation nor into the 
demonstration of the connection of the idea of 
the good with what we discussed earlier 
regarding the ancient understanding of being, 
its derivation from production. It appears as 
though our thesis that ancient philosophy 
interprets being in the horizon of production in 
the broadest sense would have no connection at 
all with what Plato notes as condition of 
possibility of the understanding of being. " 
Two ideas, which in the context must be the same, are of importance: the origin of the 
ancient understanding of being in Herstellen (production), and ancient philosophy's 
interpretation of being in the horizon of Herstellen. Herstellen is both Ursprung and 
Horizont for the ancient understanding of being. In the final sentence, in distinguishing 
Plato's understanding of being from that of his contemporaries, Heidegger shifts again, 
using Bedingung der Möglichkeit once more. 90 
Nevertheless, horizon is not just any old neo-foundational word; it is used with a 
relatively small range of associated vocabulary. The following constructions are 
archetypal: "Zeit als Zeitlichkeit ist der Horizont des Seinsverständnisses" (time as 
temporality is the horizon for the understanding of being), "Wir verstehen Sein aus dem 
Horizont der Zeitlichkeit her" ("we understand being in-terms-of/from-out-of the horizon 
of temporality"). The typically associated vocabulary is Zeit, Zeitlichkeit, Sein, 
Seinsverständnis, and verstehen. When "understanding" is expressed in verbal form (as 
"verstehen" rather than "-verständnis"), the typical grammatical construction is "aus dem 
Horizont her", which is untranslatable due to its deliberate ambiguity. With "verstehen". 
the "aus... her" construction means both "in terms of' (the normal German usage) and 
"from out of... towards us". 91 
89 GP, p. 405 
90 Further evidence: SZ. §55 is entitled "Die existenzial-ontologischen Fundamente des Gewissens" 
(The existential-ontological foundations of conscience). The word Fundamente (foundations) 
is 
footnoted, in the Gesamtausgabe, "Horizont". 
91 See, e. g., SZ, p. 17: "... bedarf es einer ursprünglichen Explikation der Zeit als Horizont 
des 
Seinsverstnndnisses aus der Zeitlichkeit als Sein des seinsverstehenden Daseins. "; 
GP, p. 22: 
"Der Horizont, aus dem her dergleichen wie Sein überhaupt verständlich wird, ist 
die Zeit. "; 
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"Verstehen aus etwas her" is one of the directions of the dialectical structure analysed 
earlier. 
92 During this analysis of the Verstehen-Entwurf relation, the question structure of 
<Gefragte, Erfragte, Befragte> was diagrammatically analysed. In SZ§? the question 
structure receives this interpretation: the Gefragte is being, the Erfragte is the meaning of 
being, and the Befragte is eventually designated as Dasein (in its inquisitive capacity). 
Thus the diagram now appears as follows: 93 
Sein 
dasein 
Sinn von Sein 
Taking the subsequent identification of the ground or basic structure of Dasein as 
Zeitlichkeit, one can substitute Dasein in the above diagram for Zeitlichkeit. The resulting 
diagram would represent the following passage: 
"Sein verstehen wir demnach aus dem "Accordingly, we understand being from the 
ursprünglichen horizontalen Schema der original horizontal schema of the ecstases of 
Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit. " 94 temporality. " 
Now replacing Zeitlichkeit with horizon, one can compare the diagram with a diagram of 
Heidegger's own (allowing for a little interpretation in copying the diagram). The diagram 
is offered by Heidegger as showing the structure of the future ecstasis. 
95 
GP, p. 385: "Das vulgäre Erfahren von Seiendem verfugt über keinen anderen Horizont 
des 
Seinsverständnisses als den der Vorhandenheit. " 
92 See pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
93 Explanation of diagram: this is a development of the sequence of diagrams used in pt. A, ch. 
4. 
section 2 (above). Basically the pattern consists of two reciprocal directions, dispersing 
into a 
common horizon on the right hand side, diverging slightly on the left. The upper 
direction 
corresponds to the Entwurf. The lower to Verstehe,:. The last diagram in pt. A, ch. 4, section 
2 
involved the terms Gefragte, Erfragte, Befragte. Heidegger interprets these terms in SZ§2. 
The 
new diagram simply replaces the old terms with their new interpretations. 
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Horizon 
The diagram is not well explained by the context. For example, the verbal expansions of 
the future ecstasis have only one clearly directional element, whereas the diagram has two 
distinct and reciprocal directional elements, which can only be explained by reference to 
the Verstehen-Entwurf dialectic. The ecstatic movement is marked by the "Entwurf auf 
etwas hin" direction, now interpreted as "Entrückung nach etwas hin". 96 The returning 
movement is the understanding which occurs "from" the horizon. 
Having thus set the horizon in the context of the dialectical pattern of phenomenology, the 
foundational issue of infinite regression (vicious circles) can once again be raised. 
94 
GP, p. 436. 
95 
MAL, p. 266 
96 GP, p. 378: "Sofern dieser ekstatische Charakter die Zeitlichkeit kennzeichnet, liegt 
im Wesen 
jeder Ekstase... eine Entrückung nach..., auf etwas hin.... Das, wohinein... bezeichnen wir als 
Horizont der Ekstase. " Tr: In so far as this ecstatic character is distinctive of temporality, each 
ecstasis... contains within its own essence a carrying-away toward something.... 
That toward 
which each ecstasis is intrinsically open in a specific way we call the horizon of the ecstasis. 
" 
1E-' 
"Die früher erwähnte Folge der einander 
gleichsam vorgeschalteten Entwürfe: Verstehen 
von Seiendem, Entwurf auf Sein, Verstehen von 
Sein, Entwurf auf die Zeit, hat ihr Ende am 
Horizont der ekstatischen Einheit der 
Zeitlichkeit. Ursprünglicher können wir dies 
hier nicht begründen, wir müßten dabei auf das 
Problem der Endlichkeit der Zeit eingehen. An 
diesem Horizont hat jede Ekstase der Zeit, d. h. 
die Zeitlichkeit selbst ihr Ende. " 
97 
"The series, mentioned earlier, of projections 
as it were inserted one before the other - 
understanding of beinLs, projection upon 
being, understanding of being, projection upon 
time - has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic 
unity of temporality. We cannot establish this 
here in a more primordial way; to do that we 
would have to go into the problem of the 
finiteness of time. At this horizon each ecstasis 
of time, hence temporality itself, has its end. " 
Here the possibility of infinite regress is denied by reference to an end "at the horizon of 
the ecstatic unity of temporality". The horizon marks this end of finite time. Thus it is the 
conception of the horizon which carries the burden of stopping foundational regression. In 
passing, it should be noted that there is a structural disarticulation (disas-sembly) here: on 
the one hand, time is the horizon for an understanding of being; on the other, the horizon 
is the end of time as temporality. Put these together, and one deduces that time is its own 
end - which is the same proposition-disintegrating metactical move observed in the 
analysis of the apriori. 98 Leaving this apparent paradox behind, we find another: how is it, 
that if the horizon puts a stop to regression, that the following applies? 
"Der Horizont ist die offene Weite, wohinein 
die Entrückung als solcher außer sich ist. " 
99 
"The horizon is the open expanse toward which 
carrying-away as such is outside itself. " 
b) Finitude: Openness and Closure 
The lack of foundation is characterised by Vattimo as having the structure of an infinite 
regression of grounds: 
"As happens also in Heidegger's great etymological reconstructions of the great 
words of the past, the relationship with tradition does not supply us with a fixed 
point of support, but rather pushes us on in a sort of return in infinitum to the 
past, a return through which the historical horizons that we inhabit become more 
97 GP, p. 437 
98 
pt. B, ch. 1, section I a. 
99 GP, p. 378: Hofstadter's translation slightly adjusted. 
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fluid.... The meaning of Being is precisely what is recalled through this re-ascent 
in infinitum through the past.... 
11 00 
The previous section raised the apparently paradoxical idea of the horizon as both open 
and closed. The closure of the horizon is important as the end (finitude) of grounding and 
temporality (together). The openness of the horizon prevents this closure being a simply - 
naive self-grounding or pure stop. 
101 
"Was ist mit dem Horizontcharakter der 
Ekstasen gemeint? Horizont - darunter 
verstehen wir den Umkreis des Blickfeldes. 
Aber Horizont, von horizein [Gk. ], ist gar nicht 
primär auf Blicken und Anschauen bezogen, 
sondern besagt einfach an sich das 
Eingrenzende, Umschließende, den Umschluß. 
Und die Ekstasen sind ja kein Wissen um, kein 
Bewußtsein, und noch weniger ein Schauen. " 
102 
"What do we mean by the horizonal character 
of the ecstases? We understand horizon to be 
the circumference of the field of vision. But 
horizon, from horizein, is not at all primarily 
related to looking and intuiting, but by itself 
means simply that which delimits, encloses, the 
enclosure. And the ecstases are, of course, not 
an awareness of, not a consciousness, and even 
less a looking. " 
The strength of the "aber" at the beginning of the third sentence is that the idea of the 
second sentence, that horizon is the limit of the field of vision, is rejected, while the 
original Greek meaning receives a positive appraisal. Looking at the fourth sentence, not 
only are visual interpretations of horizon rejected, but so too cognitive interpretations - so 
presumably therefore also the normal figurative meaning of horizon as the limit of mental 
experience. What Heidegger picks up is the idea of horizon as Umschluf3 (enclosure), and 
this he contemplates and turns over in the following lines. 
"Jede Ekstase umschließt sich selbst, und zwar 
gerade als eloasis [Gk. ]. Man könnte meinen, 
das Umgekehrte wäre der Fall - Entrückung ist 
doch gerade der Sprung über jede Schranke. " 
103 
"... each ecstasis encloses itself and does so 
precisely as ekstasis. One could believe the 
converse to be the case, that being-carried- 
away is the very leap over the barrier. " 
The first element in the development of horizon as Umschlug is to point out a problem. 
True the ecstasis is, in its horizon, self-enclosing, in so far as it depends upon (or grounds 
in) nothing further than its own horizon. Yet to express this truth in terms of enclosure 
100 G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity, pp. 120-121. 
101 On time and finitude in general , cf. 
D. Krell, op. cit., ch. 3; J. Sallis, Delirnitatiotzs, ch. 10. 
102 MAL, p. 269 
103 MAL, p. 269 
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seems to contradict another characteristic of the ecstasis - that it breaks every boundary. 
Heidegger's strategy in the following lines is not to reject one or the other side of the 
contradiction, but to resolve it in retention of elements of truth from both sides. This 
resolution leads forward to a narrower determination of the character of horizonality. 
"Wohl zu beachten bleibt: die Ekstase 
überspringt jedes Seiende, der Horizont ist nicht 
etwa in der Sphäre des Subjektes angesiedelt. 
Dieser Horizont ist daher auch, weil er nichts 
bestimmtes Seiendes darstellt, nirgends, er ist 
weder räumlich noch zeitlich in gewöhnlichem 
Sinne lokalisiert. Er »ist« überhaupt nicht, 
sondern er zeitigt sich. " 
104 
"We must keep in mind, however, that the 
ecstasis surpasses every being and the horizon 
is not located, say, in the sphere of the subject. 
Hence this horizon is also nowhere, since it 
presents no determinate being: it is neither 
spatially nor temporally located, in the usual 
sense. It 'is' not as such, but it temporalizes 
itself. " 
To interpret rather freely: the possibility of a boundary, which first initiates the difference 
between openness and closure, is conditional upon a temporo-spatial dimension, or 
subjecticity (setting a boundary between subject and world/object). The ecstatico-horizonal 
does not subsist in such media, however. 
"Jede Entrückung ist in sich selbst offen. Zur 
Ekstase gehört eine eigentümliche Offenheit, die 
mit dem Außer-sich gegeben ist. Das, wohinein 
jede Ekstase in einer bestimmten Weise in sich 
selbst offen ist, bezeichnen wir als Horizont der 
Ekstase. Der Horizont ist die offene Weite, 
wohinein die Entrückung als solche außer sich 
ist. Die Entrücking öiiiet und hält diesen 
105 Horizont offen.  
"Every such carrying-away is intrinsically 
open. A peculiar openness, which is given with 
the outside-itself, belongs to ecstasis. That 
into-and-toward which each ecstasis is 
intrinsically open in a specific way we call the 
horizon of the ecstasis. The horizon is the open 
expanse toward which carrying-away as such is 
outside itself. The carrying-away opens up this 
horizon and keeps it open. " 
In the second sentence, Heidegger says that the ecstasis is open into-and-toward the 
horizon. This into-and-toward (Wohinein) is the same movement of the Entrückung 
(carrying-away), of the Entwurf, which was noted earlier. Heidegger does not say "opens 
out onto" but "is open into-and-toward" - which is structurally problematic. The "into" 
is 
carefully contrasted to the "outside-itself' of the ectasis. These structural peculiarities are 
metactical: that is, they revise (disintegrate) the structure whereby the horizon acts as a 
pole of the relation of Entrückung. The horizon is the openness of the metaleptically self- 
enclosing outside-itself of the ecstasis. The metaxy which appears here aims at removing 
104 MAL, p. 269 
105 
GP, p. 378; Hofstadter's translation adjusted. 
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the propositional structure on which infinite regression depends. 106 The metactical point is 
stated more succinctly in the following (along with the PIA passage107 quoted earlier. 
these are most direct statements of metaxy in the early Heidegger). 
"Das Ganze der Entrückungen zentriert nicht 
etwa in etwas, was für sich entrückungsfrei, 
unekstatisch vorhanden und das gemeinsame 
Zentrum für den Ansatz und Ausgang der 
Ekstasen wäre.... Sie bedürften keines Trägers 
und keiner Pfeiler wie der Bogen einer Brücke, 
sondern, wenn wir überhaupt von »Sein« der 
Ekstasen sprechen dürften, müßte gesagt 
werden: ihr Sein liegt gerade im freien 
ekstatischen Schwung. " 
108 
"The whole of these three ways of being- 
carried-away does not center in a kind of thing 
which would itself lack any being-carried- 
away, something present on hand unecstatically 
and which would be the common center for 
initiating and unfolding the ecstases.... They 
need no support and pillars, as does the arch of 
a bridge. But if we may speak at all about the 
'being' of the ecstases, we must say that their 
being lies directly in the free ecstatic 
momentum. " 
The last sentences, introducing the idea of an arch without pillars, held by its own 
momentum, is an expression of metaxy. Further, openness is not simply an absolute 
opening outwards into an infinite yawning void or abyss: 
"Als Entrückung zu... ist die Gegenwart ein 
Offensein für Begegnendes. " 109 
"As carrying-away to... the present is a being- 
open for that which is encountered. " 
In "openness", attention is drawn towards the respects in which limits lack, so that the 
respects in which limits exist are unnoticed. If a pub is "open", this expresses a narrow 
relation in which the interior is rendered accessible to the public while physical and 
conventional boundaries remain plentiful. Offensein (being-open) expresses a relation 
towards that which is encountered by Dasein. The directional contrast in the passage is 
important: "Entrückung zu... " has direction away from the local towards the horizon; 
"Offensein für... " has a reciprocal direction away from the horizon towards the local. The 
openness of the horizon does not denote an openness into a beyond, something yet further 
away; rather, it denotes the accessibility of what is within the horizon. At the horizon. 
openness (regressiveness) turns in. 
106 For the dependence of the vicious or infinite circle on this, see pt. A, ch. 4, section 
2 
107 PIA, p. 37. 
108 
MAL, p. 268; Heim's translation slightly altered. 
109 
GP, p. 436; own translation. 
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In the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, Vattimo contrasted having a 
support, and falling into an infinite, abyssal regression, as if these were the onl\ 
possibilities. Vattimo fails to appreciate the metactical "turn" of idiom in Heidegger, 
which seeks to create, which experiments with, the possibility of a finite arch (arch) 
without pillars. 
The horizon is no innocent rotation of ground through 90 degrees, replacing a vertical 
hierarchy of concepts with a horizontal line of co-original concepts. There is no 
replacement, but a seamless extension of the foundational network into a semantic 
heterogeneity. Within this tension of non-assimilables, while no lexical item is prioritised, 
nevertheless some are made to bear particular revisional functions (e. g. Zi itigung, 
Horizont). It is easier to imagine local concepts indefinitely extended, than to imagine 
their explanation on the basis of non-local concepts of a wholly different structural 
character to anything previously encountered. To ask of the ecstases what their support or 
ground might be is to make a mistake of the same order as that of asking what stops the 
earth and the stars falling. To ask what holds the earth up is to rely on concepts derived 
from experience only of local conditions on the earth's surface, and a radical change of 
idiom (both of language and of thought) is required to see one's way through the question. 
Likewise with ontological foundations. But the explanation of the former question by 
reference to universal laws of gravitation is an abandonment of "gravity" as little as the 
ecstatico-horizonal analysis is an abandonment of ground. Grounding is a universal fact of 
life, a part of normal human conceptual existence. The philosophical question is not 
whether such grounds are "real" (foundational ism v. anti-foundational ism), but what the 
ultimate nature of such grounding is - and this requires a change of idiom. 
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cl Question-worthiness 
Questioning is more of a general philosophical issue, crossing into different traditions, 
than some of the Heidegger secondary literature acknowledges. ' 10 Characteristic of 
Heidegger's treatment of questioning is the importance and ultimacy it receives. 
In MAL, Heidegger draws the following diagram of the ecstatic concept of the future. "' 
9 
He says that the question-mark denotes "den offenbleibenden Horizont" (the open-staying 
horizon). Thus the question is not only the horizon, but the horizon in its openness, and 
the horizon as the into-and-towards-which of ecstatic temporality. In a similar vein, in 
PIA, Heidegger states clearly that the ground or foundation is the "Zeitigung der 
Fraglichkeit". 112 The same idea of ground as question occurs in SZ: 
"Das ontologische Vordringen zum »Ursprung« 
kommt nicht zu ontischen Selbstverständlich- 
keiten für den »gemeinen Verstand«, sondern 
ihm öffnet sich gerade die Fragwürdigkeit alles 
Selbstverständlichen. " 113 
"The ontological thrust to the 'origin' arrives 
at nothing ontically self-evident to the 
' common understanding'; rather to this 
ontological thrust opens precisely the question- 
worthiness of everything self-evident. " 
110 When the Revue Internationale de Philosophie (no. 174,1990) recently devoted a bumper issue 
to questioning, Heidegger hardly received a mention among the mass of contributions. Likewise, 
Crease points out that Nozick (a philosopher from a distinctly non-Heidegger tradition) did not 
see it unreasonable that the "ultimate principle" should be in the interrogative mood: R. Nozick, 
Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. p. 671 footnote no. 15, 
quoted in R. Crease, Heidegger, Leibniz, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, dissertation, 
Columbia University, 1987. 
III MAL, p. 266 
111) PIA, pp. 35 & 37 (quoted at the beginning of this chapter). 
113 
SZ, p. 334; own translation. 
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The crucial point here is that what reveals the question-worthy is the thrust towards an 
origin (ground). 
114 Once again, the image of "opening" occurs. In the earlier section on 
openness, it was concluded that this meant, not an openness into the beyond, but an 
opening of what lies within the horizon. "The ontological thrust opens the question- 
worthiness of the self-evident" can be rephrased as "ecstatic projection [Enr%vurf] opens the 
horizon for its within". Bearing in mind the violent reversal performed by Entwurf on 
normal processes of understanding, one can then interpret this passage from John Sallis: 
"what Heidegger undertakes is to invert these prejudices in such a way that, rather than 
covering over the questionableness and directing us away from it, they may come to point 
into that very questioning. , 
Hs Derrida, too, turns over and over the idea of the question 
as the ultimate (and unreconstructedly so) ground in Heidegger. 116 Derrida does not 
frontally, unquestioningly, declare Heidegger's questioning as unquestioned. Taking up 
Heidegger's phrasing in "Die Frage nach der Technik", that "questioning is the piety of 
thinking", 117 Derrida hesitantly says: 
"Mais il n'a presque jamais cesse, me semble-t-il, d'identifier le plus haut et le 
meilleur de la pensee avec la question, avec la decision, Pappel ou la garde de la 
question, cette «piete» de la pensee. Cette decision, cet appel ou cette garde, est-ce 
dejä la question? Est-ce encore la question? Quoi de cette «piete»? Et pourquoi 
118 
presque jamais? " 
1 14 The scare-quotes around "origin" perhaps mean that Heidegger has the idea of the 
unreconstructed notion of ground in mind here; the point is that by mimicing (reducing- 
constructing) the metaphysical discourse, one can wreak its internal destruction - turning it 
around in itself [Verstehen - Entwurf] to reveal the question at its origin. 
115 J. Sallis, Delimitations, p. 104. 
116 J. Derrida, "De 1'esprit", in J. Derrida, Heidegger et la question, Paris: Flamrnarion, 1990. See 
also: F-W. von Herrmann, Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins, Vol. 1, p. 18: "Das Sein 
als solches und das zu ihm als Horizont gehörende ursprüngliche Wesen der Zeit sowie das 
Verstehen des Seins im Horizont der ursprünglichen Zeit bilden in ihrer Zusammengehörigkeit 
ein ursprüngliches Sachfeld, das wir als den Fundamentalbereich des philosophischen Fragens 
bezeichnen können. " Tr: "Being as such, and the primordial essence of time which as horizon 
belongs to being, together with the understanding of being in the horizon of primordial time, 
form from their association a primordial field which we can describe as the fundamental region 
of philosophical questioning. " 
117 VA, p. 40: "Denn das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Denkens. " 
118 J. Derrida, op. cit., p. 20f. Tr: "But he almost never ceased, so it seems to me, to 
identify the 
highest and the best of thinking with the question, with the decision, with the call or 
the 
maintenance of the question, this 'piety' of thinking. This decision, this call or this maintenance, 
is it already the question? What of this 'piety'? And why almost never? ". For critical essays 
on 
1'14 
Derrida seems to want to place the Heidegger question in a category: that of the 
unreconstructed, unrevised notion of ground - something enclosed and privileged in the 
(bad) metaphysical sense. Theodore Kisiel points out the same necessity which faces 
Heidegger - the necessity of avoiding turning the question into a metaphysical Urgrund: 
"Accordingly, even without the historical neglect and confusion into which the 
question had fallen, to ask this question would still call for turning the 
interrogative mood back upon itself and inquiring into the conditions of emergence 
and the dynamics of its own questioning as well as of all other questions. "1 19 
It seems that Heidegger does indeed meet the demands. A long footnote by Derrida almost 
completely refutes his own suggestion: in some places in Unterwegs zur Sprache (US), 
Heidegger takes a distinctly critical tilt at the question, including his own earlier phrasing 
of questioning as the "piety" of thought. 120 US is not the only departure from an 
unreconstructed questioning. Returning to PIA, Heidegger said that das Fundament, der 
Boden ist die radikale Zeitigung der Fraglichkeit, des Fragens - ground is the radical 
Zeitigung of the question. The ground is the question - the question is the ground -a piety 
surely? But what of radikale Zeitigung? What is Zeitigung? What sort of genitive is the 
genitive in Zeitigung des Fragens? Is the question the agent or the patient? What if the 
question was the patient? What kind of operation is Zeitigung? A de(con)structive or disas- 
sembling operation? In the same book (PIA), the Zeitigung des Fragens is interpreted as a 
de-structive process. 121 Or what if neither agent nor patient, but both, paratactically 
subsumed into the same originative movement? 
Derrida's "De l'Esprit" (including his point about the question), see: J. Sallis, "Heidegger und 
die Dekonstruktion" in D. Papenfuss & O. Pbggeler eds. Zur Philosophischen Aktualität 
Heideggers, vol. 2, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990 (pp. 257-272) and Ö. S5zer, "Kommt der Geist 
fragend zurück? ", in D. Papenfuss & O. Pöggeler eds., op. cit., pp. 273-283. 
119 T. Kisiel, "Towards the Topology of Dasein", in "Listening -A Journal of Religion and 
Culture", River Forest, Illinois, USA, vol. 12/3 (1977), p. 43. 
120 For the footnote, J. Derrida, op. cit., pp. 114-121, in which he discusses especially US, pp. 174ff. 
(in the lectures "Das Wesen der Sprache"). For Heidegger's self-criticism, see US, p. 175. A 
passage missed by Derrida in the lecture "Der Weg zur Sprache" (US, p. 257): "Die Frage frägt 
zuviel und übereilt" (the question asks too much too fast). Are such passages criticisms of the 
early Heidegger position? Early Heidegger is interested primarily in Fragwürdigkeit, not Fragen. 
121 PIA, p. 195: "Das Fragbare - die Fragbarkeit... radikal gezeitigt... Dies ist nur 
destruktiv zu 
zeitigen! " "The questionable - questionability... radically temporalised... This can onl), 
be 
temporalised destructively. " (Own translation) 
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In the sense that Kisiel demands a crude reflexivity of the question, Heidegger does not 
meet his demand. Returning to the passage quoted above from SZ, the contrast there was 
between Selbstverständlichkeit (of-course-ness) and Fragwürdigkeit (question-worthiness). 
Although Heidegger, as ever, slides between similar words such as Frage, Fraglichkeit, 
fragbar, Fragwürdigkeit - all of which have different nuances - it seems that 
Fragwürdigkeit should be the centre of our attention. It is not a well-defined and 
articulated question which stands at the horizon, but a primordial sense of interrogation, of 
question-worthiness. One might say that Fragwürdigkeit is what first makes such a thing 
as questioning and answering possible. Certainly, as Sallis points out, the Heidegger 
question is not a question that is crudely contrasted to answering: 
"The asking is not simply distinct from that which is asked about, the questioning 
not simply over against what is questioned. Rather, the two sides of the question 
are intrinsically connected, so thoroughly interconnected that the very deployment 
of the question cannot but be engaged already in answering it, disrupting the 
simple opposition between asking and answering. " 
122 
Sallis continues by turning to the circularity which can arise between asking and 
answering, and defends Heidegger on the basis of SZ§2, where Heidegger says that the 
question of the meaning of being is not circular, but has a backwards-forwards movement 
-a dialectical pattern like that of Verstehen-Entwurf. 
1223 There is another dialectical 
interplay which can be identified here. Derrida's question is essentially about the relation 
between question and ground in Heidegger. One must ask, not only whether the question 
is a ground, but also whether ground coalesces into question-worthiness, and in what way 
they relate. Twice, so far, in this thesis, Heidegger's tactic of revaluing the problematic 
(question-worthy) as the fundamental was pointed out. 
124 Rather than perceiving the 
problematic or question-worthy as an impasse meeting the fundamental inquiry from 
outside, it was to be perceived as emerging from the fundamental inquiry itself, and thus 
reflecting the inner structure, the ground, of the matter in hand. Fragwürdigkeit, the 
possibility of the question-answer relation, is not only the horizon towards which the 
122 J. Sallis, Delimitations, p. 110. D. Panis, in "Heidegger et le question du fondement" (p. 8). finds 
that the persistence of the Seinsfrage, as opposed to the tendency of other questions to devolve 
into answers, turns on the abyssal nature of the foundation. 
123 J. Sallis, ibid.; SZ, p. 8. 
124 See pt-B, ch. 1, section lb (on transcendence), and pt. A, ch. 4, section 2. 
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fundamental inquiry moves, but in so doing it is itself taken into the grounding which 
occurs. The Zeitigung des Fragens (translating Zeitigung not as temporal isation, but as 
maturing) is the slow and careful cultivation and maturing of a new idiom (destructive of 
the tradition), a new idiom in which no simple unreconstructed question, but a sense of 
Fragwürdigkeit lies at the basis. 
3) Transition: Links between Temporality and Ereignis 
In the introduction Gianni Vattimo's use of the following quotation was discussed. ' 25 
"Das Sein, es selbst eigens denken, verlangt, 
vom Sein abzusehen, sofern es wie in aller 
Metaphysik nur aus dem Seienden her und für 
dieses als dessen Grund ergründet und ausgelegt 
wird. Das Sein eigens denken, verlangt, das 
Sein als den Grund des Seienden fahren zu 
lassen zugunsten des im Entbergen verborgen 
126 
spielenden Gebens, d. h. des Es gibt. " 
"To think being itself explicitly requires 
disregarding being to the extent that it is only 
grounded and interpreted in terms of beings 
and for beings as their ground, as in all 
metaphyiscs. To think being explicitly requires 
us to let being go as the ground of beings in 
favor of the giving which prevails concealed in 
unconcealment, in favour of the It gives. " 
This was interpreted by him as the recommendation of the abandonment of grounds and 
foundations for a kind of abyssal nihilism. The important question here is one which 
Heidegger points out repeatedly, and which Vattimo fails to remain with, namely: what is 
the "it" that "gives"? The "it" has many names in Heidegger's writing. In the lecture "Zeit 
und Sein" (from which the above passage is taken) the name was Ereignis. In MAL, 
written 34 years earlier, a different name is given. But does this mean the named is so 
different? 
"Nun muß auch deutlicher geworden sein, 
inwiefern wir von der Welt sagen können, sie 
127 sei ein Nichts. Was für ein nihil ist sie? " 
"It must also have become clearer to what 
extent we can say about the world that it is a 
nothing. What sort of nihil is it? " 
125 Introduction, section 2bii. 
126 ZSD, p. 5f.; Stambaugh's translation slightly altered. 
127 MAL, p. 271. 
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The matter here is not simply the kind of Nichts that the world is; rather, it concerns the 
nature of the Nichts in Heidegger's philosophy, as the ensuing passage shows: 
"Wenn sie [die Welt] also ein nihil ist, dann 
kein nihil negativum, d. h. nicht die einfache, 
schlechthinnige leere Negation von etwas. Die 
Welt ist nichts in dem Sinne, daß sie nichts 
Seiendes ist. Nichts Seiendes und gleichwohl 
128 
etwas, was es gibt. " 
"If it is a nihil, then it must not he a i, ihil 
negativum, i. e. not the simple pure empty 
negation of something. The world is nothing in 
the sense that it is nothing that is. It is nothing 
that is yet something that ' is there'. " 
So far Heidegger has been merely negative in his comments, but in this last sentence he 
turns to a positive thesis, and as in "Zeit und Sein", this positive move turns to the phrase 
"es gibt". The world is not an entity, but "there is a world". Heidegger then interprets the 
"es": 
"Das »es«, das da dieses Nicht-Seiende gibt, ist 
selbst nicht seiend, sondern ist die sich 
zeitigende Zeitlichkeit. Und was diese als 
ekstatische Einheit zeitigt, ist die Einheit ihres 
Horizontes: die Welt. " 129 
"The 'there is' which is this not-a-being [more 
accurately: the 'It' which gives this non-being] 
is itself not being, but is the sel f-temporal i zing 
temporality. And what the latter, as ecstatic 
unity, temporalizes is the unity of its horizon, 
the world. " 
The "es" is named here as "die sich zeitigende Zeitlichkeit". The previous formulation that 
11 es gibt eine Welt" has been developed: "die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt eine Welt". The "es" is 
Zeitlichkeit, the verb "geben" has been named as "zeitigen". Recapitulating this 
conclusion, Heidegger continues: 
"Die Welt ist das Nichts, das sich ursprünglich 
zeitigt, das in und mit der Zeitigung 
Entspringende schlechthin - wir nennen sie 
daher das nihil originarium. " 
130 
"World is the nothing which temporalizes itself 
primordially, that which simply arises in and 
with temporalization. We therefore call it the 
nihil originarium. " 
Does this nihil originarium mark a commitment to some form of nihilism? Not every nihil 
founds a nihilism, as a brief comparison with Kant can show. Kant described time (and 
space, as the pure forms of intuition) as a Nichts, and produced a four-fold analysis of 
128 MAL, pp. 271-2. 
129 MAL, p. 272. 
130 MAL, p. 272. 
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Nichts. 13' Time was specified as one of these four kinds, namely, ; 'Wichts as ens 
imaginarium. There is no nihil originarium in the Kantian analysis; what Kant and 
Heidegger share is the need they feel to develop conceptions of Nichts that are not a mere 
nihil negativum (which would found a nihilism). On the basis of what Heidegger says here 
about Nichts, there is no immediate reason to attribute to him any greater nihilism or 
abandonment of foundations in favour of a void, than there is to attribute such a view to 
Kant. The problem here is one of the nature and character of the Nichts. What might 
Heidegger mean by a nihil originarium? The "originarium" must be emphasised: origin, 
ground. Rather than being excluded in favour of a void (the Vattimo interpretation). 
ground has coalesced with a nothing. This same paradox is found in the conception of the 
abyssal ground, the "abgründige Grund", which appears in the writings of the thirties, 132 
and which characterises the renaming of Zeitlichkeit as Zeit-Spiel-Raum. The nihil 
originarium is not analysed further as such in Heidegger's extant writings, but the 
passages on the abgründige Grund can be taken as providing a development of this 
theme. 
133 
So far connections have been traced between: (a) es gibt and temporal language; (b) es 
gibt and Ereignis. Is there any more direct relation of time and Ereignis in Heidegger? In 
MAL the following passage is to be found: 
"Weil das Ereignis des Welteingangs des 
Seienden das Urereignis und in seinem Wesen 
134 Zeitigung ist,....  
"Because the event of the entity's access to the 
world is the original event and is in its essence 
temporalisation..... " 
In MAL, Ereignis has not yet emerged as a central keyword, but it is in the formative 
stages of doing so. These passages mark a transition between a relatively normal 
understanding of Ereignis as an occurrence or event, and Ereignis (here Ur-ereignis) as 
something of fundamental import. In this transitional phase, words such as Urereignis, 
131 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B348. 
132 See esp. BP, pp. 371-388. 
133 On the abgrundiger Grund, see next chapter. For more detailed discussion of the 
Nichts in 
Heidegger's philosophy, see R. Regvald, Heidegger et le probleme du nennt, Dordrecht: 
Nijhoff, 
1987. 
134 MAL, p. 274 
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Urgeschehen, and Urbewegung all occur as possible forerunners of the later concept of 
Ereignis. Heidegger's prefixing of all of these dynamic-eventful notions with "Ur-" is 
significant: the "Ur-" denotes absolute foundation. Further, from the passage it appears 
that there is an association between being this Urereignis, and having the essence of 
Zeitigung. 
The final passage for citation in this chapter draws a fascinating parallel between the work 
of the SZ project, and the later writings involving the terminology of the Ereignis. The 
passage builds up to an identification of "the moment of the Ereignis" and "the time of 
being". 
"Warum muß diese Entscheidung gewagt 
werden? Weil damit die Notwendigkeit des 
Seyns in die höchste Fragwürdigkeit 
hinaufgehoben und die Freiheit des Menschen, 
daß er seines Wesens Erfüllung ins Tiefste legen 
kann, in die Ab-gründigkeit hinabstoßen, weil 
so das Sein in die Wahrheit der einfachsten 
Innigkeit seiner Er-eignung gebracht wird. Und 
was »ist« dann? Dann erst ist diese Frage 
unmöglich, dann ist, für einen Augenblick, das 
Er-eignis Ereignis. Dieser Augenblick ist die 
135 Zeit des Seins. " 
"Why must this decision be ventured? Because 
by doing so the necessity of Being is raised up 
into the highest questionworthiness and the 
freedom of man to be able to situate the 
fulfilment of his essence at the most profound 
level is pitched down into the un-fathomable; 
because by this Being is brought into the truth 
of the simplest intimacy of its ap-propriation. 
And then what "is"? Only then is this question 
impossible; then, for a moment, ap-propriation 
is appropriation. This moment is the time of 
being. " 
The moment described is a moment of two simultaneous extremes: the raising of being 
into the highest questioning, and the pitching of human freedom down into the most 
unfathomable (Abgrundigkeit). The quasi-paradoxical simultaneity of these extremes, the 
correlativity posited between Fragwürdigkeit and Abgründigkeit, is a problem which needs 
to be maintained as such. An unfathomable question would (supposing only that the free 
translation is acceptable) be a question which does not go away. Heidegger then asks what 
"is" at this moment, replying on two levels: (i) the question of "is" no longer applies at 
this moment; (ii) seemingly tautologically, abusing subject-predicate structure, "Er-eignis 
ist Ereignis". This moment of being brought into the truth, where things are seen as the` 
are, is then identified as the "time of being". At the time of being, in the time of being, 
"Er-eignis ist Ereignis". 
135 BP. p. 508 
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Connections: ground into time; time into Ereignis. But to what extent doe. the Ereignis 
engage in the foundational problematic, to what extent is it involved in the disas-semhl`, ot 
ground? Robert Crease identifies a middle period of Heidegger's thought in which ground 
"is" Ereignis. 136 The "is" is increasingly problematic during the development of 
Heidegger's thought, and thus, while the next chapter essentially deals with Grund as 
Ereignis, it deals less with the Ereignis as such, as with the thinking which takes place 
within the site of the Ereignis. Texts can certainly be adduced from BP which state the 
foundational role of Ereignis, 137 but the issue is rather, what does this connection have to 
say about the revision or disas-sembly of ground? It is this latter issue which the thesis 
now turns to. 
136 R. Crease, op. cit., p. 243. 
137 For example, (i) there are many occurrences of the phrases "Das Ereignis gründet... " or 
"... gründet im Ereignis"; (ii) one of the six Fügungen of the Ereignis is named "die Gründung"; 
(iii) At BP, p. 307, Grund (as disas-sembled) is placed in apposition to Ereignis; (iv) Consider 
this passage from BP, p. 346: "Wahrheit... ist der Grund als zurücknehmender und 
durchragender, der das Verborgene überragt, ohne es aufzuheben, die als dieser Grund 
stimmende Stimmung. Denn dieser Grund ist das Ereignis selbst als Wesung des Seyns. Das 
Ereignis trägt die Wahrheit = die Wahrheit durchragt das Ereignis. " Tr: "Truth is ground as 
taking-back and rising-through, which rises over the hidden without superseding [aufheben] it, 
truth is as this ground the sounding mood. Because this ground is the event [Ereignis] itself as 
the essencing of being. The event bears the truth = the truth rises up through the event. " 
Comment: the passage describes Grund as disas-sembled (rising over the hidden); as such Grund 
conforms to the dialectical patterns described in pt. A, ch. 4, section 2: zurücknc'hme'id- 
durchragend and tragen-durchragen both have a directional reciprocity -a reciprocity which at 
BP, p. 261 & 265 Heidegger describes as "kehrig" (turn-like, versive) and as a "kehnge 
Gründung" (versive grounding). This dialectical pattern, though, is no neutralisation or 
superkeding (Aufhebung). This ground (i. e. as dialectical or kehrig), and no other interpretation 
of ground, is the Ereignis. 
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CH. 2. THE TURN: A LEAP INTO THE ABYSS? 
The question, to repeat, is narrow: what "is" ground in the earlier writings of Heidegger?, 
What should have become clear is that no stable response to this question is possible: the 
very being ("is") of ground is undergoing interrogation - is maturing with interrogation 
(der Boden ist die Zeitigung des Fragens). It therefore becomes integral to ask, not only 
about the present of the term "ground" in the early Heidegger, but also of its future - 
where is this experimental development going? This chapter is primarily concerned with 
the meaning of the term Abgrund (normally translated as "abyss") and thus the fate of the 
concept of ground in the earlier work of Heidegger. The most important text for the 
exploration of the themes is Beiträge zur Philosophie (BP). 2 
The themes of a "turn" (Kehre), a "leap" (Sprung) and an "abyss" (Abgrund) are highly 
characteristic of Heidegger in this period of his thinking; they are also open to serious 
misinterpretation - as if Heidegger's thought suddenly and fundamentally changed, and 
this change involved a leap into the abyss in the sense of a turn away from ground. The 
concept of the Kehre is indeed the key to understanding the fate of ground towards the end 
of the earlier work of Heidegger - but not at all in the way in which this might initially be 
expected. The Kehre is, at the same time, a key to recovering the unity of Heidegger's 
thought. 
I Throughout this dissertation, this question has never been intended in an innocent or frontal sense. 
Heidegger's strategy with "what is...? " questions should not be taken as justifying their 
abandonment; they are strategically useful. In writing this dissertation I could find no more 
useful and instructive a guideline for initiating the discussions than this question - but its 
integration into the dissertation is strategically non-simple. 
2 Contributions to Philosophy, written 1936-38, unpublished until 1989, when it appeared as 
volume 65 of the Gesamtausgabe. Although the contents of BP were not entirely unknown before 
its publication (scholars who knew Heidegger personally sometimes had access to the manuscript 
- see O. P6ggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (3rd ed. ), p. 442 and D. Krell, Intimations of 
Mortality, pp. 106ff. ), nevertheless a much smaller familiarity with BP is assumed on the part of 
the reader than in the case of SZ or the lectures of the 20's. It should be emphasised that this 
dissertation does not attempt to deal comprehensively with Heidegger's writings after about 
1928, though obviously there are many works of paramount importance for the general topic 
throughout Heidegger's career. The position of BP in this dissertation responds to the need for at 
least some indication of where Heidegger is going; in this respect BP is the most important 
transitional writing yet published. The presence of BP here does not indicate an intention to deal 
more widely with the thought of the 1930's, nor does it indicate an undervaluing of the 
intricacies of development in Heidegger's thought between 1928 and 1936. 
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1) Structural-foundational eccentricities in Beitragur Philosophie 
The subject of this section, structural-foundational eccentricities in BP, will he compared 
wherever possible to the SZ project. This section deals especially with the notions of 
Kehre and fugue, but only insofar as these are necessary for a limited assessment of the 
idea that Heidegger's turn consists in a "leap" into an "abyss" and away from 
foundational ism. 3 
While a crude parallel between the SZ-BP relation and the relation of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to his Philosophical Investigations is not wholly invalid, 
the comparison only further propagates the innocent misconception of a sudden change or 
turn in Heidegger's thought. 4 The same propagation is achieved by Von Herrmann, 
distinction such that SZ is the transcendental-horizonal or fundamental-ontological 
approach, in contrast to the seinsgeschichtliche (pertaining to the history of being) 
approach of BP. 
5 To try to put SZ and BP into separate categories from the very 
beginning seriously prejudices their interpretation. It suggests that Heidegger, having 
spent a decade toiling with the SZ project and refining various versions of it into lecture 
series and draft hooks, started again with a fresh piece of paper, and wrote a completely 
new, self-standing approach to the question of being. This only draws further attention to 
the already invitingly obvious, superficial differences between BP and SZ. One of the first 
tasks for an interpreter of BP must be to draw the reader in the opposite direction, to the 
far more difficult task of perceiving the unity and interrelation of the two books. 
6 BP is no 
clean start. Neither is it an unquestioning continuation of SZ in the form proposed within 
the SZ project. The relation, even at a superficial level, is complex: BP contains many 
explicit references to SZ, some of which are critical or revisionary; it also contains many 
more implicit references, such that a familiarity with SZ is essential for a reading of BP; 
3 Cf. G. Vattimo, La Fine della Modernitä, p. 37: "Heidegger... parla della necessitä di «lasciar 
perdere 1'essere come fondamento», per «saltare» nel suo «abisso}. " Tr.: "Heidegger... speaks of 
the necessity of 'relinquishing being as foundation' in order to 'leap' into its 'abyss'. " See 
introduction, section 2bii, of this thesis. 
4 Cf. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 5; Krell's description of BP as a "gigantic 
manuscript of extended aphorisms" perhaps has the same parallel in mind (op. cit., p. 
106): 
"aphorism" rather devalues the strategy and method of BP. 
5 E. g. Von Herrmann's editorial afterword to BP, at p. 511. 
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these implicit references often involve the acceptance of much of what the earlier work 
achieved. BP does not obviously contain any major ideas or theses which conflict with SZ 
- at least, none which conflict with SZ more than they conflict with other ideas or 
principles within BP itself. Certainly SZ is a ladder for reaching BP; but it not even 
possible to distinguish the two by saying that the ladder is thrown away after use. 
BP is a book which, like SZ, concentrates on the question of being. It does so, not by 
expounding any thesis or system (although at times it may seem to do so): rather, by 
developing a single, complex but unified conception, previously foreign to (or rather, 
hidden within) thought: Ereignis. Thus the subtitle of BP: Vom Ereignis. The name of this 
conception is indeed new when compared strictly to SZ, but is the conception itself new? 
It is not uninstructive to view Heidegger as constantly translating his own work into new 
idioms in order to exploit the properties of the new idiom - and perhaps this is indeed the 
main difference between SZ and BP: translation. 
7 But if this is the case, it is a translation 
which raises many of the most difficult problems of translating: there is little that maps 
directly between the two idioms. Yet it is the difficulty of providing a mapping which 
shows up the very advantage of the translation - that the new idiom contains possibilities, 
connections and structures which were unavailable in the old. Heidegger once famously 
remarked that language was the nemesis of SZ, but it is possible that these famous lines 
have been badly misinterpreted. 8 
"Der fragliche Abschnitt [von SZ] wurde 
zurückgehalten, weil das Denken im 
zureichenden Sagen dieser Kehre versagte und 
so mit Hilfe der Sprache der Metaphysik nicht 
durchkam. " 9 
"The questionable section [of SZ] was withheld 
because thinking came to a breakdown in the 
adequate saying of this turn and thus could not 
continue through with the help of the language 
of metaphysics. " 
6 Cf. the explicit comments by Heidegger in BP on the SZ-BP relation; e. g. pp. 84-87. 
7 This was written partly with the following in mind: D. C. Wood, The Deconstruction of 
Time, 
p. 148. As regards the development of Heidegger's thinking and writing, Wood speaks of 
"superimposition", "transformation" and especially the "mapping of one discourse onto another", 
rejecting the notion of "translation". 
8 For a lengthier reinterpretation, see R. Hosokawa, "Heidegger und das Problem 
der Kehre", 
pp. 10-12. 
9 BH, p. 159 (GA9, p. 328); own translation. 
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This does not say that SZ failed because of metaphysical language; nor does it say that the 
metaphysical language of SZ led to a Kehre. Rather, the Kehre was already an intended 
part of SZ (whether at a point in the narrative or as a philosopheme - this is unclear), but 
the idiom did not suffice for the satisfactory formulation of the relevant part of SZ. 
Clearly SZ itself has a far from homogeneous idiom, subsisting in a development of 
language or a continual process of translation. The breakdown is the breakdown of this 
developmental self-translation. This does not mean to say that the ideas of SZ are in any 
way invalidated by the BH passage, and indeed one finds within the new idiom of BP that 
many ideas, patterns and strategies are carried over, extended or amended from SZ. 
Ereignis, then, belongs to an idiom which translates (with extensions and amendments) the 
language of SZ into a mode in which the saying of the Kehre is possible - but a translation 
in which one-to-one lexical mappings are often unavailable. 
Robert Crease has identified a middle Heidegger characterised by the interpretation of 
ground as Ereignis. 1° This raises various questions. Given the link between ground and 
Ereignis, to what extent is this different from ground in the 1920's writings? Further, if 
the link exists, does it mean that Ereignis is simply another metaphysical Urelement, or 
does Ereignis, by its foundational function, disas-semble (deconstruct, lay free) a certain 
metaphysical foundational ism? One may start by remarking that Ereignis has a curious 
relation to BP, for while conditioning both form and content of that book (subtitled Vom 
Ereignis), it is nevertheless relatively absent from the book. Nor is this a mere paraleptic 
absence. A closer reader may develop the feeling that somehow the Ereignis has a relation 
to the text like that of the eye to its field of vision. It is Heidegger's tactical goal to create 
this effect: 
"Die gemäße Überschrift lautet daher Vom 
Ereignis. Und das sagt nicht, daß davon und 
darüber berichtet werde, sondern will heißen: 
Vom Ereignis er-eignet ein denkerische- 
sagendes Zugehören zum Seyn und in das Wort 
»des« Seyns. " 
11 
"The appropriate sub-title therefore reads Vorn 
Ereignis. And that does not mean reporting 
' of or 'about' the event, rather, it means: 
from the event comes to pass a thinking-saying 
belonging to being and in the word 'of 
being. " 
10 R. Crease, Heidegger, Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, p. 243. 
I BP, p. 3; this and all subsequent translations from BP are own translations. 
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The key move in the text is an untranslatable reversal (Kehre) of the meaning of "vom". 
"Vom Ereignis" would normally suggest first the sense of "Of the Event", in the sense of 
a comprehensive analysis of the event. Heidegger switches to another possibility held 
within the German word: "from". The book is written "from" the Ereignis, and as such 
presents a "thinking-saying belonging to being". The idea that BP is written from the 
event might initially be taken as a suggestion that Heidegger believes himself to have 
achieved "the other thinking" in the sense of Denken; it becomes clear later in the hook 
that the Ereignis is not the achievement of Denken or even a concept belonging to Denken; 
Ereignis is rather the site of the transition between metaphysical thinking and the "other" 
thinking. Heidegger does not write in a style in which form and content can he separated 
out. In BP, "form" has to be taken more widely than the pages of the book, for quite 
explicitly what is most important to the book (Ereignis) is scarcely to be found within 
those pages. It is in this sense that BP is written "from the event". The position of the 
Ereignis with respect to the text is thus the first feature which de-conventionalizes a 
possible foundational ism. 
To continue the exploration of a possible foundational ism, if one was to try to impose a 
tree-structure on BP with Ereignis at the base, the first fork might be between the two 
structurally dominant figures of BP, namely: Kehre and Fuge. The rest of this section 
examines these two structurally dominant figures. 
a Fugue 
The core structure of BP is a sixfold fugue, where the fugue elements (Fügungen) are (1) 
der Anklang (ringing-in), 12 (2) das Zuspiel (play-off), 13 (3) der Sprung (leap). (4) die 
12 Translation difficult. The sense of the word conveys the first calling or summons to the recovery 
of the question of being, or the heralding of the initiation of the quest 
for being; normally 
Anklang describes the reception or approbation of the public to some achievement 
(presupposing 
a separation of observer and observed); but in Heidegger's text the Anklang seems 
to be, 
indistinguishably, the summons of the subject-matter and the response of the thinker; 
further, 
Heidegger exploits the compound construction of the word (An-klang: at-ring), so 
to translate the 
word we also need to respect the auditive element. "Ringing-in" (as in "to ring 
in a new era") is 
taken as combining the auditive and the initiating elements; however 
it loses the idea of a 
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Gründung (grounding), (5) die Zukünftigen (those-to-come), (6) der letzte Gott (the last 
god). What is the significance of this idiosyncratic structure? 
Briefly, fugue can be seen both (a) as paratactic association or semantic interpenetration, 
which lets go normal propositional structure, further refined and transferred from the level 
of the sentence to the level of the text as a whole, and (b) as a development of the textual 
superstructure of the SZ project - namely regressive recapitulation. 
More slowly, one can take the meaning of the German word Fuge (lit.: fugue) as an initial 
clue, the core meanings are fivefold: (1) a stringing-together in a construction that may be 
physical, grammatical or socio-economic; (2) the gaps or joints in such a structure, as 
distinct from the constituent parts; (3) a musical fugue ("a polyphonic composition in 
which short melodic theme is introduced by one part and successively taken up by others 
and developed by interweaving the parts" 14); (4) a decree of fate or of a god; (5) in 
addition to the normal German meanings, Heidegger adds an association with the word 
Verfügung ("disposal", as in "at one's disposal"), such that a Fügung is that which is 
"posed" at our dis-posal for the venturing of the quest for being. 15 Heidegger would seem, 
with his use of the word Fuge (and its morphological derivatives) to want to hold together 
all of these meanings. 
Initially the choice of the six Fügungen (fugue-parts) can seem to be rather inexplicable. 
Heidegger claims the origin of this structure (both the overall fugue and its constituent 
Fügungen) lies in the matter of the enquiry itself: 
summons (or ap-peal) issued by the human situation. D. Krell translates "intimation" (op. cit., 
p. 106). 
13 "Play-off", not in the sense of a tie-breaker, but in the sense of "playing off one thing against 
another". D. Krell: "interplay" (ibid. ). 
14 As defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed. ); this should be taken serious)}: the parts 
of Heidegger's fugue speak polyphonically, successively taking up the theme of the Ereignis with 
its melodic figure of the Kehre, developing by interweaving the parts. 
is BP P. 81 
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"Dieser Aufriß gibt keine Anreihung 
verschiedener Betrachtungen über verschiedene 
Gegenstände.... Der Aufriß dieser »Beiträge« 
zur Vorbereitung des 
Übergangs ist dem noch 
unbewältigten Grundriß der Geschichtlichkeit 
16 
des Übergangs selbst entnommen.... " 
"This outline does not give a sequence of 
various observations about various objects.... 
The outline of these 'contributions' to the 
preparation of the transition is taken from the 
still unmastered ground-plan of the historicality 
of the transition itself.... " 
In this passage it should be emphasised: that the six Fügungen are supposedly given by the 
matter itself, rather than imposed by the writer 
S7; likewise, that the matter itself (the 
transition of thinking), as it gives the six Fügungen, is respected as unmastered, untamed, 
finally, that the matter itself, as it gives the six Fügungen, is regarded in its 
Geschichtlichkeit (its narrative historicality). In what sense should we take this 
Geschichtlichkeit? Discernible in the naming of the six Fügungen is a movement from 
beginning to end, from first to last (from the ringing-in to the last god). Can one therefore 
suppose a linear, directional structure? Such an impression is one Heidegger attempts to 
avoid: 
"Dieser Aufriß... ist auch kein einleitender 
Aufstieg von einem Unten nach einem Droben. " 
18 
"Neither is this outline an introductory ascent 
from something lower to something higher. " 
The following passage gives one of the most positive overall interpretations: 
16 BP, p. 6. 
17 Cf. the comments on phenomenological method in §7 of SZ. 
ý8 BP. p. 6. 
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"Die Fuge ist wesentlich anderes als ein 
»System«.... Die sechs Fügungen der Fuge 
stehen je für sich, aber nur, um die wesentliche 
Einheit eindringlicher zu machen. In jeder der 
sechs Fügungen wird über das Selbe je das 
Selbe zu sagen versucht, aber jeweils aus einem 
anderen Wesensbereich dessen, was das 
Ereignis nennt. Äußerlich und stückhaft 
gesehen findet man dann leicht überall 
»Wiederholungen«. Doch das Verharren beim 
Selben, dies Zeugnis der echten Inständlichkeit 
des anfänglichen Denkens, fugenmäßig rein zu 
vollziehen, ist das Schwerste.... Jede Fügung 
steht jeweils in sich, und dennoch besteht ein 
verborgenes Ineinanderschwingen und 
eröffnendes Gründen der Entscheidungsstätte 
für die wesentlichen Übergang in die noch 
mögliche Wandlung der abendländischen 
Geschichte. " 19 
"The fugue is essentially other than a 
system'.... The six fugue-parts of the fugue 
each stand for themselves, but only in order to 
make their essential unity the more penetrating. 
In each of the six fugue-parts, it is sought 
always to say the same about the same, but in 
each case from another essential sphere of that 
which the event names. Externally and 
fragmentarily seen, one can then easily find 
repetitions' everywhere. However to cleanly 
accomplish the persistence with the same (this 
testimony of the genuine proficiency of 
initiatory thinking) is the most difficult task.... 
Each fugue-part stands respectively in itself and 
yet a hidden swinging-into-each-other prevails, 
an opening grounding of the decision-site for 
the essential transition into the still possible 
transformation of Western history. " 
Despite the superficial novelty of the fugue in Heidegger's writing, all the elements in this 
passage are reminiscent of well-established themes. For example: consider the discussion 
of tautology and contradiction earlier in this thesis. Each Fügung is said to the same about 
the same, to persist with the same - which is what a tautology achieves. In other words, 
what Heidegger has earlier achieved by means of tautology, at the level of the sentence, he 
here raises to the level of the text by means of fugue. Yet fugue-structure is also a quasi- 
contradiction: self-standing parts which nevertheless find their sole purpose in their unity: 
supposedly saying the same they apparently say quite different things. The character of 
this contradiction is described as a swinging-into-each-other - the notion of swinging was 
used in earlier works to describe the relation of the ecstases of temporality. The relation of 
the fugue and its Fügungen repeats the problem of the origin of identity and difference, 
and in this vein the interrelation of the Fügungen is reminiscent of Gleichursprünglichkeit. 
Heidegger continues by describing this curiously contradictory unity of the Fügungen as 
an opening grounding (Gründen) of the decision-site. It is not only that one of the 
Fügungen is named Gründung, but each has a foundational role. Yet this foundation is 
described as "open" and appositionally related to the horizontally interpenetrative notion 
of "swinging into each other" (Ineinanderschwingen). The fugue-structure is called 
foundational (among other things), but clearly it can only he so in a radically 
unconventional sense. 
19 BP, pp. 81-2. 
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If all of this leaves the impression that however unconventional the foundational ism cat the 
fugue-structure may he, it is nevertheless a formalism, this too is balanced out in BP. In a 
number of passages in BP, Heidegger summarizes the movement and interrelation of the 
Fügungen in a non-formal, narrative movement. 
"Der Anklang des Seyns als der Verweigerung. 
Das Zuspiel des Fragens nach dem Seyn. Das 
Zuspiel ist zuerst Zuspiel des ersten Anfangs, 
damit dieser den anderen Anfang ins Spiel 
bringe und aus diesem Wechselzuspiel die 
Vorbereitung des Sprunges erwachse. Der 
Sprung in das Seyn. Der Sprung erspnngt den 
Abgrund der Zerklüftung und so erst die 
Notwendigkeit der Gründung des aus dem Seyn 
zugewiesenen Da-seins. Die Gründung der 
Wahrheit als der Wahrheit des Seyns (das Da- 
20 sein). 
"The ringing-in of being as shutting-out. The 
play-off of the questioning after being. The 
play-off is initially the play-off of the first 
beginning, so that this may bring the other 
beginning into play and that out of their 
interplay may evolve the preparation of the 
leap. The leap into being. The leap leaps from 
the abyss of the clefting and thus first [arises] 
the necessity of the grounding of the Da-sein 
assigned from being. The grounding of truth as 
the truth of being (the Da-sein). " 
In this last passage, summarising the first four Fügungen, one of the important points to 
notice is how each Fügung is linked to Seyn. 
"Der Anklang hat seine Trag-weite in das 
Gewesende und das Künftige und somit seine 
Einschlagskraft in das Gegenwärtige durch das 
Zuspiel. Das Zuspiel nimmt seine 
Notwendigkeit erst aus dem Anklang der Not 
der Seinsverlassenheit. Anklang und Zuspiel 
sind Boden und Feld für den ersten Absprung 
des anfänglichen Denkens zum Sprung in die 
Wesung des Seyns. Der Sprung eröffnet zuvor 
die unabgeschrittenen Weiten und 
Verbergungen dessen, wohin die Gründung des 
Da-seins, zugehörig dem Zuruf des Ereignisses, 
vordringen muß. Alle diese Fügungen müssen 
in solcher Einheit bestanden werden aus der 
Inständlichkeit im Da-sein, die das Sein der 
Zukünftigen auszeichnet. Sie übernehmen und 
verwahren die durch den Zuruf erweckte 
Zugehörigkeit in das Ereignis und seine Kehre 
und kommen so vor die Winke des letzten 
"1 Gottes zu stehen. " - 
"By means of the play-off, the ringing-in has a 
range carrying into the having-been and the 
yet-to-come, and thus [has] its strike-power in 
the present. The play-off first takes its necessity 
from the ringing-in of the need of the 
desolation of being. Ringing-in and play-off 
are earth and field for the first leap-down of 
initiatory thinking to the leap into the 
essencing of being. The leap opens up the 
unchartered reaches and concealments of that 
into which must push forward the grounding of 
the Da-sein belonging to the acclamation of the 
event. All these fugue-parts must be fashioned 
into a unity of this kind from the proficiency in 
the Da-sein which distinguishes those-to-come. 
They adopt and maintain the belonging to the 
event and its turn, a belonging awakened by' the 
hail; and thus they come to stand before the 
gestures of the last god. " 
Note that "die Not der Seinsverlassenheit" (the need of being's desolation), "anfängliches 
Denken" (initiatory thinking), "die durch den Zuruf erweckte Zugehörigkeit" (the 
20 BP, p. 9. 
21 BP, p. 82. 
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belonging awakened by the hail), and "der Wink" (the gesture) are all terms and phrases 
of special significance in BP. 
"Was gesagt wird, ist gefragt und gedacht im 
»Zuspiel« des ersten und des anderen Anfangs 
zueinander aus dem »Anklang« des Seyns in der 
Not der Seinsverlassenheit für den »Sprung« in 
das Seyn zur »Gründung« seiner Wahrheit als 
Vorbereitung der »Zukünftigen« »des letzten 
22 
Gottes«. 0 
What is said is asked and thought in the 'play- 
off' against each other of the first and the other 
beginning, out of the ' ringing-in' of being in 
the need of the desolation of being, for the 
' leap' into being to the ' grounding' of its truth 
as preparation for ' those-to-come' 'of the last 
god'. " 
In this last sentence, Heidegger accomplishes a complete saying of the Fügungen in one 
sentence, a sentence which reads like a narrative. However there is not only a non-formal 
narrative element here in the interrelation of the Fügungen; the passage has more to say: 
the play-off of the first beginning of thought (metaphysics) with the other beginning is 
already the leap; the leap is already grounding, before anything is "reached"; and so on. 
The journey is not a journey from the ringing-in to the last god; rather, it is a journey to 
the realisation that in each Fügung only the same has been said, and indeed to the 
realisation that even within each Fügung, only the same has been said in different ways, 
and with this realisation the consciousness of what is meant by Ereignis, as the site of the 
fugue, is developed. What is said in (a) the "concept" Ereignis (word level), (b) the 
"principles" and "sub-theses" of BP (sentence level), (c) the Fügungen (fugue-parts), (d) 
the whole book, comes to the "same". Does this mean that BP is one great tautology, in 
the pejorative sense, sterile and meaningless? The response to this is to say that the reader 
should look less for the result (the "same") and more for the achievement of this result: it 
is the coming to the same that is the contribution to philosophy of BP. Phenomenology 
strives to see things as they are for themselves - that is, as nothing other than the same - 
and is thus a disas-sembling of the semblances of metaphysics. In BP this disas-sembl`y is 
the coming to the same effected by a macro-structural convergence of narrative parallels. 
To the extent that fugue provides a foundational structure, it can be compared instructively 
to the rhizomatic foundationalism of Deleuze and Guattari. 
23 In his 1989 dissertation on 
Heidegger's early ontology, Purcell suggested the account of Deleuze and Guattari as an 
22 BP, p. 7. 
23 
e. g. G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, Rhizome (Paris: Minuit, 1976). 
191 
advance and improvement on Heidegger. 24 Rhizomatic foundationalism basically 
substitutes the traditional single arborial structure of metaphysics for a plurality of 
horizontally iterating, interconnecting, mutually originating but autonomous mini-tree 
structures. Criticism of the rhizome account, as an ontology, would focus on its failure to 
change the idiom of the tradition; this failure reduces it to a minor qualification of arborial 
philosophy, a reordering or reshuffling of the same categorial stock. Rhizomes may he 
exciting as regards their superficial logical properties, but they involve no deep-syntactic 
change. They operate entirely within a logical space governed by Kant's amphibolies; 25 
Heidegger questions this government. The Heideggerian fugue seems to comprise all the 
virtues of the rhizome, while liberating itself rather more successfully from the vices of 
arborial philosophy (i. e. its deep-structural origins). 
h Kehre 
Fugue-structure, then, is a saying of the "same"; but the nature of this "same" is a 
problem, not least because it is a highly contradictory same; it is a same that thrives on 
tension, on the unresolved problematic of conflicts, a problematic from which BP takes its 
life as a contribution to philosophy. The pre-figure of all these conflicts is the Kehre. 26 
Thus Kehre is anything but separate from fugue. 
The so-called Kehre is an enormous topic in secondary literature, and despite this it 
remains deeply misunderstood. For decades even Heidegger's ridiculing of the critics' 
misinterpretations failed to stir this most entrenched of errors. 
27 Much which needs to be 
said to correct the misinterpretation has been set down in two excellent and condensed 
24 J. Purcell, Heidegger's Early Ontology: Rethinking the Ground (dissertation, Purdue University, 
1989). 
25 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B316-324 (matter-form, inner-outer, identity-difference, agreement- 
opposition). 
26 Lit.: a sharp bend; left untranslated except in quotations. In quotations I have avoided the 
traditional "turn" and "reversal", and used "version" (in an etymologically primitive sense of 
turning), as this allows the links between the morphological variations of the -kehr- root to 
be 
translated as well; and leaves "turn" for the word Wende (which it more accurately translates). 
27 Letter to Richardson, p. XIX. 
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articles by Ryiochi Hosokawa (1989) and Jean Grondin (1990), `8 A summar` could not do 
justice to these articles or substitute reading them. The basic idea is that the Kehre is NOT 
a turn or reversal which applies to Heidegger's philosophical biography, marking a change 
in his thinking; rather, it is a philosopheme, a keyword of his thought. As such (Grondin 
says), "loin de la scinder, la Kehre pourrait ainsi nous habiliter ä reconquerir I'unite de la 
 29 pensee heidegg6rienne As a philosopheme, the Kehre is a virtual or non-abstractahle 
pattern which iterates through a number of guises on different scales in Heidegger's 
thinking (i. e. what I call a paratype). It has an intellectual elusiveness which defies an 
adequate or satisfactory account. Like Ereignis, it names the locus within which 
Heidegger's always strives to move, but within which it moves rather more confidently 
and self-consciously in BP than in SZ. 
The Kehre is perhaps the nearest Heidegger comes at this stage of his philosophy to an 
elaboration of being itself: 
In der Kehre des Ereignisses ist die Wesung 
der Wahrheit zumal die Wahrheit der Wesung. 
Und diese Widerwendigkeit selbst gehört zum 
Seyn als solchem. " 
30 
"In the version of the event the essencing of 
truth is at the same time the truth of essencing. 
And this contra-turning itself belongs to being 
as such. " 
The chiasmatic structure of the first sentence is only one of the many non-assimilable 
versions in which the Kehre appears. 31 The following text emphasizes the relation of the 
Kehre to being even more strongly. 
28 R. Hosokawa, "Heidegger und das problem der Kehre", in Studies in Philosophy, no. 5 (1989). 
(This periodical is a bulletin of the Faculty of Literature, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan). 
J. Grondin, "Prolegomenes ä 1'intelligence du tournant chez Heidegger", in Les Etudes 
philosophiques 3 (1990), pp. 333-352. Inter alia, these articles discuss and account for the 
famous Heidegger passages on the Kehre. 
29 J. Grondin, op. cit., p. 343. Tr.: "Far from dividing it, the Kehre can thus enable us to reconquer 
the unity of Heidegger's thought. " 
30 BPS p. 258. 
31 The chiasmus or Kehre is not a "dialectical game", as Heidegger comments in a similar passage 
on p. 95. 
191 
"Die Er-eignung in ihrer Kehre ist weder im 
Zuruf, noch in der Zugehörigkeit allein 
beschlossen, in keinem von beiden und doch 
beides er-schwingend, und das Erzittern dieser 
Er-schwingung in der Kehre des Ereignisses ist 
32 
das verborgenste Wesen des Seyns. " 
"The e-venting in its version is summed uff, 
neither in the acclamation alone, nor in the 
belonging alone, [swinging /attainable33] in 
neither of these and yet in both; and the 
trembling of the [swine/attainment] in the 
version of the event is the most hidden essence 
of being. " 
In this passage another version of the Kehre is seen in the bipolar opposition of Zuruf and 
Zugehörigkeit: the Kehre is (n)either in one, (n)or in the other, and certainly no tertium 
quid. A relation of Er-schwingen names the presence of the Kehre in the opposition -a 
relation which is similar to that of the In einandersch wing en of the Fügungen (and of the 
ecstases of temporality in the 1920's). 
The Kehre is a primitive figure present in the Ereignis, 34 prefigurative for the structure of 
a number of conceivably quite different philosophical problems: the interrelation of 
bipolar oppositions, pre-propositional structure, the nature of truth, the problem of 
foundations, the difficulty of escaping one's philosophical heritage in pursuit of a new 
beginning, the hermeneutic circle.... In this description of the Kehre, it is important to 
emphasize its prefigurativeness for (philosophical) problems - for the unresolved, for the 
situation of still not having come to terms with conflicts and tensions. Moreover, as such a 
prefigure, Heidegger described the Kehre as a ground: 
32 BP, p. 342 
33 "Er-schwingen" is an untranslatable play between (a) "erschwinglich", meaning attainable or 
affordable, and (b) "schwingen" (to swing), which has already commonly been used to express 
the interrelation of certain concepts. 
34 The phrases "die Kehre im Ereignis" or "die Kehre des Ereignisses" are highly characteristic of 
the thought of BP; see e. g. pp. 31f, 34,82,185,231,258,267,311,320,342,351,372.40 
7ff. 
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"Das Ereignis hat sein innerstes Geschehen und 
seinen weitesten Ausgriff in der Kehre. Die im 
Ereignis wesende Kehre ist der verborgene 
Grund aller anderen, nachgeordneten, in ihrer 
Herkunft dunkel, ungefragt bleibenden, gern an 
sich als »Letztes« genommenen Kehren, Zirkel 
und Kreise (vgl, z. B. die Kehre im 
Leitfragengefüge; den Zirkel im Ver-stehen). " 
35 
The event has its innermost happening and its 
furthermost purview in the version. The 
version essencing in the event is the hidden 
ground of all those other subordinate versions, 
circles and rings whose origins are dark and 
which remain unquestioned and gaily accepted 
in themselves as 'ultimate' (cf. e. g. the version 
in the fugue of the leading question; the circle 
in the understanding). " 
Heidegger never says that the Kehre is universal as pre-figurative for thinking; on the 
other hand, it does in fact pre-figure every pattern to be found in his thinking at this stage. 
Some examples follow. 
While discussing the question "who are we? " (the same question addressed in SZ §§25- 
27), Heidegger comments: 
"Sogleich wird deutlich: die Art wie in der 
Frage das Befragte angesetzt wird: »wir«, 
enthält schon eine Entscheidung über das Wer. 
Das will sagen: wir können nicht, unberührt 
durch die Wer-frage, das »wir« und »uns« 
ansetzen gleichsam als ein Vorhandenes, dem 
nur noch die Bestimmung des Wer abgeht. 
Auch in dieser Frage liegt ein Wiederschein der 
Kehre. Sie ist nicht geradezu weder zu stellen 
noch zu beantworten. " 
36 
"This at once comes clear: the way in which 
the questionee is situated in the question (' we') 
already contains a decision about the Who. 
That means to say: we cannot, unaffected by 
the who-question, situate 'we' and 'us' just as 
if they were things present-at-hand lacking no 
more than the determination of who they are. 
In this question too there is a reappearance of 
the version. The question cannot be formulated 
directly, neither can it be answered directly. " 
Thus at the heart of the general philosophical problem of personal identity, Heidegger 
argues that there is a Kehre-figure. From SZ, it might be thought that Heidegger takes an 
approach similar to Ryle's category-mistake tactic. 
37 However Heidegger is beyond saying 
simply that the question grammatically connects concepts which "should" not be connected 
in this way: the first person (7, 'we') can be situated in the who-question; but not as if it 
was a thing present-at-hand. Situating the first person in the who-question (a legitimate 
35 BP, p. 407; further example of the Kehre as pre-figure of the structure of understanding - p. 
239, 
"Im Verstehen als geworfenen Entwurf liegt notwendig gemäß dem Ursprung 
des Daseins die 
Kehre. " "In the understanding as thrown projection necessarily lies, according to the origin of 
Dasein, the version. " 
36 BP, pp. 48-49 
37 There is more than a mere possibility that Ryle got his idea from Heidegger - see 
M. MurraI . 
"Heidegger and Ryle: Two Versions of Phenomenology", in M. Murray ed. 
Heidegger and 
Modern Philosophy (Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 271-290. 
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move, not a mistake) will only get questioners towards their goal if they first respect the 
grammatical peculiarity of such a question. Respecting the grammatical peculiarity of the 
question means: to recognise that the question has a different deep-structure to that which 
it normally has, i. e. to recognise the Kehre as the heart of the problem. To note the 
circularity, and, believing this circularity to be the ultimate problem and defeat of the 
question "who am IT", to give up, is to fail to go deep enough. To put this another way', 
Kehre is a metagrammatical form of thinking (paratype), which, if it could be grasped, 
bypasses the category-mistake objection and permits the question (but not in the "direct" 
categorial sense, not according to the surface-structure). 
To turn to the next example, one of the standard characteristics of Heidegger's style is the 
juxtaposition of opposites (particularly prepositional pairs such as in/out and near/far) in a 
way falling short of outright contradiction. In the following passage we see such 
juxtaposition used to describe the phenomenon of death. 
"Der Tod ist als das Äußerste des Da zugleich 
das Innerste seiner möglichen völligen 
Verwandlung. Und darin liegt zugleich ein 
Hinweis in das tiefste Wesen des Nichts.... Was 
hier als eigenste Verborgenheit in das Da 
hereinsteht, der Wechselbezug des Da zu dem 
ihm zugekehrten Weg, ist der Widerschein der 
Kehre im Wesen des Seins selbst. " 
38 
"Death is, as the outermost of the there, at the 
same time the innermost of its possible 
complete transformation. And in this there lies 
at the same time a pointer to the deepest 
essence of the nothing.... Here what, as 
ownmost hiddenness, stands into the there, the 
interrelation of the there to the away39 which 
has returned to it, is the reappearance of the 
version in the essence of being itself. " 
The play on death as both innermost and outermost has already been one of the key tactics 
in the SZ exposition of death. Here Heidegger adds something to the interpretation of this 
juxtaposition: namely, that the clash provides a pointer to the essence of the nothing. That 
to which the clash points is the Kehre. In saying this, Heidegger offers a further 
description of the juxtaposition of inner and outer: namely the pattern of a return from 
being away. This return from being away should probably be interpreted as 
38 BP, p. 325. 
39 , Away" is a deliberately unusual translation; "der Weg" normally means "the way", 
but the 
particle "weg" means "away"; on pp. 323-5 of BP, where the quoted passage occurs, the noun 
"Weg" is used in a special sense - which Heidegger tells us is a more original 
formulation of the 
SZ concept "Uneigentlichkeit" (inauthenticity); the context of these passages suggests that 
the 
translation "the away" best captures the special sense meant. 
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4inauthenticity's immanent (but hidden) potential for a "way hack" to authenticity' `' The 
play between the innermost and outermost of death's significance is a play between (what 
in SZ was known as) authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. In both SZ and BP, 
mortality is a phenomenon which can be used to effect a transition between... (kinds of 
understanding). It is this "transition between... " that is the Kehre. The avoidance of 
acknowledging the horror of mortality is an origin for misinterpretations of human 
existence, that is, for metaphysical semblances which Heidegger strives to disas-semble. 
There is another play in this passage which should be noted in passing: the Kehre is 
announced first as something pertaining to the essence of the nothing; then later in the 
passage as pertaining to the essence of being. This "contradiction" is another quite 
deliberate version of the Kehre. 
In SZ, in the discussion of the hermeneutic circle, Heidegger said that the "circular" 
structure of understanding reflected the structure of Dasein; likewise he was distinctly 
circumspect about "circularity" as a good model, maintaining it within "... ". In BP the 
Kehre names this "circular" structure of Dasein: 
"Das Dasein hat den Ursprung im Ereignis und 
dessen Kehre. "4t 
"The Dasein has its origin in the event and its 
version. " 
Or again: 
"Da-sein ist das Geschehnis der Erkluftung der 
Wendungsmitte der Kehre des Ereignisses.... 
Das Da-sein ist der Wendungspunkt in der 
Kehre des Ereignisses, die sich öffnende Mitte 
des Widerspiels von Zuruf und 
Zugehörigkeit.... " 42 
"Da-sein is the happening of the cleaving43 of 
the turning-middle of the version of the 
event.... The Da-sein is the turning-point in the 
version of the event, the self-opening middle of 
the counter-play of acclamation and 
belonging.... " 
In this there was an accumulation of the ideas of: turning, middle, self-opening, 
happening, cleaving, counter-play, and Zuruf versus Zugehörigkeit. The Kehre is not only 
40 
See previous footnote. 
41 BP, pp. 31f. 
42 BP, p. 311. 
43 "Er-klüftung" is a neologism whichh adds the nuance that the cleaving involves an achievement 
rather than a loss; the association with the "Er-" prefix of "Er-eignis" should also 
be noted. 
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a turning and a middle, but an opening and a cleaving: the Kehre is not like a bend in a 
road, where one moves from one end to the other; rather its directions of coming and 
going split open the line into a move between identity and difference. In the following, not 
dissimilar text, are added ideas of truth (grounded truth), illumination and concealing, 
"Die Wahrheit des Seyns ist nichts geringeres 
als das Wesen der Wahrheit, begriffen und 
gegründet als lichtende Verbergung, das 
Geschehnis des Daseins, des Wendungspunktes 
in der Kehre als sich öffnende Mitte. " 
44 
"The truth of being is no less than the essence 
of truth, conceived and grounded as 
illuminating concealment, the happening of the 
Dasein, of the turning-point in the version as 
self-opening middle. " 
The Kehre, as opening middle, is both illumination and concealment, and as such contains 
the essence of truth. In the following passage the illuminating concealment is developed 
into a similarly counter-playing association of swinging and counter-swinging. 
Tie Lichtung für die Verbergung ist schon die 
Schwingung des Gegenschwunges der Kehre des 
 45 Ereignisses. 
"The illumination for the concealment is 
already the swinging of the counter-swing of 
the version of the event. " 
This swinging idea was met earlier as describing the manner in which oppositional pairs 
were held together in the two parts of the Kehre. The way in which the Kehre is 
foundational for dichotomies is probably its most important feature in BP, and it is to this 
feature the analysis now turns. 46 
In BP the Ereignis is depicted by means of a number of two-part expressions, the two 
parts of which are in tension with one another. Each of these bi-polar tensions names the 
Kehre in the Ereignis. The most important dichotomous tensions in BP include: (1) a first 
beginning of thought - an other beginning of thinking; 
47 (2) Zeit - Raum; 
48 (3) Welt - 
44 Bpi p 189. 
45 BP, p. 351. 
46 Cf. Derrida's engagement with metaphysical dichotomy in "La Pharmacie 
de Platon" On La 
Dissemination, Paris: Seuil, 1972). Would Derrida sell a product like Kehre in his own 
pharmacy (along with di erance, pharmakon, et al. )? 
47 
BP, passim, esp. pp. 169-224. 
48 
time - space; BP, passim, esp. pp. 371-388. 
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Erde; 49 (4) Götter - Menschen; 
so (5) Grund - Abgrund; 
51 (6) Lichtung - Verhergung: `- (7) 
Entrückung - Berückung; 
53 (8) Ankunft - Flucht; 
54 (9) Anfall - Aushleih; 55 (10) Nah - 
Ferne; 56 (11) Ermittlung - Vermittlung; 
57 (12) Sein - Seiendes; 
58 (13) Sein - Nicht. (, i 59 n: 
(14) Entweder - Oder; 
60 (15) Zuruf - Zugehörigheit; 
61 (16) schaffend - opfernd; 
62 (17) 
Entzug - Schenkung. 
63 In many cases, there are words describing the site or middle of 
these pairs: Übergang, Streit, Spiel, Zuspiel, Mitte, Dasein, Wahrheit, Seyn, 
Entscheidung... (transition, struggle, play, play-off, middle, Dasein, truth, being, 
decision... ). 
A number of comments need to be made with respect to this. Tension may be internal to 
the pairs - i. e. they contain contradictions 
64 (for example: illuminating-concealing, 
creating-sacrificing) or the tension may be imposed by Heidegger (e. g. the pairs world- 
earth and gods-men are not obviously in any kind of tension, but Heidegger continually 
refers to these pairs in respect of the struggle (Streit) between them). Further, some of the 
pairs have a relation of the kind earlier described as "dialectic" (e. g. arrival-flight, onset- 
49 
world - earth; BP, passim, e. g. pp. 96,322,408; esp. p. 310. 
5o 
gods - human beings; e. g. BP, pp. 87,413; esp. p. 310. 
St 
ground - abyss; BP, passim, esp. pp. 371-388. 
52 illuminating - concealing; BP, passim, e. g. pp. 70,236,322,389. 
53 
carrying-away-in-thought - applying-thought-in-a-considered-manner; e. g. BP, pp. 
70,236. 
54 
arrival - flight; e. g. BP, pp. 31f., 406,408. 
55 
onset - abeyance; e. g. BP, pp. 235,408. 
56 
proximity - distance; e. g. BP, p. 91. 
57 facilitation - mediation; e. g. BP, p. 73. 
58 being - entity (i. e. the ontological difference); e. g. BP, pp. 13f., 343. 
59 being - non-being; e. g. BP, p. 102. 
60 
either - or; e. g. BP, p. 102. 
61 
calling-to - belonging; e. g. BP, pp. 311,407. 
62 
creating - sacrificing; e. g. BP, p. 236. 
63 BP, p. 293. 
64 Thus the Kehre names a "solution" to the considerations of pt. A, ch. 2. 
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abeyance), or as metaleptic (e. g. near-far). Moving to a different point, the pairs should 
not be thought of categorically - reified and separable; nor as aspects, nor as dialectical in 
the Hegelian sense of creating some third thing, nor as neutralisations. They are quasi- 
simultaneous; their conjunction is intended to be harsh and problematic. Moreover, it 
would be a mistake to suppose that the opposition of, for example, Welt and Erde makes 
them different from the Streit which reigns between them. One of the means by which 
Heidegger avoids this is that a number of terms may be used both as the pole of a 
dimension, and as the site held open by these dimensions (Lichtung and Scvn are good 
examples). The "poles" of the dimensions of the Kehre cannot be thought of on the 
analogy of two fixed banks spanned by a bridge. In the analogy the banks are primary and 
the bridge secondary, dependent; in Heidegger's thinking it is if anything the opposite. 66 
Finally, in SZ, to a large extent the key figures (which were triadic and quadratic) were 
mappable, due to relations of mutual derivation. 67 In BP every bi-polar figure is a 
manifestation of the Kehre, otherwise there is little mapping or interrelation of the figures, 
although one may say that in most cases the dichotomies open the same site (Ereignis). 
The Kehre is multi-dimensionally dichotomous. 
Perhaps the most dominant dichotomy of BP is the first mentioned - that between the first 
beginning and other beginning of thought -a transition within which BP attempts to 
remain, without resolving the play-off between the two sides. One possible interpretation 
of this dichotomy is the possibility of escaping metaphysics for a thought that is other than 
metaphysics. Obviously it is problematic whether such a thing is indeed possible. What is 
found in BP is not an attempt to enact such a transition, or to show its possibility, rather, 
there is another example here (the earlier examples were those of the hermeneutic circle 
and transcendence) 68 of the revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental. The 
possibility of the escape from metaphysics is problematic, and its problem-character or 
questionworthiness is virtually hypostatized as a new foundation, or if not a foundation, at 
least as a philosopheme. One may hazard a guess that something similar occurs with the 
dichotomy of Grund-Abgrund: whether or not philosophy can find a foundation 
is 
65 See pt. A, ch. 4. 
66 See pt. A, ch. 4. 
67 See pt. A, ch. 3. 
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problematic, and this problematic becomes a philosopheme in the kehrige (versive) relation 
of Grund and Abgrund. 
One may generalise these particular cases to an account of the Kehre in general as an 
ultimate structure of philosophical thought. One of the main problems of philosophy 
concerns the "limits" of thinking or knowledge. While it is clear that thinking and 
knowing have their "limits", it seems that we can only apply the word "limit" to this 
phenomenon in a qualified or metaphorical sense; because to apply the word "limit" in its 
full meaning might suggest, contradictorily, that we had somehow "thought" or "known" 
something about the "other" side. Further, it is doubtful whether any new word or concept 
would be adequate to discussing such "limits". Generally, the problem of thinking about 
the region, or within the region, of the limits of thinking, poses the circular problem of 
how to avoid presuming anything about the unthinkable (i. e. what cannot be thought). In 
this problem can be seen the figures of circularity, presuming, and the interplay of 
positive and negative. The tactic of revaluating the problematic as the fundamental, when 
faced with a circle, dilemma or other impasse to thinking, consists in not standing off, in 
refusing to separate out (i) the impasse and (ii) the path of questioning, as if the thinker 
had somehow been wandering down a path and met an obstacle which came from outside. 
Rather, it consists in seeing the impasse as belonging essentially to the question which met 
it. Seeing the impasse in this way means: the nature or structure of the impasse will 
therefore give an indication of the nature or structure of what it was one was trying to 
understand in the first place. Instead of trying to get past the impasse and continue as if 
down a path, the thinker turns the impasse into the new path. To recapitulate: the problem 
of thinking about the region, or within the region, of the limits of thinking, poses the 
circular problem of how to avoid presuming anything about the unthinkable; thus the 
nature of that which one was trying to understand (the "limits" of thinking) is reflected in 
the nature of the impasse that this gives to thinking: namely, a kind of circularity - the 
Kehre. As a kind of circularity, the Kehre at the limits of thinking may be determined 
further. In trying to reach the "limits" of thinking, thinkers finds themselves metaleptically 
thrown instead into the "centre". This invertive or reversing phenomenon can be 
reexpressed with other opposites (e. g. first and last, near and far). On the whole, one 
68 See pt. A, ch. 4, section 2 and pt. B, ch. 1, section 1b. 
'u1 
should not he surprised to find that the space of thinking does not obey the same structural 
rules as natural space. 
2) Does the term Abgrund signify a nihilistic anti-foundational ism? 
The purpose of the previous section was to set the context for the use of the term Abgrund 
(abyss69) in Heidegger's thought. BP contains very much more material on ground and 
foundations; the approach taken here is strictly selective. The choice of Abgrund is made, 
since this term is most open to misunderstanding. Although the word Abgrund does not 
really come into its own until after the 1920's, it is already significantly impending within 
the SZ project: 
"Der Grund ist ein existenzialer, d. h. ein 
erschlossener Grund - und zwar ein 
Abgrund. "70 
The ground is an existential one, i. e. a 
disclosed ground - and for that matter an 
abyss. " 
Writing of the openness of being in BP, David Krell says that "although it receives the 
name Gründung... the way in which being 'founds' Da-sein in any given epoch really has 
to do with the abyss or the radical adsence of grounds. " 71 rounds. "71 Perhaps the crucial word here is 
"really": Krell privileges Abgrund (abyss) over Grund. Vattimo similarly finds that 
ground is abandoned for a leap into the Abgrund. 72 Such interpretations are not faithful to 
what Heidegger writes. As Daniel Panis remarks, "l'originalite de cette interpre=tation... ne 
conduit pas simplement ä 1'identification de l'etre et du sans-fond [Abgrund], mais plus 
subtilement ä l'identification de l'etre et du fondement sans fond. L'etre n'est pas 
69 Lit: down-ground. It is not a pure negative of Grund - for this Heidegger uses the words 
ins a grundlos and Ungrund. Pure absence of ground is something from which Heidegger mainta 
distance, regarding it as the hidden truth behind an unreconstructed conception of ground. 
Abgrund has a greater emotive impact, as the loss of ground, its falling away - evocative of a 
fear 
of falling oneself, and of the desire to clutch to something firm to save oneself. 
70 
GA20, p. 402; own translation; reference owed to R. Regvald, Heidegger et le problerne 
du neant, 
Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987; see also SZ, p. 152. 
71 
D. Krell, op. cit., p. 107. 
72 
e. g. G. Vattimo, La Fine delta Modernitä, p. 37. 
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simplement abime, il est fond abyssal. " 
73 Panis correctly notes that occurrences of 
Abgrund are always associated with occurrences of Grund, such that no privileging 
occurs, and that the two are held together in a heterogeneous unity. The French translation 
of Abgrund as "sans fond" leads to his interpretation of this heterogeneous unity: namely, 
that the ultimate ground has no further ground - not even itself; thus it is not even self- 
grounding. 
74 This falls rather short of the full impact of Abgrund in Heidegger's thought. 
Perhaps the best available assessment of Abgrund is that of Richard Regvald. 75 Working 
without access to BP, he remarks: "le sans-fond ne s'oppose pas au fondement ä la facon 
d'une entite negative, mais ouvre les voies de la difference. "76 
Why should the view of Panis and Regvald be generally preferred to that of (e. g. ) 
Vattimo? Might it be the case that the increased use of 'nihilistic' concepts after the SZ 
project, particularly of the word Abgrund, show that Heidegger is 'abandoning' 
fundamental ontology, recognising that its reliance upon ground-concepts tied it 
inextricably to metaphysics? Such would be a shallow misinterpretation. Yet a better 
interpretation is hard even to approach. In BP Heidegger writes the following about 
Abgrund in the development of his thought. Here he is discussing the "changes" between 
SZ and BP, "changes" which he himself puts in inverted commas, warning the reader to 
beware of applying such a concept to the SZ-BP relation. 
"Die »Änderungen« entspringen der wachsenden "The 'changes' spring from the growing 
Abgründigkeit der Seynsfrage selbst.... " 
77 abyssalness of the question of being itself.... " 
How might this be interpreted? In the passage, Heidegger shifts the responsibility for the 
changes away from himself and onto the Seynsfrage. This shift of responsibility echoes 
73 D. Panis, "Heidegger et la question du fondement", p. 11. Tr.: "The originality of this 
interpretation... does not simply lead to an identification of being and abyss, but more subtly to 
the identification of being and the abyssal ground. Being is not simply abyss, it 
is abyssal 
ground. " (Panis' emphasis). 
74 D. Panis, op. cit., p. 6. 
7S R. Regvald, op. cit., pp. 93,116-119,122. 
76 ibid., p. 122. Tr.: "The abyss does not oppose ground in the manner of a negative entity, rather 
it 
opens the paths of difference. " 
77 BP, p. 85 
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Heidegger's remark that BP was written not "about" but "from" the Ereignis. How should 
we interpret the time-structure of the present participle "wachsend" (growing)? Was the 
Seynsfrage growing in its abyssalness year by year, so that in 1936 it was more ahv, sal 
than in 1926? Perhaps there is a reference here to the developments in Heideggers 
immediate environment - i. e. to the rise of Nazism in these 10 years. Or, more likely, 
Heidegger perceived Nazism as symptomatic of the entire abyssalness of the Western 
mood. Alternatively, instead of a human-historical interpretation of the time-structure, one 
could take a textual interpretation: the Seynsfrage is in its essence not static, but dynamic - 
the questioni of being ("questioning" now a present participle too) is a growing. To put 
this another way, as the question of being follows its natural progress, the conception of 
the Abgrund must come to the fore. The passage just quoted witnesses the importance of 
the conception of the Abgrund in BP; it could be well misused to promote the view that 
BP is indeed a turn away from metaphysics into Vattimo-esque post-modernist nihilism. 
The problem here is this: can it be said that Abgrund is introduced into Heidegger's 
thinking to replace Grund, marking a turn away from the metaphysically tainted SZ 
project towards something else (e. g. post-modernist nihilism)? Such an interpretation rests 
on the standard misunderstanding of the Kehre, and a misreading of how Heidegger 
actually uses the term Abgrund. 
The interpretation can be countered fairly easily: while the use of Abgrund in BP may be 
striking and invite overemphasis, it could never seriously be taken as a replacement for 
Grund and other (positive) ground-words. Both a qualitative and statistical comparison 
must conclude that Abgrund is more a footnote or qualification to Grund than vice versa. 
Statistically, BP not only positively reappropriates the large range of grounding 
expressions found in the SZ project and employs them with a similar frequency, but 
in 
fact BP shows a significant expansion of the variety of expressions (neologisms, 
morphological variations, compounds) associated with grounding. BP is, foundationallY' 
speaking, outrageously creative. Further, in most cases of the incidence of Abgrund 
(or a 
morphological variation78) there is a paradoxical or quasi-paradoxical conjunction with 
78 The morphological variations found in BP are: abgründig, Abgründigkeit, Abgrürulurlg, 
abgrundlich, abgründigerweise, abgründigst; all of which frequently occur with the 
"ab-" prefix 
separated by a hyphen. 
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Grund (or a morphological variation). From this it can he taken that the central problem is 
not the possible existence of Abgrund as a replacement of Grund; rather the central 
problem is the clash and tension deliberately maintained between Grund and Ahgrund. The 
following passages provide some examples of these conjunctions of Grund and Abgrund. 
"Die Fragenden haben alle Neugier abgelegt; 
ihr Suchen liebt den Abgrund, in dem sie den 
79 
ältesten Grund wissen. " 
"The questioners have abandoned all curiosity; 
their searching cherishes the abyss, in which 
they know the most ancient ground. " 
"Der Grund gründet als Ab-grund. " 
80 
"Der gegründete Grund ist zugleich Abgrund 
für die Zerklüftung des Seyns und Ungrund für 
die Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden. " 81 
"Abgründig gegründet ist in das Ereignis das 
Da-sein und somit der Mensch, wenn ihm der 
Einsprung in schaffender Gründung gelingt. " 
82 
"Ground grounds as abyss. " 
"Grounded ground is at the same time abyss for 
the sundering of being and un-ground for the 
entity's desolation of being. " 
"The Da-sein is abyssally grounded in the 
event, and with this likewise man, when he 
manages the leap-in into creative grounding. " 
The passages in which Abgrund and Grund are conjoined do not allow any priority to he 
given to one or the other; the concepts are treated as correlative, as co-equal. How can the 
"paradox" of the "abyssal ground" be resolved? Is it indeed a proper paradox? 
Heidegger's concern to show the non-negativity of Abgrund suggests that "paradox" is the 
wrong way to think about what is going on here. Heidegger's primary aim is to set in 
motion an interplay, to revive a tension; not to tinker with logic. 
"Allein, der Ab-grund ist als Wesung des 
Grundes kein bloßes Sichversagen als einfacher 
Rückzug und Weggang. Der Ab-grund ist Ab- 
" 83 grund. 
"Alone the abyss [lit. down-ground] is, as 
essencing of ground, no mere self-denial as 
simple retreat and departure. The down-ground 
is down-ground. " 
79 BP, p. 13; Neugier (curiosity) refers back to the SZ project (e. g. SZ§36) in which it exemplified a 
way of falling. Curiosity was an inadequate attitude for the venturing of the question of 
being. 
80 BP, p. 29. 
81 BP, p. 33. 
82 BP, p. 280. Further evidence: pp. 286,352,375 (occurrences of the frequent phrase 
"abgründiger 
Grund"); also pp. 256,304,317,346,350,381,383,384,386,411,430,490,500. 
83 BP, p. 379; cf. also for the non-negativity of Abgrund pp. 380 & 382. 
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Heidegger's hyphenisation and emphasis in the last sentence, whether or not faithful to a 
German speaker's linguistic intuitions, are probably intended to show that a "positive 
element is internal to the concept of Abgrund; the reader is invited to think of Abgrund as 
a kind of modification of ground, rather than as its sheer denial. The following passage 
not only militates against a negative appreciation of Abgrund, but presents some of the 
more positive characteristics as well. 
"Das Offene des Ab-grundes ist nicht grundlos. 
Abgrund ist nicht das Nein zu jedem Grund wie 
Grundlosigkeit, sondern das Ja zum Grund in 
seiner verborgenen Weite und Ferne. Der Ab- 
grund ist so die in sich zeitigend-räumend- 
gegenschwingende Augenblicksstätte des 
»Zwischen«, als welches das Da-sein gegründet 
sein muß. Der Ab-grund ist so wenig »negativ« 
wie die zögernde Versagung; beides zwar, 
unmittelbar (»logisch«) gemeint, enthält ein 
»nein«, und gleichwohl ist die zögernde 
Versagung das erste und höchste Aufleuchten 
des Winkes. Ursprünglicher begriffen west in 
ihr freilich ein »Nicht«. Aber es ist das 
ursprüngliche Nicht, das zum Seyn selbst und 
84 
somit zum Ereignis gehört. " 
"The open of abyss is not groundless. Abyss is 
not the No to every ground as groundlessness, 
rather the Yes to ground in its hidden width 
and distance. Abyss is the momentary site of 
the ' between', temporo-spatially counter- 
swinging into itself, as which the Da-sein must 
be grounded. Abyss is as little 'negative' as 
hesitating refusal; 
85 both indeed, taken 
immediately ('logically'), contain a 'no', and 
yet hesitating refusal is the first and highest 
illumination of the gesture. 
86 Primordially 
conceived, of course there essences a 'not' in 
hesitating refusal. But it is the primordial not, 
which belongs to being itself and thus to the 
event. " 
Another significant non-negative characterisation of Abgrund is the description of Abgrund 
as freedom. 87 This evokes, among other passages, the work on ground and freedom in 
§§11-14 of MAL, where the origin of ground was found to reside in freedom. 
88 How can 
the link between der abgründige Grund and freedom be explained? So-called "negative 
freedom" consists in an absence of constraints, whereas "positive freedom" is the capacity 
for self-creation. Positive and negative freedom do no finä a place in Heidegger's 
9120, 
writings as such, but the issues of absence of constraint (whether in thinking or acting) 
and the capacity for self-creation do find a place. Heidegger deals with issues such as the 
constraint of the inescapable historical determination of our thinking, the absence of 
constraint in the loss of traditional "grounds" (e. g. the "death of god"). the necessity of 
refounding man's self-understanding in the face of these absences and constraints. 
Such 
84 BP, p. 387f. 
85 "Zögernde Versagung" (hesitating refusal) is a term of art in BP. 
86 
wem" (gesture, signal) is likewise a term of art. 
87 
BP, p. 438. 
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issues have the same form as the issue of the nature of freedom - Heidegger would 
probably say the same origin. Thus the complex, conflicting issues present in the problem 
of freedom provide a model for the kind of tension found in the notion of the abyssal 
ground. 
This non-negative maintenance of the Abgrund in strict conflictual proximity to Grund can 
ultimately only be explained by reference to the Kehre. As was seen, the Kehre is a virtual 
pre-figure subsisting in a multi-dimensionality of dichotomies. As such the Kehre created 
no tertium quid and no neutralisation; rather it reflected the irresolvably conflictual and 
heterogeneous character of the origin, of being. There is no metalanguage of the Kehre: 
the language in which the Kehre is described (e. g. as foundational, as ground, for the 
problems of the hermeneutic circle and transcendence) is subject to the Kehre, and for this 
reason the foundational is subjected to a certain versiveness, is maintained in conflict with 
the Abgrund. The abyssal ground names a dimension of the Kehre as a philosopheme. The 
subsequent analyses of this section turn to the relation between the abyssal ground and two 
other dimensions of the Kehre, namely: (a) illuminating concealment (i. e. the essencing of 
truth), and (b) time-space. 
***** 
What can be learnt from the association of illuminating concealment and abyssal ground 
about the nature of Abgrund? 
"Der Ab-grund ist die erstwesentliche lichtende "The abyss is the first-essential illuminating 
Verbergung, die Westing der Wahrheit. " 89 concealment, the essencing of truth. " 
Selective quotation might suggest that truth is primarily abyssal in BP; however the 
association of Abgrund with Wahrheit does not provide an instance in which Grund and 
Abgrund can be disentangled. The following passages balance the previous ones: 
88 
e. g. MAL, p. 282 
89 BP, p. 380. 
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"Ein ursprünglicher Wesensbezug zwischen 
Grund und Wahrheit besteht, aber Wahrheit 
90 
begriffen als lichtende Verbergung. " 
"There is a primordial essential relation between ground and truth, but truth conLeived 
as illuminating concealment. " 
"Der Grund ist das Wesen der Wahrheit. " 
91 "Ground is the essence of truth. " 
These apparently conflicting assessments of the nature of truth actually sometimes occur 
juxtaposed, in the same sentences: 
"Das Seyn: das Ereignis, im Gegenschwung 
nichthaft und so strittig. Der Ursprung des 
Streites - Seyn oder Nichtsein. Die Wahrheit: 
Grund als Abgrund. " 
92 
"Being: the event, nothing-like in the 
counterswing and thus conflictual. The origin 
of the conflict - to he or not to be. Truth: 
ground as abyss. " 
In this text, the sentence "Die Wahrheit: Grund als Abgrund" should probably be 
understood on the basis of the previous sentences, as structurally isomorphic to the 
counterswinging conflict between being and non-being. In one of the earlier passages, 
truth was described as lichtende Verbergung (illuminating concealment), a conflict- 
dimension pre-figured by the Kehre. Truth analysed in terms of Grund and Abgrund 
carries the same irresolvable tension. Abgründiger Grund; lichtende Verbergung: what 
might these two non-assimilable but structurally isomorphic manifestations of the Kehre 
character of truth be? The lichtende Verbergung theme plays on the disclosive character of 
truth, drawing on Heidegger's well-known analyses of the Greek word aletheia (truth not 
only draws attention to something, but in so doing draws attention away from something 
else; all language, as interpretation, hides at the same time as it shows). The abgründige 
Grund theme plays on a superficially different but ultimately similar character of truth; 
this is expressed most clearly in the following passage: 
90 BP, p. 308. 
91 BP, p. 379. 
92 BP, p. 346; further examples on pp. 375 & 386. 
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"Wahrheit ist uns nicht das Festgemachte.... 
aber auch nicht das bloße Gegenteil.... Sie ist 
die abgründige Mitte, die erzittert im 
Vorbeigang des Gottes und so der 
ausgestandene Grund ist für die Gründung des 
93 
schaffenden Da-seins. " 
"For us truth is not the firmly secured.... but 
neither is it the sheer opposite.... Truth is the 
abyssal middle, which trembles in the passage 
of the god and is thus the outstood ground for the grounding of creative Da-sein. " 
The structure of this passage is a "neither... nor... " followed by a "both... and...... The 
rejected couple are das Festgemachte (the firmly secure) and its opposite. The accepted 
couple, accepted together, are die abgründige Mitte (the abyssal middle) and der 
ausgestandene Grund (the outstood ground). Thus the passage makes it clear that Grund 
and Abgrund are not the same as das Festgemachte and its opposite. The abgründig(' 
Grund dimension of truth is not the repetition of an old dichotomy, but a conflict whose 
poles have been revised from the traditional conception. The qualification of Grund with 
ausgestandene (cognate with ecstasis - standing out) emphasizes this revision. 
Turning to another point in this last passage, what does it mean to say that truth, as 
abyssal middle, "trembles in the passage of the god"? Might it be a religiously cynical 
idea, that religious thinking has always violated truth, and thus truth trembles (in fear of 
its violation) before theology? A subtler idea might be that the ideals which have normally 
been associated with religious thinking nurture false epistemological ideals, 
epistemological ideals which place the problem of truth in a tortured, irresolvable set of 
dilemmas. An example of such a false ideal might be: that responsibility for the 
guaranteeing of truth can be left to the absolute or divine, and that therefore the question 
of truth becomes "what 'is' truth? ", rather than a matter of how can we understand our 
own responsibility for the truth, of how we can reappropriate and understand our 
neglected guardianship of the truth. 95 Truth as "our own terrifying responsibility" is one 
way in which truth as "abyssal ground" may be taken: there is no further court for the 
judgement of truth, and this realisation brings the terror of a loss (Abgrund); at the same 
time the development of our responsibility for the truth is a founding of truth (Grund). 
93BP, 
p331. 
94 Translation of "ausgestandene" difficult. It evokes the SZ ideas of "Ausstehen", which 
is 
etymologically cognitive with "Ekstasis". However the past participle used here may add quite a 
different slant. 
95 Dasein as guardian (Wahrer und Wächter) of truth is a theme of BP; see, e. g., BP, p" 
16f. 
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To put these thoughts and more together, what might Heidegger he trying to cOnvev in 
these passages about truth and abyss? To my mind, his thinking lies in the fcýllo%ý ing 
region. Many attempts have been made in the history of philosophy to provide some 
concrete standard or starting-point, from which true knowledge may be derived, by which 
it may be measured, on which it may be built up. The location and identification of such a 
standard or starting-point has always been problematic and controversial; yet the search 
has pressed forward with the fervour of a crusade, spurred on by the unpleasant 
("nihilistic") implications (e. g. ethical, political, religious) of an admission that its holy 
grail did not exist. It is not the case that the only alternative to "the chase for truth v. 
submission to nihilism" is some kind of "relativism" (e. g. by which truth is measured 
merely according to its fit with the totality of an indeterminate set of already held 
common-sense notions). Heidegger's way belongs to another set of alternatives (where 
Kant might also be placed), which regard "truth" in an absolute sense as non-susceptible to 
understanding (i. e. inexpressible). In Kant, however, this ineffable truth had a hare 
objective existence, which was never placed in doubt. Heidegger's thought represents 
strong reactions against the rigid distinctions of the Kantian system: (i) "objectivity" is 
weakened to something presupposing subjectivity-objectivity; (ii) "ineffability" is 
weakened to susceptibility to an allusive, pre-linguistic understanding; (iii) the dubitability 
of the existence of absolute truth is transferred from an external phenomenon facing and 
challenging formulators of a theory of truth, to an integral part of the theory of truth (i. e. 
revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental). Truth becomes something which may 
be understood allusively in a site presupposed by the distinction of "subjective-objective", 
and to the essence of which belongs the possibility of its doubt and denial, of its self- 
effacement. If truth, then, may be allusively understood, in what does this allusive 
understanding consist? Although what Heidegger produces may often seem like high-flown 
speculation, the standard tactic is in fact to return to the history of philosophy and the 
human situation (albeit very abstractly), taking the obstacles and dilemmas faced in history 
or in the human situation, and using them as clues for making further progress with the 
problem. The phenomena which the history of philosophy and the human situation have in 
common, as regards truth, are (a) the desire for certainty, or perhaps the feeling of our 
temporary factual existence as certain and (b) the dread of the absence of this anchor 
(whether this manifests itself for example as the intellectual inability to conceive of truth. 
or as the loss of factual existence in death). The dimension opened up by (a) and 
(b) - 
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naming truth - is a dimension between Grund and Abgrund. These phenomena are the 
irreconciliable poles between which all searching for truth has occurred. Heidegger takes 
up the theme of their irreconciliahle interplay as a clue, an indication, for what the esse%e 
of truth might indeed be. Thus: a new beginning on the path to achieving at least an 
allusive understanding of truth must take the given situation as regards truth at its most 
comprehensive and fundamental: as an agonised tension between.... 96 
***** 
The bipolar pair time-space likewise form a dimension of the Kehre. In what way does this 
relate to the abyssal ground, and what can be learnt from this about the Abgrunan. But 
before this, what exactly is Zeit-Raum (time-space)? As said, a dimension in the Kehre; as 
such Zeit-Raum functions as one of the namings of the Ereignis, that is, of the site of the 
transition between the first beginning of thinking (metaphysics) and the other beginning. 
"Der Zeit-Raum ist als Fügung der Wahrheit "Primordially time-space is as fugue of truth 
ursprünglich die Augenblicks-Stätte des the momentary site of the event. " 
97 Ereignisses. 
"Der Zeit-Raum ist die ereignete Erklüftung der 
Kehrungsbahnen des Ereignisses, der Kehre 
zwischen Zugehörigkeit und Zuruf, zwischen 
Seinsverlassenheit und Erwinkung (das Erzittern 
der Schwingung des Seyns selbst! ). " 
98 
"Time-space is the evented polarisation of the 
versive-paths of the event, the version between 
belongingness and hail, between desolation of 
being and gesturing (the trembling of the 
swinging of being itself! ). " 
What relation is there between the 1920's concepts of Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität, and 
Zeit-Raum? In the SZ project, Heidegger had thought that he could account for space on 
the basis of time; therefore in his more fundamental exploration of the relation of being 
and time, he thought that space could be left out. 
99 This is a position from which 
Heidegger has withdrawn by the mid 1930's, and he has taken a more traditional view 
placing time and space on an equal level. While this change is a major refurbishment of a 
key concept, Zeit-Raum should not be taken as "different". The SZ work on Zeitlichkeit 
and the BP work on Zeit-Raum complement each other. That Zeit-Raum is a modification 
96 For a comment on the extent to which the Wahrheit-Grund relation was seen in SZ, and 
in what 
sense 13 P differs: BP, pp. 351 f. 
97 BP, p. 30. 
98 BP, p. 372. 
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(or translation) of Zeitlichkeit/Temporalität, rather than an abandonment, is suggested h, 
clues such as the apposition' 
00 of Zeit-Raum and Tempora)ität and the elaboration of 
Zeitlichkeit as "den Zeit-Spiel-Raum des Da". 101 In more detail, Zeit-Raum in BP is not a 
simple conjunction of four dimensions as a natural scientist might understand the phrase 
"space-time". Zeit-Raum is a concept preceding both time and space as we know them, it 
is a concept which obeys Heidegger's curious metalogical forms of thought (paratypes) - 
for example, in that it operates with a tension between its unity (such that time and space 
are indistinguishable) and its duality; and in that in so far as it is internally complex, its 
moments determine one another. This interdeterminability, associated in SZ with the 
phenomenon of Gleichursprünglichkeit, and in BP with the Kehre, means that the temporal 
in Zeit-Raum determines the spatial, and vice versa: the spatial determines the temporal. In 
fact, the SZ position survives intact within BP: space is still "derived from" time, the 
development is an addition - the reverse is also the case. 
102 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the relation between ground and Zeitlichkeit or 
Zeitigung is essential to an appreciation of the SZ project. In BP Heidegger provides the 
following comment, which not only vaguely confirms this, but rephrases the relation, 
retrospectively, in terms of space as well. 
"Dabei sind aber Zeit und Raum ursprünglich 
aus der Wahrheit begriffen und auf die 
Gründung wesentlich bezogen. In »Sein und 
Zeit« ist dieser Bezug gesehen, aber 
hintergründlich und nicht bewältigt. " 
103 
"Yet therewith time and space are primordially 
conceived in terms of truth and essentially 
related to grounding. In 'Being and Time' this 
relation was seen, but in the background, and 
not properly dealt with. " 
In what way, then, is this relation between time-space and grounding developed in BP? 
Section (d) of the fourth Fügung (die Gründung), entitled "der Zeit-Raum als der 
Ab- 
99 SZ, §§22-24 & §70. 
100 BP, p. 18. 
101 BP, p. 22. 
102 See BP, §98. 
103 BP, p. 308 
ýý, 
grund", 
104 circles around and around the relation, establishing, for the most part, its 
intangibility and elusiveness. It begins: 
"Der Ab-grund ist die ursprüngliche Wesung 
des Grundes. Der Grund ist das Wesen der 
Wahrheit. Wird daher der Zeit-Raum als Ab- 
grund begriffen und kehrig vom Zeit-Raum her 
der Ab-grund bestimmter gefaßt, so eröffnet 
sich damit der kehrige Bezug und die 
Zugehörigkeit des Zeit-Raums zum Wesen der 
Wahrheit. " 105 
"The abyss is the primordial essencing of 
ground. Ground is the essence of truth. If time- 
space is therefore conceived as abyss and 
conversely [kehrig] the abyss understood more 
determinately in terms of time-space, then with 
this the versive [kehrige] relation and belonging 
of the time-space to the essence of truth open, 
up. " 
Here it can be seen that Abgrund, Zeit-Raum, and Wesen der Wahrheit all interrelate 
according to a Kehre figure, which means that each can be understood in terms of the 
other, but none are prior to the others. This is the relation which in the SZ project was 
known as equiprimordiality. It has already been shown how each of the dimensions 
abgründiger Grund, Zeit-Raum, and truth as lichtende Verbergung form dimensions of the 
Kehre; here one sees that the Kehre figure not only operates within these dichotomous 
phenomena, but also between them. 
As was the case with the relation between Abgrund and Wahrheit, it is possible, by 
selective quotation, to create the impression that Abgrund plays the primary role in 
relation to Zeit-Raum; more careful use of texts creates a different picture. For example, 
compare the two following passages: 
"Der Abgrund ist die ursprüngliche Einheit von 
Raum und Zeit. " 
106 
"The abyss is the primordial unity of space and 
time. " 
104 "Time-space as the abyss", BP, pp. 371-388. 
105 BP, p. 379. 
106 BP, p. 379 
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"Sie [Raum & Zeit] haben 
Gemeinsames als Einheit, 
Einigendes, was sie entsprin; 
unzertrennliche Gewiesenheit, 
das Ab-gründen des Grundes: 
107 
Wahrheit. " 
aber auch kein 
sondern ihr 
? en läßt in jene 
der Zeit-Raum, 
die Wesung der 
"However neither do space and time ha% c anything common as unity, rather what unifies 
them, what lets them leap out into that indivisible array, time-space, the down- 
grounding of ground: the essencing of truth. " 
In the second passage the unifying of time and space is stated rather more carefully as "das 
Ab-gründen des Grundes". With respect to the first passage, it is probable that Heidegger 
sometimes uses Ab-grund for both Grund and Abgrund; there is, in any case, a cultivated 
lexical inexactitude in Heidegger's writings. 
Given, then, that there is this link between Zeit-Raum and abgründiger Grund, what can 
be made of it? In BP, Heidegger exploits the concept of "emptiness" as a link between the 
abyss and the site opened in the dimensions of time and space; but, as he is at pains to 
point out, this is no "emptiness" in the ordinary or negative sense. 108 In the same way that 
Zeitlichkeit was quite unlike the vulgar concept of time, and Grund was quite unlike any 
firm Boden or Festgemachtes, so this emptiness is more an emotive prelude to filling. 
Another way one might try to explain the link between Zeit-Raum and abgründiger Grund 
is that the latter concept articulates the non-entitativeness or nothing-character of time and 
space, together with their status (in Kantian terms) as conditions for the possibility of 
experience. In MAL109 Heidegger used the concept of the nihil originarium (originative 
nothing) - this term, which evokes the idea of the abgründige Grund, could be applied to 
time and space as such non-entitative pre-conditions. 
The link between Zeit-Raum and abgründiger Grund is very much more explicit in BP 
than the link between Zeitlichkeit and Grund in the SZ project. Probably the BP position 
should be conceived as a translation of the SZ position: thus, for example, in the 1920's 
Grund was identified with Transzendenz; in BP there is a fugal relation between Sprung 
(probably a modifying translation of Transzendenz) and Gründung (slightly different 
from 
Grund). The translation of Zeitlichkeit < --- > Grund to Zeit-Raum < --- > abgründiger 
107 BP, p. 386; for further passages connecting Zeit-Raum to the idea of the abgründiger 
Grund 
(abyssal ground), see pp. 17,29,223,308,323,346,379,384-388. 
108 BP, §242. 
109 MAL, p. 272. 
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Grund represents a maintenance of all that the earlier position contained, along with two 
additions: the mutual interdef inability of time and space (despite their fundamential 
difference of kind), and the integration of the Nichtigkeit of temporality (and spatialit\ ) 
into their foundational status. 
***** 
One final comment will be added by way of conclusion to this section on the Abgrund In 
his article "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", Stephen Tyman concludes 
by saying that Heidegger's revision of ground (together with the tradition in which that 
revision stands) responds to a need. 110 1 would agree with and extend this conclusion. In 
BP, which was not available to Tyman, Heidegger speaks of this need. 
"Anklang der Wesung des Seyns aus der 
Seinsverlassenheit durch die nötigende Not der 
Seynsvergessenheit. Diese Vergessenheit durch 
eine Erinnerung als Vergessenheit zum Vor- 
schein ihrer verborgenen Macht bringen und 
darin den Anklang des Seyns. Die Anerkenntnis 
der Not.... Die höchste Not: die Not der 
Notlosigkeit. "111 
"Ringing-in of the essencing of being from the 
desolation of being by means of the 
necessitating need of forgottenness of being. 
To bring this forgottenness into the light of its 
hidden power by means of a remembering as 
forgottenness and therein the ringing-in of 
being. The recognition of need.... The highest 
need: the need of needlessness. " 
It is with these words that Heidegger opens the first Fügung and declares the need to 
which he responds, to which the enquiry responds. The Fügungen are a saying of the 
same, and the same which is said in the phrase Not der Notlosigkeit (in the context of the 
Fügung of der Anklang) is surely the same that is is said in the phrase abgründiger Grund 
(in the context of the Fügung of die Gründung). Heidegger proclaims no nihilism; it is the 
challenge of nihilism, the Not der Notlosigkeit, to which Heidegger responds. No need is 
greater or more penetrating than the human need to escape the nihilistic threat, and this 
need is the foundation (an abyssal foundation) of philosophy. The foundation is abyssal 
because it arises from this highest of needs. The abgründiger Grund is no nihilistic 
concept; it is a dimension of Ereignis, a foundational decision-site, a conflictual Kehre, 
which contains within itself the archetype of the fundamental need. 
110 S. Tyman, "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", InternatioPial Philosophical 
Quarterly 24 (1984), at p. 372. 
111 
BP, p. 107. 
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SUMMARY OF PART B 
This part of the thesis was devoted to the connections between Grund, Zeitlich) tit and 
Ereignis. Despite the demands of many other themes (e. g. metaphysics, history), to mvv, 
mind the most urgent considerations in answering the question about what ground "is" in 
Heidegger's early ontology, are (after method) time and Ereignis. There is no attempt in 
this thesis to be comprehensive, only to examine the most essential. 
What do these connections contribute to an understanding of what ground "is" in 
Heidegger's early ontology? 
In the time chapter it was shown how ground was inextricably interwoven with time, not 
only lexically or textually, but also as a matter of issues. The normal conceptions of both 
time and ground are revised (disas-sembled) such that they coalesce, becoming a 
heterogeneous "same" which responds to certain standard philosophical problems. This 
coalescence of time and ground of course applies only to the metalinguistic, that is, it 
carries only as a matter of the deep-structure of a paratypal discourse. 
This interweaving of lexis and problematic was shown first with respect to the notions of 
apriori, transcendence and Zeitigung. Apriori occupies a semantically undecidable position 
between the temporal and the foundational: traditionally a foundational conception, 
Heidegger literalises it as the "earlier", a temporal relation. The apriori was used to 
introduce the way in which Heidegger recasts the threat to foundationalism of circularity 
or infinite regress as a temporal problematic. Understood temporally, the problem was 
then subjected to certain disas-sembling techniques (not unlike some of those studied in 
part A). In particular, the end of the regression folded in on the medium of the regression. 
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a metactic move isomorphic to the tautology. 
112 Transcendence is both foundational and 
temporal, not by virtue of semantic manipulation, but by virtue of interpretation (but not 
such that any substitution occurs). Transcendence itself names the pattern of another 
problem raised by the traditional conception of ground against which Heidegger reacts. To 
take ground, not as subject to the problem of transcendence, but as characterised by the 
structure of transcendence, is the disas-sembling move (paratype) of revaluing the 
problematic as the fundamental or essential. The link between transcendence and the 
revised notion of temporality lay essentially in the ecstatic nature of time, such that it 
always already stands outside itself. The structure of ecstasis is isomorphic to the structure 
of ground as transcendence. 
113 Subsequently the concept Zeitigung was examined. ''4 
Ostensibly a purely temporal term, Zeitigung in fact semantically interpenetrates with 
foundational language in a manner described in part A, chapter 1, that is, such that one 
cannot speak of a change of lexis, or of substitution or interpretation; rather, of a near 
interchangeability, a Zusammengehörigkeit. Zeitigung itself is a term which is less an 
innocent verbalisation of time (Zeitlichkeit) than it has seemed - in PIA there are 
provocative associations of this term with questioning as the ultimate foundation of 
philosophy, and with the historically destructive (disas-sembling) method of 
phenomenology. 
The second section of the first chapter turned to the term "horizon" as marking both the 
textual and philosophical limits of the SZ project. Among the foundational associations of 
horizon, it was found in particular that the revision of ground in VWG and MAL (namely, 
ground as Umwillen) was the same as the future-orientated schema in the triadic horizonal 
schematism of time onto being - that is, that ground formed the primary or originative part 
of the horizon. 115 It was then sought to determine more exactly the structural properties of 
the horizon, 116 for example, in relation to the dialectic movement in phenomenological 
method examined in chapter 4 of part A. Horizon was found to contain certain structural 
disarticulations (impossible at least from the perspective of a horizon in natural space). 
By 
112 See pt-B, ch. 1, section la. 
113 
See pt. B, ch. 1, section lb. 
114 
See pt. B, ch. 1, section l c. 
115 
See pt. B, ch. 1, section 2a. 
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virtue of these disarticulations, an end was put to foundational (temporal) regression, not 
as a crude stop or reflexivity, but as a metactical disas-sembly (e. g. of propositional 
structure, of the traditional idiom of founding). The horizon was then 117 used to lead into 
a brief account of the role of the question as a foundation: as a foundation, Heidegger's 
question is not an unreconstructed object of veneration, rather, there is prima facie 
evidence, even quite early in Heidegger, for suspecting that even the question has 
undergone a disas-sembling revision. 
The disas-sembling foundational innovation particularly associated with the connection of 
Grund and Ereignis is the idea of Grund as Abgrund. 118 While there are indications that 
the Abgrund move was already intended in the mid-1920's, the abgründige Grund is a 
manifestation of the Kehre. The Kehre was a part of the SZ project where Heidegger had 
initially insuperable difficulties in developing an adequate idiom, and consequently the full 
elaboration of the abgründige Grund did not appear until the 1930's. The term Abgrund is 
particularly prone to misinterpretation, and thus it was sought to place this firmly in the 
context of the structural-foundational eccentricities of BP. Above all, it had to he 
understood in terms of the Kehre, Kehre not as a biographical feature of Heidegger's 
thought, but Kehre as a philosopheme, as an omnipresent pre-figure of the structural 
tendencies of thought at its extremes. As such, the Kehre in BP was, inter alia, 
dichotomously multi-dimensional, holding together a range of non-assimilable dichotomies 
in a manner which sought to go behind or cleave open traditional possibilities of 
conceptual interrelation. 119 Thus it was not only possible to reject outright the view that 
somehow the notion of a foundation came to be abandoned in favour of a negative or 
nihilistic abyss; it was also possible to develop the beginnings of an account of the 
synchronous tension and intimacy of Grund and Abgrund. 
120 To this end the associations 
of the abgründige Grund with freedom, time-space, and the illuminating concealment of 
truth were all exploited. Ultimately, however, the abyssal ground, the abgründige 
Grund. 
was explained as a trans-lation of another phrase from BP: the need of needlessness 
(die 
116 See pt. B, ch. 1, section 2b. 
117 See pt. B, ch. 1, section 2c. 
118 See pt. B, ch. 2. 
119 See pt. B. ch. 2, section lb. 
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Not der Notlosigkeit). Ultimately Heidegger's position is an attempt to lay thinking tree of 
the metaphysical semblances which hide its hiding of the true origin or foundation - and 
that origin is a need, the highest need, a need which responds to the lack of all needs. 121 
120 See pt. B, ch. 2, section 2. 
121 Notlosigkeit could be interpreted as a phenomenon characterising the technologicaljI 
all-satiating 
post-society of the twentieth century, and as such representative of a threat of nihilism. 
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CONCLUSION 
What has been shown in this dissertation, and what has not? As this dissertation is an 
exploratory exegesis of an attempted ontological revolution, there is a danger of trying to 
extract weightier conclusions than the evidence warrants. Nevertheless, on the one hand it 
is plausible that what is valuable as a matter of Heidegger interpretation also lies beyond 
the bounds of what can be "proved" or established beyond reasonable doubt, and thus for 
which one must go beyond the evidence. On the other hand there are also fairly concrete 
corrections to be made of entrenched misinterpretations of Heidegger. This conclusion 
deals with the following (interlinking) areas: (i) the interpretation of Kehre; (ii) the 
interpretation of Abgrund; (iii) the general nature of the development of Heidegger's 
thought; (iv) whether the revised notion of the foundational should actually he called 
"foundational"; (v) the assessment of Heidegger's language; (vi) the issue of Heidegger's 
overcoming of metaphysics; (vii) the role of the word "deconstruction" in the title of this 
dissertation; (viii) a final answer to the guiding question of this dissertation. 
There can be little doubt that the decades of interpretation of the Kehre as biographical 
were wrong. This much has been shown by Hosokawa and Grondin. What their 
corrections leave open is a deeper examination of the nature of the Kehre as a 
philosopheme or paratype encompassing or iterating through or crowning the "content" of 
Heidegger's thought. A straight exposition of BP can meet this requirement, but this has 
been added to in this dissertation by identifying further paratypes in the 1920's thought 
which anticipate the Kehre. ' Although the biographical development of Heidegger's 
thought can be traced into the Kehre, it is only as a derivative (and a less important one at 
that) of the Kehre as a philosopheme or paratype. It follows that the term Kehre cannot he 
Not all the paratypes necessarily anticipate the Kehre, though most seem to. Turning to parat) pes 
in general, the most important I have identified include: semantic interpenetration, revaluation of 
the problematic as the fundamental, dialectic-metactic subversion of the propositional. 
One could 
also name amphiboly, metalepsis, paralipsis. I hesitate to definitively enumerate parat) pes 
present in Heidegger's writing, since, to the extent that they are "present" there, there 
is a 
problem as to their ability to be distinguished and enumerated. Heidegger's 
language Is 
undoubtedly paratypal, having a tendency to reproduce paratypes, and permitting at 
least a partial 
imposition of a schema of paratypes. But I do not wish to suggest (e. g. 
by listing the" 
paratypes) that Heidegger was operating with a fully conceptualised list of devices 
identical to 
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employed as a model for an "abandonment" of ground, and that those many authc, r. who 
were cited in the introduction as holding such a view (e. g . Marx) can he refuted. 
With regard to the use of the term Abgrund in Heidegger, there is a similar level of 
certainty. The term Abgrund marks no retreat or abandonment of ground; it does not 
replace ground; it cannot be used to justify anything approaching anti-foundational ism. 
Abgrund, already anticipated before SZ, has a versive intimacy with Grund, an intimacy 
which pre-figures the "foundational ism versus anti-foundational ism" division by its 
embodying the Not der Notlosigkeit (the need of needlessness) as an original existential 
situation fuelling the Seinsfrage. The interpretation of Abgrund by authors such as Vattimo 
can be refuted. 
It is not only with respect to the secondary literature hijacking of the terms Kehre and 
Abgrund that an abandonment of foundations can be ruled out. The dissertation also 
establishes the general point that an abandonment or distancing (in the conventional sense) 
from the lexis, idea or problematic of foundations does not occur in the period under 
investigation; rather, there is a revision of ground. Thus textual analysis shows very 
Ua, tMC. ý 
plainly that, contrary to the claims of, e. g., f 
Marx, the lexis of foundations never gets 
"substituted" by a lexis of temporality, opening, Ereignis, clearing and so on. Rather the 
various, supposedly separable lexes are used inextricably and interchangeably, without 
prioritisation. Likewise one may state firmly that the problematic of ground (e. g. the 
hermeneutic circle, infinite regression, transcendence) does not disappear, but is 
appropriated or internalised in the course of the revision. 
Something which cannot be established with quite such assurance is the nature of the 
revision which ground undergoes. The revision is a change of the idiom, not only of 
language, but also of thinking. Thus the fate of ground is that same movement Heidegger 
constantly prepares and contemplates - the movement into an other thinking. 
That there is 
less certainty and more intangibility here arises from the nature of the matter itself: the 
new idiom is one which depends upon its rejection of a system of categories which would 
those I have identified, nor do I wish to suggest that I think I have exhaustivel}, analy,, ed 
Heidegger in this respect. 
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admit of a neat and tidy description. 
2 The question arises with respect to this claim of a 
revision, does the revised notion of ground actually deserve the name "ground", or is the 
difference between the "abandonment and substitution" model and the "revision" model 
simply one of terminology? Here Heidegger can he defended firmly: what is revised he 
continues to associate with (inter alia) a foundational lexis; further, the revised notion not 
only explains the inadequate notion, it likewise responds (rather more self-consciousl`) to 
the same need from which the conventional notion arose. It is as senseless to cease talking 
of ground just as it would have been senseless to cease talking of gravity after the 
scientific revolutions associated with Copernicus and Newton: in both cases the relation 
between old and new conceptions remains of paramount importance for the new theory; to 
deprive the new theory of the old name removes its legitimate importance and 
misinterprets it. 
Another issue which arises is the extent to which this dissertation bears on the problem of 
Heidegger's language. It was not the intention to produce a revolutionary theory of 
language or to engage with, en bloc, those many Heidegger commentators in this area. 
The intention was to demonstrate how Heidegger's language works in so far as this was 
necessary for investigating the fate or deconstruction of foundations in his earlier work. It 
is not adequate to have deep and penetrating thoughts about Heidegger's language, only to 
wrap these in a parody of his style as an offering to literary art. Naturally there is the 
issue of misinterpreting Heidegger by violently subjecting him to a conventional 
metalanguage, and the question of the impossibility of addressing the issues of his thought 
in a conventional idiom; nor do I suggest that literary art has no place in philosophy. On 
the other hand there are the dual needs of those students and scholars who have to 
approach Heidegger initially from the outside, and of a response to the strong and 
vilifying criticism of his language (and the linking of this with accusations of Nazism). To 
meet these latter needs, a prosaic and analytical account of how his language operates, and 
why it does so, is required. The "why" of his language is that it is integral to the anti- 
metaphysical thrust of phenomenology that the natural processes of the understanding 
which lead one away from being should be reversed. This reversal is an anticipation of the 
Kehre. It is almost as though Entwurf were an attempt to harness and tame the processes 
2 See further below for a more extended attempt to characterise the new idiom and the revised 
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of inspiration and genius. The "how" of his language is then worth investigating further as 
a multi-level series of tactics for achieving such a reversal and return. 3 Only a few 
beginnings of this task were made in this dissertation. At the same time it must he borne 
in mind that Heidegger probably regards many of the traditional ills of philosophy as 
derived from an established omnipresence in language of the illegitimate glohalisation of 
local cognitive and linguistic conditions (i. e. local not only geographically, culturally and 
socially, but also as a matter of the range of experiences which are encountered in 
everyday life). This provides a secondary motivation for the unconventional language 
tactics of his philosophy. But these are remarks which arise out of the dissertation; they do 
not represent its substance or purpose. 
To extend on this theoretical linguistic framework: an ideally paratypal language (i. e. a 
means of deconstruction or disas-sembling, of reversing the natural processes of 
understanding), if such a thing could exist, would not consist merely in the provision of a 
range of syntactical categories alternative to those of the main European language group. 
Paratypes would not be alternative categories; rather, they would be such that they would 
prevent categorisation - that is, the tendency of thought and language to create their own 
ruts. One can think of language on the analogy of a river, and consider the meandering of 
the river in its full maturity across a flood plain. The river cuts its course deep and 
clearly, but over the centuries the course slowly changes: new curves and meanders are 
carved out; old courses become blind channels or are separated completely from the river. 
Language too can change some of its categories over time, it can create its own 
alternatives. A paratype could never be a natural linguistic category, since it seeks to 
reverse the natural processes of language - in particular, to reverse the process by which 
the surface-categories of language invade thought (and for this reason a paratypal language 
is of interest as a philosophical tool). Since the visible or audible parts of such a 
discourse would nevertheless have to follow fairly closely the surface-forms of a natural 
language, a paratypal communication would have to contain a radical misfit between its 
surface-grammar and its deep-grammar, between its surface-semantics, and its 
deep- 
notion of ground. 
3 Such a language is what I have called a "paratypal" language; such tactics are paratypeS. 
ti B: 
"tactic" is a methodological notion; "philosopheme" a notion governing content. 
ParatY'pes" such 
as the Kehre, are both. 
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semantics. Such a misfit reveals itself, for example, in the use- of semantic 
interpenetration and paradox in Heidegger. 
In these comments on the assessment of Heidegger's language, the anti-metaphysical thrust 
of phenomenology was mentioned, which raises the implications of this dissertation for the 
metaphysical status of Heidegger's earlier ontology. This dissertation has intentionally 
avoided studying the metaphysical aspect of the problem of ground, 4 and there is no claim 
to an adequate study of the primary and secondary materials bearing on this matter. The 
thoughts here are side remarks. To what extent does Heidegger overcome metaphysics, 
and to what extent do the matters dealt with in this dissertation contribute to this question? 
Derrida perhaps raises the most crucial question for Heidegger: 
"La requete de l'archie en general, quelles que soient les precautions dont on 
entoure ce concept, nest-elle pas ]'operation essentielle de ]a metaphysique? " 
5 
This turns partly on what one means by "metaphysics", nor is it a matter of mere caprice 
how this is defined. Some definitions are more useful than others; some definitions are 
presupposed or encompassed by others. Further, given the disdain with which this term is 
now commonly met, any worthwhile definition of metaphysics would have to explain why 
it is an undesirable thing. To define metaphysics on the basis of a lexis, a style, or an 
epoch would be too superficial (though it might transpire that on the basis of a more 
worthwhile definition, metaphysics was in fact associated with some such thing). On the 
whole, it seems the accounts of metaphysics in the secondary literature are open to 
objection, or they amount to versions or derivations of the definition given in the 
introduction. 6 Of course, there may be other worthwhile accounts, but if one takes the 
definition given in the introduction, then it follows from the account of this dissertation 
that even in his early ontology, Heidegger was developing a method of some suhtlet}' 
which directs itself not only at (in Purcell's terms) "certain determinations within 
metaphysics", but at the metaphysical pattern of thinking in its entirety. One of the critical 
4 See the comments on aims and limitations of the dissertation in section 3 of the introduction, 
where metaphysics is also discussed. 
5 J. Derrida, "Ousia et Gramme"; ET at p. 63: "Is not the quest for an ar_chia in general, no matter 
with what precautions one surrounds the concept, still the "essential" operation of metaphysics? 
" 
6 See introduction, section 3. 
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ruts one needs to avoid in judging Heidegger is the terminology of success and failure. 
Heidegger's developmental claims (e. g. "ways, not works", from the motto to the 
Gesamtausgabe, or the insistence in BP that he remains within the transition between the 
first and the other thinking) need taking seriously. His writing is experimental, such th,. it 
even a "failure" contains a "success". In any case, was it not Heidegger who said that it is 
in their breakdowns that the inner structure of processes become most conspicuous? In 
what way is Heidegger's writing experimental, and what is the nature of the breakdown in 
Heidegger, if there is one? There is the possibility of regarding SZ as a kind of 
(metaphysical) agar dish for growing (anti-metaphysical) cultures. (The cultures would he 
the paratypes, the tools of disas-sembly). The turn in the unpublished third section of the 
first half of SZ was perhaps where Heidegger stopped growing the cultures, and extracted 
them for closer study. Thus, are the breakdowns and incoherencies in SZ (both those 
mentioned in this dissertation and by other critics) perhaps breakdowns cultivated by 
Heidegger? If one takes Heidegger's theory of conspicuity seriously, then an immanent 
destruction of metaphysics would undoubtedly consist in pushing it to its limits from 
within until it revealed through its own inadequacies and fissures a "beyond". Such a 
perspective on the metaphysics of SZ is one which, I think, cannot he proved or 
disproved; nevertheless it remains a viable and valuable possibility and perspective. 
To return to the Derrida's question, it ran: 
"La requete de 1'archie en general, quelles que soient les precautions dont on 
entoure ce concept, n'est-elle pas l'operation essentielle de la metaphysique? " 
In this question there is a play between inner and outer. The precautions "surround" the 
concept, that is, they do not penetrate it. But metaphysics and the archie have an essential 
relationship, they penetrate. The issue is the penetration and the non-penetration of 
ground. With regard to the tactic of semantic interpenetration in Heidegger, it would seem 
that Heidegger has already anticipated Derrida and penetrated ground to an extreme where 
one can no longer say what lies inside or outside it. Perhaps, after this, one could play a 
little with Derrida. La conquete de la metaphysique, quelles que soient les precautions 
dons on entoure ce concept, nest-elle pas 1'operation essentielle de la requete de 
I'archie? 
That is, however one might try to twist metaphysics free by redefinitions, the project of 
fundamental ontology is the overcoming of metaphysics. If one nurtures the concept of 
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metaphysics in order to let its all-encompassing jaws loose on others, who is the greater 
metaphysicist? At which end does metaphysics bite? This is no frivolous ohjecti()n` but a 
point about where the interpretation of a text occurs, about where it is jud`,, rd as 
metaphysical. A text "is" not necessarily metaphysical. There are also writers of tests and 
readers of texts. and reading and writing the same text could have an independent degree 
of metaphysicality. If it is the case that metaphysics arises from the invasion of linguistic 
deep-structure (thought? ) by linguistic surface-structure, then a text which attempts to 
break with metaphysics must set up a radical break between its surface structure and its 
7 deep structure, and employ devices to maintain this break. For such a text, there will 
always be the possibility of reading it only according to its surface structure, in other 
words, of producing a metaphysical reading. A metaphysicist can surely he so, not ornik' 
by virtue of writing, but also by virtue of reading. The inversion of Derrida's question 
likewise has a serious intent. If metaphysics and foundations have such an intimate 
connection as he claims, then might not the successful revision of the foundational have 
implications for the fate of metaphysics. The foundational could be an exit as well as an 
entrance to the domain of metaphysics. In any case, one should not rule out a priori the 
possibility of a useful and valuable conception of the foundational. 
The next issue which arises for consideration is the extent to which, as the title suggests, 
this is an exercise in deconstructivism. It is not. The term Destruktion used by Heidegger 
is inadequate for two reasons: (i) it does not represent the entirety of the 
phenomenological method of Reduktion-Konstruktion-Destruktion; (ii) the English 
equivalent "destruction" is suggestive of a rather immature vandalism (cf. Derrida's 
comments on his original choice of the word deconstruction discussed in the introduction). 
Heidegger's method certainly has the character of methodically taking apart a conventional 
or received structure of thinking and speaking, of philosophizing, and in this sense the 
literal sense of "deconstruction" undoubtedly applies. However this word also has its 
7 The idea here becomes clearer if one uses the terminology of deep structure, surface structure, and 
a break between the two. The increased clarity also brings an increased susceptibility to 
objection. The depth-surface model is used hypothetically here, and only approximates to what 
I 
want to attribute to Heidegger. The danger of this model is that it oversimplifies the relation cat 
thought and language in Heidegger - certainly one cannot speak of a "break" 
between them. On 
the other hand, one should speak of devices inserted in the writing (paratYpe') whi 
h are 
intended to enable a thinking to speak in the language without being infected or 
"bewitched' 
2 ýfý 
shortcomings: it is not only the use of the word over the past couple of de, : ads, but di<O 
the inherent suggestion of the word, that it denotes something purely negative and 
parasitic. The experience of deconstructivism as a movement has also added (perhaps 
unjustified) overtones of textual idealism. Thus bringing deconstruction into proximit\ 
with Heidegger's Freilegung and the English "disas-sembling" (with a hyphen) is intended 
to point out that (in Heidegger) the process of deconstruction reveals somethinLg (extrd- 
textual) which the conventional structures of thinking and speaking have concealed. 8 Thus 
the "deconstruction of foundations" is both a dismantling of the conventional notion of a 
foundation (removing the mantle constituted by the conventional foundations) and a 
revealing of the foundation which dissimulates and effaces itself in the assembling of 
metaphysics. Is there such a deconstruction in Heidegger? 
The partial demonstration of such an incomplete deconstruction consisted in tracing certain 
paratypes (deep-structures9, infrastructures, metalogical forms of thinking) which occur 
for the most part inexplicitly in Heidegger's use of foundational notions and structures. 
The terms Tiefenstruhxur (from Rombach), infrastructure (Gasches) and metalogical form of 
thought (Schäfer) all seem, independently, to get at the same thing, and to be applicable to 
Heidegger, even if not in the sense that the original users of these terms would have 
preferred. The Tiefenstruktur (if one calls it this for the moment) is a post-systematic 
(Wittgenstein) by the organisational properties peculiar to writing and speaking. The point about 
metaphysical readers remains the same. 
8 See also the more extensive comments at the beginning of the introduction and in section 3 of the 
introduction. 
9 The term (German: Tiefenstruktur) is taken from the discussion of H. Rombach in L. Dümpelmann 
& R. Hüntelmann, Sein und Struktur (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991). The 
work by Rombach of relevance is H. Rombach, Die Gegenwart der Philosophie (Freiburg: Alber 
Verlag, 1962,1988). In its use here it has a much narrower meaning than its more well-known 
use by Chomsky (see, e. g., N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1965), though it remains loaded with structuralist dogma. Chomsky's distinction 
between deep structure and surface structure can certainly be used to specify the relation of 
paratypes to Heidegger's text: the paratype gives rise to but is not immediately, visible in the text. 
Chomsky himself pointed out that he did not mean anything substantially different 
from 
Wittgenstein's distinction between deep grammar and surface grammar (Chomsky. op. cit.. 
p. 199: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 168). However, for reservations about 
the 
application of such a crude dichotomy to Heidegger, see the earlier footnote on the 
depth-surface 
model (in this conclusion). Rombach's idea of the deep structure as an iterating and non- 
systematic pattern narrows Chomsky's use. The paratype differs in that it reverses or 
disas- 
sembles the conventional structures of language. In forming the word I have taken the prefix 
"para-" in its senses of changing or guarding against. 
- 
pattern: relatively simple, but iterating itself at different levels and in the mos: Vari d 
contexts; any field of human activity (including the writing of philosophical texts) 
supposedly tends towards reproducing such forms, but they are not subject to any global 
pattern. The rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari is a simple transfer of foundationalism as a 
system to the foundational as a Tiefenstruktur. The Kehre is perhaps the paratvpe par 
excellence in Heidegger's thought, but there are other paratypes, which may not 
necessarily always have been intended to be drawn into the Kehre, some of which are 
developed and continued in Heidegger's thought, others of which are dropped. Thus 
semantic interpenetration, logico-syntactic disruption, the dialectic-metactic disintegration 
of the proposition, tripolar-tetrapolar uncertainty, wrap-into clustering, naetalepsis, 
paralipsis may all be metalogical forms which emerge from the breakdown of the 
conventional notion of ground, and which contribute to the refounding of foundations. 10 It 
is quite possible that some, perhaps much of this, was not intended by Heidegger, or at 
least, not conceived as such. Perhaps his distinctive method evolved more by avoidance of 
standard pitfalls, and only in retrospect did he appreciate the patterns into which his style 
had developed. Or perhaps even in retrospect he did not appreciate the patterns as such, 
but they might nevertheless be necessitated in the attempt to reappropriate and comprehend 
his thinking in a critical framework which does it justice, as a framework to hold one 
relatively free of domination and submersion into his style. The issue is, to the extent that 
it reads too much into Heidegger, is it nevertheless valuable? 
The final point I wish to make in this thesis concerns what the reader expects of it as an 
answer. At one point this dissertation came near to reenacting (perhaps presumptuously') 
with respect to Heidegger what Gasche does to Derrida in The Tain of the Mirror. That is, 
a systematisation of a number of devices or foundational infrastructures Which disas- 
semble a text or way of thought. A close study of methods of the early Heidegger does 
indeed reveal such disas-sembling yet foundational infrastructures. Nevertheless, with 
his 
positive evaluation of foundations and system, Gasche risks pitching deconstruct 
ivism 
back into a system. In response to this, Gasche has a small stock of anti-sYstematier 
e. g. minimality as opposed to totality, incompletion as opposed to completion, 
heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity. There is perhaps one metaphysical trait 
toi 
10 But note the earlier footnote in this conclusion on the questionability of listing paratypes. 
22 
which Gasche remains vulnerable: while the number of infrastructures may remain open 
and incomplete, the account has an aura of satisfying, perfecting completion. evverythin, _, 
fits too well - which raises a prima facie doubt as to its truth-value, The 
Derrida tradition is one of experimentation and restless readjustment - for which rcaý, ()n a 
Gasche-esyue approach, if it is textually faithful, must result in something which is 
ultimately unsatisfactory, where the relevant mis-fits. To return to the issue, what can the 
reader expect as a conclusion? There is, in Heidegger's early ontology, a multiplic tý- of 
incompletely assimilable and sometimes conflicting experimental tactics and patterns, some 
of which develop and merge (not necessarily improving in the process), other of which 
disappear, more or less non-systematically. This dissertation is foremost an exegesis of 
Heidegger, which both in its preparation and presentation sought to work from the 
"ground" up, from the text; it has avoided the procedure of setting up a hypothetical 
framework or proposition (thesis) in advance, which then dominates the presentation and 
the evidence adduced (however elegant such a procedure might be). The unity of the 
dissertation is thematic, not logical. The primary development of the thesis is not that of 
an argument, it is the putting together of a picture, the growth of an appreciation. So, 
finally, what is ground in the earlier writings of Heidegger? Without laying claim to an 
exhaustive analysis, and without supposing that a list of concluding propositions could 
"contain" an answer (they can only point back at some of the turns along the path of 
answering) one can say that ground is the Zeitigung of questioning, in the sense of a 
historically destructive appropriation of the aporetic structures of its own sembling (inter 
a/ia, transcendence, the hermeneutic circle, the issue of its own existence and origin), that 
ground is coalescent with a pre-temporal dimension, a dimension which is pre- 
propositionally metactic; that ground is open, not only as ecstatic temporality, as the 
future-orientated horizonal schema (Umwillen) of the schematism of time and being, but 
also on, e. g., the semantic level (cf. semantic interpenetration); that ground is kehrig in 
the sense of dialectical, as the reversing of its own sembling; that ground, as ah)'ssal. 
responds to a need, the highest need, the need of needlessness. 
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Appendix - Guide to German terms used in the text 
This guide includes only those terms used repeatedly in the text (i. e. it excludes (i) terms 
used only on one occasion, (ii) terms used in the quotations. Quotations are akwav, 
translated. Likewise, all German terms used in the text are translated at their first 
occurrence in each chapter. The list does not contain all the standard translations, since it 
is a guide to Heidegger's German, not to his English translations. 
Note: the reasons for the considerable use of German words in the text of the thesis are a' 
follows: (1) many of Heidegger's terms have received a number of standard translations 
into English (even the simplest - let alone the untranslatable); this situation has reached the 
point where misunderstanding can arise through the use of English terminology. 
particularly when comparing different works, where different sets of translations are used, 
the points of lexical contact between the texts can only be maintained by using the 
German; (2) unlike many previous German philosophers, Heidegger cannot he subjected to 
an intensive textual study in any language other than his own (one may cite word-plays, 
neologisms, philosophically pregnant alliterative and etymological associations). 
Abgrund ...................................... abyss 
(lit. down-ground) 
Anklang ....................................... intimation, ringing-in 
Angst .......................................... dread 
Auslegung 
.................................... interpretation 
aussprechen .................................. to express 
(lit. speak out) 
Bedingung 
.................................... condition 
Befindlichkeit 
................................ 
disposition, state-of-mind 
bestimmen 
.................................... to determine, 
define 
Boden 
......................................... floor, basis 
Dasein 
......................................... (normally untranslated) 
Daseinsanalytik 
.............................. analysis of 
Dasein 
Entdecktheit 
.................................. discoveredness 
entspringen ................................... to rise 
(as the source of a river) 
Entwurf 
....................................... projection 
Ereignis 
....................................... event (of appropriation) 
ermöglichen .................................. to make possible 
Ermöglichung 
................................ making possible 
Erschlossenheit 
.............................. 
disclosedness 
erwachsen .................................... to grow up 
Existenz 
....................................... existence 
Festgemachtes 
............................... something solidly secured 
V 
Frage .......................................... question 
fragen ......................................... to ask, inquire 
Fraglichkeit .................................. questionability 
Fragwürdigkeit .............................. question-worthiness 
Freiheit ........................................ freedom 
freilegend ..................................... free-laying 
Freilegung .................................... laying-free 
Fuge ........................................... 
fugue (see pt. B, ch. 2, section la) 
Fundament ................................... foundation 
fundamental .................................. fundamental 
fundieren ..................................... to found 
Fügung ........................................ (see pt. B, ch. 2, section 1a) 
Furcht ......................................... 
fear 
Gerede ........................................ gossip, idle chatter 
Geschehen .................................... happening, occurrence 
Geworfenheit ................................ thrown-ness 
gleichursprünglich .......................... equiprimordial, co-original 
Gleichursprünglichkeit ..................... equiprimordiality, co-originality 
Grund ......................................... ground, reason 
gründen ....................................... to ground 
gründlich ..................................... thoroughly 
(lit. ground-ly) 
Gründlichkeit 
................................ thoroughness 
(lit. ground-liners) 
Gründung 
..................................... grounding 
Horizont 
...................................... 
horizon 
In-der-Welt-sein 
............................. 
being-in-the-world 
In-sein 
......................................... 
being-in 
Kehre 
.......................................... turn, reversal 
kehrig 
......................................... versive, turning 
Kehrigkeit 
.................................... versiveness, turn-like-ness 
Lichtung 
...................................... clearing 
(lit. light-ing) 
liegen 
.......................................... to lie 
Mitteilung 
.................................... communication 
Möglichkeit 
.................................. possibility Öffnung 
....................................... opening 
Neugier 
....................................... curiosity 
Phänomen 
.................................... phenomenon 
Praesenz 
...................................... presence 
Rede 
........................................... speech, discourse 
Seiendes 
...................................... entity 
Sein, Sevn 
.................................... 
being 
Seinsfrage 
.................................... question of 
being 
Seinsgesch ichte 
.............................. 
history of being 
'I 
seinsgeschichtlich ........................... according to history of being 
Seinsverständnis ............................. understanding of being 
selbstverständlich ........................... of course 
Selbstverständlichkeit ...................... of-course-ness 
Sicht ........................................... sight 
Sinn ............................................ sense, meaning 
Sorge .......................................... care 
Sprache ....................................... language 
Sprung ........................................ leap 
Temporal ität ................................. temporality 
Tod ............................................ death 
Transzendenz ................................ transcendence 
Umwillen ..................................... for-the-sake-of 
Urgrund ....................................... most basic or original ground 
Urphänomen ................................. most basic or original phenomenon 
Ursprung ..................................... origin (lit. most original leap) 
ursprünglich .................................. original, primordial 
Verbergung .................................. concealing, concealment 
Verfallen ...................................... falling 
Verstehen ..................................... understanding 
Verwurzelung ................................ rootedness 
voraussetzen ................................. to presuppose 
Wahrheit ...................................... truth 
Wesen ......................................... essence 
Woraufhin 
.................................... whither-upon, towards-which 
Worausher 
.................................... 
from-out-of-which, whence 
Zeit 
............................................ time 
Zeit-Raum 
.................................... time-space 
zeitigen ........................................ (see pt. B, ch. 1, section lc) 
Zeitigung 
..................................... (see pt. B, ch. 1, section 1 c) 
Zeitlichkeit 
................................... temporality 
Zusammengehörigkeit 
...................... 
belonging-together-ness 
Zweideutigkeit 
............................... ambiguity 
\I! 
List of Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations are used for the works of Heidegger. For bibliographical 
details, see section 2 of the bibliography. 
AE ................ the so-called 
Aristoteles-Einleitung, entitled Phänomenologische 
Interpretationen zu Aristoteles 
BH ................ 
Brief über den Humanismus 
BP ................. 
Beiträge zur Philosophie 
GA (+ no. ) ..... 
Gesamtausgabe (complete edition), followed by volume number 
GP ................ Die 
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie 
KM ............... Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik 
MAL ............. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe 
der Logik 
PGZ .............. Prolegomena zur 
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs 
PIA ............... Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (i. e. the lectures of this name) 
SG ................ Der Satz vom Grund 
SZ 
................. Sein und Zeit 
US ................ Unterwegs zur Sprache 
VA 
................ Vorträge und Aufsätze 
VWG 
............. Vom Wesen des Grundes 
WD 
............... Was heißt Denken? 
WIM 
.............. Was ist Metaphysik? 
ZSD 
.............. Zur Sache des Denkens 
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